Transcript Regulatory preparations for the next NPP projects in Finland

Regulatory preparations for the next
NPP projects in Finland
Finnish Energy Conference 08
Tampere, 29 October 2008
Lasse Reiman
Director
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Nuclear power plants in Finland
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units - ABB BWRs
• EPR under construction
Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
• EIA done for Olkiluoto 4
• 2 operating units - VVERs
• EIA done for Loviisa 3
Fennovoima Ltd
• EIA ongoing on 3 alternative
sites for a new plant
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Licensing Steps - Olkiluoto 3 schedule
Operating License
Construction
Construction License
Bidding & site preparation
nuclear safety
energy policy
Decision in Principle
– May 2002
Feasibility studies
Siting including EIA
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– February 2005
?
Regulatory review of the NPP design is
conducted in several phases – in gradually
increasing depths
1.
Feasibility Studies: Design issues that are chosen by the license
applicant are discussed between the vendor, licensee, and regulator
(STUK)
•
2.
Decision in Principle: Basic design requirements and main safety
features of each proposed alternative design are reviewed by STUK
•
3.
objective of these three party discussions is to identify of possible
“show stoppers” from licensing point of view and discuss key
safety issues of each design
STUK’s conclusions are formally presented in its preliminary
safety assessment
Bidding phase: Conclusions in STUK’s preliminary safety assessment
are clarified as necessary, and the positions of the respective vendors
are discussed between the three parties
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Regulatory review of the NPP design is
conducted in several phases – in gradually
increasing depths
4.
Construction License: Design criteria and conceptual design of the
plant, safety related systems and systems integration are reviewed
before STUK presents it safety assessment – review covers also
deterministic safety analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA)
•
5.
main design features are assessed at this stage
During construction: Detailed design features of systems,
structures and components are reviewed − review covers also
deterministic safety analysis and PRA revised for “as built” design.
•
safety assessment for Operating License is based on review
and inspections conducted throughout the construction phase
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STUK reviews also capabilities and
management of the involved organisations
1. For Decision in Principle: Strength of license applicants’ and
vendors’ organisations for construction and operation of a nuclear
power plant.
2. For Construction License: Plans for organising the safety and
quality management during the project (licensee, vendor, major
contractors, interactions between key organisations).
3. During construction: Performance of the organisations in
managing safety and quality issues.
•
Oversight of manufacturing and construction to verify that QA
and QC activities of licensee, vendor, and the manufacturers
are properly conducted
•
Regular audits to assess licensee’s and vendor’s safety
relevant management processes
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Feasibility studies
• Feasibility study precedes the actual licensing and is done in
parallel with siting process
– Nuclear Energy Act (§ 55): STUK may, upon request by
anyone planning to use nuclear energy, check the plan
drawn up by them and issue preliminary instructions on
what should be taken into account with respect to
safety, physical protection and emergency planning.
– The Act thus gives STUK
• a mandate to discuss key safety issues before formal
license application
• a possibility to charge utilities for the assessment work
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Feasibility studies
• Important aspects to be considered in the feasibility
study phase
– It is not a licensing phase (there are no formal decisions,
unless explicitly requested by the utility)
– Equal treatment of different designs and vendors interpretation of safety requirements in different designs
– Meetings are carefully documented to avoid
misunderstandings
– Open items to be discussed in the future steps of the
licensing are listed
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Feasibility study phase - topics under
discussion regarding new reactor projects (1)
• External threats
– protection against air craft crashes - loads to be considered in the design
(penetration, vibrations, fires)
– malevolent acts
– severe weather conditions
• Design basis accidents
– Identification of most limiting accident(s) for the design, for example
2ALOCA as a design basis accident (environmental qualification,
capacities of core cooling systems, loads to be considered in the design
