Transcript Ensuring Temporariness: Mechanisms to Incentivise Return Migration in the Context

Ensuring Temporariness:
Mechanisms to Incentivise
Return Migration in the Context
of GATS Mode 4 and Least
Developed Country Interests
“If all economists were laid end to end, they
would not reach a conclusion”
George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)
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Presentation Overview
• Case studies of three bilateral agreements between
developing and developed countries to manage the
movement on non-high skilled workers:
• The accord between Spain and Ecuador regulating
migratory flows.
• Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme
(CSAWP) with Mexico and the Caribbean.
• The Philippines’ partnership with various countries in
East Asia, Southwest Asia and the United States.
• Observing lessons learned from these ‘Mode 4’ style
bilateral agreements from LDCs and their development
interest.
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Two caveats:
1. The necessity of remembering key differences in the
nature of bilateral agreements and WTO agreements,
particularly with respect to host country control on
incoming service providers
2. The lack of data on temporary service provider return
rates where entering the host country through bilateral
agreements.
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Case study 1: Spain and Ecuador
• The Agreement on the Regulation and Planning of Migratory Flows
(Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y la República del Ecuador
relativo a la Regulación y Ordenación de la Flujos Migratorios)
signed between Spain and Ecuador in 2001 allows for both
permanent and temporary migration of Ecuadorian workers.
• The Government of Ecuador and the IOM jointly established the
Technical Unit for the Selection of Migrant Workers (UTSTM) in
2002 to screen Ecuadorian workers wanting to work in Spain. The
screening process was also carried out in collaboration with Spanish
authorities and employers.
• UTSTM also assisted Ecuadorian workers in settling contract and
visa issues as well as providing pre-departure training.
• Between 2002 and 2006 UTSTM selected 2,577 Ecuadorian workers
out of 2,700 Spanish employment offers, with a majority of migrant
workers entering the agriculture, restaurant and personal service
industries.
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Case study 1: Spain and Ecuador
Positive incentive mechanisms provided by Ecuador:
• Maintenance of social networks: Association of
Ecuadorian Migrants Llactacaru in Barcelona.
• Political investment: 2005 legislation to allow Ecuadorians
living overseas to vote in Ecuador's presidential elections.
• Flexible work contracts: possibility to extend temporary
work contracts for work or service specified in initial
contract.
• Disregarding national labour situation for re-entry.
• Livelihood capacity-building in source country: free
transfers via Ecuadorian Banco Solidario for migrant
remittances so money can be saved for housing and
micro-enterprises.
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Case study 2: Canada, Mexico and
the Caribbean
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The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Programme (CSAWP) created
to hire overseas workers during the peak harvesting and planting periods in
Canada.
•
CSAWP based on a government to government memoranda of
understanding. These MOUs can be terminated with only three months’
notice.
•
The CSAWP has been going since 1966 when Canada signed an agreement
with Jamaica, then agreements made with Trinidad and Tobago and
Barbados the following year, followed by Mexico in 1974. Finally the
agreement was extended to the Organisation of Caribbean States in 1976.
•
In 2005 the average length of stay for a seasonal worker was 19 weeks,
although they are technically permitted to work in Canada for a maximum
period of eight months.
Case study 2: Canada, Mexico and
the Caribbean
• Positive incentive mechanisms to ensure the
temporariness of workers in the CSAWP include:
– Flexible work contracts
– Mandatory remittance
– Avoidance of double taxation
– Name-hiring
• However, the programme also employs a number
of negative mechanisms such as:
– Restriction of labour mobility
– Premature repatriation
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Case study 3: The Philippines
• The Philippines has developed a highly elaborate system
of temporary labour export governed by the Philippines
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA).
• In 2006 the Philippines deployed 1,062,567 overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) in 197 country destinations.
• The Philippines government asserts that it is facilitating
a response to global market forces in labour demand.
• The Philippines government pinpoints labour market
niches in countries with which it has concluded bilateral
agreements.
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Case study 3: The Philippines
• The Philippines has developed a highly elaborate
system of temporary labour export governed by the
Philippines Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA).
• In 2006 the Philippines deployed 1,062,567 overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) in 197 country destinations.
• The Philippines government asserts that it facilitating a
response to global market forces in labour demand.
• The Philippines government pinpoints labour market
niches in countries with which it has concluded
bilateral agreements.
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Case study 3: The Philippines
• Several positive incentive mechanisms used by the
Philippines government to ensure the return of workers
going abroad on temporary work contracts:
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Migrant Workers’ Resource Centre and OFW advisories
Maintenance of social networks
National Reintegration Centre
Credit, savings, investment and livelihood schemes
Name-hiring
Public recognition of exemplary performance
Education and training programmes in source country
Exit clearance
Lessons learned for LDCs
• Market access to service sectors must be
complementary to development policies.
• Investment required in prioritising sectors and
investing infrastructure for screening processes.
• Consider collaboration with targeted markets
on capacity building, domestic regulation and
mutual recognition of educational
qualifications.
• Consider pros and cons on negotiating trade in
services in the multilateral and in the bilateral
contexts.
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Questions and comments
Contact: [email protected]
Copies of the publication available from www.quno.org
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