Transcript Type title here - coscap-SEA

Fifth Meeting of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation
Safety Team (SEARAST)
COSCAP-SEA
29, 30 August 2005
Bangkok, Thailand
Tab 1 : ANNEX 1
Meeting Agendas
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Monday, 29 August 2005
3
0815 – 0900
Registration
0900 – 0910
Opening remarks
0910 – 0920
Self-introduction of participants
0920 – 0930
Adoption of the agenda
0930 – 1000
Coffee Break
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Monday, 29 August 2005 (continued)
1000 – 1030
Presentation: Review of COSCAP-SEA and
SEARAST
• Capt. Ronald Allendorfer
Project Coordinator, COSCAP-SEA
1030 – 1130
Presentation: Line Oriented Safety Audits
(LOSA)
• Capt. Missman Leham
Malaysian Airlines (MH)
4
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Monday, 29 August 2005 (continued)
1130 - 1230
Discussion:
LOSA Advisory Circular
University of Texas
Human Factors Research Project
1230 - 1330
Lunch
1330 - 1415
Presentation: Aircraft Leasing – the ICAO Perspective
Michel Beland, Regional Officer
Flight Safety, ICAO Paris
5
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Monday, 29 August 2005 (continued)
1415 -1500
Review and Discussion (TAB 1):
Sixth COSCAP-SEA Steering Committee Meeting
Extraordinary Steering Committee Meeting
1500 -1530
Coffee Break
1530 -1700
Review and Discussion (TAB 1):
Fourth SEARAST Meeting
6
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Tuesday, 30 August 2005
7
0900 -1030
Review – CAST/JSSI Safety Interventions
1030 -1100
Coffee Break
1100 -1230
Review – CAST/JSSI Safety Interventions (continued)
1230 -1330
Lunch
5th Meeting of the Flight Operations Component of the
Southeast Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team (SEARAST)
AGENDA
Tuesday, 30 August 2005 (continued)
1330 -1500
Regional Flight Safety Issues:
ICAO pilot training syllabus
Language testing under Annex 1
8
1500 -1530
Coffee Break
1530 -1700
Conclusions/Close of the Meeting
Combined RAST Meeting
(NARAST and SEARAST)
AGENDA
Wednesday, 31 August 2005
0900 – 0915
Opening remarks
• Mr. Lalit B. Shah, Regional Director
ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Bangkok
0915 – 1015
Presentation : Safety Management Systems,
ICAO Requirements
Safety Management System Basic Concepts
ICAO Harmonization of Safety Provisions
ICAO Safety Management Manual
9
Combined RAST Meeting
(NARAST and SEARAST)
AGENDA
Wednesday, 31 August 2005 (continued)
10
1015 - 1045
Coffee Break
1045 - 1115
Panel Discussion – Safety Management Systems
1115 - 1200
Association of Asia Pacific Airlines – Safety Initiatives
1200 - 1300
Lunch
Combined RAST Meeting
(NARAST and SEARAST)
AGENDA
Wednesday, 31 August 2005 (continued)
1300 – 1430
Presentation : RNP/RNAV
1430 – 1500
Coffee Break
1500 – 1615
Presentation : Runway Incursion
Runway Incursion Issues
ICAO Runway Safety Toolkit
1615 – 1630
11
Closing Remarks
12
Tab 1 : ANNEX 3
Conclusions of the
6th Steering Committee Meeting
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS
 Key elements of COSCAP-SEA
14

SEARAST (25%)

Development of Air Laws and Regulations for Member States which
lack one or both (20%)

Primary Inspection and Surveillance Assistance (15%)

Professional Development of Inspectors (Including Regional
Seminars/Workshops (15%)

Harmonization of Policies and Procedures (10%)

Supplemental Inspection and Surveillance Assistance (8%)

Coordination of Technical Assistance (5%)

Evaluations/Audits (2%)
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 1: PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT
• The Steering Committee approved the Tentative Work Plan
for calendar year 2005. CTA will coordinate with members.
• Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China will host the
7th Steering Committee Meeting in Hong Kong, China, in the
first quarter of 2006.
15
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 2: SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL
AVIATION SAFETY TEAM (SEARAST)
• The Steering Committee took note of the outputs from the 4th
SEARAST Meeting and resolved to continue to assign a high
priority to SEARAST activities by the COSCAP-SEA
Programme.
• The Steering Committee agreed to continue to monitor the
implementation of safety-related interventions which are
undertaken by SEARAST and ensure that the SEARAST
Team Members from their organizations are given adequate
top-level support to carry out national SEARAST-related
activities.
16
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 2: SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL
AVIATION SAFETY TEAM (SEARAST)
• Continuity in the SEARAST process was recognized by
ensuring, to the maximum extent possible, that personnel
serving as Team Members remain in those positions over the
long term.
• The Steering Committee agreed to further explore the
possibility of developing National Aviation Safety Teams to
coordinate with SEARAST and to review/discuss items
unique to the State, as well as other national safety-related
matters.
17
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 3: REVISED ICAO LANGUAGE
REQUIREMENTS
• The Steering Committee agrees that its regular meetings be
utilized as a forum for the exchange of information that can
assist States’ efforts with the implementation of this SARP.
18
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 3: REVISED ICAO LANGUAGE
REQUIREMENTS
• Based on the developments to date, the Steering Committee
agreed that COSCAP-SEA should develop a more detailed
cooperative mechanism to assist Member States with the
implementation of this SARP. In this respect, the Steering
Committee noted with gratitude the proposal of CAD Hong
Kong, China, to offer a seminar on the subject in the latter part
of 2006, possibly to be offered to all COSCAP programmes in
the Region. The Steering Committee also noted the
availability of language courses under the EU Civil Aviation
Project in the Region.
19
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 4: BUDGET AND ANNUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS
20
•
The Steering Committee urges its members who have not yet made their
full contributions for five years to do so as soon as possible so that the
Programme can continue to provide assistance to States/Administrative
Regions in the field of safety oversight.
•
The Steering Committee encourages its Associate Members and Industry
Partners to continue their contributions to the COSCAP-SEA Programme,
since these are vital to the success of this Programme.
•
Based upon the very limited resources available to the Programme, the
Steering Committee reiterated that Member States/Administrative
Regions should support the Airworthiness component of the COSCAPSEA Programme by seconding national inspectors for short-term
assignments as necessary.
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 4: BUDGET AND ANNUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS
21
•
The Steering Committee agreed that, funds permitting, an International
Airworthiness Expert should be employed for short periods of time when
required by project activities/outputs.
•
The Steering Committee requests the Programme to enhance reporting of
its achievements and its plans, e.g., through a cost/benefit analysis,
benchmarking, re-circulation of EC COSCAP evaluation report, USOAP
and accident data comparisons, etc. To this end, the Steering Committee
encourages the members to provide the Programme at each Meeting with
an update on the Safety Enhancements implemented.
•
The Steering Committee approved the Programme budget through March
2006.
6th Steering Committee Conclusions
DP 5: TWO-YEAR PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Aug. 2005–July 2007)
• The Steering Committee decided to defer the proposal for an
extension and expansion of the Programme, including addressing
Immediate Objective 3, to the next meeting.
22
Tab 1: ANNEX 3
Summary of Discussions
Extraordinary Steering
Committee Meeting
Extension of COSCAP-SEA Programme
24
•
Licensing Expert to review compliance with new Annex 1
provisions provided funding from partners can be sourced
•
Key activities of Objective 3 (operator inspections)
postponed from SCM 2
Extension of COSCAP-SEA Programme
• Commence with Immediate Objective 3
- Establish a systematic, interim programme of operator
inspections on behalf of Member States/Administrative
Regions and as required
- Follow-up actions on behalf of those Member States/
Administrative Regions who lack the capability
25
Extension of COSCAP-SEA Programme
• Substantial Amendments to Annex 1 since commencement of
Programme.
- Human Factors requirements
- Language Proficiency Requirements in full force after
5 March 2008
- Safety Oversight obligations
26
Extension of COSCAP-SEA Programme
• Medical provisions: substantial amendments included in
Amendment 166 effective 25 November 2005
• Review by Licensing Expert to include assistance in
drafting regulations and training of staff
27
Extension of COSCAP-SEA Programme
• 15-month period beginning 1 July 2006
• Reflects continuity to the end of extension
• Retains the format and contents of the original approved
Programme document
• Indicates progress achieved and incorporates the expansion
into other safety areas
28
Extraordinary Steering Committee Meeting
Bangkok, Thailand
15 June 2005
29
•
Committee Meeting supports the extension of the
Programme through 2007, as proposed
•
Supports the submission of a grant application to the EU
•
A letter be submitted to those Member Administrations not
represented providing a summary of the discussions held
•
Opportunity to voice any objections they may have and raise
them with the Chairman
Tab 1 : ANNEX 4
Conclusions of the
4th SEARAST Meeting
Bangkok, Thailand
10-11 January 2005
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Airline Proactive Safety Programmes
SE-10 / AP 1.08 CFIT - Airline Proactive Safety Programmes
(FOQA & ASAP), and SE- 29 / AP 3.05 - Loss of Control
31
•
CTA to review the Advisory Bulletin/Circular on the Flight Data
Analysis Programme and see how the aircraft falling in the
category below 27,000 kg, but providing air transport service, may
be included in the FDA Programme. CTA may discuss with
FAA/JAA and ICAO if necessary. Pending.
•
CTA to communicate with Member States not present at the
Meeting (Cambodia, Indonesia, and Viet Nam) to solicit their
views on the acceptance of the Advisory Bulletin/Circular on the
Flight Data Analysis Programme. Completed.
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
ALAR Tool Kit Implementation
• States/Administrative Regions to advise COSCAP-SEA by 1
March 2005 if they require ALAR Workshop to be conducted
in their respective States. Yes.
(ALAR Workshop conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia
22 July 2005. 57 attendees from DGCA and airlines.)
32
18-
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS)
• CTA to review AB CSEA 001 and AC CSEA 001 and ensure
that all terms used in the AB/AC are in accordance with
standard ICAO terminology. Review to be completed by
June 2005. Completed.
01
• States that are yet to incorporate the requirements of ICAO
SARPs in their regulations must take action to do so at the
earliest, and advise the implementation date. No feedback.
• States must ensure installation of GPWS/TAWS equipment as
mandated by ICAO SARPs or file a difference. States are
requested to advise COSCAP-SEA of the status of
implementation. No feedback.
33
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06 – Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs)
• CTA to review/revise the Draft Advisory Circular CSEA 002
on “SOPs for Flight- deck Crewmembers” to include Crew
Briefings (including approach briefings), Landing Rollout
(actions and callouts), and Crew Monitoring and Cross
Checking. Pending.
• MSA to kindly provide a copy of the “Cabin Crew Briefing
Form” to COSCAP-SEA. Not received.
34
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Loss of Control (SOPs)
SE-26 / AP 3.03 Loss of Control (SOPs)
• CTA to review the Upset Recovery CD (Revision 1) and
determine if any changes are required to the Draft AC CSEA
002 to incorporate the provisions of the SE-26 on Loss of
Control (SOPs). Completed
SE-28/AP3.05 Loss of Control (Safety Information)
•
CTA to modify the ‘Statement of Work” in SE-28 to
accurately reflect the Safety Enhancement/Outputs.
Pending.
35
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Loss of Control (SOPs)
SE-27/AP 3.01 Loss of Control (Risk Assessment and
Management)
• As the aspect of risk assessment was still being developed
by FAA/JAA, the meeting decided to postpone further
deliberations on the SE/AP pending additional inputs.