of containment and primary components)
– Identification of Design Extension Conditions
• Severe accidents
– independent systems and components for severe accident management
– hydrogen management and containment design
– containment filtered venting system for long term accident management
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Feasibility study phase - topics under
discussion regarding new reactor projects (2)
• Safety classification of systems, structures and components
– scope of SC2 (frontline and their support systems)
– use of standardised components in higher safety classes
• Safety systems - application of redundancy, diversity and
separation principles
– fulfilment of N+2 failure criteria in SC2 systems
– diversification of safety functions - diverse means for shutdown, cooling
and radioactivity control in case of loss of dedicated frontline systems
– separation requirements between redundancies and between diverse
functions within one redundancy
• Plant layout
– physical separation - internal and external hazards
• Design and manufacturing of primary circuit components
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Feasibility study phase - topics under
discussion regarding new reactor projects (3)
• Principles of Electrical and I&C systems design
– architecture - application of defence in depth within the design and
fulfilment of independence requirements between different systems
– standards to be applied in the design
– safety classification
• Passive plants
– safety classification of passive systems and active systems needed to
bring the plant into cold shutdown
– criteria and application of failure criteria in a passive plant
– definition of controlled state
• Requirements for the use and scope of PRA
• Application of national civil construction codes in Finland (size
of accepted steel rebar)
• Capabilities and experience of the utility and vendor
– resources and tools for engineering, procurement and construction
– special attention to the subcontractor management
• Licensing and oversight activities
• Siting issues
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Ongoing Feasibility Studies
• Teollisuuden Voima Ltd
– Environmental Impact Assessment process for OL4 almost
finalised (reactor 1000-1800 MWe) - Statement of the contact
authority, Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TEM) has
been issued.
– Feasibility studies are ongoing including negotiations
between plant vendors and STUK
– Application for Decision in Principle submitted to the
Ministry (TEM) in April.
– Designs in the application
•
•
•
•
•
ABWR, Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE)
APWR, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI)
AP1400 Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP)
EPR (Areva)
ESBWR, GE Hitachi (GEH)
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Ongoing Feasibility Studies
• Fortum Power and Heat Ltd
– Feasibility studies ongoing - negotiations between
Fortum, Vendors and STUK begun in May 2008
– Schedule:
• EIA done in autumn 2008,
• Readiness to submit the application for Decision in
Principle to the Ministry during second half of 2008
– Feasibility Studies for following designs:
• ABWR Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE)
• AES2006 Atomstroyexport (ASE)
• EPR (Areva)
• ESBWR GE Hitachi (GEH)
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Ongoing Feasibility Studies
• Fennovoima Ltd
– Fennovoima is a new Finnish nuclear power company that
aims at constructing one or two 1000–1800 MW nuclear
power plant units in Finland
– Feasibility studies are ongoing - negotiations between
Fennovoima, Vendors and STUK begun in May 2008
– EIA conducted during 2008, application for Decision in
Principle to be submitted to the Ministry (TEM) by the end of
2008 or early 2009
– Feasibility Studies for following designs:
• ABWR Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE)
• EPR (Areva)
• SWR1000 (Areva)
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Site characterization
Information on the following topics is required for assessing
site suitability and for determining plant design values for
external events
•
•
•
•
Geology and seismology
Hydrology
Meteorology
Transport routes (sea, land and air routes, pipelines)
– oil and hazardous substances
• Industrial activities
– production, storage
• Population
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Meteorology and hydrology
Phenomena considered in design of OL3
• Highest and lowest outdoor air temperature
– instantaneous, short term, long term
• Air humidity
• Extreme wind speed
– including tornadoes (trombs) and downbursts
• Seawater temperature
– high temparature
– subcooling, frazil ice formation
• Seawater level, extreme high and low
– all sites are coastal
• Ice conditions
• Precipitation
• Snow load
• Lightning peak current, rise time etc.
