Market Efficiency (Evidence?)
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Transcript Market Efficiency (Evidence?)
Evidence Regarding Market
Efficiency From Studies
Background Information
Early 1970’s, Fama & MacBeth did a
famous study testing the CAPM.
They found weak evidence that
portfolios of stocks with higher betas
had higher returns, and found an
intercept slightly higher than zero.
(CAPM Assumes Alpha = 0)
Beta & Return of Portfolios
Return
Beta
Early Evidence
Early evidence basically supported the
weak and the semi-strong form EMH.
Early Weak Form EMH Tests
(+) Serial Correlation:
+ returns follow + returns for a given
stock or - returns follow - returns for a
given stock
Called “momentum” or “inertia”
Early Weak Form EMH Tests
(-) Serial Correlation:
+ returns follow - returns for a given
stock or - returns follow + returns for a
given stock.
Called “reversals”
Tie to a Random Walk
If we find (+) or (-) serial correlation, this
is evidence against the weak-form EMH
as it implies that past prices can be
used to predict future prices.
(Technical analysis)
Early Weak Form EMH Tests
In 1960s Fama showed that:
1. Stock Prices followed a random walk
2. No evidence of serial correlation. The price
of a stock is just as likely to rise after a
previous day’s increase as after a previous
day’s decline.
Early Semi-Strong Form EMH
Tests
Event studies in the 1960s & 1970s
looked at stock prices around the
release of new information to the public.
(Fundamental analysis)
Graph of a Typical Study
Keown and Pinkerton (1981): CARs for
target firms around takeover attempt.
See graph on p. 371 in text
Challenges to the EMH
1980s & 1990s:
Empirical evidence began to
accumulate that provided evidence first
against the semi-strong EMH and later
against the weak form EMH
Initially any evidence against EMH
called an anomaly.
More Recent Tests of the SemiStrong Form EMH
Are abnormal risk-adjusted returns
possible if you trade after information is
made public? (fundamental analysts)
General Equation for Abn. Returns:
Actual Rit – Predicted Ri,t
Abn. Returns:
Use Historic Data
Without a risk adjustment:
Actual Rit – Actual Rm,t
With a risk adjustment:
Actual Rit – [ai + Bi[Actual Rm,t]
Or,
Actual Rit – [Actual Rmatch,t]
Challenges to Testing
Difficult to measure risk-adjusted returns
a) Is beta the proper measure of risk?
b) CAPM is forward looking and you are
using historic data.
c) Is your matched firm the best match?
Quarterly Earnings Surprises
(Quarterly EPS Released –
Forecasted Quarterly EPS)
Measure the abnormal risk-adjusted return
after an earnings surprise.
Measure CAR: Actual Rit – Predicted Ri,t
(Used CAPM)
Quarterly Earnings Surprises
Rank from highest to lowest by magnitude of
earnings surprises and place stocks into
decile portfolios.
See if trading on earnings surprises results in
subsequent abnormal returns.
(Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are
the daily abnormal returns summed up over
time)
Evidence:
Quarterly Earnings Surprises
For positive earnings surprises:
The larger the earnings surprise the
higher the positive abnormal return.
The upward drift in the stock price
continues a couple of months after the
earning announcement!
Evidence:
Quarterly Earnings Surprises
For negative earnings surprises:
The larger the negative earnings
surprise the larger the loss as measured
by the abnormal return.
The downward drift in the stock price
continues a couple of months after the
earning announcement!
Interpretation: Mkts Efficient
Measurement Errors
Markets are efficient. The evidence of abn.
risk-adjusted returns is due to various
Measurement Errors when using the CAPM.
(1) Benchmark Error: Beta & SML wrong
(2) CAPM is a forward looking model & are
testing it with historic or ex-post data.
Interpretation:CAPM Not Valid
Markets are efficient. The evidence of
abnormal risk-adjusted returns (evidence
against market inefficiency) is inconclusive as
the CAPM may not be the proper risk
adjustment model.
[Joint or Dual Hypothesis Problem!]
If the CAPM is wrong, then abnormal riskadjusted returns using this model are wrong.
Interpretation: Mkts Not Efficient
Behavioral Finance: Psychological
and behavioral elements lead to
predictable biases.
Arbitrage:
Not always possible to execute
arbitrage trades.
Arbitrage is risky and therefore limited
1.
2.
Evidence of Abn Risk Adj.
Returns ….
After share repurchase announcements
(Ikenberry (1995))
After dividend initiations and omissions
(Michaely (1995))
After stock splits
(Ikenberry (1995))
After seasoned equity offerings & after IPOs
(Loughran and Ritter (1995))
Size Effect
Portfolios of small cap stocks earn
positive abnormal risk-adjusted returns
(+ alphas):
Size Effect
January Anomaly: Most of the abnormal
returns occur in January! (tax loss selling??)
