Transcript Today’s Lecture • Alvin Goldman • Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
Today’s Lecture
• Alvin Goldman • Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• A few things about this paper.
• (i) It is hard…it’s not just you.
• (ii) Don’t worry about the minute of the account (i.e. the discussions of a certain object
c
at time
t
having a set of properties
J
and being in a DOE [or distance-orientation environment] relation
R
to
S
). It is enough to understand the general details of this account.
• (iii) When trying to understand the paper try to relate it to some of the discussion we have already had about Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Russell.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• The first paragraph nicely sets up some of the basic parameters of the paper.
• (1) This is
not
a general analysis of knowledge. This paper only concerns perceptual knowledge. Goldman even admits that the analysis in this paper is partial even when considering perceptual knowledge (it concerns non inferential perceptual knowledge).
• (2) It will involve an appeal to the relevant causal processes of belief formation or maintenance to explicate (non inferential perceptual) knowledge.
• (3) It does not require that
S
’s belief that
p
connected to the state of affairs
p
is causally that makes
S
’s belief true (
CP
, p.5).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Keeping in mind the Gettier problems I spoke of yesterday, what Goldman is trying to do is provide an analysis of knowledge that accommodates the insight of the traditional JTB (justified true belief) analysis of knowledge while both avoiding its short comings and adopting a more external ‘view’ of knowledge acquisition. • So whatever analysis of knowledge he proffers he will continue to think of knowledge as true belief plus … whatever else is needed for
S
’s belief to be knowledge.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• What Goldman has in mind as his fundamental position is that
S
knows that
p
if and only if her belief forming (and sustaining) mechanisms and processes are reliable. • A mechanism or process is reliable in the relevant way if produces true beliefs “in actual situations, but would produce true beliefs, or at least inhibit false beliefs, in relevant counterfactual situations” (
CP
, p.5).
• Translated into ‘clearer’ English: A mechanism or process is reliable in the relevant way if it produces a belief that
p
when it is the case that
p
, and doesn’t produce a belief that
p
when it is not the case that
p
.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Goldman’s appeal to counterfactual sensitivity seems to preempt any potential Gettier problem for his view. After all, what you want as a Gettier problem to Goldman’s account is a true reliably produced belief that is nevertheless not knowledge. But Goldman has defined reliability such that a belief forming mechanism is not reliable if it succumbs to Gettier problems.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Note some of the concerns Goldman raises as considerations for evaluating the adequacy of a theory of (non-inferential perceptual) knowledge.
• (1) A theory of knowledge should accord with as many historic uses of the term ‘know’ as it can (
CP
, p.6).
• (2) It should accord with our considered judgments about when we would call something knowledge (
CP
, pp.8, 9).
• (3) It should ‘leave room for’ skepticism (
CP
, p.16).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• (4) A theory should explain how more figurative uses of ‘know’ came about (
CP
, p.16). “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” • (5) A theory of knowledge should accommodate its more “primitive” (
CP
, p.16) roots in animal cognition. This means that the proffered notion of knowledge should not be “overintellectualized” (
CP
, p.16).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Note that there are several thought experiments Goldman has in mind as he develops his analysis of (non-inferential perceptual) knowledge. He thinks we will be inclined to make certain judgments about
S
’s knowledge in each case, and that these judgments must be adequately accommodated by his final analysis.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• “Henry and son’s drive in the country-side” thought experiment • We are to imagine Henry driving in the country-side with his son some lovely afternoon. It’s a clear day, no haze and the windshield is clean enough that both Henry and his son have a nice panoramic view of the fields and structures they are passing. Henry’s son is of an age where he enjoys his father identifying certain objects and structures as they pass them, and so Henry does so (and in so doing makes various knowledge claims about various features and objects in the area through which they are driving).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• We are to imagine two ways in which this scenario can go. • In both scenarios, Henry sees a barn and accurately reports this to his son.
• In one scenario, all of the barns are real.
• In the other scenario, they have inadvertently driven into an area where, for whatever reason, there are barns and barn facsimiles scattered throughout the country-side.
• The barn facsimiles are purposely designed to fool travelers who may pass them while driving on the road.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• In the scenario in which all the barns are real, Goldman thinks that we will not quibble with the judgment that Henry knows that there is a barn in yonder field.
• He thinks, however, we will be disinclined to be so ‘generous’ in the scenario where Henry sees a real barn and identifies it as so, but couldn’t tell the difference between that real barn and the fakes in the area (
CP
, p.6).
• Do you agree with Goldman here? If so, why? If not, why not?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• “Sam sees Trudy ... or is it Judy?”thought experiment • We’re asked to imagine the following. Sam, Trudy and Judy live in the same town or city. These individuals know each other, at least enough to say “hi”. Trudy and Judy are identical twins. Sam knows they are identical twins. Sam meets Judy on the street on day and forms the belief ‘That is Judy’. The question is, Does he know that ‘That is Judy’?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Again we have two ways in which this scenario can go.