• Combinations of correlated events are potentially important
– snow and wind: potential for loss of offsite power and simultaneous
failure of diesel generators due to combustion air intake blockage
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Principles of emergency zoning
•
YVL 1.10 Siting criteria
–
site area, about 1 km radius
–
protective zone, 5 km radius
•
•
•
–
the essential question is the possibility to evacuate the
population
no hospitals or other facilities difficult to evacuate
no activities that could cause danger to the plant
detailed emergency planning area, about 20 km radius
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Simo, Karsikkoniemi
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Pyhäjoki, Hanhikivi
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Ruotsinpyhtää, Kampuslandet and Gäddbergsö
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Overall reform of Finnish nuclear safety
regulations
The Nuclear Energy Act is revised
• basic safety requirements are moved from the old Government
Decisions to the Act reflecting the new Finnish constitution of 2000
• the Act is completed with physical protection related requirements
• requirements on decommissioning added
• new Advisory Committee for security issues established
• no changes in the licensing process
The new Government Decrees will replace the old Government Decisions
• some existing requirements in the YVL Guides moved to the
Decrees
• requirements concerning Management Systems revised
• experiences from OL 3 project taken into account
– Design Extension Conditions introduced into Finnish regulations
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Design Extension Conditions
Design Extension Conditions refer to events in which a common-cause
failure or a complex combination of failures occurring in the safety
systems are related to an initiating event, and which the NPP is
expected to withstand without severe fuel damages
Examples of DECs
• ATWS
• loss of a safety injection system in connection with a small leakage
• loss of grid connection and normal emergency electrical power
supply in connection with a small leakage
• loss of normal ultimate heat sink (3 days)
• loss of digital I&C system/systems
• loss of fuel ponds cooling system
• rupture of several SG tubes
• stuck-open safety relief valve in connection with a primary to
secondary circuit leakage
• extreme weather conditions (cliff-edge effects)
• airplane crash
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Overall reform of the STUK-YVL guidance
approach
Initiated in 2006 and continues until 2011
• structure of the whole system has been re-evaluated
• standard format for single guides has been developed
• consistent terminology / full coherence with the new
Government Decrees and between different guides will be
ensured
• experiences from OL3 project will be taken into account
• consideration of IAEA safety standards and WENRA
reference requirements
• STUK-YVL Guides are to be applied as such to new NPPs,
application to operating plants or plants under construction is
considered case by case (no changes in this policy)
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Structure of new STUK-YVL Guidance Approach
1 General Safety Requirements
1.1 Regulatory oversight of nuclear facilities (II/VR)
1.2 Definitions applied in STUK-YVL Guides (I/VR)
2
Safety management
of nuclear facilities
3
Plant and system
level design
2.1 Management systems (IV/NiK)
2.2 Personnel (II/NiK)
2.3 Construction operations (III/PT)
2.4 Operating operations (II/TiE)
2.5 Safety assessment (IV/REA)
2.6 Risk management (I/RV)
2.7 Manufacturing, inspection and
technical support (III/MEK)
2.8 Management of
modifications (II/TV)
2.9 Condition monitoring,
maintenance and ageing
management (I/PK)
2.10 Physical protection (II/RO)
2.11 Emergency preparedness
(I/TS)
2.12 Nuclear liability (V/VR)
2.13 Reporting (V/OKA)
2.14 Operating experience and
feedback (III/OKA)
3.1 General design criteria
(II/REA)
3.2 Safety classification of
systems, structures and
components (I/KV)
3.3 Reactor and nuclear fuel
(IV/REA)
3.4 Primary circuit (IV/MEK)
3.5 Safety systems (III/REA)
3.6 Containment (III/REA)
3.7 Internal and external threats
(III/VLT)
3.8 Fire protection (V/VLT)
4
Radiation safety
of nuclear
facilities
4.1 Radiation protection of
personnel (III/SÄT)
4.2 Environmental releases
from NPPs (IV/SÄT)
4.3 Measurement of
environmental releases
(IV/SÄT)
4.4 Constructive
arrangements for radiation
safety in nuclear facilities
(V/SÄT)
5
Nuclear materials
and nuclear waste
5.1 Procurement of nuclear
fuel (V/YMO)
5.2 Safeguards control
(II/YMA)
5.3 Transportation of nuclear
materials and nuclear waste
(IV/YMA)
5.4 Storage of nuclear fuel
(III/YMO)
5.5 Waste management and
decommissioning (IV/YJÄ)
5.6 Disposal of nuclear
waste (II/YJÄ)
6
Structures and components of nuclear facilities
6.1 Fabrication and operation of nuclear fuel (V/MEK)
6.2 Mechanical structures and components (III/MEK)
6.3 Structures of construction engineering (IV/VLT)
6.4 Electrical and automation equipment (IV/VLT)
Stage I, Pilot study, four guides and definitions, 2006 - 2007
Stage II, Eight guides, 2007 - 2008
Stages III - V, seven to eight guides in each stage
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Organization and Resource Management
Change of the NRR organization
• effective 1 April, 2008
• several goals, among them
– to enable growing of the organization
– to enable succession planning
– to make the organization less vulnerable
– to expand the knowledge of superiors
