Transcript Possible Lessons on the sourcing, framing and delivery of

possible lessons on the sourcing, framing and
delivery of scientific and technical advice
the OPCW experience
[email protected]
“on tap but
not on top”
delivering advice on S&T
the multilateral context
Legitimisation
Politicisation
Scientisation
Mistrust
Polarisation
A permanent BWC review structure
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Will be loosely structured or formal?
How will membership be decided?
What will its mandate be? What scope will it have (specific or wide)?
Who will set/guard the agenda?
Who will protect its independence? Will it be independent?
How will it maintain its legitimacy/authority?
Will there be any oversight? Who will it report to?
Should it operate by consensus?
What is scientific consensus? Is it compatible with political consensus?
Who is an expert?
How regular will reviews be? How to avoid S&T fatigue….?
Avoiding political capture?
 $$$$$$$$$
Scientific Advisory Board
Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
 25 independent individuals
 Appointed on the basis of their expertise but…
 Frequency of meetings dependent on funding
 OCPW budget provides for one meeting per year
 Operates through SAB and Temporary Working
Groups
 Mandate of the CWC
 Institutional support
(CSP, EC, TS)
 Technical Secretariat
 500 staff
Scientific Advisory Board
categories of advice on S&T
 Developments in science and technology relevant to
the CWC
 Amendments to the schedules of chemicals and other
technical amendments?
 Technical interpretations of the Convention
 Assess the merits of present or new
technologies/equipment for use by the OPCW
 Coordinate the TWGs
CWC Article VIII, paragraph 21(h)
“…direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific
Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of
his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of
science and technology relevant to this Convention, to
the Conference, the Executive Council or States
Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be
composed of independent experts appointed in
accordance with terms of reference adopted by the
Conference”
Article VIII, paragraph 4
“The Director General shall, in consultation with States
Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory
Board…”
Terms of reference, p. 2
“when directed by the Conference acting in accordance
with paragraph 22 of Article VIII, provide advice and
make recommendations taking into account any
relevant scientific and technological developments for
the purpose of assisting the Conference in its review
of the operation of the Convention”
Director-General
Technical
Secretariat
Executive Council
SAB
States Parties
Conference
of the States
Parties
Associations Civil society
Industry
getting the right people involved
engaging the life sciences
 What is relevant expertise?
 Weapons? Regulatory science? Public health?
biodefence? Pure science? Social scientists? A mix?
 Limitations of a permanent membership
 Imbalances of info on Conventions
 Peripheral expertise…
 Semantics: “of concern”, “threats”…or… “of relevance
to”, “potential consequences for”..
 One off vs long-term interest (generational?)
straddling divides
science and politics
 Routes onto the agenda
 Erosion in the credibility of advisory committees takes
place when their recommendations become
associated with political positions
 Political expediency, the long grass
straddling divides
dissent versus consensus
 Audience(s)
 (linked to purpose…are we trying to educate the BWC
policymakers? Scientists? Both?)
 Scientific versus political consensus
 Reporting dissent (write it out or acknowledge it?) and
producing pluralistic and conditional advice (not
popular)
 Who shouts the loudest / unhappiness with process?
straddling divides
talking science to policy
 Delivery of reports to DG
 Note from the DG
 Opportunities….? Policy translations (BWC?)
 Executive Council ==>CSP / Review
Conferences
 Managing expectations (the ivory tower)
setting boundaries
by framing questions to the Board
“requested the SAB to study all relevant aspects of
the applicable concentration limits for mixtures of
chemicals containing Schedule 2A and 2A*
chemicals”
(Report of the Fourth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board,
2001)
policy/political debate (weapons significant quantities of
PFIB..)
(Report of the Second Session of the Scientific
Advisory Board, 1998)
“address, solely from a scientific and technical
aspect, the qualitative and quantitative implications
of this issue in relation to their impact on
declarations and inspections and, without making
any recommendations or in any way prejudging the
nature of any future decision on the issue, to report
its findings to the Director-General.”
setting boundaries
by maintaining independence of science
 Independence of experts
 Differing relationships with delegation
 Mistrust
 Independence of the agenda
 Avoiding political capture (from any regional group)
 ‘government expert groups’ and government
oversight (cf. second CWC RevCon)?
advisory boards are tasked with political issues presented
as technical problems
states appropriate technical arguments to legitimise policy
states claim that issues have been ‘fudged’
advisory structures are asked to make technically complex
decisions about threats and risk
divisions of labour
Temporary Working Groups
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Meet independently
Chaired by a member of the SAB
Enable the Board to tap into pools of expertise
Reports usually technical and forwarded to SAB for
‘policy translation’
An intro to the CWC
Popular
Ideal for focused, technical discussions
Possibility for states to sponsor themes
divisions of labour
intersessional work
Science advice is not diplomacy
(at least not entirely…)
Preparation for meetings
Background papers and documents
Avoiding repetition
SAB not immune to memory loss
“political decisions are seldom purely scientific. They
involve ethics, economics and social policies as well.
And in domains beyond their special expertise,
scientists speak just as citizens.”
- Lord Rees, May 2010 -
…some lessons
 Set a clear mandate & reporting structure
 Insist on independence (private/state) from members
 A purely scientific approach to its tasks, incl. responsibility for framing
 Advisory structures must have a politically neutral ‘protector’ (cf. DG/TS)
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Enable the flexibility to accommodate very different types of expertise
Communicating with different audiences
Accept the limitations of science
Ensure the commitment and motivation of members
Develop a clear intersessional plan of work
Structure meetings to maximise the use of time and money
Establish a clear division of labour esp. if there are various mandates
Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology
Risk and Response Assessment
 Assessment of the biosecurity
implications of advances in
biotechnology
 ‘Horizon scanning’ for developments in
the technology fields of synthetic biology
and nanobiotechnology that may place
dangerous capabilities at the disposal of
groups or individuals that want to cause
harm to society
 Final report as a result of two expert
workshops held in 2010
For more information or a copy of the final report, please contact Sergio
Bonin, UNICRI Project Officer, [email protected]