• In one scenario, Sam correctly identifies Judy when he sees Judy and Trudy when he sees Trudy.
• In the other scenario, Sam frequently mistakes one sister for the other (
CP
, p.9).
• Goldman thinks you will grant that Sam knows in the former but not the latter scenario. Is he right?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• “Oscar and Dack the dachshund” thought experiment • We’re asked to imagine the following scenario. Oscar is standing in an open field. Dack the dachshund is also in the field. Upon seeing Dack, Oscar forms the belief that ‘There is a dog in the field’. It so happens that wolves frequent this field, though none are visible today. Oscar has the tendency to mistake wolves for dogs, which will probably get him killed someday if he frequents this field too much.
• Does Oscar know, upon seeing Dack, that ‘There is a dog in the field’?
• Goldman thinks he does, do you agree?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• I’ve already said that Goldman wants to develop a reliabilist theory of (non-inferential) perceptual knowledge. S knows that p if and only if the belief forming (or sustaining) mechanisms or processes causally responsible for p are reliable (i.e. when p is the case, S will believe that p in the relevant perceptual context, and if p is not the case S will not believe that p in the relevant perceptual context).
• Another way of putting this is that S reliably discriminates between p and non-p when forming the relevant perceptual beliefs (
CP
, p.7).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• What does a lot of work in Goldman’s account is the notion of relevant alternatives.
• The thought is this. Take any putative case of knowledge.
S
fails to know that
p
if
S
cannot eliminate an alternative possibility to the fact that
p
which is nevertheless consistent with
S
’s data or evidence (loosely construed) (
CP
, p.7).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Imagine you go out on one of the few clear summer nights in South-Western Ontario. You look up at the sky and see a bright celestial object with a steady light. You’ve been told, and correctly, that such celestial objects are usually planets. What’s more, you know that one of the planets up at this time of the night is Saturn. Upon looking up at the object in the night sky you form the belief ‘That’s Saturn’.
• Now it turns out that it is Saturn, so you have formed a true belief. Also Jupiter is also in the sky, and you can’t tell the difference between Jupiter and Saturn in the night sky.
• Do you know? Goldman, and others, would say that you don’t and that’s because you can’t eliminate the possibility that what you are seeing is Jupiter instead.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• This seems to be a clear example of what is meant by alternative possibility. But, suggests Goldman, the alternative possibilities to which we should be responsive if we are to know cannot be understood too broadly or we will never be able to acquire knowledge (think of Descartes’ Malicious Omnipotent Demon).
• The alternative possibility must be a relevant alternative (
CP
, p.7).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Think back to the example of seeing Saturn. Which is really the relevant alternative in judging whether you know ‘That’s Saturn’ - that you can’t tell the difference between Saturn and Jupiter in the night sky, or that you can’t tell the difference between really seeing Saturn and having the experience of seeing Saturn while under the ‘spell’ of Descartes’ Demon?
• Is this position question begging against the skeptic? Should we worry if it is?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Goldman seems to say the following about what makes an alternative possibility relevant. (It is important to note that he never definitively settles this dispute [see his admission to this affect on page 9 of your
CP
].) • An alternative possibility is relevant if it is taken seriously by those ascribing or denying knowledge to
S
(
CP
, p.8).
• Goldman does not think that we can determine
exactly
why the ascriber or denier of knowledge to
S
takes certain alternative possibilities seriously and not others. He does think that there are some psychological regularities that explain our choices on the whole (
CP
, pp.8-9).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• In explaining the reliability of
S
’s belief forming (or sustaining) mechanisms and processes, Goldman takes some time to discuss the nature of the counterfactual sensitivity they must possess.
• This is where he develops his analysis involving object
c
possessing properties
H
at time
t
in DOE relation
R
to
S
. Just ignore
the details
of this complication in the paper.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• • Do note the following however.
S
(non-inferentially) perceptually knows that
p
if and only if
S
forms a belief that
p
from the interaction of because of percept
P b
which arises with
S
’s noetic faculties and there is no perceptual equivalent to
b
such that
S
would form the belief
p
because of percept
P*
and yet
p
would be false of the relevant objective cause
c
.
• ‘because’ should be understood causally here, and the percepts ought not to differ from each other in their causal roles to bring about
S
’s belief that
p
(
CP
, pp.12-13).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Perhaps in clearer English: • “What our analysis says is that
S
has perceptual knowledge if and only if not only does his perceptual mechanism produce true belief, but there are no relevant counterfactual situations in which the same belief would be produced via an equivalent percept and in which the belief would be false” (
CP
, p.13).
• Do note that Goldman uses the notion of percept. This should remind you of Locke’s ideas and Russell’s sense data.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• What do you think of Goldman’s discussion of “The candle in the room of mirrors” thought experiment? (See
CP
, p.14).