Grossman/Stiglitz: Professionals move
prices to efficiency. Don’t buy at the small cap
end of the market much due to limits on
portfolio positions.
Problem With CAPM?
Possible sources of risk for small caps
Neglected by analysts and institutional
investors, so is less information, which
implies higher risk.
Less Liquidity: Higher trading costs as
bid-ask spreads are wider, and broker
commissions are larger.
Background Information
Back to Early 1970’s, Fama & MacBeth
test of CAPM.
Fama MacBeth CAPM Test Early
1970’s
Return
Beta
Relationship Between Beta and
Returns
Fama & French re-examined the earlier
tests of the CAPM forming size decile
portfolios.
Fama-French 1992
Beta & Return of Portfolios
Small cap stocks
Return
Large cap stocks
Beta
Fama-French Interpretation
See that small cap stocks have higher
betas than large cap stocks. Fama and
French concluded that size is driving the
relationship between beta and return
not beta!
Previous Slide (cont)
Also see that within the small cap
groupings, portfolios of stocks with
lower betas have higher returns! The
same is true within the large cap
groupings.
Interesting Fact
Fama, once a strong proponent of the
CAPM now claimed that beta was dead.
Beta was a rough proxy for size in his
earlier tests!!
The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns
Table 1 Panel A
Average Monthly Returns (in Percent)
All
Low-β
β-2
β-3
β-4
β-5
β-6
β-7
β-8
β-9
High-β
All
1.25
1.34
1.29
1.36
1.31
1.33
1.28
1.24
1.21
1.25
1.14
Small - ME
1.52
1.71
1.57
1.79
1.61
1.50
1.50
1.37
1.63
1.50
1.42
ME-2
1.29
1.25
1.42
1.36
1.39
1.65
1.61
1.37
1.31
1.34
1.11
ME-3
1.24
1.12
1.31
1.17
1.70
1.29
1.10
1.31
1.36
1.26
0.76
ME-4
1.25
1.27
1.13
1.54
1.06
1.34
1.06
1.41
1.17
1.35
0.98
ME-5
1.29
1.34
1.42
1.39
1.48
1.42
1.18
1.13
1.27
1.18
1.08
ME-6
1.17
1.08
1.53
1.27
1.15
1.20
1.21
1.18
1.04
1.07
1.02
ME-7
1.07
0.95
1.21
1.26
1.09
1.18
1.11
1.24
0.62
1.32
0.76
ME-8
1.10
1.09
1.05
1.37
1.20
1.27
0.98
1.18
1.02
1.01
0.94
ME-9
0.95
0.98
0.88
1.02
1.14
1.07
1.23
0.94
0.82
0.88
0.59
Large - ME
0.89
1.01
0.93
1.10
0.94
0.93
0.89
1.03
0.71
0.74
0.56
Interesting Result
Within each size group, the higher the
beta the lower the return.
The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns
Table 5
Book-to-Market Portfolios
All
Low
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
High
All
1.23
0.64
0.98
1.06
1.17
1.24
1.26
1.39
1.40
1.50
1.63
Small - ME
1.47
0.70
1.14
1.20
1.43
1.56
1.51
1.70
1.72
1.82
1.92
ME-2
1.22
0.43
1.05
0.96
1.19
1.33
1.19
1.58
1.28
1.43
1.79
ME-3
1.22
0.56
0.88
1.23
0.95
1.36
1.30
1.30
1.40
1.54
1.60
ME-4
1.19
0.39
0.72
1.06
1.36
1.13
1.21
1.34
1.59
1.51
1.47
ME-5
1.24
0.88
0.65
1.08
1.47
1.13
1.43
1.44
1.26
1.52
1.49
ME-6
1.15
0.70
0.98
1.14
1.23
0.94
1.27
1.19
1.19
1.24
1.50
ME-7
1.07
0.95
1.00
0.99
0.83
0.99
1.13
0.99
1.16
1.10
1.47
ME-8
1.08
0.66
1.13
0.91
0.95
0.99
1.01
1.15
1.05
1.29
1.55
ME-9
0.95
0.44
0.89
0.92
1.00
1.05
0.93
0.82
1.11
1.04
1.22
Large - ME
0.89
0.93
0.88
0.84
0.71
0.79
0.83
0.81
0.96
0.97
1.18
Value Puzzle
It is not evident why value stocks should
be riskier than growth stocks. Value
stocks have lower standard deviations
than growth stocks after controlling for
size.
