Transcript One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic Dies and a Part

One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic
Dies and a Part-time Fire
Fighter/Paramedic is Injured When
Caught in a Residential
Structure Flashover – Illinois
Department Make-up
• Career Department
– 15 full-time
– 17 part-time
• 20,000 population in 4 sq miles
• 3 engines, 1 aerial, 2 ALS ambulances, 1 squad
• Typically 4 – 6 personnel per shift with Lt in
command vehicle
Department Make-up
• Minimum manning 5
– 3 for engine
– 2 for ambulance
• Depending on call crew took engine, ladder or
squad
• Rely heavily on mutual aid (regionalization)
The Structure
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One-story wood-frame built in 1951
950 sq feet of living space
Built on concrete slab
2 car garage on D-side connected by a family
room addition.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
17616 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood,
Illinois
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17622 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood
Incident Information
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March 30, 2010
Approximately 9pm 53o
5 people on duty
Typical dispatch for structure assignment
– Lt and 2 FF on Engine
– 2 FF/PM on ambulance
Timeline
• 2055: 911 Call received
• 2057: Units dispatched
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E534 – Lt and 2 FF
A564 – 2 FF/Medics
T1220 – Lt and 3 FF
E1340 – Lt and 4 FF
T1145 – Lt and 3 FF
S440 – Lt 3 FF
• 2101: E534/T1220/A564 On Scene
Timeline
• 2103: E1340 On Scene
• 2106: T1145/S440 On Scene
• 2109: Flashover and FF down
Illinois - LODD
Illinois - LODD
Scene conditions after crews
advanced inside.
Contributing Factors
• Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon
arrival
• Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up
• Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
• Ineffective fire control tactics
• Failure to recognize, understand, and react to
deteriorating conditions
Contributing Factors
• Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire
behavior
• Removal of self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
• Inadequate command, control, and
accountability
• Insufficient staffing.
Key Recommendations
• Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational sizeup is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it
is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versusgain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped
occupants is conducted prior to committing to
interior fire fighting operations
• Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the
fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the
given fire load and structure, use of fire streams,
appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate
personnel to operate the hoseline
Key Recommendations
• Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when
operating on the fireground, especially when
performing interior fire suppression activities
• Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound
understanding of fire behavior and the ability to
recognize indicators of fire development and the
potential for extreme fire behavior
Key Recommendations
• Ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters
understand the influence of ventilation on fire
behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with
suppression techniques to release smoke and heat
• Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA
emergency procedures.
The victim, FF1, and injured fire fighter/paramedic are
operating the 2 ½ inch hoseline inside the structure
View of flashover.
• Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational
size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and
others where it is physically possible and
ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a
survivability profile for trapped occupants is
conducted prior to committing to interior fire
fighting operations
• Ensure that interior fire suppression crews
attack the fire effectively to include
appropriate fire flow for the given fire load
and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate
hose and nozzle selection, and adequate
personnel to operate the hoseline
• Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew
integrity when operating on the fireground,
especially when performing interior fire
suppression activities
• Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a
sound understanding of fire behavior and the
ability to recognize indicators of fire
development and the potential for extreme
fire behavior
• Ensure that incident commanders and fire
fighters understand the influence of
ventilation on fire behavior and effectively
coordinate ventilation with suppression
techniques to release smoke and heat
• Ensure that fire fighters use their selfcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are
trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
• Fire departments should ensure that
adequate staffing is available to respond to
emergency incidents.
• Fire departments should ensure that staff for
emergency medical services is available at all
times during fireground operations.
• Fire departments and dispatch centers should
ensure they are capable of communicating
with each other without having to monitor
multiple channels/frequencies on more than
one radio.
• Fire departments should ensure that the
incident commander, or designee, maintains
close accountability for all personnel operating
on the fireground.
• Fire departments should ensure that fire
fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing
and personal protective equipment
appropriate for the assigned task while
participating in fire suppression.
• Fire departments should ensure that a
separate incident safety officer, independent
from the incident commander, is appointed at
each structure fire.
• Fire departments should ensure that all fire
fighters are equipped with a means to
communicate with fireground personnel
before entering a structure fire.