• Remember you have a person them. They form the belief that ‘That’s a candle ahead of me’.
S
seeing a candle in front of • Unfortunately, it’s a candle that is behind
S
and its image is being reflected by a series of mirrors so that it looks like it is ahead of
S
.
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• What does Goldman conclude from this thought experiment?
• Is this a perceptual equivalent such that S never successfully knows ‘That’s a candle ahead of me?’ What does Goldman say to this?
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• Goldman finishes his paper with a
brief
discussion of what he calls Cartesian epistemology.
• He makes it clear that he rejects what he thinks is the justification requirement understood within the Cartesian framework (
CP
, p.15).
“Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”
• He describes two elements of Cartesian epistemology: • (1) “
S
knows that
p
at time
t
adequately, etc.) justified at
t
only if
S
is (fully, in believing that
p
” (
CP
, p.15).
• (2) “
S
is justified at
t
in believing
p
only if either (i)
p
is self-warranting for
S
at
t
, or (ii)
p
is (strongly, adequately, etc.) supported or confirmed by propositions each of which is self-warranting for
S
at
t
.” (
CP
, p.15).
• Has he rejected too much in his account?
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• We can, I think, divide Feminist concerns into two overlapping areas: the effect of patriarchy on human practice and the effect of patriarchy on human theorizing.
• You may be more aware of Feminist critiques of societal practices.
• Feminists have engaged with general society to seek equality rights for women, people of color, lesbians, gays, transsexuals and the transgendered.
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• This is still an ongoing engagement in this society, as we have seen with the recent dispute over marriage equality rights for lesbians and gays.
• It is still an ongoing engagement in this society on the issue of equal pay for equal work.
• Much work is still to be done for such equality rights outside of Canada too (think of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, India or China).
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• Don’t be too complacent about gender rights in Canada. Women still only make 70 cents to each man’s dollar.
• Also, don’t think that its just countries in the Middle or ‘Far’ East that have poor human rights records regarding women.
• In several States in the USA it is still possible for a husband to force his wife to have sex with him and it is not considered rape under law.
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• What does Feminism have to say about the effect of patriarchy on human theorizing?
• Consider this quote from Charles Darwin.
• “Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic than woman, and has a more inventive genius. His brain is absolutely larger, but whether or not proportionately to his larger body, has not, I believe, been fully ascertained” (Darwin, Charles. 1874/1998.
The Descent of Man
. New York: Prometheus Books, pp.576-77.)
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• Here’s more.
• “Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, chiefly in her greater tenderness and less selfishness; and this holds good even with savages, as is shown by a well-known passage in Mungo Park’s Travels, and by statement made by many other travellers. Woman, owing to her maternal instincts, displays these qualities towards her infants in an eminent degree; therefore it is likely that she would often extend them towards her fellow creatures.”
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• “Man is the rival of other men; he delights in competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into selfishness. These latter qualities seem to be his natural and unfortunate birthright. It is generally admitted that with woman the powers of intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps imitation, are more strongly marked than in man; but some, at least, of these faculties are characteristic of the lower races, and therefore of a past and lower state of civilization.”
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• “The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shown by man’s attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can woman - whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands.”
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• “If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music ..., history, science, and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not bear comparison. We may also infer, from the law of the deviation of averages ... that if men are capable of a decided pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the average mental power in man must be above that of woman” (Darwin, Charles. 1874/1998.
The Descent of Man
. New York: Prometheus Books, pp.583-84.)
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• This quote from Darwin nicely encapsulates how women have generally been viewed for millennia within the Western canon of thought. There’s more like Darwin’s sentiments in the classics of Western philosophy and political theory.
• Note some of the ways in which Darwin’s comments touch on epistemological issues.
• The mental faculties of women are of a lower development than those of men.
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• Darwin talks of “rapid perception”. This ascribes non-inferential perceptual abilities to women, while reserving powers of inference or reasoning for men. The same can be said for the notion of ‘intuition’.
• “Maternal instinct”. This should be a familiar phrase. Note that a woman’s knowledge of child care is not knowledge per se but instinct. It is also automatic rather than learned (as the term ‘instinct’ implies).
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• Darwin also contends that when it comes to areas of inquiry (requiring deep thought, reasoning and imagination), men exceed the capacities of women.
• Not surprisingly, then, it is men rather than women who excel in science and philosophy.
Preliminary comments about Feminist Epistemology
• Think back now on what we have discussed in our brief trek through some of the classic pieces of Western epistemology.
• Think of the kinds of capacities required to successfully know, according to the philosophers who have provided your readings in our texts.
• Now line this up with the kinds of sentiments expressed by Darwin (again typical rather than atypical both for his contemporaries and predecessors) and judge whether the epistemic subject was truly generic in traditional epistemology.