Transcript Document 7179516

Epistemology: Knowledge, Skepticism,
and Ignorance
Clark Wolf
Director of Bioethics
Iowa State University
[email protected]

Mind and body are either the same thing, or they
are different substances. If two things are
identical, then they will have all the same
properties. So if my mind and body are the
same substance,they’ll have all properties in
common. But I can doubt my body’s existence–
my body is dubitable. I can’t doubt my mind’s
existence– my mind is indubitable. Therefore
mind and body are different substances.
1) Mind and body are either the same thing, or they are
different substances.
2) If two things are identical, then they will have all the
same properties.
3) So if my mind and body are the same
substance,they’ll have all properties in common.
4) But I can doubt my body’s existence– my body is
dubitable.
5) I can’t doubt my mind’s existence– my mind is
indubitable.
6) Mind and body do not have all properties in common.
7) Therefore mind and body are different substances.
Argument for Analysis
Argument for Analysis
I have an idea of a perfect being: a being that is
perfect in every way. This idea is itself perfect.
But I’m imperfect– I clearly have failures and
faults and limitations. As an imperfect being, I
couldn’t be the source, origin, or cause of
something perfect: only something perfect could
be the cause of something perfect. So there
must be a perfect being external to me which is
the cause of my perfect idea.
Argument for Analysis
1) I have an idea of a perfect being: a being that is
perfect in every way.
2) This idea is itself perfect.
3) But I’m imperfect. (I clearly have failures and
faults and limitations.)
4) As an imperfect being, I couldn’t be the source,
origin, or cause of something perfect: only
something perfect could be the cause of
something perfect.
5) So there must be a perfect being external to me
which is the cause of my perfect idea.
Argument for Analysis:
According to Descartes, we can’t know something
unless we are so absolutely certain that it is true that
we can’t doubt it. But if we accepted this, we would
be forced to conclude that we know nothing at all, or
almost nothing. It’s just wrong to say that we don’t
know something just because we can doubt that it’s
true, or just because it’s possible that it’s false: this
isn’t what we mean by the term ‘know.’ For example,
when I say “I know where I parked my bike, because I
remember doing it.” I don’t mean to indicate that I can’t
possibly be wrong about where I parked my bike, even
if it turns out that I’m a brain in a vat. So to know
something isn’t to be certain about it. So the
Cartesian analysis of knowledge doesn’t capture what
we typically mean by ‘knowledge.’
Argument for Analysis:
1) According to Descartes, we can’t know something
unless we are so absolutely certain that it is true that
we can’t doubt it.
2) But if we accepted this, we would be forced to
conclude that we know nothing at all, or almost
nothing.
3) But we know more than the Cartesian view would
support.
4) So to know something isn’t to be certain about it.
5) Descartes was wrong to believe that certainty is
necessary for knowledge.
Argument for Analysis:
You don’t know something unless you are absolutely
certain that it is true, and you have good reasons for your
belief that constitute evidence that your belief is true. You
believe that you are in a classroom in Ames Iowa. But if
you think carefully about it, you don’t know that you’re in a
classroom in Ames Iowa. For example, you might instead
be a brain in a vat in some laboratory somewhere, being
fed false impressions of your surroundings and your
situation. You have no evidence that you are not a brain
in a vat. So you cannot be certain that you are in a
classroom in Ames Iowa.
Argument for Analysis:
1) You believe that you are in a classroom in Ames Iowa.
2) It is possible that you are a brain in a vat in some
laboratory somewhere, being fed false impressions of
your surroundings and your situation.
3) You have no evidence that you are not a brain in a vat.
4) You don’t know something unless you are absolutely
certain that it is true, and you have good reasons for your
belief that constitute evidence that your belief is true.
5) So you cannot be certain that you are in a classroom in
Ames Iowa.
6) Therefore you don’t know that you’re in a classroom in
Ames Iowa.
Epistemology:
Theory of Knowledge
What is ‘knowledge?’ What is it to know
something?
 What does it mean to say that a belief is
‘justified?’
 What can we know?

