Transcript 6. JAPAN: STILL THE ‘REACTIVE STATE’? 1. The ‘1955 system’

6. JAPAN: STILL THE ‘REACTIVE STATE’?
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The ‘1955 system’
Japanese foreign & trade policy in the Cold War
The ‘reactive state’
Post-Cold War Japanese politics
Debate: ‘Will the Japanese sun rise again?’
Japan’s international & regional roles
Conclusion
1. THE ‘1955 SYSTEM’
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LDP (Conservative) dominance
‘Iron triangle’ (LDP, big business, bureaucracy)
LDP factionalism
Electoral system with multi-member constituencies
Endemic corruption
Weak political leadership (‘the buck keeps circulating’)
Strong bureaucracy
Economic nationalism & important (but declining)
economic role for the state (‘administrative
guidance’)
2. JAPANESE FOREIGN & TRADE POLICY IN
THE COLD WAR
• Constitutional ban on war & maintenance of
armed forces (in practice circumvented)
 Alliance & security treaty with the US, 1951 Yoshida Doctrine:
* Abstention from international conflicts
* Reliance on US military protection
* Focus on ‘catching up’ economically with West
• Support for multilateral trading system, but
largely a bystander in international
negotiations
JAPAN’S PASSIVE INTERNATIONAL ROLE
‘At the UN Law of the Sea Conferences in the 1970s,
although Japan accounted for a fourth of the world’s
catch of fish, a sixth of the merchant shipping, and a
fifth of the maritime freight & was heavily dependent on
seabed minerals, “Japan … championed no significant
causes, took no major initiatives, was not a key consensusbuilder, & was not associated with any major formulation.”’
Kenneth W. Pyle, ‘Japan: Opportunism in the Pursuit of
Power’, in: Robert Pastor (ed.), A Century’s Journey:
How the Great Powers Shape the World (New York:
Basic Books, 1999), p. 279
3. JAPAN: THE ‘REACTIVE STATE’
Its two distinguishing traits
• ‘Fails to undertake major independent foreign
economic policy initiatives when it has the power
& national incentives to do so’
• ‘Responds to outside pressures for change, albeit
erratically, unsystematically & often incompletely’
Kent Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy
Formation: Explaining the Reactive State’,
World Politics 40:4 (July 1988), p. 519
3. JAPAN: THE ‘REACTIVE STATE’ (Contd.)
Determinants
• Late development – forced to respond to conditions
determined by Western powers
• Lessons of World War II: wisdom of ‘self-restraint’
• Yoshida Doctrine & dependence on US
• Structural weakness of political leadership
4. POST-COLD WAR JAPANESE POLITICS
• LDP split & lost power – temporarily – under
weight of political scandals in 1993
• In non-LDP interregnum, Hosokawa govt introduces
anti-corruption electoral reforms
• Rather than the LDP, the former principal opposition
party – the Socialists – has declined
• Predictions of the demise of the 1955 system (case,
van Wolferen) have proven premature
WHY JAPAN MATTERS
‘The fate of Japan’s economy is no longer a matter
only for Japanese or even for Japanese and
Americans. Somehow persuading Japanese
leaders to do the heart transplant of deregulation
and decartelization as well as the blood transfusion
of fiscal stimulation is of the utmost importance
to the entire world’
Clyde Prestowitz, quoted in: Manfred Pohl,
‘Japan und die Zukunft der ASEANStaaten’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
B48/98, 20 November 1998, p. 24
JAPANESE POLICY PARALYSIS
‘The LDP appears paralyzed, too closely enmeshed
in a web of financial and political interest groups
to take action that would benefit the country
but might hurt its supporters’
Paul Abrahams, ‘Gripped by policy paralysis’,
in: Financial Times, 28 September 1998
6. JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL & REGIONAL ROLES
• Japan unnerved by rise of China & unpredictable
behavior – until recently – of North Korea
• Security ties with US have, if anything, grown closer
• But heightened preparedness to stand up to US in trade
conflicts (recourse to new WTO disputes procedure)
• Increased interest in exploration of alternatives to
multilateralism: Asian regionalism (ASEAN+3!) &
bilateral trade agreements (Singapore, S. Korea) consequence of increased economic engagement
in region since mid-1980s (Plaza Accord)?
7. CONCLUSIONS
• In its essentials, especially in LDP’s predominance,
the ‘1955 system’ has remained intact
• LDP’s dependence on conservative groups is big
brake on economic reform & rejuvenation
• Some traits of ‘1955 system’ (weak leadership!) have constrained Japan to maintain low international profile
• Militarily, E. Asian tensions have persuaded
Japan to draw closer, if anything, to the US
7. CONCLUSIONS (Contd.)
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Economically, Japan’s relations with the US
have worsened & Japan has become more
prepared to stand up to the US
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There has been a relative shift in its trade policy
priorities from multilateralism to regionalism &
bilateral trade agreements (Singapore, S. Korea)
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It has grown more willing, but is becoming less
able, to assume a leadership role in Asia –
the mind is more willing, but the flesh
weaker, than earlier!