36
Conclusions : 4th SEARAST Meeting
Loss of Control (SOPs)
SE-3/AP 1.03 CFIT – Precision-like Approach
Implementation
• (“21st Century Instrument Approaches”) (Vertical
Angles – PAI 1-7,11) CTA to follow up any
significant changes (if required) on the DDA as
reflected in AC CSEA 008.
SE-31 /AP 3.01 - Loss of Control (Advance Maneuver
Training)
• States to kindly provide feedback on the Upset
Recovery CD Revision 1.
37
Tab 1 : ANNEX 5
List of Current Advisory Bulletins
and Advisory Circulars
LIST OF
CURRENT ADVISORY BULLETINS
AB Number Issue Date
CSEA 001
Subject
15-Nov-04 Information to States/Administrative Regions on Terrain
Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
(Supercedes: Draft Bulletin No: CSEA001, dated 17-Sep-03)
39
CSEA 002
15-Nov-04 Information to States/Administrative Regions on Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
CSEA 006
30-Jun-04
Information to States on Promotion of Flight Safety by the
Air Operator Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
CSEA 007
30-Jun-04
Information to States on Flight Data Analysis Programme
(FDA)
CSEA 010
15-Nov-04 Information to States/Administrative Regions on
Approach and Landing Reduction (ALAR) / Controlled
Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Prevention Training
LIST OF
CURRENT ADVISORY CIRCULARS
AC Number Issue Date
CSEA 001
Subject
01-Aug-05 Guidance for Operators on Training Programmes for The
Use of Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
(Supercedes: Draft AC No: CSEA001, dated 17-Sep-03)
40
CSEA 001A
10-Nov-04 Access to Information on Supplemental Type Certificates
CSEA 002
01-Aug-05 Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck
Crewmembers
(Supercedes: Draft AC No: CSEA001-A, dated 17-Sep-03)
(This AC supercedes: Draft AC No: CSEA002, “Standard
Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers”, and
incorporates a rewrite of Draft AC No: CSEA005-A, “Crew
Resource Management Training”, Draft AC No: CSEA005-B,
“Communication and Coordination between Flight
Crewmembers and Cabin Crews”, and Draft AC No: CSEA005C, “Line Operations Simulations : Line-oriented Flight Training,
Special Purpose Operational Training”, all dated 17 September
2003)
LIST OF
CURRENT ADVISORY CIRCULARS
(con’t)
AC Number Issue Date
Subject
CSEA 004
10-Nov-04 Guidance for Air Operators in Establishing a Flight Safety
Documents System
CSEA 006
10-Nov-04 Guidance for Air Operators on the Establishment of a
Flight Safety Department
(Supercedes: Draft AC No: CSEA006, dated 17-Sep-03)
CSEA 007
30-Jun-04
Guidance for Air Operators on the Establishment of a
Flight Data Analysis Programme (FDA)
(Supercedes: Draft AC 004-A and AC 004-B, dated 17-Sep-03)
CSEA 008
01-Aug-05 Guidance for Operators for Conducing Constant Descent
Final Approach for Non-Precision Approaches (CDFA)
(Supercedes: Draft AC No. CSEA003, dated March 2004, Draft
AC No. CSEA003-A and Draft AC No. CSEA003-B, dated 17
September 2003)
41
Tab 9
TCAS Misuse
Eurocontrol ACAS II
Bulletin 6
Tab 10
Tentative Work Plan 2005
Information on National
Aviation Safety team
COSCAP-SEA Website
www.coscap-sea.com
- END -
THANK YOU
SE
REFERENCES
45
TAB 3
SE – 10 CFIT / AP 1.08
SE – 29 AP 3.05
SE-10 CFIT / AP 1.08
AIRLINE PROACTIVE SAFETY PROGRAMS
(FOQA & ASAP)
Statement of Work
Develop and implement a mutually agreed upon methodology to
use de-identified Flight Operations and Quality Assurance
(FOQA), and Aviation Safety Action Partnership (ASAP)
information for the purpose of proactively identifying safetyrelated issues and corrective actions. Key to the development
and implementation of this project is to ensure that legislative,
regulatory and contractual actions are taken which prevent
misuse of information. Included in this development and
implementation of proactive safety programs is the development
of analytical tools which will enable the identification of system
safety deficiencies and corrective actions.
47
SE-10 CFIT / AP 1.08
AIRLINE PROACTIVE SAFETY PROGRAMS
(FOQA & ASAP)
Outcome/Benefits
Give operators the tools to enable them to identify safety issues
and trends, and identify and initiate corrective actions prior to an
accident occurrence.
48
SE-10 CFIT / AP 1.08
AIRLINE PROACTIVE SAFETY PROGRAMS
(FOQA & ASAP)
Outputs
49
•
Agree upon Standards for Appropriate Data Use - As outlined in
the “Statement of Work,” the key to implementation of this plan is
to ensure that legislative, regulatory and contractual actions occur
which prevent the use of collected information for punitive or legal
purposes.
•
Provide guidance material outlining standards for the establishment
of FOQA and ASAP programs. This material must include
adequate guidance regarding the establishment and implementation
of the program, an outline for the role of the regulatory agency and
employee groups in the program, and minimum standards and
components for the analytical tools and methods that could be used
to identify safety trends. Also included should be a method and
process to recommend and obtain approval for corrective actions.
SE-10 CFIT / AP 1.08
AIRLINE PROACTIVE SAFETY PROGRAMS
(FOQA & ASAP)
Outputs
•
50
Provide guidance documentation outlining voluntary procedures
and protocols for the sharing of trend information or corrective
actions amongst the user community. Progress on this product is
extremely dependent on the development and implementation of
the protective provisions outlined earlier.