Knowledge and Belief

We have a vast collection of beliefs, and some of them are false:
-Some people believe that astrology can inform us about our futures.
-Some people believe that aliens from outerspace are in contact with
human beings.
-Some people believe that human beings are the product of natural
selection and survival of the fittest.
-Some people believe that there is a God who created everything and
who cares about us.
-Some people believe that human beings will make settlements on
Mars before the end of the next millenium.
-Some people believe that human beings are more likely, in the next
millenium, to deplete the earth of its resources and destroy the
ecosystems on which we depend for our lives.

Sifting and sorting: Those beliefs about which we're less certain are
less likely to count as knowledge than those we're more certain of. Are
there any beliefs of which we are absolutely certain?
Knowledge and Belief
We believe many things.
 Not all of the things we believe are things
we know.


Among the things I believe, which are the
things I know?
Knowledge and Belief

Among the things I believe, which are the
things I know?

Hypothesis: The things I know are the
beliefs that are true.

Problem: What if I have true beliefs by
accident or for bad reasons?
Knowledge and Belief

Example: Accidentally True Belief.
I’ve been brainwashed to believe that I’m a
philosophy professor.
 My reason for believing this is that I’ve been
brainwashed, so I’d believe it whether or not
it was true.
 But it happens to be true.

Knowledge and Belief

Example:
I have on my car a sticker that says "Oberlin College."
People who see this sticker often form the belief that I
graduated from Oberlin college.

BUT: The sticker was on the car when I bought it (used),
and I didn't put it there. If people knew this, it would
undermine their belief that I went to Oberlin college, by
showing that their reason for believing that I did was not a
good reason.

Question: If you don't know that the sticker was on my car
when I bought it, is your belief that I went to Oberlin
College justified?
Knowledge: Platos’s Analysis

Plato, Euthyphro: Knowledge is Justified
True Belief.

A person S knows a proposition P If and
only if:
1) S believes P
2) S is is justified in believing P
3) P is true
Knowledge: Platos’s Analysis

A person S knows a proposition P If and only if:
1) S believes P
2) S is is justified in believing P
3) P is true
What is belief?
(Mental attitude associated with accompanying
dispositions)
What are the objects of belief?
(Propositions: Statements that can be true or false.)
When is belief justified?
(Alternate theories of justification)
What is it for a proposition to be true?
(Alternate theories of truth)
Knowledge: Platos’s Analysis

JUSTIFICATION AND BELIEF:

The 'Why?' game...: at a certain point in a childs
development, she gets the idea that there are reasons for
things, and start asking why.

Justification: A theory of the justification of beliefs must
provide us with a model of how to play the why game, or
as it is sometimes called, the justification game.

Example:
Proposition P: We are in a classroom together in Ames
Iowa.
[Presumably we all believe that P is true.]
Knowledge and Belief:
Descartes’s Problem

Descartes's Problem: How can I have
knowledge of anything, and which are the things
I know?

Sifting and sorting: Those beliefs about which
we're less certain are less likely to count as
knowledge than those we're more certain of. Are
there any beliefs we're absolutely certain of?
Knowledge and Belief:
Descartes’s Problem

DF of "undermining:" A proposition P undermines
another proposition Q just in case the truth of P would be
good evidence either (i) that Q is false, or (ii) that our
reasons for believing Q are not good reasons for
believing Q.

Proposed Principle for Negative Justification: Take
any propositions P and Q where P undermines Q. If you
have no evidence that P is false, then you are not fully
justified in believing Q.
Knowledge and Belief:
Descartes’s Problem

Example 1:
I have on my car a sticker that says "Oberlin College."
People who see this sticker usually form the belief that I
graduated from Oberlin college.

BUT: The sticker was on the car when I bought it (used),
and I didn't put it there. If people knew this, it would
undermine their belief that I went to Oberlin college, by
showing that their reason for believing that I did was not a
good reason.

