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Reading Group “Networks, Crowds and Markets”

Session 1: Graph Theory and Social Networks

Overview

 Introduction Reading Group  Ch. 2 Graphs, Paths and Small Worlds  Ch. 3 Strength of Weak Ties  Ch. 4 Homophily  Schelling model Typ hier de footer 2

Introduction to the Reading Group

 Book:

Networks, Crowds and Markets

 Why this book?

 Multidisciplinary and Comprehensive 

Networks

: Jon Kleinberg, Computer Scientist 

Crowds and Markets

: David Easley: Economist  Up to date (2010)  Good Reputation Typ hier de footer 3

Introduction to the Reading Group

 Additional comments  Treated chapters are in Syllabus  Chapters are online:  http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks book/  Book is at Undergraduate level  Consider Advanced Material and additional papers when presenting Typ hier de footer 4

Chapter 2

GRAPHS, PATHS AND SMALL WORLDS

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A social network

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A financial network

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A technological network: ARPANET

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Graphs, Paths and Distances

 A network is mathematically represented by a graph, G=, a set of vertices (nodes) V and the edges (ties, links) between them  A graph can be directed or undirected Typ hier de footer 9

Graphs, Paths and Distances

 A path is a sequence of (distinct) nodes,

v 1 , v 2 , …, v k ,

such that for each

i

in {1,…,k-1} there is an edge between

v i

and

v i+1

GJHML is a path Typ hier de footer 10

Graphs, Paths and Distances

 The

distance

between two nodes

v 1

and

v 2

is the length of the shortest path between them Typ hier de footer The shortest path between G and L is (among others) GJHL and its length is 3 11

Small-World Phenomenon

 When we look at large social network with thousands of nodes, we find that distances are generally quite short, often less than 10. This is called the Small-World phenomenon  Stanley Milgram e.a. in 1960s: Small World Experiment  Random participants in Nebraska and Kansas were asked to send a chain letter to Boston through first name based acquaintances Typ hier de footer 12

Distribution of Chain Lengths

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Small Worlds

 Milgram found that average lengths of the chains in the experiment was around six  Six degrees of separation  This number has been replicated in other studies, e.g. Leskovec & Horvitz in Microsoft Instant Messenger network  Why is this?

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Small-World Phenomenon

 Suppose everyone has on average 100 acquaintances and there is little overlap between acquaintanceships  Me: 1  Acquaintances: 100  Acquaintances at distance 2: 100^2=10,000  Acquaintances at distance 3: 100^3=1,000,000  Acquaintances at distance 4: 100^4=100,000,000  Acquaintances at distance 5: 100^5=10,000,000,000 Typ hier de footer 15

Chapter 3

STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES

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Strength of Weak Ties

 Links differ in terms of strength  Friends vs. Acquaintance  Amount of contact time, affection, trust  Mark Granovetter (1974):

Getting a Job

 Jobseekers obtain useful job info through social network  More often from acquaintances than from close friends  Why?

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Strength of Weak Ties

 Granovetter (1973):

The Strength of Weak Ties

 Link between

local network property

and

global network structure

 Local:

Triadic closure

of triads with strong ties  Local-Global: Strong ties cannot be

bridges

 Global: Bridges more important for information transmission  Conclusion: Weak ties are more important for information transmission Typ hier de footer 18

Strength of Weak Ties

 Triadic closure of triads with strong ties  A satisfies

strong triadic closure property:

 for all B and C for which there is a strong tie AB and AC, there is also a (strong or weak) tie BC B A C B A Typ hier de footer C 19

Strength of Weak Ties

 A

bridge

is a tie that connects two otherwise unconnected components  Information within group is often same  Information between groups is different  Bridge provides link to different information source, and is therefore more important E B C D A Typ hier de footer F 20

Strength of Weak Ties

 Tie AB is a

local bridge

if A and B have no friends in common  The span of a local bridge AB is the distance between A and B after removal of AB itself AB is a

local bridge

of span 4 A B Typ hier de footer 21

Strength of Weak Ties

 Claim: if a node A satisfies the Strong Triadic Closure and is involved in at least two strong ties, then

any local bridge

it is involved in

must be a weak tie

 Proof by contradiction: suppose C satisfies STC and CD is a strong bridge, then there is a triple BCD with BC and CD strong. But then, BD should be linked.

