Transcript Slide 1

Pre-Incident Planning
A key Element in Successful
Management of Industrial Emergencies
Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE, MBA
Athena HESS
Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd
Singapore
Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail
"He who fails to plan is planning to
fail“
- Winston Churchill
"If you fail to prepare then you are
preparing to fail“
- Benjamin Franklin
©Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Pre-Incident Planning (PIP) - Definition
The process of documenting and maintaining
critical
information
and
predetermined
actions to precipitate concerted mitigation
efforts by response parties to successfully
contain incidents and minimize consequential
losses.
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Outbreak escalates to Conflagration
A recurrence of this
incident is playing out
NOW !
Preventable
Consequence!
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Largest Refinery of Global Oil Major
September 2011
Preventable
Consequence!
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Buncefield UK 2005
Preventable
Consequence!
6
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Crude Pipeline Explosion - Dalian(2010)
Preventable
Consequence!
7
Firework Plant Explosion - Yichun City (2010)
Preventable
Consequence!
8
Largest Refinery of Global Oil Major
COSMO Petrochem. Explosion & Fire - Ichihara, Chiba , March 11, 2011
 Injures : serious 1, slight 5
 Time table of accident
- March 11, 14:46 earthquake broke out
- 15:35 : inflammable gas leaked near the LPG tank
- 15:47 : the tank fire and explosion, all units were
shut down
- 16:04 : start extinguishing
- March 21, 10:10 : extinguished fire(10 days)
Preventable
Consequence!
9
Largest Refinery ofTa
Global Oil Major
Polystyrene polymerization unit explosion
Hyundai EP Petrochem. Co. Ulsan, KOREA, August 17, 2011




Fatalities : 3, Injures : 2
Runaway reaction resulted from the cooling
water failure at polymerization reactor
Rupture disc burst and occurred VCE
$50 million property or product damage
Preventable
Consequence!
10
Polyethylene Textile Mfg - August 2011
Ta
Gumi, Korea
Preventable
Consequence!
11
Video – Fire at an Oil Refinery
URL: http://www.youtube.com/user/bozkuhi#p/a/u/2/uKQinSGm6cI
OR
Hyperlink attached video clip
©Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
If these incidents are indeed Preventable:
Consider why these incidents are recurring with
disturbing regularity!
1. Which HES Management System element is
responsible for these lapses?
Leadership and Accountability
2. How?
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Leadership failure due to:
1. Emergency preparedness program not robust:
• Lack of sustained will and commitment
2. Limited resource allocation:
• Priority for operational demands.
3. Sporadic nature of incidents:
• Short organizational memory.
4. Failure to recognize incident potentials & consequences
• Ineffectual risk assessment & management.
5. Underestimation of IM complexities
• Lack of management insight
6. Paucity of easy-to-use tools
• Failure to challenge & motivate creativity
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
The Necessity of Pre-Incident Planning
• An industrial emergency invariably requires the coordinated
effort of multi-disciplinary teams such as Operations,
Engineering, Emergency Responders and Management.
• Whist each team may be carrying out different tasks; their
collective effort requires cohesion and must conform to a
single overall strategy.
• Furthermore, resources available within an organization to
handle an emergency are limited and have to be applied in
unison.
• Pre-Incident Plans (PIP) are a vital tool to harness the finite
resources of an organization to mount concerted and
coordinated action to contain an industrial emergency.
©Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Emergency Preparedness Framework
Start
Risk Indentification
& Analysis
BowTie/HAZOP
HAZOP Reports
Previous Incidents
ER Strategy & Tactics
Mitigation /Solution
Emergency Preparedness
Pre-Incident Plans (PIP)
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Fire Brigade SOP
Incident Command System
(ICS)
Implementation &
Training
End
Implementation of
Plans & Procedures
Emergency Responder
Skills
Responder Training
'Live' Fire Training
Brigade SOP Training
Professional FF Training
Dry & Wet Drills
Combined Exercises
Responder Training
Incident Management &
Leadership Skills
Incident Management
Training
Fire Ground Command
- Fire & Rescue
- HAZMAT
Incident Management
Training
Operations Response
Capability
Operational Emergency
Training
Personal Safety & Evacuation
Safe Plant Shutdown
Fire Protection System
Combined Exercises
Operational Emergency
Training
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Pre-Incident Plan (PIP) Development Process
1. Identify and review of potential scenarios
 BowTie® / HAZOP reports
 Past incidents and trends
 Site inspection and assessment of
• Plant layout and spacing
• Verification of implementation of BowTie/HAZOP recommendations
• Exposure/escalation potentials
• Emergency access adequacy
• Fire Protection system adequacy and configuration
2. Rationalize & prioritize identified scenarios
3. Develop of mitigation strategy and tactics for IAPs
4. Determine standard template for PIPs
5. Deploy resources & responsibilities for PIP development
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Essential Elements of PIP
1. Target Equipment / Facility
2. Potential Scenarios
3. Alternative Mitigation Means
4. Thermal Radiation & Vapour Plume Simulations
5. Fixed Fire & Other Protection Systems
6. Extinguishing Media Requirements/Logistics
7. Incident Action Plans
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Generic Scenarios – Example
Scenario
Category
Scenario Description
1
Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
2
Flammable Liquid Pool Fire - Enclosed/Furnace
3
Potential Furnace Explosion - Flammable Liquid Pool Fire (Enclosed)
4
Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash
Fire
5
Confined Explosion (Deflagration/Detonation) in Vessel/Pipeline
6
Sewer Fire
7
Tank Fire - Fixed Roof
8
Flammable Liquid Pool Fire - Toxic Fuel (TCE)
9
Toxic Release/Hazmat (H2S, HCL, Ammonia, Caustic, TCE, Process
Catalyst)
10
Collapse of Process Structure/Equipment/Column - Major Incident
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1
Refinery 1: List of Specific Scenarios Pre-Incident Plans
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CDU1 Crude Charge Pumps G101/G101A/G101B Mechanical Seal Failure: 1)
Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour
Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
CDU1 Heat Exchanger E-1001B Shell Rupture: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
CDU2 Heat Exchanger E-101B/E-1014/E-1016/E-1020/E-1019 Shell/Line Rupture: 1)
Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour
Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
CDU3 Furnace (#___) Tube Rupture: Enclosed (Furnace) Liquid Pool Fire
CDU5 Overhead Pump G-111 Mechanical Seal Failure: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet /
Pool Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash
Fire
CDU6 (Pump Type & G#) Mechanical Seal Failure: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool
Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
CDU6 Heat Exchanger E-119 Shell Rupture: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire 2)
Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
HTU1 Reaction Charge Heater F101 Explosion - Enclosed Flammable Liquid Pool
Fire
HTU1 Column C-401 Flammable (Gas) Release: Unconfined Vapour Cloud
Explosion/Flash Fire
HTU1 Surge Drum C101 Rupture: Flammable Liquid Pool Fire
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1 (Cont…2)
Refinery 1: List of Specific Scenarios Pre-Incident Plans
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HTU1 Reaction Charge Heater F101 Explosion - Enclosed Flammable Liquid Pool
Fire
HTU1 Heat Exchanger E-102 Shell/Line Rupture: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool
Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
HTU1 Stripper Reboiler Pumps G-102/A Mechanical Seal Failure: 1) Flammable
Liquid Jet / Pool Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud
Explosion/Flash Fire
Plat1 TCE Storage Drum D-102: Flammable Liquid Pool Fire - Toxic
16
Pumps G-401/A/B Mechanical Seal Failure: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire 2)
Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
Plat 2 Run Down Tank #? - Fixed Roof Tank / Liquid Pool Fire
17
Plat2 After cooler E115 Shell Rupture: Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
18
Asphalt Unit Vacuum Heater F301 Enclosed Flammable Liquid Pool Fire
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Asphalt Unit HVGO pumps G303/G303AMechanical Seal Failure: Flammable
Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
LPG1 Feed Drum C201/De-Ethaniser C202/C203A De-Ethaniser Overhead
Receiver: 1) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash
Fire 2) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Specific Scenarios – Refinery Unit 1 (Cont…3)
Refinery 1: List of Specific Scenarios Pre-Incident Plans
21
LPG1 Heat Exchanger E-202 Shell/Line Rupture: 1) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool
Fire 2) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
LSR/LPG Naphtha Sand Filter C211/ LSR Sand Filter C214 drain valve Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
LPG1 Feed Drum C201/De-ethaniser C202/C203A De-ethaniser Overhead
23 Receiver : 1) Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud
Explosion/Flash Fire 2) Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
24 LPG Merox: Heat exchanger E201Rupture: Flammable Liquid Jet / Pool Fire
LSR/LPG Naphtha Sand Filter C211/ LSR Sand Filter C214 drain valve 25
Flammable Gas Release/Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Flash Fire
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26 LPG/LSR Merox: LPG Tank D201 Vent - Toxic Release/Hazmat - H2S
LPG/LSR Merox - Tank D201 Vent - Confined Explosion
(Deflagration/Detonation) in Vessel/Pipeline
LPG/LSR Merox Ammonia Storage Tank D1001 - Toxic Release/Hazmat 28
Ammonia
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29 LPG/LSR Merox Tank D-201 - Toxic Release/Hazmat - H2S
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Pre-Incident Plan
Specimen
(Refining)
©Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Cover Page
ABC Refining Company Limited
Pre Incident Plan
Crude FeedPump
Mechanical Seal Failure
Applicable to:
Pump # 1101
Pump # 1102
Pump # 1103
Pump # 1104
Pump # 1105
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 1: Target Equipment / Facility
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•
•
Equipment, Facility
Technical data
Environmental Data
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 2: Potential Scenario
•
•
•
Potential Scenario & Challenges
Special Hazards & Precautions
Alternative Mitigation Means
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 3: Alternative Mitigation Means
•
•
Additional Isolation Means
Alternative Access
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 4: Thermal Radiation Simulation
- 37.5 kW/m2
- 12.5 kW/m2
- 4.0 kW/m2
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 5: Vapour Plume Simulation
•
•
•
Concentration
Cloud Height
Distance Downwind
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 6: Fixed Fire Protection System
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Part 7: Extinguishing Media Demand
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 8: Initial Standard Response Deployment
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 9A: IAP – Immediate Ignition (Liquid)
Incident Action Plan
A. Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire (Immediate ignition)
1. Raise alarm
2. Stop pump involved (G101/ G101-A/ G101-B)
2. Evacuate non-essential personnel from Unit and conduct headcount
3. Isolate crude feed line (by shutting valve at battery limit – Road #)
4. Stop crude pump at source (CTT)
5. Cool adjacent exposures
6. Confirm Fire Pump(s) in operation and line pressure
7. Deploy Fire Tenders (predetermined locations, refer FB-SOP #)
8. Initiate Foam Attack
9. Shut water monitors (FWM)
10. Establish foam concentrate replenishment
11. Standby Foam hand-lines for mopping up operation
12. Confirm extinguishment, maintain vigilance against re-ignition.
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 9B: IAP – Delayed Ignition (Vapour)
B. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE); Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire
1. Raise alarm
2. Evacuate personnel from Unit and conduct headcount
3. Stop pump (G101)
4. Commence Shut-down of unit and eliminate all sources of ignition
5. Isolate crude feed line (by shutting valve at battery limit – Road #)
6. Stop crude pump at source (CTT)
7. Activate Fixed Water Monitors
8. Monitor wind direction
9. Initiate gas monitoring to establish hot-zone boundary
10. Keep personnel outside the ‘hot zone’
11. Confirm Fire Pump(s) in operation and line pressure
12. Direct Fire Tenders to deploy in safe areas (refer FB-SOP #)
13. Deploy Fire Tenders per FB-SOP #( )
14. Commence Brigade operation to situation (Vapour Dispersal or Foaming) per SOP
In the event vapour cloud ignites: Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UCVE) will
occur with the characteristic “fire ball” resulting from the volumetric expansion
combusting vapours, followed by Liquid Pressure & Pool
Fire
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Pre-Incident Plan
Specimen
(Gas Plant)
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
ABC Gas Company Limited
Pre Incident Plan
Product Bullet Drain Valve Seizure in
Open Position
Applicable to:
LPG Bullet # 9
LPG Bullet # 10
LPG Bullet # 11
LPG Bullet # 12
LPG Bullet # 13
LPG Bullet # 14
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 1: Target Equipment / Facility (LPG)
Material
Phy sical State
O peration
Condition
Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) - 80% Butane, 20% Propane
Atmospheric condition
Pressurised Liquid
Prevailing Wind direction
5
Pressure(kg/cm2)
TBC
50 (Summer), 18 (Winter)
Temperature(℃)
Prevailing Wind speed(m/s)
Flow Rate(kg/s)
TBC
TBC
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 2: Potential Scenario
Potential Incident: Siezed Drain Valve (Uncontrolled flow of LPG)
1. Liquid Pressure /Jet Fire
Crude Feed
2. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Ex plosion
1
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Part 2B: Special Hazards & Precautions
1. In the event vapour cloud ignites, an Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
(UVCE) will occur with the characteristic “fire ball” resulting from the volumetric
expansion of combusting vapours.
2. If an explosive situation is credible, priority shall be to evacuate all nonemergency personnel to the designated evacuation assembly area(s).
3. Emergency Response Team members should be moved to a safe area upwind
of the incident.
4. In the event of thermal radiation from UVCE affecting the neighbouring bullets,
raised internal pressure may cause PSVs to release LPG vapour jets which may
get ignited. Extinguishment of the resultant jet fires could be achieved by the
Cooling of the bullets. Fixed water spray systems, supplemented by water
monitors.
5. Unfreezing of the seized valves may be achieved by applying water streams on
the affected valve(s).
6. Gas fires should not be extinguished other than by isolating the source, unless
isolation can be achieved immediately upon extinguishment.
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
IAP – Liquid Jet Fire (Immediate ignition)
A. Liquid Pressure / Jet Fire (Immediate ignition)
1. Raise alarm (Sounding of Plant siren; Civil Defence notification)
2. Initiate Total Plant Shutdown by activating ESD
3. Stop all vehicular movement within Plant
4. Evacuate non-emergency personnel to designated assembly area.
5. Activate of Water Spray System of involved bullet
6. Activate of Water Spray System of adjacent bullet
7. Deploy portable 'water-curtain' monitor between drain line discharge & root-valve
a. Provide water spray cover from handline for deployment
8. Apply water stream from handline on root-valve to 'unfreeze' valve seizure
9. Close root-valve to starve jet fire issuing from drain valve
Note. In the unlikely event that the root-valve cannot be fully closed, attempt
should be made to safely close the tail end drain valve.
10. Maintain cooling until normal operating conditions are attained.
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
IAP – Vapour Cloud (Delayed Ignition)
B. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Release threatening Explosion (UVCE) followed
by Liquid Pressure / Jet Fire (Delayed ignition after release)
1. Raise alarm (Sounding of Plant siren; Civil Defence notification)
2. Initiate Total Plant Shutdown by activating ESD
3. Evacuate non-emergency personnel from Plant
4. Eliminate all sources of ignition (including vehicular traffic)
7. Operate Fixed Water Monitor (where available):
a. Dissipate vapour cloud
b. Divert vapors away from bullet
8. Supplement monitor operation with wheeled monitors
8. Monitor wind direction
9. Initiate gas monitoring to establish hot-zone boundary
10. Keep personnel outside the ‘hot zone’
11. Apply water stream from handline on root-valve to 'unfreeze' valve seizure
12. Close root-valve to starve jet fire issuing from drain valve
Note. In the unlikely event that the root-valve cannot be fully closed:
Attempt should be made to safely close the tail end drain valve.
13. Maintain cooling until normal operating conditions are attained.
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UCVE) will occur with the characteristic
“fire ball” resulting from the volumetric expansion combusting vapours,
followed by Liquid Pressure & Pool Fire
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Leveraging BowTieXP® Software
A Current Initiative in the Netherlands
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Leveraging BowTieXP Software
Advanced Barrier Management
Plan – Do – Check – Act
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Leveraging BowTieXP® Software
Athena HESS lending its Concept & Experience.
© 2011 Athena HESS Consultants Pte Ltd, Singapore
Possible Message to Management:
PIP = Profit Insurance Plan
[email protected]
Thank you!