Question: If you don't know that the sticker was on my car
when I bought it, is your belief that I went to Oberlin
College justified?
Knowledge and Belief:
Descartes’s Problem
Argument:
1) John regards the Oberlin sticker on Clark’s car as
evidence that Clark went to Oberlin college.
2) John’s belief that <Clark went to Oberlin College> is
based on the fact that he saw an Oberlin sticker on Clark’s
car.
3) Contrary to John’s belief, the sticker on Clark’s car is
not evidence that Clark went to Oberlin.
4) Therefore John’s belief that Clark went to Oberlin is not
justified.
5) Therefore John does not ‘know’ that Clark went to
Oberlin.
Knowledge and Belief:
Descartes’s Problem

Descartes, Meditation I: The Dream Argument
1) In Meditation 1, Descartes believes that he is sitting
before a fire.
2) But if Descartes is in bed dreaming, then he's not
before a fire.
3) Descartes argues that he has no evidence (or
inadequate evidence) to justify his belief that he's not
dreaming.
4) So he doesn't know that he's not dreaming.
5) So he doesn't know that he's sitting before a fire.
Skepticism:

Skepticism: The view that we don’t have
any knowledge.
“Nobody knows anything. Not even me. I
don’t even ‘know’ that nobody knows
anything. But it’s true.”
Two Skeptical Scenareos


Sextus Empiricus' Trilemma (a Modern Rendition):
(Answers to the "why" game.)
1) We have knowledge only if our beliefs are justified.
2) 'justification' can take three possibile forms:
A) We justify our total belief set by reference to some
foundational belief or set of such beliefs, which are not
themselves justified by any further beliefs.
B) Our beliefs mutually justify one another.
C) There is an endless regress of justifying reasons.
3) Not A: A foundational belief could not justify other beliefs unless it were
itself justified.
4) Not B: Circular justification is no justification at all.
5) Not C: An endless regress of reasons could not provide justification for
our first-level beliefs.
6) Therefore, we don't have knowledge. [Sextus was a skeptic.]
Skeptical Question:
Do we know anything at all?
 If I might be dreaming, might be a brain in
a vat, might be systematically deceived by
an evil genius…
…then can I know anything?


Many epistemic theories are attempts to
show that skepticism is false, and that we
can have justified beliefs in spite of the
force of skeptical arguments.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Meditation One: Introduces Skeptical Problem,
Method of Doubt, distinguishes among different
sources of belief.

The Project: Wholesale reconstruction of a
belief system: Descartes wants to tear it to the
ground and build it back from solid foundations.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

THE SKEPTICAL PROBLEM:

The starting point: recognition that many
previously held beliefs are either false or
unfounded. We need, he believes, a firm
foundation on which to place our knowledge, to
insure that our beliefs will be true.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Method of Doubt: Test beliefs according to their
"doubtability." If I can doubt one belief, but I
cannot doubt another, then surely my belief in
the second is firmer than my belief in the first.
For the moment, Descartes recommends that I
admit only those truths (if any) which I can
immediately perceive clearly and distinctly. Any
others whose truth I can derive from this basic
set will also be justified.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

First Possible Way Out: Foundationalism: A
person is justified in holding a belief only if it is
either self evident, or is directly or indirectly
inferred from self evident propositions by selfevident principles of inference.

A proposition is self evident(df) just in case
believing that it is true is sufficient for knowing
that it is true. [Some philosophers have doubted
that there are any self evident propositions.]
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Two Potential Problems for Foundationalism:
[These two are inconsistent with one another.
Do you see why?]

1) Perhaps there are no self-evident
propositions.
2) Perhaps there are some self-evident
propositions, but they are inadequate since they
provide us with no conclusive argument against
the skeptic.

DESCARTES: Meditations

CATEGORIES OF BELIEFS: Rather than examining each
belief in turn, (there are just too many) Descartes categorizes
his beliefs:
1) Blfs deriving from the senses. (Undermined by Dream
argument) (But the images composing my dream must have
their source somewhere-- there must exist some basic source
of this material I dream about... no? But what that basic source
may be is quite mysterious. Do I know that it mightn't be me?)
2) Blfs about empirical science have the same status as other
blfs deriving from the senses.
3) Blfs about "simple and universal" things (math & Logic)
Descartes finds that he can even doubt these...(Perhaps I get
confused whenever I add 2 and 2) (139.2)
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

ON THE EVIL GENIUS HYPOTHESIS:
Don't misunderstand: Descartes doesn't believe
that there is an evil demon, he rather considers
whether he has any evidence which would
enable him to prove that there is not one. The
evil demon hypothesis is one way to call into
question the justification of beliefs which derive
from the senses: it is a potential defeater for
many of the things we think we know.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Meditation One ends as it starts: with
unresolved doubts. It seems, at the end, that the
demon hypothesis provides a potential reason
for doubting just about anything. However,
Descartes (like Hume later) finds that he cannot
maintain skepticism: See p. 63: "But this
undertaking is arduous and a certain laziness
brings me back to my customary way of living."
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

One Kind of Objection: We don't have the technology
to envat people, and there isn't an evil genius... In sum,
the evil demon hypothesis is just not true.

Response: This objection is a non-starter since it begs
the question. Descartes never claimed that there is an
evil genius (nor did I claim that we are really envatted
brains). The point is to sift among our beliefs to find
those that are more securely justified than others. The
evil demon hypothesis is not true, but it is conceptually
possible (That is, thinking about it doesn't involve us in
any contradictions.)
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Descartes and Skepticism: if we can find a
foundation for our belief system which is both
1) self evidently true, and
2) sufficiently powerful to enable us to deduce
that our perceptual beliefs are true, THEN we
could escape the skeptical argument. Is there
such a foundation?
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

ON TO MEDITATION TWO!



Descartes DISCOVERS a self-evident belief.
Descartes ARGUES that some of his beliefs
could not have originated with him.
Descartes PROVES (?) that God exists and
that God is not a deceiver.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Cogito: Consider the proposition 'I exist.'

Apply method of doubt: If there is any conceivable circumstance in
which it could SEEM TO ME that I exist, and yet I could be wrong,
then the proposition 'I exist' can be doubted. Is there such a
circumstance? Demon world is the most complete hallucination
imaginable. If I couldn't be wrong in the demon world, then I couldn't
be wrong at all.
But in the demon world I must exist, since there is an 'I' to be
deceived.
Therefore I know that I exist any time I stop to consider the question.

"Cogito Ergo Sum." (I think therefore I am.)
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Descartes’s Foundational Belief: “I exist.”
1) I know X only if I perceive that clearly and distinctly
that X is true, such that it is impossible for me to doubt
X.
2) Query: Can I doubt my own existence.
3) For me to doubt my existence, there must be a ‘me’ to
do the doubting.
4) Any time I doubt my existence, I can clearly and
distinctly understand that I must exist.
5) I can’t doubt my own existence.
6) I know the proposition “I exist.”
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

"Cogito Ergo Sum." (I think therefore I am.)

How far will this get us?
Descartes has argued that the proposition "I
exist." is self evident. But is it powerful enough
that it can support my knowledge of the external
world? Can this help me out of the vat?
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Descartes and Skepticism: if we can find a
foundation for our belief system which is both
1) self evidently true, and
2) sufficiently powerful to enable us to deduce
that our perceptual beliefs are true, THEN we
could escape the skeptical argument. Is there
such a foundation?
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

"Cogito Ergo Sum." (I think therefore I am.)

How far will this get us?
Descartes has argued that the proposition "I exist." is self evident. But
is it powerful enough that it can support my knowledge of the external
world? Can this help me out of the vat?

Question: What is this thing (ME) whom we know to exist?
Am I my body? Not in the demon world, where I still exist...

I am a thing that thinks. That's all I know for sure.
I am something that doubts, affirms, understands, denies, wills,
refuses, imagines and senses.