Value Puzzle
Value Puzzle:
Value stocks have lower standard
deviations and higher returns!
Fama-French Findings
Beta does not explain returns.
Small cap stocks have higher returns.
Small cap stocks have higher betas, but
it is size not beta driving higher returns.
Low P/E or high Book-to-Market of
equity stocks have higher returns.
Explanations for Fama-French Results
Alternative Explanations for their results?
Market Semi-Strong Efficient:
Small cap stocks and low P/E (high B/M)
stocks generate higher returns because
they are riskier. However, this risk is not
captured by Beta!
Problem
Lack of a theoretical model to explain
why size and style (value vs growth) are
important risk factors. The CAPM had
an elegant, logical theory underlying it,
this has none!
Explanations for Fama-French Results
Market Semi-Strong Efficient:
Abnormal risk-adjusted returns for small cap stocks or
for stocks with low P/E (or high B/M) are due to various
measurement errors when using the CAPM.
(1) Benchmark Error: Beta & SML wrong
(2) CAPM is a forward looking model & we are
testing it with a historic or ex-post data.
Explanations for Fama-French Results
Market Semi-Strong Efficient. Abnormal riskadjusted returns (evidence against market
inefficiency) are inconclusive as the CAPM
may not be the proper risk adjustment model.
[Joint or Dual Hypothesis Problem!]
If the CAPM is wrong, then abnormal riskadjusted returns using this model are wrong.
Explanations for Fama-French Results
Market Not Semi-Strong Form Efficient:
Can make abnormal returns using public
information regarding market capitalization
and P/E or B/M ratio.
How can this persist?
Behavioral Finance
Decisions people make deviate from the
maxims of economic rationality in
predictable ways:
1. Attitudes towards Risk
2. Non Bayesian Expectation
Formation
3. Framing Effects of Decisions
Attitudes Toward Risk: Example
90% chance of $1 million; 10% chance of $0.
I offer to buy you out for $900,000. Will you
take my offer?
Attitudes Toward Risk: Example
90% chance to lose $1 million; 10%
chance of $0. I will take the bet if you
pay me $900,000. Will you take my
offer?
Behavioral Finance
Attitudes Towards Risk:
People look at gains and losses relative to
some reference point rather than the levels of
final wealth.
Display Loss Aversion! Outcome Typically
Doesn’t follow standard von NeumannMorgenstern rationality.
Behavioral Finance
Non-Bayesian Expectation Formation
Representativeness: Predict the future
taking a short history of data and determine
the model driving the data. (Too small a
weight on chance.)
Conservatism: Slow updating to new
information as have extrapolated a short
earnings history too far into the future.
Non-Bayesian Expectations
1st 2 winters here mild. Assumed they
were always like that.
Investors may extrapolate short
histories of rapid earnings growth too far
in the future and may overprice
“glamour” stocks.
Behavioral Finance
Framing Effects
How data is presented can affect the
decisions people make.
Framing Effects: Example
Investors will allocate more money to
stocks rather than bonds when they see
long-term cumulative wealth graphs
than they will if you only show them
volatile short-term stock returns.
Behavioral Finance Explanation
for Quarterly Earnings Surprise
In this case, would argue that initially
there is slow updating or “conservatism”
as a reaction to the news released by
the earnings surprise. [Short run underreaction]
Eventually keep seeing good news so
“representativeness” sets in [then get
over-reaction].
Mkt Not Efficient?
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney)
These professors offer a different
interpretation. Markets are inefficient.
People overreact with a lag. Overprice firms
with good recent returns (growth) and
underprice firms with poor recent returns
(value).
Long-Term Horizons:
Test of Weak-Form EMH
DeBondt and Thaler (1985):
Create Loser and Winner portfolios based on
past 36 months of CARs. Top decile are
Winners, bottom decile are Losers.
Examine CAR’s for next 36 months.
“Loser’s outperform “winners” Is an
overreaction followed by a correction.
Efficient Market Believers Say....
Evidence is due to market risk
premiums varying over time. Is not
overshooting & correction but instead a
rational response to changes in the
discount rate.
Short Horizons
(Tests of Weak Form EMH)
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) test to see if
there is serial correlation of weekly
stock returns for NYSE stocks.
Lo & MacKinlay
Stock Price
+ momentum
reversal
reversal
- momentum
1
2
Period
Lo & MacKinlay
If momentum is present, the variance of
returns should increase as the number
of periods used is increased.
If there is no momentum, gains or
losses will tend to reverse, keeping the
variance of returns from becoming
wider.