SE-29 AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
Statement of Work
The purpose of this project is to ensure that essential safety
information and operational procedures generated by airplane
manufacturers are included in companies' operating manuals, training
programs for pilots and other appropriate employee groups, in daily
operations. Operators should also develop a means to improve the
performance of those flight crew members that meet the minimum
criteria, but have shown a limited proficiency.
Safety Enhancement 29: Aviation safety will be improved by ensuring
carriers have a process to enhance pilot proficiency.
51
SE-29 AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
Output
Operators, in collaboration with pilot associations, should
ensure their training and qualification processes utilize information from programs such as FOQA, AQP, and ASAP to assist in
assuring pilot proficiency.
Actions
1) All pilot associations and operators should review
existing programs and collaborate to develop a
mechanism to continuously improve pilot performance
and proficiency.
52
SE-29 AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
2) Improved overall flight crew performance and proficiency
should be paramount in program design.
3) The program should be a joint effort among pilot
associations and operators, with safeguards designed to
protect confidentiality of individuals and information.
4) The program shall be non-punitive, voluntary, and
managed by the individual airlines.
53
SE-29 AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
Performance Goals for Safety Enhancements/Outputs
Safety Enhancement 29 Goal: Develop a more effective pilot
qualification and proficiency program.
Output Goal: Develop a process to enhance pilot proficiency and
competency.
54
SE-29 AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
Key Products
55
•
Develop processes to disseminate essential safety information.
•
Develop pilot enhancement system.
SE-10 CFIT / AP 1.08; SE-29 AP 3.05
INFORMATION TO STATES ON FLIGHT DATA
ANALYSIS PROGRAMME
Background, Reference, and Guidance Materials
56
•
Advisory Bulletin No: CSEA 007 Information to States on Flight
Data Analysis Programme (FDA), Issue date: 30 June 2004
•
Advisory Circular No: CSEA 007 Guidance for Air Operators on
the Establishment of a Flight Data Analysis Programme (FDA),
Issue date: 30 June 2004
Tab 4
SE- 1 CFIT / AP 1.01
SE-1 CFIT / AP 1.01
TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM
(TAWS)
Statement of Work
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) - accidents, where a
properly functioning aircraft under the control of a fully qualified and
certificated crew is flown into terrain with no apparent awareness on
the part of crew, could be substantially reduced or eliminated with the
installation of TAWS equipment. Regulatory authorities must establish
Rules/Regulations which mandate the installation of TAWS equipment
in accordance with ICAO Standards and Air Operators must install
TAWS equipment on their aircraft, as required by regulation, and
establish procedures for its use.
58
SE-1 CFIT / AP 1.01
TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM
(TAWS)
Outcomes
Substantially reduce or eliminate the CFIT accident rate by
improving pilot situational awareness with respect to terrain avoidance
by establishing appropriate procedures for the installation and use of
TAWS. Procedures must include proper flight crew reaction in regard
to TAWS aural and visual warnings.
59
SE-1 CFIT / AP 1.01
TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM
(TAWS)
Outputs
60
•
Rules/Regulations to require TAWS in accordance with ICAO
Standards.
•
A comprehensive system to support TAWS including installation,
maintenance, training and use of TAWS equipment in commercial
air transport operations.
SE-1 CFIT / AP 1.01
TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM
(TAWS)
Background, Reference, and Guidance Materials
61
•
ICAO Annex 6 Part I 6.15 Aeroplanes Required to be Equipped
with Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
•
Advisory Bulletin No: CSEA 001 Information to States/
Administrative Regions on Terrain Awareness and Warning System
(TAWS), Issue date: 15 November 2004
•
Advisory Circular No: CSEA 001 Guidance for Operators on
Training Programmes for The Use of Terrain Awareness and
Warning System (TAWS), Issue date: 01 August 2005
•
Advisory Circular No: CSEA 001-A Access to Information on
Supplemental Type Certificates, Issue date: 10 November 2004
Tab 5
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06
SE-26 / AP 3.03
SE-27 / AP 3.04
SE-28 / AP 3.05
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
(SOP)
Statement of Work
All operators should have standard operating procedures
(SOPs). These procedures should address all normal situations which
flight crews will encounter. SOPs will address use of checklists, what
each person’s responsibilities are, use of available equipment, and
expected procedures to be used during preflight, taxi, take-off, climb,
cruise, descent, approach, missed approach, landing, taxi and parking.
Line crews should be consulted in the development of new procedures
so as to increase acceptance and understanding of these procedures.
Standard operating procedures for any new equipment will be
developed and published, and training will be conducted before any
new equipment is installed/used. Operators will train to proficiency in
their SOPs and crews will use published company SOPs.
63
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
(SOP)
Outcome
To improve aviation safety by:
64
•
Ensuring that all operators establish flight crew Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) that fit that operator’s
particular operation;
•
Ensuring that all operators train to their SOPs and require
that SOPs be utilized in all normal operations.
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
(SOP)
Outputs
In order to provide guidance to the operators in establishing
SOPs for their particular airline, the following activities will need to
occur:
65
•
SOP template to be provided for use by all commercial air
transport in generating SOPs for each particular airline.
•
Operators will adopt SOPs and revise their training
manuals and programs to incorporate the proposed SOP
template items as appropriate for the technology of the
equipment in the aircraft.
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Statement of Work
The purpose of this project is to ensure that all airline operators
publish and enforce clear, concise, and accurate flight crew standard
operating procedures (SOPs). These procedures should include
expected procedures during pre/post flight and all phases of flight, i.e.:
checklists, simulator training, PF/PNF duties, transfer of control,
automation operation, rushed and/or unstabilized approaches, rejected
landings and missed approaches, in-flight pilot icing reporting, and
flight crew coordination. Operator instructors and check airman should
ensure these SOPs are trained and enforced in their aircrew proficiency
and standardization programs.
