Transcript The Tonkin Gulf Incident

The Tonkin Gulf Incident
Making the Vietnam War Official
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
two separate incidents involving naval forces of
North Vietnam and the US in the waters of the Gulf of
Tonkin
1.
On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox engaged three
North Vietnamese torpedo boats, resulting in damage
to the three boats.
2.
On August 4 the Maddox reported a second
engagement with North Vietnamese vessels.
This second report was later concluded to be incorrect
Background
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the
first year of the Johnson administration
Johnson's supported military escalation in
Vietnam
After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson
ordered in more American forces to support
the Saigon government
Background
According to the U.S. Naval Institute, covert actions
against North Vietnam had begun under the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961.
The night before the launching of the actions against
North Vietnam facilities, a covert team was captured in
North Vietnam territory
Also that night two flights of CIA-sponsored Laotian
fighter-bombers attacked border outposts well within
southwestern North Vietnam
The Hanoi government assumed that they were all a
coordinated effort to escalate military actions against
North Vietnam.
The 1st Incident
On July 31, 1964, the Maddox had begun its
intelligence collection mission in the gulf
The Maddox was under orders not to approach
closer than eight miles from the North's coast
On August 2, Maddox claimed it was attacked by
three North Vietnamese patrol boats 28 miles
away from the North Vietnamese coast in
international waters
The 1st Incident
Maddox evaded a torpedo attack and opened
fire with its guns, forcing the patrol craft away
U.S. aircraft were launched then attacked the
retiring patrol boats, claiming one as sunk and
one heavily damaged
Maddox, suffering very minor damage retired to
South Vietnamese waters
The 2nd Incident
On August 4, another North Vietnamese patrol
off the North Vietnamese coast was launched
This time the Maddox was to close to no more
than 11 miles from the coast of North Vietnam
During an evening and early morning of rough
weather and heavy seas, they received radar,
sonar, and radio signals that they believed
signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese
navy
The 2nd Incident
For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets
and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual
reports of enemies.
At 1:30 am Washington time, Maddox sent a cable in
which he admitted that the attack may never have
happened and that there may have been no Vietnamese
craft in the area
One hour later, Maddox sent another cable, stating,
"Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent
ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance
in daylight by aircraft."
The 2nd Incident
At 6 pm Washington time, Maddox cabled yet
again, this time stating,
"the first boat to close the Maddox probably fired
a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but
not seen. All subsequent Maddox torpedo
reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that
sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller
beat"
Consequences
President Johnson, who was up for election that year,
launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national
television
Although Maddox had been involved in providing
intelligence support for South Vietnamese Defense
Secretary McNamara denied that the U.S. Navy had
supported South Vietnamese military operations in the
Gulf
He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since
the ship had been in international waters
Consequences
As a result of his testimony, on August 7,
Congress passed a joint resolution titled the
Southeast Asia Resolution, which granted
President Johnson the authority to conduct
military operations in Southeast Asia
The Resolution gave President Johnson
approval "to take all necessary steps, including
the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense
of its freedom."
The Aftermath
Just a few days after the incident, President
Johnson commented privately: "For all I know,
our Navy was shooting at whales out there."
In 1981, Captain Herrick of the Maddox reexamined the ship's log and determined that the
first torpedo report from August 4th, which
Herrick had maintained had occurred—the
"apparent ambush"—was in fact unfounded