Evidence: Lo & MacKinlay
Lo and Mackinlay (1988) find serial
correlation of weekly stock returns for
NYSE stocks as the variance of returns
increases as the return interval is
lengthened. Implies there is inertia in
the short run.
Evidence: Lo & MacKinlay
The effect is the strongest in the small
cap stocks.
Not clear if abnormal returns are
possible by exploiting this information.
Intermediate Horizons:
Test of Weak-Form EMH
Study by Jegadeesh and Titman.
Intermediate Horizons
1.Measure stock rates of return over the past 6
months.
2.Rank the stocks from highest to lowest past 6
month return and then divide the sample into
deciles. “Losers” are the bottom decile and
“winners” are the top decile
Jegadeesh and Titman
3. For the next 36 months, every time one of the
winners or losers reports quarterly earnings,
record 3-day returns starting 2 days before
the earnings announcement and ending the
day of the announcement.
4.Observe the difference in 3-day returns
between the winners and losers reporting
earnings in each month.
Evidence: Jegadeesh and Titman
For the 1st 7 months, the market is
pleasantly surprised by the earnings
announcements of the winners and
disappointed by the earnings
announcements of the losers.
(momentum in the short run)
Evidence: Jegadeesh and Titman
From months 9 - 36, the market is pleasantly
surprised by the earnings announcements of
the losers and disappointed by the earnings
announcements of the winners.
(Reversals in the intermediate term)
If the stock market is efficient, it should be
able to anticipate the good or bad reports in
advance.
Evidence: Jegadeesh and Titman
Abnormal profit opportunities.
Reversion to the mean.
The market overreacts with a lag.
Consistent with “Representativeness
and Conservatism.”
Short Run: Inertia
Intermediate Run: Reversals
Technical Analysts
Technical analysts claim to exploit these
trends or patterns.
Mutual Fund Performance
If the stock market is not weak or semistrong form efficient, then professional
portfolio managers should be able to
achieve abnormal risk-adjusted returns!
Evidence: Mutual Funds
Malkiel (1995) examined the alphas of
mutual funds.
Recall Regression Model
(Ri,t – RFRt) = i + i(Rm,t - RFRt) + ei,t
If market is efficient what should we find
regarding the multiple-period alpha?
Evidence: Mutual Funds
WSJ Article, “Stock Funds Just Don’t
Measure Up”. Oct. 5, 1999
After adjusting for size and survivorship
bias, funds trailed the S&P 500 by 1.4%
per year which is on average what they
charge for annual expenses.
Evidence: Mutual Funds
Other studies: 1970’s – 1990’s: After
expenses & commissions, only 1/3 beat the
market on a risk-adjusted basis.
STRONG FORM EMH TESTS
Are abnormal risk-adjusted returns
possible if you trade using private
information?
Evidence on Insiders
Corporate insiders are required to report
their transactions to the SEC.
They are not supposed to trade when in
the possession of “material” information.
Even with regulation, they achieve
positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns.
Market Crash of Oct. 1987
23% Drop in One Day??
No large release of news
Efficient Market explanation: Due to chance.
Are outliers in the distribution. Just an outlier
observation in a random process.
Panic & Crowd Psychology (behavioral
finance explanation)
Internet Bubble
Some companies saw their stock price
go up just by adding dotcom to their
names
When 3-Com spun off Palm Pilot, but
kept 95% of the shares, The 95% of
Palm owned by 3-Com were worth more
than the market cap of 3-Com. Implies
negative value for the rest of 3-Com!
Internet Bubble
It is obvious now that the 1998-March
2000 tech run-up was a bubble, but was
this market inefficiency, or merely poor
valuations?
How do you know a bubble when you
are in it?
Should you try to short a bubble if you
don’t know when it will burst?
Limits of Arbitrage
Just because you know something is
overvalued or undervalued, doesn’t
necessarily mean you can make money
off it
Classic Example: We know that
someday the sun will explode, but you
can’t short the Earth
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) Paper
Most arbitrage is not carried out by
small investors, but by large money
managers.
They usually manage OPM (other
people’s money)
Most arbitrage in the real world is
actually “risk arbitrage” and requires
capital
If money managers observe a price
discrepancy and commit capital to an
arbitrage position based on
convergence, the initial movement may
be away from convergence, but that
merely means there is a greater
opportunity for profit, and more capital
should be committed.
But that is exactly when investors are
most likely to pull out.
Investors invest based on PBA
(Performance Based Arbitrage) rather
than expected returns
This lack of capital prevents arbitrage
from taking place
This is often given as an explanation for
the collapse of LTCM (Long-Term
Capital Management).
Amazingly, the Shleifer and Vishny
paper came out about a year prior to the
LTCM collapse