Transcript Document 7317287

Social Resilience and
State Fragility in Haiti
A Country Social Analysis
Presented by
Dorte Verner
World Bank
May 2006
Background
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Haiti is a resilient society whose rural communities in
particular have developed coping mechanisms in
response to a long history of underdevelopment and
political instability
The country’s religious, cultural, and artistic life is
highly diverse and vibrant
Like other fragile states, however, Haiti is also beset by
widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline
and unemployment, poor governance, and violence
Objectives
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To support the Bank’s Country Assistance
Strategy and Bank and other donors’ policy
dialogue with Haiti
To assess the main components of Haiti’s
conflict-poverty trap from the perspective of the
triangle of factors that have been identified
The report’s three main sections explore the
nature of these components, and a closing section
considers the linkages among them.
Components of a
conflict-poverty trap
Demographic and socioeconomic outcomes
and risks
Institutional capacity;
provide public goods
Political actors and strategies
Demographic risk factors for violent
conflict:
A very young population profile,
 High population turnover
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because of high in- and out-migration—new migrants
continue to be attracted to the metrop. area by higher
levels of infrastructure, services, and jobs
Poverty
Rapid population growth and
urbanization
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Rapid population growth
 now about 8 M (could reach
about 12.3 M by 2030)
 2.2% per year, 5% in urban
areas
Rapid urbanization:
 1.2 mill (1982) to 3.2 mill
(2002)
 Two-thirds of growth
occurred in PauP
High population turnover &
absent economic growth

High population turnover in PauP
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75,000 migrants to greater PauP per year
 High
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rate of dissolved families
The rapid rate of pop gr +poor economic
performance => lowering per capita GDP

has fallen by about 50% to $332 in the last two
decades
High transfer dependency, Inequality
and Informality
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Very high access to nonlabor income
 World’s top receiver of remittances—30%+ of HH receive
 Esp. in urban areas
 Remittances contribute 32% of HH income
 Education promotes internal and external migration
Little demand for workers
 83% are self-employed/informal
 Skilled wage labor is key to escaping poverty
World’s highest income inequality (Gini 0.66)
 Both within and between rural and urban areas
 Remittances reproduce existing inequality
Few and diminishing options
for Haiti’s young

115,000 persons enter
the PauP labor mk every
year
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Unemployment is staggering
among the young and
educated (secondary>50%)
Number of skilled jobs in the
capital < one year’s supply of
new entrants
Total number of wage jobs in
the PauP< 2 years’ supply of
new entrants
%
100
80
60
40
20
0
1519
2024
25- 3029 34
35- 4039 44
Age
4549
50- 55- 60 +
54 59
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
None
Primary
Secondary
Education
Higher
Poverty is very deep and broad (2001)
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49% of all Haitian households lived in extreme
poverty (on the basis of a US$1 a day extreme poverty line)
Wide differences among localities and regions
20, 56, and 58 % of households in metropolitan,
urban, and rural areas, respectively, were extremely
poor
 Most of the approx. 3.9 M who are extremely poor
live in rural areas
 Poverty is especially extensive in the Northeast and
Northwest regions
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Many social indicators low
but improving
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Adult illiteracy
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Infant mortality
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From 148 to 79 per 1000
(1970-2002)
Child malnutrition
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From 78 to 40% (1970-2000)
From 34 to 23% (1990–2000)
But varies strongly with HH
income and region (rural vs.
urban)
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Likely result of…
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Remittances
Illegal economy
Price changes
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Reduction of food import
tariffs in the 1990s
Aid and non-state service
provision
Access education and infrastructural
strongly correlated with poverty in Haiti
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Infrastructure
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access infrastructural services is highly unequal (income,
location)
the rural poor in particular lack access to potable water,
electricity, and roads
Eduaction. Although overall educational attainment has
increased in recent decades, there is substantial
variation in attainment and school attendance across
regions;
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children and youth in the poorest regions lag behind their
peers in richer regions.
the children of poor households have less education than
their nonpoor peers
Crime and cohesion
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Despite troubles, many indicators
point to strong social cohesion
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Rural peace and cooperation
Migrant – household bonds
Social capital a factor in escaping
poverty
Violent deaths by main urban center
June 2004 - May 2005
350
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Homicide rates on regional average, 300
but high incidence of domestic
250
violence
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35% of women victims of domestic
violence
27 homicides per 100,000 citizens in
2001 (LCR: 22.9)
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Violent deaths concentrated in PauP
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Political violence worse in earlier
periods
200
150
100
50
0
Gonaives
Port au Prince
Cap Haitien
Rest of Country
High criminal threat areas
A resilient society
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Economic indicators reflect pervasive
development neglect & demographic and socioeconomic indicators point to high conflict risks
But majority of population live in peace
Crime rates are not higher than regional average
 Human security is improving & basic social
indicators are showing progress
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A society that has learnt to cope despite the
state
Components of a
conflict-poverty trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality:
welfare outcomes and social risks
Institutional capacity :
provide public goods
Political actors and strategies:
leadership and entrepreneurs of
violence
Dimensions of Stateness
Functions
Activist
Coordinating private activity
Wealth redistribution
Intermediate
Addressing externalities
Minimal
Pure public goods
Social insurance
Protecting the poor
Public adm.
Law and order
Basic health and education
Infrastructure
Addressing market failure
Improving equity (ex post)
Institutions matters
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Institutions matter for social and economic
development, and are crucial for state building
Institutions have the potential to mitigate the risk
factors of violence and conflict that emanate from
the socioeconomic and demographic context
The Haitian state, however, has only a limited
capacity to establish law and order, or to create
conditions for economic growth and poverty
reduction.
Progress in breaking out of the conflict-poverty trap
demands attention to the restoration of core state
functions in these areas
To understand the Haitian state’s capacity
to be a driver of development, its financial
constraints must be noted (2005)
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GDP is low and declining since 1980
Gov. revenues were only 9% of GDP (avg. of 18% in low-income
cou)
Only 1.8% of revenues derive from taxes on income, profits, or
capital
Gov. expenditures have fluctuated sharply—9-16% of GDP—
largely as a result of volatility in external assistance.
Therefore a weak domestic revenue base, unstable external
flows, and poor expenditure targeting have left spending
on edu., health, and infrast. below the avg of low-inc cou
The absent state
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1987 constitution established complex and
comprehensive national governance structure
But the Collectivities Territoriales never implemented in
practice
 Local participation in policy planning and
institutional channels between local levels and central
gov. remains low
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Public infra. (electricity, telephones, piped water, roads,
regulatory frameworks) hardly provided outside of
PauP =>NSS
Basic service provided by
non-state actors
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Non state sector (NSS) has expanded rapidly to
respond to unmet needs
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Some 80% of education provided by NSS providers
Make the difference between access and nonaccess for large
parts of the population, esp in rural areas
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The NSS sector is diverse diverse in character & Serious
problems of efficiency, accountability, equity, and
access for the poor
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Can the state successfully facilitate and coordinate
service provision to enhance quality and cover gaps in
provision to the poor?
Weakness and corruption of
police and judiciary
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Massive efforts to build
Number of police officers per 100,000 people
police and judiciary
363
Asia
institutions in the 1990s
346
Achievements wiped out America (North)
325
in late 1990s because of
304
political interference
285
America (Latin)
Police is involved in
corruption, smuggling
etc.(HNP chief October 05)
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ILAC 2005 assessment : “Rule
of law has fallen to lowest point
since 1994”
Politicization is the
fundamental problem
180
Haiti
63
0
100
200
300
400
A failed state
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The Haitian state does not provide core public
goods (security, rule of law, infrastructure) and cannot
claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within its given territory
Economic growth, poverty reduction, increased
equity, and conflict prevention are equally
dependent on restoration of core state functions
Components of a
conflict-poverty trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality:
welfare outcomes and social risks
Institutional capacity :
provide public goods
Political actors and strategies:
leadership and entrepreneurs of
violence
Soup of democracy, fork of division;
Political Actors and Strategies
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Twenty years have passed since the 1986
ouster of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier
created a window of opportunity to establish a
more stable and democratic form of
governance
But polarized politics has complicated efforts
to address the country’s complex and deeply
rooted development challenges
Haitian Politics
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The 1987 constitution provides for a clear separation of
executive, judicial and legislative powers, as well as
decentralized governance structures
In practice politics in Haiti lacks a predictable system of
rules
Political stability will remain illusive without the
establishment of an equilibrium among the competing
forces within society
Haitian politics swings between two key dangers:
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capture by privileged elites who harness government to protect
their dominant position in society; and
populism that neglects the cou.’s long-term institutional and eco.
development while paying lip service to the poor
Strong national leadership is crucial
to achieving a turnaround in Haiti
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Entrepreneurs of violence have taken advantage of political
instability and weak state institutions to manipulate popular
grievances for political and criminal ends
Breaking free of Haiti’s poverty-conflict trap will require
capable national political leadership that is committed to the
consolidation of democratic institutions and processes
In a context of very difficult socioeco. conditions, high social
risks, defunct state institutions, extremely limited budget
resources, and political polarization, Haiti’s leaders face
enormous challenges
The 2006 electoral process, however, has created new
opportunities for reform, reconciliation and partnerships
Summary: The Trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality
Social risks,
high demand
Opportunities for
illegality,
growth disabling
Tactical
mobilization
Supply of grievances
and recruits
Political interference and
corruption
Institutional capacity
Institutional
weakness, missing
checks and balances
Political actors and strategies
Conclusion:
Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap
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Haiti’s social resilience and social capital and improvements
in social indicators are keystones to draw upon in breaking
the conflict-poverty trap
The state has struggled to provide basic services to the
population and has been dominated by a small elite that
has made limited investments in infrastructure and basic
services
Development, poverty reduction and conflict prevention
will not be possible without a focus on strengthening the
state’s capacity to provide basic public goods, including
security and the rule of law
Its financial and managerial resources must be used with
an exceptionally strong sense of priority
Conclusion (2):
Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap
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The most important factor for breaking out of Haiti’s poverty-conflict
trap cannot be provided by donors but only by Haitians themselves:
good leadership
Because of the centrality of corruption in undermining good
leadership, transparency in public finances should be a foundation for
the Bank and other donors’ assistance to the new Haitian government
Among the triangle of risk factors in the poverty-conflict trap,
institutional capacity building is a key entry point for breaking the
cycle; improving demographic and socioeconomic outcomes and
supporting political dialogue remain longer-term objectives
National planning and international assistance should build on the
existing International Cooperation Framework by prioritizing
resources and monitoring progress, such that both donors and
government can be held accountable for results