Transcript 下載/瀏覽
多媒體網路安全實驗室 A novel user identification scheme with key distribution preserving user anonymity for distributed computer networks Date:2011/10/12 報告人:向峻霈 出處: Chien-Lung Hsu Yu-Hao Chuang Information Sciences pp. 422-429 ,2009 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Related work 3 Proposed scheme 4 5 3 Functionality comparison Conclusion 2 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Introduction The distributed computer networks allow hosts and user terminals connected into the same network share information and computing power 3 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Introduction (2/2) Security problems in the distributed computer networks user identification key distribution user anonymity 4 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Related work Review of the Yang et al. and Mangipudi– Katti schemes 5 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Key generation phase SCPC sets up the system parameters Nj =pj*qj selects two integers ej and dj such that ejdj =1 mod φ(Nj) φ(Nj) = (pj-1)(qj-1) chooses a generator g in the field ZNj a hash function H(m) on a message a symmetric-key cryptosystem such as AES public parameters =>ej, Nj, gj, and IDj secret =>dj,pj,qj 6 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase-(Yang et al. scheme) Client Service request Server Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ IDj mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = gt ‧ SiH(w,T) y = Eki|(IDi) M3 = (w,x,y,T) Ki| = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi 檢查ID表是否存在 w IDiH(w,T) mod N = xe mod N 7 Accepts this login request 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase-(SIKA) Client Service request Server Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N u = gjv v = H(Z,T,IDj)dj M2 =(Z,T,u) u = H(Z,T,IDj) uej mod Nj = gju mod Nj a = Ze ‧ IDj mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = gt ‧ SiH(w,T’) y = Eki|(IDi) M3 = (x,y,p,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dki|(y) -> IDi 檢查ID表是否存在 w IDiH(w,T’) mod N = xe mod N 8 Accepts this login request 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) Server M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) D’i = Di 9 Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Security analysis Security of the private keys Security of the session keys Security of user identification Security of user anonymity Prevention of a DoS attack 10 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) Server M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) D’i = Di Security of the private keys 11 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) Server M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) D’i = Di Security of the session keys 12 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) Server M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) D’i = Di Security of user identification 13 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) D’i = Di Server M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) //the adversary will face the problems of solving the DLP Security of user annymity 14 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Anonymous user identification and key agreement phase Client Service request Sj = IDjd mod N Z = gk ‧ Sj-1 mod N M2 =(Z) a = Ze ‧ ID-1j mod N Kij = at mod N w =get mod N x = Sjh(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N y = Ekij(IDi) D’i = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) Server //Z,T,IDj M3 = (w,x,y,T) M4=(Di,T’) Kij = wk mod N Dkij(y) -> IDi IDih(Kij||Z||w||T) mod N = xe mod N Di = h(Kij || T’ || Z || IDi || IDj) D’i = Di Prevention of a DoS attack 15 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Functionality comparison Th : the time for executing a one-way hash function Tinv : the time for executing a modular inverse computation Tmul : the time for executing a modular multiplication computation Texp : the time for executing a modular exponentiation computation Tenc : the time for executing a symmetric-key encryption Tdec : the time for executing a symmetric-key decryption |x| : the bit length of x 16 Communi cation costs Ui Pj The Lee -Chang 4|N| + |T| Th + 5Tmul + 5Texp Th + Tinv + 2Tmul + 4Texp 1999 The Wu–Hsu 3|N| + |T| Th + Tinv + 3Tmul + 4Texp Th + Tinv + 2Tmul + 4Texp 2004 The Yang et al. 3|N| + |T| + |IDi| Tenc + Th + 3Tmul + 5Texp Tdec + Th + Tinv + 2Tmul + 4Texp 2004 The Mangipudi– Katti 4|N| + 2|T| + |IDi| Tenc + 2Th + 3Tmul + 7Texp Tdec + 2Th + Tinv + 3Tmul + 5Texp 2006 The proposed 3|N| + |T| + |IDi| Tenc + Th + Tinv + 2Tmul + 4Texp Tdec + Th + Tmul + 4Texp 2009 The proposed scheme against a DoS attacka 4|N| + 2|T| + |IDi| Tenc + 2Th + Tinv + 2Tmul + 6Texp Tdec + 2Th + 2Tmul + 5Texp 2009 Computational complexities 多媒體網路安全實驗室 年份 17 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Functionality comparison C1 : Prevention of a replay attack. C2 : Prevention of a compromising attack ? C3 : Prevention of an identity disclosure attack C4 : Prevention of an impersonation attack C5 : Prevention of a compromising attack ? C6 : Prevention of a DoS attack C7 : Mutual authentication C8 : Session key establishment C9 : Session key confirmation from the user to the service provider C10 : Session key confirmation from the service provider to the user 18 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Functionality comparison The Lee-Chang scheme The Wu–Hsu scheme Yang et al.’s scheme The Mangipudi –Katti scheme The proposed scheme C1 O O O O O C2 O X O O O C3 X X X X O C4 X X O O O C5 O X O O O C6 X X X O O C7 X X X O O C8 O O O O O C9 X X O O O C10 X X X X O 19 多媒體網路安全實驗室 Conclusion Yang et al.’s scheme suffers from identity disclosure attack and DoS attack. The proposed scheme can withstand the possible attacks and achieve mutual authentication. 20 多媒體網路安全實驗室