Transcript 150307-09MN003-Makita presentation-IT9E.ppt

ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥᐅᑦ ᒪᑭᑕᒍᓇᕐᓂᖏᑦ
Nunavummiut
Makitagunarningit
Nunavummiut Makitagunarningit, or
‘Makita’ for short, is an independent, nongovernmental organization made up of
Nunavummiut who came together in the
fall of 2009 to share our concerns about
the possibility of Nunavut being opened to
uranium mining.
Everything we do, we do as volunteers.
One of the first things Makita did was
lobby the Government of Nunavut to call a
public inquiry into all aspects of the
possibility of uranium mining in Nunavut.
The GN denied Makita’s request.
I will summarize Makita’s comments on
AREVA’s Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS).
1) Analysis of Timeline
AREVA’s statement that the world price for
uranium will increase in the near future
may reflect overly optimist projections
about the future of nuclear power.
In their opening presentation to this
hearing, AREVA used a graph to explain
that the world will need a lot more
uranium in order to power nuclear
reactors.
Who made that graph? Where did it come
from?
It was made in 2011 by the World Nuclear
Association (WNA), an organization that
promotes nuclear power and supports the
many companies that comprise the global
nuclear industry. It is not an objective
organization.
The WNA estimates of demand for
uranium in the future are based on their
own estimates of installed nuclear
generating capacity in the future.
What do independent organizations say,
and predict?
Let’s look at ‘Uranium 2014: Resources,
Production and Demand’, prepared jointly
by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s
Nuclear Energy Agency and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
That report looked around the world at
each country that has (or might have)
nuclear reactors, and developed a Low
estimate and a High estimate of the
installed nuclear generating capacity for
each country until the year 2035.
Note that for Canada, both the Low and
the High estimate are lower than what the
present-day capacity is.
The authors then calculated total
estimated installed nuclear generating
capacity for (A) the 34 OECD countries, and
(B) the entire world.
From that basis, the report estimates the
“annual reactor-related uranium
requirements” for each country. Again
there is a Low estimate and a High
estimate.
And again the report calculated the
“annual reactor-related uranium
requirements” for (A) the 34 OECD
countries, and (B) the entire world.
The independent OECD/IAEA estimates of
how much uranium will be needed to
power nuclear reactors in the future are
significantly lower than the industry-group
WMA’s estimates are.
WNA estimates are in red,
OECD/IAEA estimates are in blue
The World Nuclear Association hopes that future
demand for uranium will look like the red line:
But the OECD and the IAEA believe it will be
no higher than the blue line:
And it could be as low as the green line:
It is because the World Nuclear Association
is super-optimistic about the future of
nuclear power that it is also superoptimistic about the demand for uranium.
If the demand for uranium for nuclear
reactors in the coming years is lower than
the WMA estimates, then logically the
price of uranium will also be lower.
An interesting analysis published in the
journal Nuclear Engineering International
in 2014 concluded that nuclear companies
like AREVA are “incurable optimists.” They
believe their own propaganda.
Note the sub-title of the article:
“Predictions of the rise in price of uranium
are unjustified.”
If Kiggavik is approved and actually gets
built, the Kivalliq region faces:
• the prospect of the entire region being
opened to uranium development;
• induced development after the Kiggavik
mine is opened; and,
• significant cumulative impacts without
protection in place for the caribou
calving and post-calving grounds.
And if Kiggavik is approved but remains
unbuilt because the price of uranium
remains low, we will have uncertainty
hanging over our heads for years.
Makita agrees with the HTO that the lack
of a start date for the project makes many
of the analyses and conclusions contained
in the FEIS so uncertain that they are
largely unreliable.
2) Cumulative Effects and the BasinOpening Nature of the Kiggavik Proposal
The current planning and policy framework
is insufficient to protect critical wildlife
habitat and important Inuit cultural areas
from the induced development that would
result from the approval of the Kiggavik
proposal.
The Kiggavik proposal and its basinopening potential poses a serious threat to
the long-term viability of the Kivalliq
region’s caribou herds and potentially their
harvesting by Baker Lake Inuit.
3) Significance Thresholds
Our concern regarding significance
thresholds has not been resolved to our
satisfaction.
To Inuit, being able to reasonably access
the caribou herds we depend on IS A VERY
SIGNIFICANT THRESHOLD.
4) AREVA’s Track Record
In addition to the Saskatchewan story,
there’s also the Niger story – and it’s not a
entirely happy one…
AREVA’s parent company in France is in
financial crisis.
Last Wednesday AREVA declared a financial
loss of $6.5 billion. This is a staggering
amount of money, more than the
company’s entire value on the stock
market.
There has been speculation in the financial
press that, as part of restructuring, AREVA
may sell its uranium mining operations.
Yesterday The New York Times ran a story
suggesting that AREVA’s huge mine in Niger
might be sold to Chinese investors.
Makita believes that NIRB must seriously
consider the implications of the possibility
that AREVA might sell its rights to the
Kiggavik deposit to another company.
5) Shipping with Reference to Land and
Water
Makita has serious concerns about AREVA’s
uncertainty re: an all-weather or a winter
road, the possible impacts of an allweather road, and the lack of scientific
data about the impact of roads on caribou.
6) NTI and GN Uranium Policy Statements
NTI: One ‘principle’ (the economic one)
should not be allowed to trump the others
(especially the one about protecting health).
GN: Is the stated principle that uranium
projects must have the support of
neighbouring communities meaningless
now that a proposal is being reviewed?
7) End Uses
Our expert advisors tell us that international
agreements that uranium mined in Canada
can never be used for nuclear weapons are
meaningless accounting exercises.
We have a moral issue with that. It does not
reflect our priorities and values as per NLCA
article 12.2.5 (c).
7) Conclusion
For all of the reasons outlined in this
presentation, Nunavummiut
Makitagunarningit urges you – and I urge
you – to reject the proposed Kiggavik
uranium mine.
Ma’na.