– to increase co-operation between the basic organizational
units
– to spread decision-making to assistant directors
– to develop internal reporting
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Organization 1.4.2008
Regulation
Director Lasse Reiman
Deputy Directors:
Marja-Leena Järvinen
Pentti Koutaniemi
Security
Management Support
Department Services
Nuclear Facilities and
Systems
Structures and Components
Assistant Director
Matti Ojanen
Assistant Director
Keijo Valtonen
Projects and Operational
Safety
Assistant Director
Petteri Tiippana
Reactor and Safety
Systems
Mechanical
Engineering
Organisations and
Operation
Risk Assessment
Civil Engineering
Projects
Electrical and
Automation Systems
Manufacturing
Technique
Radiation Protection
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Organization and Resource Management
• STUK’s strategy and long-term action plan (2008-2011) of
NRR renewed in the beginning of this year
• Action plan includes for example basic principles for
–
–
–
–
development of activities
knowledge management
resource management
actions to promote well-being of the staff
• In addition a separate long-term resource plan of NRR (20082013) is made and updated yearly
• Use of TSOs and consultants for short-term activities an
important part of RM
• Changes in the regulations and practices need to be
considered, too
– safety classification
– inspections in lower safety classes
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Organization and Resource Management
Short-term RM
• as a part of the yearly planning process the work of each
inspector is allocated to different projects for each quadrant of
the year
• work-load of inspectors is followed in several ways
Long-term RM
• long-term plan takes into account future tasks and
retirements, updated yearly
• replacement recruitments typically 1-2 years in advance
• essential issue is the scheduling of new NPP projects
• in addition to oversight activities, resources are needed for
renewing regulations
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Organization and Resource Management
• Net-budgeting is a pre-requisite for flexible practices
• Long-term plan does not yet take into account resources
needed for construction of more than one NPP at the same
time
• Plan includes about 30 recruitments of which about half are
replacements due to retirements
• Three main sources in recruitments
– Technical Universities
– Technical Research Center of Finland (VTT)
– conventional industry
• For each new inspector a personal development plan is made
– Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety (YK)
– on-the-job training
– mentoring
• National research programs (SAFIR2010) produce experts
and basic capabilities into the nuclear field in Finland
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RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
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NRR long-term resource plan 2009 - 2013
120
106 107 108 108
100 102
100
80
60
61
62
68
76
83
88
86
60
40
20
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20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
0
Age distribution of NRR
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
25-29
30-34
35-39
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50-54
55-59
60-
Number of Documents Received
5000
4300 4200
4500
4000
3700
3400
3500
Documents
3900
3768
3150
3000
2541
2500
2000
1520 1568
1414 1486
1500
1000
500
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12
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20
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20
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20
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20
06
20
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20
04
20
03
20
02
20
20
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0
OL3: Number of Documents Received
3000
2450
Documents
2500
1967
2000
1900
1500
1394
1500
1300
1200
928
1000
500
314
6
0
0
20
3
0
20
4
0
20
5
0
20
6
0
20
Es
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at
tim
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0
2
09
0
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11
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33
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2
Conclusions (1)
Regulator’s role in bidding phase
The licensee and the regulator need to discuss early enough on
how national safety requirements should be included in
the call for tenders, to ensure that requirements are clearly
defined and accurate – just making reference to national
regulatory guides is not adequate.
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Conclusions (2)
Preparedness for project implementation
Planning of the project management resources and the assessment
of preparedness of each party to implement a major project in
proposed schedule is necessary to avoid unexpected delays
– overall human resources, expertise, experience, and
organisation (including QA arrangements) available to the
licensee and vendor
– capability of each potential vendor to implement the project
– status of each design which is considered as true alternative
The regulator should verify that the licensee has adequate in-house
capabilities and has properly evaluated the state of the design,
and the design and engineering, manufacturing and constructing
resources available to the vendor.
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RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
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