Transcript Practice (answers included) ( -> 3249.5 kb )

This project is funded by the European Union
Projekat finansira Evropska Unija
PRACTICE
Antony Thanos
Ph.D. Chem. Eng.
[email protected]
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium
Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum
• Hazard Identification (line from tank to pump)
 HAZOP technique, examine deviations for :
o NO FLOW, LESS FLOW
o MORE TEMPERATURE
o LOSS OF CONTAINEMENT
LI
PI
LPG Tank
V-1
V-2
P-2
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Hazard Identification (cont.), HAZOP form for use
No
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
1 No flow
2 Less flow
3
More
Temperature
4
Loss of
Containment
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Hazard Identification (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
1 No Flow
Causes
Consequences
V1 or V2 closed Cavitation in pump,
and P1 starts potential pump
failure, as seal
failure with LPG
release, in
prolonged or
repeated cases
LI very low
As in No.1
2 Less Flow
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Ομάδα
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
No remote pump Develop written
start capability
procedure to require
(local only) and V2 check of proper line-up
very close to pump before pump start.
Closed suction
Installation of limit
results in
switches for V1 position
excessive noise, with position signal to
operator will
pump house.
immediately
identify incident
Procedures require Examine installation of
check for
level transmitter with
adequate level in level indication to pumptank before pump house, along with visual
start.
alarm, forcing pump trip
in very low level.
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Hazard Identification (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
V1 and V2
More
closed in
3
Temperature summer
conditions
Piping
mechanical
failure
Collision of
Loss of
vehicle in piping
4
Containment
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Consequences
Thermal expansion
increases pressure,
potential for pipe
rupture
Release of LPG
from tank,
uncontrolled if V1
cannot close
(failure close to V1)
or failure upstream
of V1
Ομάδα
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
Piping test
Install Thermal Relief
pressure according Valve (TRV) between V1
to standards
and V2
Manual isolation
of V1
Install Fail-Safe remote
operated isolation valve
at valve outlet (internal if
possible)
Establish protection of
piping routing from
collisions
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Accident scenarios
 Define some worst-case scenarios for LPG
installation
LPG Road
Tanker 20 tn
2 in hose
LI
PI
LPG Tank
200 m3
to other tanks,
compressor
LPG Tank
120 m3
to other tanks
Supply pipeline
from refinery
This Project is funded
by the European Union
2 in, gas phase
6 in, liquid phase
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Accident scenarios (cont.), answers example
 Storage area (tanks)
o Catastrophic failure of 200 m3 tank
 Movement facilities
o Catastrophic failure of road tanker
o Catastrophic failure (FBR) of 6 inch pipeline
from refinery
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Top event scenarios
 Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m3
LPG tank, complete top events in event tree
PHASE
IGNITION
CONFINEMENT
TOP EVENT
DIRECT
2-PHASE
DELAYED
NO CONFINEMENT
CONFINEMENT
NO IGNITION
DIRECT
LIQUID
DELAYED
NO CONFINEMENT
CONFINEMENT
PHASE
NO IGNITION
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Top event scenarios (cont.), answer
 Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m3
LPG tank
PHASE
IGNITION
CONFINEMENT
DIRECT
2-PHASE
LIQUID
DELAYED
TOP EVENT
FIREBALL (BLEVE)
NO CONFINEMENT
FLASH FIRE
CONFINEMENT
UVCE
NO IGNITION
SAFE DISPERSION
DIRECT
POOL FIRE
DELAYED
PHASE
NO CONFINEMENT
FLASH FIRE
CONFINEMENT
UVCE
NO IGNITION
This Project is funded
by the European Union
SAFE DISPERSION
Ομάδα
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects
 Comment Domino effects from tanker BLEVE
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects
(cont.), comments example on “internal” effects
 Domino radius includes LPGSITE tanks.
Secondary accidents expected in LPGSITE
tanks, resulting, in worst-case, in more severe
consequences compared to primary accident
(tanker BLEVE), due to higher capacity of tanks
(100 m3) than tanker capacity (appr. 40 m3)
 Domino radius includes other LPGSITE areas
(e.g. cylinder filling station, piping network). Not
significant secondary accidents, due to less
severe consequences in those areas
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects
(cont.), comments example on “external” effects to
be made from LPGSITE
 Domino radius includes areas of GASCOMP site
 GASCOMP must be informed in order to take
the relevant risk into account in its own risk
assessments
 Usually no detailed map of neighbour site is
available, nor details of operation
 Not detailed comments to be made from
LPGSITE for accidents in GASCOMP
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects
(cont.), example of comments to be made from
GASCOMP (owner and responsible for risk analysis)
on “external” effects from LPGSITE primary
accident
 Domino area does not include GASCOMP tanks
area, or road tanker station. No secondary
accidents expected in this area (excluding
fragment effects)
 Domino area includes pump station
 GASCOMP must examine accidents in pump
station (and in piping included in domino area)
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
(cont.)
 Tank BLEVE accident in LPG installation located
within industrial park, close to village
o Very severe effects : 1500 TDU, 3rd degree burns in
more than 50% of exposed population
o Severe effects : 450 TDU, 3rd degree burns in 1% of
exposed population
o Mild effects : 170 TDU, 1st degree burns at
significant part of exposed population
(TDU : (kW/m2)4/3. sec, be careful with units)
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
(cont.)
 Comment on effects to population
 Comment on access to site
 Comment on effects to transportation routes
 Consider emergency planning actions
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
(cont.), comments example
 Very severe effects restricted within industrial
park. 3 neighbour sites in very sever effects
zone. Sections of 2 other neighbour sites in
very severe effects zone
 Severe effects restricted within industrial park.
A few additional sites within zone
 Mild effects zone includes mainly industrial
park, but approaches village limits
 No vulnerable places (schools etc.) within zones
examined
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
(cont.), comments example
 Access to site for emergency personnel is
established via 3 alternative routes
 No main transportation routes affected, only
roads within industrial park. Road to village
approached only by external zone
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people
(cont.), comments example
 Traffic blockage to be established at mild zone
limits, in order to avoid consequences to police
personnel
 Precautionary blocking traffic in wider area is
beneficial for protection from potential BLEVE
fragments
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people,
(cont.), comments example
 BLEVE can develop within rather limited
timeframe from initial event (e.g. jet flame from
nearby tank)
 Limited time can be available for protection
actions to be implemented by authorities
 Proper training for self-protection to affected
population, especially for the very severe and
severe effects zone, is indispensable
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people,
(cont.), comments example
 Evacuation from lethal zone is a priority, if time
is available. Absolute evacuation necessity for
area within fireball limit
 Enclosure to closed spaces (building internal,
away from windows) can be efficient protection
action for the other zones
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium