Take care of your passwords
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Transcript Take care of your passwords
Passwords Everywhere
Ing. Ondřej Ševeček | GOPAS a.s. |
MCM: Directory Services | MVP: Enterprise Security | Certified Ethical Hacker |
[email protected] | www.sevecek.com |
GOPAS: info@gopas,cz | www.gopas.cz | www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS
Take care of your passwords
People use the same passwords for different services
• AD network, mobile phone, credit card PIN, facebook, eshops, free-mail, …
People type their passwords on unknown computers
Passwords travel over network unencrypted
Somebody else is your computer administrator
Computers store passwords often in full form
Hardware keyloggers
Easy soldier
Different service = different password?
Do you thing the databases of facebook, google+,
gmail, microsoft, alza, seznam, … are encrypted?
• nonsense
What do you thing the Indians do when bored?
• are they surfing your email, or facebook?
What do you thing is the first thing a virus is going to
do after infection?
• list all user accounts
• touch anything in your network with your current password
User Account Control (UAC)
Locally limits Administrators group membership
Does nothing over network
It matters only for a BFU on a single machine
It does not affect administrative accounts
Windows authentication seems secure
Kerberos, Kerberos, Kerberos, sometimes NTLM
Encrypted network transport
• AES, mutual authentication, rekeying, etc.
Passwords are in memory
plaintext
password
LSASS
IS
Client
Internet
Explorer
Ctrl-Alt-Del
Outlook
Lync
Passwords are in LSASS memory
plaintext
password
Local
LSASS
Server
LSASS
Internet
Explorer
IS
Client
Outlook
Lync
Kerberos
NTLM
Server
Who can steal passwords from LSASS
Local Administrators
• Debug privilege is just the only necessary to break into
LSASS memory
Basic authentication
HTTP Basic authentication
• used veeeeery often even on intranets
• mostly BFU accounts
LDAP Simple bind
• used veeeeery often by third-party NAS, VPN, VoIP,
gateways, routers, VMWare console, etc.
• often administrative accounts
RDP
• used extreeeeemely often
• extreeeeemely often administrative accounts
Passwords are in LSASS memory
plaintext
password
Server
LSASS
VPN
MSTSC
Internet
Explorer
IS
Client
Outlook
Lync
plain-text
Server
Passwords are stored in full form
IIS application pools
Services
Scheduled tasks
After attack, change your password!
Really?
Password filter on DC or on local SAM database
Good password
Long at least 12 characters
All four types of characters (a-z, A-Z, 0-9, #$%^…)
• 80% passwords are alfa-numeric
Never reuse the same password for critical services
• not too much change necessary
Password locking?
Do not exagerate
•
•
•
•
6 characters complex password
75 trials per one lock
for 1 minute
= 3 300 years
Cracking from local/AD hashes (non-cache)
MD4 hashes
• brute-force 8 characters complex
1 CPU = 25 years
10 GPUs = 15 days
• rainbow-table 8 characters complex
= minutes
= 120 GB
Every character makes it 80x more difficult
12 characters complex password is unbreakable
• at least for non-NSA mortals
Cracking from network trace and password
cache
No use for rainbow-table
• MD4 salted
Only brute-force possible
What to remember
Never type a password on an unknown computer
Accessing remote machines with RDP sends there
your password
Disable all HTTP Basic and LDAP Simple bind
authentications
Use smart cards instead
Where to read more
http://www.sevecek.com/Lists/Categories/Category.aspx
?CategoryId=17&Name=(Anti)hacking
http://www.sevecek.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=145
NASHLEDANOU
na kurzech v počítačové škole GOPAS, a.s.
GOC171 - Active Directory Troubleshooting
GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting
GOC173 - Enterprise PKI Deployment
GOC175 - Administering Security
GOPAS: info@gopas,cz | www.gopas.cz | www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS