Transcript scws2 6672

Secret Sharing: Linear vs. Nonlinear Schemes
(A Survey)
Amos Beimel
Ben-Gurion
University
Slides borrowed
from Yuval Ishai,
Enav Weinreb.
Secret Sharing
[Shamir79,Blakley79,ItoSaitoNishizeki87]
01001001101111
0001101001001©
11111001101101

00101001010111
11001011110011
01001001101111
00011011001001
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
2
Talk Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Motivation and definitions
Linear secret sharing schemes
Nonlinear secret sharing schemes
Computational secret sharing
Conclusions and open problems
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
3
Def: Secret Sharing
P1
P2
s1
s2

Pn
sn

s
r
{P ,..., P }
• Access Structure   2 1 n
•  realizes  if:
Correctness: every authorized set B can always recover s.
Privacy: every unauthorized set B cannot learn anything
about s.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
4
Applications
• Secure storage;
• Secure multiparty computation;
• Threshold cryptography;
• Byzantine agreement;
• Access control;
• Private information retrieval;
• Attribute-based encryption.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
5
The Threshold Case
• (t,n)-secret-sharing:  = { B  {P1,…,Pn} : |B|  t }
Shamir’s scheme:
– s GF(q),
q > n  prime
– p(x)=s+r1x+r2x2+…+ rt-1xt-1 (mod q)
– sj= p(j )
s
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
6
The General Case
Which access structures  can be realized?
• Necessary condition:  is monotone.
• Also sufficient!
minimal sets
s
{2,4}
s
{1,2}
s
{1,3,5}
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
Not efficient!!!!
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
7
Are there Efficient Schemes?
• The known schemes for general access structures have
shares of size 2O(n).
• Best lower bound for an explicit structure [Csirmaz94]:
(n2 / logn)
• Nothing better is known even for non-explicit structures!
– large gap
Conjecture: There is an access structure that
requires shares of size 2Ω(n).
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
8
Talk Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Motivation and definitions
Linear secret sharing schemes
Nonlinear secret sharing schemes
Computational secret sharing
Conclusions and open problems
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
9
Linear Secret-Sharing
P1
Pn
P2

F
Linear Transformation
s
r1
r2
r
m
F
Examples:
• Shamir’s scheme
• Formula based Schemes [BenalohLeichter88]
• Monotone span programs [KrachmerWigderson93]
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
10
Linear Schemes and Span Program
Monotone Span programs – linear algebraic
model of computation [KarchmerWigderson93].
Equivalent to Linear schemes.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
11
Monotone Span Programs
P2
1
1
0
1
P2
0
1
1
0
P1
0
1
1
0
P3
1
1
0
0
P4
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
The program accepts a set B
iff
the rows labeled by B span the target vector.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
12
Monotone Span Programs
P2
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
P2
0
1
1
0
P1
0
1
1
0
P3
1
1
0
0
P4
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
{P2,P4}
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
13
Monotone Span Programs
P2
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
P2
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
P1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
P3
1
1
0
0
P4
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
{P1,P2}
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
14
Span Programs  Secret Sharing
P2
1
1
0
1
s
s+ r2+r4
P2
P2
0
1
1
0
r2
r2+r3
P2
P1
0
1
1
0
r3
r2+r3
P1
P3
1
1
0
0
r4
s+r2
P3
P4
0
0
1
1
r3+r4
P4
Example s=1,r2=r3=0, r4=1
10/25/2006
=
0
P2
0
P2
0
P1
1
P3
1
P4
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
15
Span Programs  Secret Sharing
P2
1
1
0
1
s
s+r2+r4
P2
P2
0
1
1
0
r2
r2+r3
P2
P1
0
1
1
0
r3
r2+r3
P1
P3
1
1
0
0
r4
s+r2
P3
P4
0
0
1
1
r3+r4
P4
1
0
0
0
=
s
{P2,P4}
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
16
Linear Schemes: State of the Art
• Every access structure can be realized by a linear scheme.
• Most known schemes are linear.
• Linear schemes can efficiently realize only access structures in NC
(NC = languages having efficient parallel algorithms).
• Best lower bounds for linear schemes for explicit access structures
[B+GalPaterson95,BabaiGalWigderson96,Gal98,GalPudlak03]:
(nlog n).
• Best existential lower bounds for linear schemes: 2(n).
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
17
Why Linear Secret Sharing?
• Share generation and secret reconstruction are efficient.
• Perfect privacy for free
• Homomorphic
– Secure multi-party computation [CramerDamgardMaurer2000]
Why not?
• Can only realize access structures in NC.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
18
Homomorphism of Linear Secret Sharing
P2
1
1
0
1
s
y1
P2
0
1
1
0
r2
y2
P1
0
1
1
0
P3
P2
P4
P2
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0+
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
r3 0
0
r4 1
s’
0
r’2
P1
0
1
1
0
r’3
P3
1
1
0
0
r’4
P4
0
0
1
1
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
=11
1
1
0
=
0 1
1 y3 0
1 0
y
0 40
1y’
y51 1
y’2
s+s’
y1+y’1
r2 +r’2
y2+y’2
r3+ r’3
r4 + r’4
=
y3+y’3
y4+y’4
y5+y’5
y’3
y’4
y’5
19
Multiplicative Homomorphism of Linear Secret
Sharing [….,CramerDamgardMaurer2000]
P2
P2
P1
P3
P4
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
s
y1
r2
y2
r3
=
y3
y4
r4
PROTOCOL
*
P2
P2
P1
P3
P4
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
z1
y5
s’
y’1
r’2
y’2
r’3
r’4
=
y’3
z2
z3
z4
z5
y’4
y’5
Shares for s * s’
Access structure must be Q2
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
20
Talk Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Motivation and definitions
Linear secret sharing schemes
Nonlinear secret sharing schemes
Computational secret sharing
Conclusions and open problems
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
21
Constructing Nonlinear scheme
Two constructions:
1. Composition Approach  no assumptions, access structures
in NC.
2. Direct Constructions  access structures probably not in P.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
22
Nonlinear Schemes: Composition Approach
[B+Ishai01]
P1
…. P
n
Linear over GF(2)
S1
…. P
Pn+1
2n
Linear over GF(3)
S2
S= S1+S2
[B+Weinreb03]:
• access structure: easy over GF(2), hard over any other field
• access structure: easy over GF(3), hard over any other field
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
23
Nonlinear schemes: Direct Constructions
[B+Ishai01]
computationally
efficient?
10/25/2006
perfect /
statistical
access structure
equivalent to...
quadratic residuosity
modulo a (fixed) prime
Yes
perfect
Yes
statistical
co-primality
No
statistical
quadratic residuosity
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
24
Quadratic Non-Residuosity Modulo Fixed Prime
First idea: represent a set of numbers by an access structure
Only sets that contain exactly one party from each column
n = 2m
1
B1101
0
u
p fixed
p is defined by the minimal sets { Bu : u  QNRp }.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
25
Efficient Nonlinear Scheme
s = 0:
r +z3
Info. to be learned by Bu
0 +z2
0 +z1
0 +z0
1
r +z3
0 +z2
0 +z1
0 +z0
0
s = 1:
rR QRp
SUM
p
 =zir=mod
0 (mod
v)
u  QRp  SUM  QRp
u  Parties
QNRp 
 QRp
can SUM
only sum
shares
Correctness
Privacy
23r +z3 22r +z2 21r +z1 20r +z0
1
0 +z3
0
10/25/2006
0 +z2
0 +z1
0 +z0
SUM = ru mod p
u  QRp
 SUM  QRp
u  QNRp  SUM  QNRp
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
26
Talk Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Motivation and definitions
Linear secret sharing schemes
Nonlinear secret sharing schemes
Computational secret sharing
Conclusions and open problems
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
27
Computational Secret Sharing
Secret sharing schemes with computational privacy:
• Computational privacy: every set of polynomial time
players P cannot learn anything about s.
Thm [Yao89]:
If there is a polynomial size monotone circuit computing
membership in  then there is an efficient
computational secret sharing realizing  .
Uses ideas from [BenalohLeichter90] of constructing
information theoretic secret sharing from monotone
formulae.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
28
Secret Sharing Schemes from Monotone
Formulae [BenalohLeichter90]
• We represent an access structure  by its
characteristic function.
• Let f , g : {0,1}n  {0,1} be two monotone functions.
• Let S f and S g be secret sharing schemes for f and
g.
• We build new secret sharing schemes for:
– The function
– The function
10/25/2006
f g.
f g .
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
29
The Function f  g
s
g
f
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
30
The Function f  g
r
s
sr
f
10/25/2006
g
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
31
Secret Sharing from Formula
• Formula - monotone circuit with fan-out 1.
• Small monotone formula  efficient secret sharing:
– Share the secret according
to the root gate.
– Treat the shares as
secrets and recursively
share them in both sides
of the formula.






10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace



32
Does it work for Monotone Circuits?
• One gate has many outputs.
• Gets a share for each output.
• Share a bigger secret among its subcircuit.




…






Exponential Blowup

10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
33
Yao’s Solution
• Use encryption to avoid the blow-up.
• Publish the cryptogram and share the key.
• Computational Security.




E( ,  ) =
10/25/2006
…

E( ,  ) =
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace




34
Talk Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Motivation and definitions
Linear secret sharing schemes
Nonlinear secret sharing schemes
Computational secret sharing
Conclusions and open problems
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
35
Conclusions
• Linearity is useful.
• However, linear schemes can realize only access
structures in NC.
• Nonlinear schemes can efficiently realize some
“computationally hard” access structures.
• Exact power of nonlinear schemes remains unknown.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
36
Open Problems:
• Close gap for secret sharing schemes
– Improve (n2 / logn) lower bound.
• Exponential lower bounds for linear schemes
– Improve (nlog n) lower bound.
• Specific access structures:
– Directed s-t-connectivity,
– Perfect Matching,
– Weighted threshold [B+Weinreb].
• Other nonlinear schemes.
10/25/2006
IPAM - Securing Cyberspace
37