66
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Safety Enhancement: The establishment, maintenance, and
appropriate use of flight crew SOPs in accordance with AC (Standard
Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers) will improve
aviation safety.
67
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Output
1. COSCAP-SEA should conduct a review of AC 120-71 and
incorporate relative information from the LOC JSAT interventions
and operator SOPs.
2. Based on results of Output 1, SEARAST should consider a
revision/appendix to COSCAP-SEA Advisory Circular CSEA 002.
68
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Output
3. Based on results of Output 2, COSCAP-SEA should review and
possibly revise guidance to principal operations inspectors (POIs)
for incorporation of the revised AC information into the operator’s
training programs and manuals.
4. Air operators should adopt the revised SOP information and revise
their training programs and manuals to incorporate the proposed
revisions.
69
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Performance Goals for Safety Enhancements/Outputs
Safety Enhancement Goal: To improve aviation safety through SOPs,
each operator should establish, maintain, and use flight crew SOPs in
accordance with AC.
•
Output #1 Goal
SEARAST Members review air operators’ SOPs relative to
Loss of Control JSAT intervention information and make
recommendations for improvement.
•
Output #2 Goal
Revise AC per recommendations from Output 1.
70
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
•
Output #3 Goal
COSCAP-SA to provide guidance to supplement revisions in
Output 2.
•
Output #4 Goal
Operators adopt the revised LOC related SOP information.
71
SE-26 / AP 3.03
LOSS OF CONTROL: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
Key Products
72
•
Review operator SOPs and JSAT interventions
•
•
•
Revise AC
Provide guidance material
Revise operator training programs and manuals
SE-2 CFIT / AP 1.06
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
(SOPs)
Background, Reference, and Guidance Materials
73
•
Advisory Bulletin No: CSEA 002 Information to
States/Administrative Regions on Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs), Issue date: 15 November 2004
•
Draft Advisory Circular No: CSEA 002 Standard Operating
Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Statement of Work
The purpose of this project is to identify or develop and
implement methods for operators, regulators, and manufacturers to
prioritize safety-related decisions. The project will improve methods of
risk assessment for operational issues related to service bulletins,
aircraft accident/incident analysis, flight critical safety information, and
recurring intermittent failures related to dispatch.
Safety Enhancement: Aviation safety will be improved through the use
of risk assessment/management methods.
74
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Output
75
1.
Compile and assess guidance materials related to risk assessment
and risk management tools to prioritize safety-related decisions for
operational issues regarding service bulletins, aircraft accident/
incident analysis, flight critical safety information, and recurring
intermittent failures related to dispatch.
2.
Based on the assessment from Output 1, develop guidance
materials for operators, regulators, and manufacturers on risk
assessment and risk management tools to prioritize safety-related
decisions for operational issues.
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Output
3.
76
Operator, regulator, and manufacturer Directors of Safety (DOS), or
equivalents, should ensure all appropriate managers implement and
use risk assessment tools to prioritize safety-related decisions
developed in Output 2.
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Performance Goals for Safety Enhancements/Outputs
Safety Enhancement Goal: Develop and implement risk assessment
and management methods to prioritize safety-related decisions.
•
Output #1 Goal
Compile and assess guidance materials related to risk
assessment and risk management tools to prioritize safetyrelated decisions for operational issues.
77
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Performance Goals for Safety Enhancements/Outputs
•
Output #2 Goal
Develop guidance materials for operators, regulators, and
manufacturers on risk assessment and risk management tools
to prioritize safety-related decisions for operational issues.
•
Output #3 Goal
Operator Directors of Safety, or equivalents, should ensure all
appropriate managers implement and use the risk assessment
tools to prioritize safety-related decisions developed in Output
2.
78
SE-27 / AP 3.04
LOSS OF CONTROL: RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT
Key Products
79
•
Collect, analyze, and assess existing risk management programs
•
Develop risk management methods to prioritize safety-related
decisions
•
Operators implement the use of risk management methods
SE-28 / AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL: SAFETY
INFORMATION
Statement of Work
The purpose of this project is to ensure that essential safety
information and operational procedures generated by airplane
manufacturers are included in companies' operating manuals, training
programs for pilots and other appropriate employee groups, in daily
operations. Operators should also develop a means to improve the
performance of those flight crew members that meet the minimum
criteria, but have shown a limited proficiency.
Safety Enhancement 28: Aviation safety will be advanced by
improving flight crew and other operator employees’ performance
through timely identification and dissemination of essential safety
information and procedures.
80
SE-28 / AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL: SAFETY
INFORMATION
Output
Reliable processes should be developed to ensure flight
operations and maintenance personnel are made aware of and
incorporate essential operating information in a timely manner.
Actions
1) Manufacturers should review their processes for
distributing essential operating information and to identify
its significance.
2) Operators should distribute essential operating
information identified by the manufacturers to flight
crews and maintenance staff in an appropriate and timely
manner.
81
SE-28 / AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL: SAFETY
INFORMATION
3) Directors of Safety, or equivalent, should ensure the
establishment of a process to identify, review, analyze and
include essential operating information in training
programs and in manuals used by flight crews and
maintenance staff.
4) Operators should revise the company flight manual(s) in a
timely manner as essential operating information is
amended or added.
82
SE-28 / AP 3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL: SAFETY
INFORMATION
Performance Goals for Safety Enhancements/Outputs
Safety Enhancement Goal: Improve flight crew and other operator
employee’s performance through timely dissemination of essential
safety information and procedures.
• Output Goal
Develop processes to ensure safety-essential information
is identified and distributed to operations and maintenance
personnel in a timely manner.