B E C D A Typ hier de footer 22 F

Strength of Weak Ties

 Empirical support

for

Strength of Weak Ties Theory  Onnela et al. (2007)  Empirical support

against

Strength of Weak Ties Theory  Van der Leij & Goyal (2011) Typ hier de footer 23

Chapter 4

HOMOPHILY

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Homophily

 Agents in a social network have

other characteristics

apart from their links  Non-mutable: race, gender, age  Mutable: place to live, occupation, activities, opinions, beliefs  Links and mutable characteristics co-evolve over time Typ hier de footer 25

Homophily

 When we take a snapshot in time, we observe that these node characteristics are correlated across links  E.g. Academics have often academic friends, etc.

 This phenomenon that people are linked to similar others is called

homophily

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Homophily at a U.S. High School

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Homophily

 Mechanisms underlying Homophily  Selection  A and B have similar characteristics -> A and B form a link AB  Social Influence  A and B have a link -> B chooses the same (mutable) characteristic as A  E.g. A starts smoking, and B follows (peer pressure) Typ hier de footer 28

Social-Affiliation Network

 Network of persons and social

foci

(activities) Typ hier de footer 29

Triadic Closure

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Focal Closure

Selection

:

Karate

introduces

Anna

to

Daniel

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Membership Closure

Social Influence

:

Anna

introduces

Bob

to

Karate

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Homophily

 Both Selection and Social Influence drive homophily  How important is each mechanism?

 Important question: Different mechanism implies different policy,  e.g. Policy to prevent teenagers from smoking  Social Influence. Target “key players” and let them positively influence rest  Selection. Target on characteristics (e.g. family background) alone Typ hier de footer 33

Homophily

 Both Selection and Social Influence drive homophily  How important is each mechanism?

 Difficult question:  Requires longitudinal data  Requires observation of (almost) all characteristics  If a characteristic is not observed, then social influence effect is overestimated Typ hier de footer 34

Homophily

 Measuring the mechanisms behind homophily is a hot topic  Kossinets & Watts (2006): Detailed course and e-mail interaction data from university  Centola (2010, 2011): Experimental data on social influence controlling network structure  Sacerdote: Social influence among students after randomized dorm assignment Typ hier de footer 35

Homophily and Segregation

 Neighborhoods tend to be segregated according to race or culture  Ghetto formation  What is the mechanism behind that?

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Segregation in Chicago

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Homophily and Segregation

 Segregation model of Thomas Schelling  Agent-based model  Two different agents: X and O types  Agents live on a grid 

weak satisficing preferences for homophily

 At least

k

of the 8 neighbors of same type  Each period, agents who are not satisfied move to a location where they are Typ hier de footer 38

Schelling’s model (k=3)

X Typ hier de footer 39

Schelling’s model (k=3)

X Typ hier de footer 40

Schelling’s model online

 http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/project s/schelling/ Typ hier de footer 41

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Schelling’s model

 Surprising relation between

micro-behavior

and

macro-outcomes

 Weak satisficing preferences for homophily sufficient to create complete segregation  Segregation arises due to miscoordination  There exists an allocation involving

complete integration satisfying all agents

, but individual decisionmaking does not lead to that outcome Typ hier de footer 43

Overview

 Introduction Reading Group  Ch. 2 Graphs, Paths and Small Worlds  Ch. 3 Strength of Weak Ties  Ch. 4 Homophily  Schelling model  Planning  Next week: 6 March 13:00  Natasa Golo and Dan Braha  Next Reading Group: 13 March 13:30 h  44