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This project is funded by the European Union
Projekat finansira Evropska Unija
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
EXAMPLE CASES IN LPG
AND OIL STORAGE
Antony Thanos
Ph.D. Chem. Eng.
[email protected]
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium
Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum
• HAZOP technique, liquid phase LPG line from tank
to pump. Examine deviations for :
o NO FLOW, LESS FLOW
o MORE TEMPERATURE
o LOSS OF CONTAINEMENT
LI
PI
LPG Tank
V-1
V-2
P-2
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in LPG (cont.), HAZOP form for use
No
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
1 No flow
2 Less flow
3
More
Temperature
4
Loss of
Containment
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in LPG (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
1 No Flow
2 Less Flow
Causes
Consequences
V1 or V2 closed Cavitation in pump,
and P2 starts potential pump
failure, as seal
failure with LPG
release, in
prolonged or
repeated cases
Level in tank
very low
(reduced
suction to
pump)
This Project is funded
by the European Union
As in No.1
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
No remote pump Develop written
start capability
procedure to require
(local only) and V2 check of proper line-up
very close to pump before pump start.
Closed suction
Installation of limit
results in
switches for V1 position
excessive noise, with position signal to
operator will
pump house.
immediately
identify incident
Procedures require Examine installation of
check for
level transmitter with
adequate level in level indication to pumptank before pump house, along with visual
start.
alarm, forcing pump trip
in very low level.
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in LPG (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
V1 and V2
More
closed in
3
Temperature summer
conditions
Piping
mechanical
failure
Collision of
Loss of
vehicle in piping
4
Containment
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Consequences
Thermal expansion
increases pressure,
potential for pipe
rupture
Release of LPG
from tank,
uncontrolled if V1
cannot close
(failure close to V1)
or failure upstream
of V1
Ομάδα
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
Piping test
Install Thermal Relief
pressure according Valve (TRV) between V1
to standards
and V2
Manual isolation
of V1
Install Fail-Safe remote
operated isolation valve
at valve outlet (internal if
possible)
Establish protection of
piping routing from
collisions
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Accident scenarios
 Define some worst-case scenarios for LPG
installation
LPG Road
Tanker 20 tn
2 in hose
Supply pipeline
from refinery
This Project is funded
by the European Union
LI
PI
2 in, gas phase
LPG Tank
200 m3
to other tanks,
compressor
LPG Tank
120 m3
to other tanks
6 in, liquid phase
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Accident scenarios (cont.), answers example
 Storage area (tanks)
o Catastrophic failure of 200 m3 tank
 Movement facilities
o Catastrophic failure of road tanker
o Catastrophic failure (FBR) of 6 inch pipeline
from refinery
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Top event scenarios
 Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m3
LPG tank, complete top events in event tree
PHASE
IGNITION
CONFINEMENT
TOP EVENT
DIRECT
2-PHASE
DELAYED
NO CONFINEMENT
CONFINEMENT
NO IGNITION
DIRECT
LIQUID
DELAYED
NO CONFINEMENT
CONFINEMENT
PHASE
NO IGNITION
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• Top event scenarios (cont.), answer
 Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m3
LPG tank
PHASE
IGNITION
CONFINEMENT
DIRECT
2-PHASE
LIQUID
DELAYED
TOP EVENT
FIREBALL (BLEVE)
NO CONFINEMENT
FLASH FIRE
CONFINEMENT
UVCE
NO IGNITION
SAFE DISPERSION
DIRECT
POOL FIRE
DELAYED
PHASE
NO IGNITION
This Project is funded
by the European Union
NO CONFINEMENT
FLASH FIRE
CONFINEMENT
UVCE
SAFE DISPERSION
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP technique, Diesel tank in Refinery. Examine
Pressure/Vacuum
deviations for tank:
Vent
 MORE TEMPERATURE
LI
 LESS/MORE LEVEL
 LESS/MORE PRESSURE
LAH
Emergency
Relief Vent
PVV
LAL
EV
LIT
EV
MOtorized Valves
LAHH
TI
MOV1
From
harbour
From
refinery unit
LSHH
MOV2
This Project is funded
by the European Union
To pumpstations
M
Mixer
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), HAZOP form for use
No
Deviation
1
More
Temperature
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
2 Less Level
3 More Level
4
Less
Pressure
5
More
Pressure
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
High
temperature in
feed from
refinery
(potential loss
of cooling water
More
1
Temperature at production
unit exit)
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Consequences
High pressure
Vapour pressure
exceeding flash
point (elevated
ignition hazard)
Safeguards
TI (local
Temperature
Indicator)
Mixer dampens
temperature
variations from
feeds
Comments,
Recommendations
Installation of
remoteTemperature
Transmitter at production
unit exit with
Temperature Indication
and Alarm High (TIAH)
Installation of remote
Temperature Transmitter
with multiple
temperature
measurements (TITs) at
various levels
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
2 Less Level
Causes
Consequences
Unattended
Potential loss of
withdrawal from suction in pumps,
tank via
with seal damage
pumpstation
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Mixer exposed,
potential damage in
mixer seal and
leak/ignition
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
LT, LAL (remote
Level Transmitter
with low level
alarm)
Install dedidated Low
Low Level Switch (LLLS)
with Alarm (LLLA) and
automatic stop of mixer
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
Unattended
feed from
refiner or port
3 More Level
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Consequences
Potential
overpessure with
overflow via EV or
tank failure and
leak to bund
Safeguards
LT, LAH (remote
Level Transmitter
with Level Alarm
High)
Comments,
Recommendations
Examine the potential of
water hammer effects
upstream harbour MOV1
during closure of MOV1
Dedicated Level
Switch High High
(LSHH) with
remote Level
Alarm High High
and automatic
closure of feed
MOVs
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
Excessive
withdrawal
flowrate from
pump station
4
Less
pressure
Consequences
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
Potential failure of PVVs prevent
Verify that PVV sizing for
tank shell with leak vacuum conditions vacuum is set according
to bund
to standards for max flow
to pumpstations
Rapid
temperature
drop in ambient
temperature
(cooling of
vapour space)
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium
• HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example
No
Deviation
Causes
High feed rate
5
More
Pressure
Consequences
Potential vapour
PVVs
release via EV and
EV
ignition
Wrorg
component feed
to tank (high
Tank failure and
volatile
leak to bund in
substance, (e.g. case of EV failure
gasoline)
Failure of PVVs
External fire
This Project is funded
by the European Union
Safeguards
Comments,
Recommendations
Verify capacity of PVV
according to standards
for max feed rate (either
ship or production unit)
Verify capacity of EV
according to standards
Verify that connections to
tank originate only from
diesel units and diesel
loading arms from
harbour
Project implemented by Human
Dynamics Consortium