83
SE-27 / AP 3.04; SE-28/AP3.05
LOSS OF CONTROL
Background, Reference, and Guidance Materials
• Advisory Circular No: CSEA 004 Guidance for Air Operators in
Establishing a Flight Safety Documents System, Issue date:
15 November 2004
84
Tab 6
SE – 3 CFIT / AP 1.03
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
1. Identify the means by which all flight crews can fly an appropriate
stabilized vertical path to the runway end, for all instrument
approach procedures, thereby reducing the possibility of a
controlled flight into terrain accident. The Plan will direct or
encourage the aviation community to:
86
•
Identify criteria for the development of appropriate stabilized
continuous descent approach procedures to the runway end
for all instrument approaches and air carrier aircraft types,
•
address any changes necessary to ensure adequate training
and certification of flight crews,
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
87
•
address any changes necessary for certification and
authorization of aircraft and procedures,
•
take advantage of existing aircraft capabilities to improve
approach and landing safety to the maximum extent practical,
and
•
transition to use of new and evolving aircraft capabilities that
can further improve approach and landing safety at the earliest
practical time.
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
2. In the interest of safety, the industry should discontinue the use of
step-down or “dive-and-drive” Non-Precision approach procedures
as soon as, and wherever, possible. It should be made clear to all
pilots and operators that the industry should, at the earliest possible
date, develop procedures and train pilots to fly a stabilized
continuous descent approach procedure. This would include
procedures such as the constant-rate descent that can be flown by
all types of aircraft and use of the modern vertical navigation
capability (VNAV) by some existing and most new aircraft types.
88
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
3. Further safety and operational enhancements can be achieved
through the appropriate use of features and functionality available
now or in the near future on the commercial aircraft fleet. Existing
airplanes used in commercial operations worldwide have varying
operational capabilities and limitations. These various capabilities
should be utilized and the limitations accounted for. Various
strategies must be developed and employed to improve the overall
safety of approach operations.
89
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
4. The operational capabilities of the worldwide fleet may be
represented as a continuum but, for the purpose of this project, the
airplanes have been categorized as “Classic,” “Standard,” and
“Advanced.”
90
•
Classic airplanes - airplanes typically equipped with electromechanical flight instruments, basic navigation capability (i.e.,
VOR, DME, ADF and possibly first-generation Inertial Navigation
System (INS)).
•
Standard airplanes - airplanes with multi-sensor RNAV Flight
Management Systems (FMS), Electronic Flight Instruments and
Electronic Map Displays (the majority of airplanes produced during
the past fifteen years).
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Statement of Work
•
Advanced airplanes - airplanes equipped similar to the Standard
airplanes but with advanced navigation capabilities (e.g., GPS
sensors and RNP) and possibly enhanced situation awareness
systems such as Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS -- a.k.a.
E-GPWS).
The underlying strategy is to use the capabilities that are already
available in the airplane to the greatest extent while creating
operational benefits to encourage equipage with more capable
functionality. All strategies need to be promulgated internationally if
the full safety benefits are to be realized.
91
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Outcome
Operators are able to fly stabilized approaches with better
vertical situation awareness and improved vertical descent path
tracking capability in the final instrument approach segment.
92
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Outputs
5. For the purpose of this initiative, instrument approaches and
navigation capability can be broadly categorized in the following
table. The table shows current or potential aircraft approach
navigation capability for each of the Classic, Standard or
Advanced aircraft types.
AIRCRAFT NAVIGATION CAPABILITY
Instrument Approach Type
NPA* with Vertical Angles
Classic
Standard
Advance
X
X
X
X
X
RNAV-3D
RNP-RNAV
xLS (ILS, MLS, GLS)
93
X
X
X
X
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH IMPLEMENTATION
Outputs
6. For example, all types of air carrier aircraft can potentially fly
procedures such as current VOR or NDB approaches using some
type of constant vertical descent rate (or angle) method, even
though the particular method may or may not be the same for each
aircraft class. All aircraft types are capable of flying a VOR
approach with a published vertical angle, using open loop constant
vertical speed. The Standard aircraft can fly the VOR approach
and the RNAV-3D approaches using barometric vertical navigation
(VNAV) based on a published vertical angle.
94
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Outputs
Only the advanced aircraft are capable of using the better RNAV
method of flying an instrument approach using an accurate level of
RNP combined with an associated specific VNAV defined path. All
types of aircraft can currently fly the ILS and could also fly the
equivalent best method GLS (e.g., xLS) procedures if a GPS
capable Multi-mode receiver (MMR) is installed, and a Ground
Based GNSS Augmentation System (GBAS) is available.
95
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Outputs
7. The outputs of this plan are described below based on the category
of instrument approach as described in the table above. Additionally, a set of the outputs that apply across categories of approach is
described under the General heading. These are specific outputs
that may need to be integrated to form a cohesive set of products
and a consistent time scale.
96
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
8.
Develop criteria to support the inclusion of vertical angles on
existing procedures.
9.
Develop NOS Charting Specs to depict angles and TCH.
10. Update pilot and ATS information to explain the revised instrument
procedures.
97
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
11.
98
Develop a plan and initiate implementation for procedure
production/revision to address criteria described above including:
•
Determine which vertical angle (vertical paths) and visual guidance
slope indicators (VGSI) do not coincide, and revise the VGSI or
specified path so that they do coincide.
•
Determine which instrument procedures do not accommodate a
nominal 3-degree slope between FAF and Runway threshold +
TCH. Move FAF altitude, adjust step-down constraints or fixes, or
adjust descent angles, altitudes, or waypoint/ fix/navaid locations as
necessary so that the procedures can best provide for a continuous
descent at an appropriate angle (above 3 degrees).
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
12. For every instrument approach, define an appropriate vertical angle
and code it in the navigation database and depicted on the charts.
a) Ensure appropriate operational (i.e., pilot) input in the design
of instrument procedures.
b) Conduct research necessary to determine human factors
guidelines for design of instrument procedures.
c) Appropriately apply technology, including high-precision
terrain/obstacle databases and high-speed automated
procedure design tools, to produce instrument procedures in a
more timely manner with less error.
99
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
d) Make greater use of electronic means to transmit and
distribute instrument procedures.
e) Implement instrument procedure development priorities that
reflect the needs of the entire aviation community. Priorities
should be set at a national level with input from general,
business, military and commercial aviation.
100
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
f) Instrument procedure program staffing and funding levels
should accurately reflect the flight procedure workload, i.e.,
maintenance of current procedures, development/flight
inspection of new three-dimensional RNAV procedures, and
responding to special industry requests.
g) Deal effectively and proactively with private developers of
instrument procedures.
101
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
13. Develop a plan and initiate implementation for organizational
processes to ensure that appropriate privately-developed “special”
procedures are made available for public use (as public procedures
or equivalent mechanism) in a timely manner.
14. Crew Procedures/Training: Develop crew procedures and training
program to promote new instrument procedures in lieu of existing
procedures. The training and crew procedures should address
current issues (examples: notifying the pilot when the aircraft
reverts out of VNAV Path, the integrity of navigation database).
102
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
General
(applies to all categories of instrument flight procedures)
15. Crew certification/qualification and checking: Develop standards
for FAA evaluation of compliance with new training and
procedures.
16. Assess and refine the crew interface and interaction requirements
for use of these instrument procedures. This should include consideration of flight instrumentation (e.g., PFD/ND, FMS/CDU),
status (e.g., ANP or other data for monitoring when ANP, or
equivalent, is not available), deviations (e.g., RNAV/LNAV/
VNAV), and alerting (e.g., system performance degradation, mode
reversions, deviations, etc.). Based on these requirements,
develop/update and implement operational and airworthiness
criteria/guidance for design, training/qualification, and crew
procedures.
103
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Non-Precision Approach with Vertical Angles
(may apply to classic, standard or advanced airplanes)
17. Crew Procedures/Techniques: Develop crew procedures/
techniques to fly stabilized approach procedures that replace “dive
and drive” procedures.
18. Establish a plan to ensure installation of DME at airports where
significant numbers of classic air carrier aircraft are still expected
to operate, or where particularly vulnerable procedures are located.
104
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
RNAV 3-D Instrument Approach Procedures
(applies to standard and advanced airplanes)
19. Develop a plan and initiate implementation for a minimum number
of approach charts to runway end with multiple minima (suitable
for xLS, RNP, LNAV/VNAV, and LNAV minima). As part of this
plan implementation, conduct a research project to address issues
of charting, content, etc.
20. Develop and initiate implementation of a plan to educate CAA
inspectors, check pilots, and designated examiners on approved use
of advanced instrument flight procedures.
105
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
RNAV 3-D Instrument Approach Procedures
(applies to standard and advanced airplanes)
21. To ensure that operators can get the most out of current equipage,
develop and initiate implementation of a plan for operational
approval of VNAV and RNAV as appropriate. Qualification for
use of RNAV by Standard aircraft must be carefully considered and
approval must consider whether the aircraft is suitably equipped
and whether pilot information, display, and annunciation
requirements are met.
106
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
RNP-RNAV Instrument Approach Procedures
(applies to advanced airplanes)
107
1.
Develop plan and initiate implementation to develop and update
RNP policy and criteria for operational and airworthiness approval,
as needed, building on AC 120-29A.
2.
Transition to RNAV/RNP procedure production.
SE-3 CFIT / AP 1.03
PRECISION-LIKE APPROACH
IMPLEMENTATION
Background, Reference, and Guidance Materials
•
108
Advisory Circular No: CSEA 008 Guidance for Operators for
Conducting Constant Descent Final Approach for Non-Precision
Approaches (CDFA), Issue date: 01 Aug 2005
Tab 7
SE – 12 / AP 1.04
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Statement of Work
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) - accidents are the leading
cause of commercial aviation equipment loss and fatalities, worldwide.
CFIT accidents could be substantially reduced if all air carriers
developed CFIT prevention training and procedures to be added to their
approved training curriculums stressing position awareness and escape
maneuvers in the event of a terrain warning indication.
110
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Outcomes/Benefits
Substantially reduce the CFIT accident rate by the addition of
CFIT prevention training and procedures to all air carriers’ approved
training curriculums, emphasizing pilot situational awareness and
escape procedures for flight crews to use in the event of a terrain
warning indication.
111
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Outputs
•
Conduct a review of all air carriers by their assigned Inspectors to
ascertain which air carriers do not have substantive CFIT prevention
training and procedures in their approved training programs.
Actions:
112
Request inspectors to conduct a review of their
assigned air carriers and identify those carriers that
do not provide CFIT prevention training and
procedures within their approved training programs.
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Outputs
•
A Bulletin strongly recommending substantive CFIT prevention
training and procedures in all air carriers’ approved training
programs with guidance to inspectors for minimum training
program contents.
Actions:
113
Bulletin issued by COSCAP-SEA, training programs
revised by air carriers, and approval by the assigned
inspector.
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Outputs
•
Issue a copy of the CFIT Education and Training Aid to each inspector
whose air carrier does not incorporate CFIT prevention training and
procedures in their approved training program.
Action: Inspectors will present the copy of the CFIT Education
and Training Aid to their assigned air carrier, requesting a
revision to the carrier’s approved training program
incorporating CFIT prevention training and procedures.
114
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Outputs
•
CFIT Education and Training Aid.
•
All Air Carriers will incorporate the CFIT Education and Training
Aid or similar training into their approved training programs.
Action:
115
All Air Carriers submit revised training programs
incorporating CFIT prevention training and
procedures.
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Performance Goals & Indicators for Outcomes/Outputs
•
A substantial reduction of CFIT accidents involving air carriers
Indicator:
•
CFIT training aid provided to all air carriers not conducting CFIT
training. The Training aid should be revised incorporating new
technologies and making it more user-friendly.
Indicator:
116
Air carrier CFIT accident rate drops to zero.
A review of training programs indicates all air
carriers conducting CFIT training.
SE-12 /AP 1.04
CFIT – TRAINING – CFIT PREVENTION
Performance Goals & Indicators for Outcomes/Outputs
•
Bulletin issued (CSEA 010, Issue date: 15 Nov 2004)
Indicator: Necessary training programs are revised and
approved; all air carriers conducting CFIT
training.
117
Tab 8
SE – 30 / AP 3.06
SE – 31 / AP 3.01
SE-30 /AP 3.06
LOSS OF CONTROL: TRAINING HUMAN
FACTORS AND AUTOMATION
Statement of Work
In order to reduce loss of control accidents, air operator training
departments need to incorporate training that emphasizes flight
crewmembers’ situation awareness, crew coordination during
multitasking, and the use of automation in conjunction with CRM.
Flight crews should be trained to use the appropriate levels of
automation. Emphasis should be placed on the knowledge of functional
operation, capabilities and limitations of automation to ensure pilot
control of the aircraft.
Safety Enhancement: To improve the overall performance of flight
crews to recognize and prevent loss of control accidents, through
effective use of automation and CRM.
119
SE-30 /AP 3.06
LOSS OF CONTROL: TRAINING HUMAN
FACTORS AND AUTOMATION
Outputs
1.
An evolutionary training aid that consolidates regulatory,
academic, industry and pilot association literature that addresses
the human factors issues surrounding the employment of
automation within the context of CRM.
Actions
1) AC on CRM to be amended to reflect human factor issues.
2) A human factor training aid should be developed.
120
SE-30 /AP 3.06
LOSS OF CONTROL: TRAINING HUMAN
FACTORS AND AUTOMATION
Outputs
2.
All operators should incorporate applicable principles of the
Training Aid into their training programs and standard operating
procedures.
Actions
1) AC on CRM to be modified based on the training aid.
2) Bulletin to be issued to alert inspectors of the training aid
and for them to encourage its use by operators.
3) Operators should review the training aid and include the
applicable principles in their training programs and standard
operating procedures.
121
SE-30 /AP 3.06
LOSS OF CONTROL: TRAINING HUMAN
FACTORS AND AUTOMATION
Performance Goals for Outcome/Outputs
122
•
Eliminate the misuse of automation and ineffective CRM as a
contributing factor in loss of control accidents.
•
Development and distribution of the Training Aid to the Director of
Safety of every air operator.
•
All air carriers should have incorporated the principles of the
Training Aid into approved training programs and standard
operating procedures.
SE-30 /AP 3.06
LOSS OF CONTROL: TRAINING HUMAN
FACTORS AND AUTOMATION
Key Products
•
•
•
•
•
123
Training Aid team formed
Training Aid published and distributed
AC amended to reflect Training Aid material
Bulletin to inspectors
DOS to monitor the Training Aid implementation
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL : ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Statement of Work
Advanced Maneuvers Training (AMT) refers to training to
prevent and recover from hazardous flight conditions outside of the
normal flight envelope, such as in-flight upsets, stalls, ground proximity
and wind shear escape maneuvers, and inappropriate energy state
management conditions.
124
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Statement of Work
The purpose of this project is to collect and provide advanced
maneuver training material and to encourage air operators to use these
materials to implement advanced maneuver ground training and flight
training using appropriate flight training equipment. Emphasis should
be given to stall-onset recognition and recovery, unusual attitudes, upset
recoveries, effects of icing, energy awareness and management, and
causal factors that can lead to loss of control.
Safety Enhancement: Pilots will be better trained to avoid and recover
from excursions from normal flight and loss of control.
125
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Output
1.
A survey of existing training material from regulators, industry,
operators, academia and other resources and a set of advanced
maneuvers training material produced by a joint industry working
group.
Actions
1) The Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid to be procured.
2) The Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid to be distributed
to all CAAs and to all applicable air operators.
3) A strategy be developed to maintain AMT training
materials.
126
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Output
2.
AMT ground training provided by all operators.
Actions
1) Issue a Bulletin to announce and recommend the use of the
AMT training materials.
2) Operators should implement ATM ground training.
3) Rules/Regulations to be amended to require AMT ground
training and to promote AMT flight training in suitable
flight simulation devices.
127
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Output
3.
AMT flight training provided by all operators. The expectation is
that this training will be accomplished via ground and simulator
instruction within the certified flight envelope, with emphasis on
recognition, prevention and recovery techniques.
Actions
1) Promote a high level of commitment to AMT by operator
flight operations and training departments.
128
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Output
2) The Loss of Control JSAT identified that a number of
accidents involved the crew not recognizing or preventing
entry into an unusual attitude and, when upsets occurred,
were unable to effect recovery. Operators should
implement AMT flight training emphasizing energy state
management and early recognition and recovery from flight
outside the certified aircraft-operating envelope within the
limitations of the training device being utilized. The
expectation is that this training will be accomplished via
ground and simulator instruction within the certified flight
envelope, with emphasis on recognition, prevention and
129
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Output (continued)
recovery techniques. Operation outside of the normal flight
envelope must be discouraged to avoid negative training.
Advanced Maneuvers Training (AMT) refers to training to
prevent and recover from hazardous flight conditions
outside of the certified flight envelope, such as in-flight
upsets, stalls, ground proximity and wind shear escape
maneuvers, and inappropriate energy state management
conditions.
130
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Performance Goal for Outcomes/Outputs
131
•
Reduce occurrence of LOC accidents.
•
Make available AMT material for use in air operator approved
training programs.
•
All air operators incorporate AMT in their approved training
programs
SE-31 /AP 3.01
LOSS OF CONTROL: ADVANCE
MANEUVERS TRAINING
Key Products
132
•
Distribute currently available Airplane Upset Recovery Training
Aid.
•
Publish Bulletin.
•
Track adoption of AMT.