In fact, what I know is that I am a thing that has IDEAS! What are
ideas?
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

The Wax Example:
My idea of the wax remains the same while the wax goes through
drastic changes: it is the same wax although its properties change
when it is melted or frozen. My senses do not give me an
understanding of the wax: I get different sensory information as the
wax changes, but my idea of the wax itself persists over these
changes. So "perceiving the wax" is essentially an act of the mind,
not of the senses.

Theory of Representative Ideas: Knowledge is a two-way
relationship between one's ideas and the objects in the external
world. We have internal access to our ideas, but not to the objects of
which they are ideas.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

The Wax Example:
My idea of the wax remains the same while the
wax goes through drastic changes: it is the
same wax although its properties change when
it is melted or frozen. My senses do not give me
an understanding of the wax: I get different
sensory information as the wax changes, but my
idea of the wax itself persists over these
changes. So "perceiving the wax" is essentially
an act of the mind, not of the senses.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Theory of Representative Ideas:
Knowledge is a two-way relationship
between one's ideas and the objects in the
external world. We have internal access to
our ideas, but not to the objects of which
they are ideas.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

A Problem for Cartesian Foundationalism: The theory
of representative ideas leaves us trapped in the confines
of our own mind! Descartes has (perhaps?) found a
foundational belief, but is it powerful enough to respond
to the skeptic? Does it enable us to think ourselves out
of the vat? Unfortunately, even if we have certainty with
respect to the COGITO and also to our first level sensory
beliefs (beliefs about the way things seem to us), we
cannot derive from these basic beliefs any statements
about the existence of external objects. We can't make it
out of the vat.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

To respond to the skeptic, a
foundationalist must show two things:
1) There are self evident propositions, and
2) From these propositions we can derive
knowledge of empirical reality.

So Descartes needs some more
equipment: He needs GOD.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

MEDITATION THREE: Concerning the Existence of
God

Method: Descartes has established that he exists as a
thinking thing. In the third meditation he undertakes to
examine the ideas that he finds in his mind, and to
consider their origin. (@38+) "But here I must inquire
particularly into those ideas that I believe to be derived
from things existing outside of me." If he can deduce that
these ideas do nor originate in him, then he may
conclude that there is something external that is the
origin of these ideas.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

DESCARTES ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD:

Argument from the Perfect Idea of an Infinite Being:
1) I have an idea of God which is the idea of a substance
that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, and
supremely powerful. [III.45-6]
2) As a finite and imperfect being, I cannot be the cause
of a perfect idea of an infinite substance. [III.45-6]
3) Only an infinite and perfect being could be the cause
of such an idea.
4) Therefore, there exists an infinite and perfect being
who is the cause of my idea.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Ontological Argument: (Meditation Five)
1) I have an idea of God.
2) The idea of God is the idea of a being that
has all perfections.
3) 'Existence' is a perfection. [That is, what
exists in reality is more perfect than what exists
only in the imagination.]
4) Therefore a being that has all perfections
must have 'existence.'
5) God exists.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Anselm's Version of the Ontological Argument:
1) I have an idea of God.
2) The idea of God is the idea of the greatest conceivable being.
3) A being that exists in reality as well as in the mind (in
imagination) is greater than a being that exists only in the mind.
4) Suppose that the Greatest Conceivable Being exists only in the
mind but not in reality.
5) Then we can conceive of a being that is even greater: one who
exists in reality as well as in the mind.
6) Then we can conceive of a being greater than the greatest
conceivable being-- but that would be a contradiction!
7) Therefore it is not the case that the greatest conceivable being
exists only in the mind but not in reality.
8) Therefore the greatest conceivable being exists in reality as well
as in the mind.
9) Therefore God exists.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Some Further Steps:
1) If there is a perfect being, then the evil
demon hypothesis is false.
2) Therefore my senses give me true
information about the world.
3) Therefore skepticism is false.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Physicalism: Mind and body are both
physical substances, and the
consequence of interaction of physical
particles and forces.

Dualism: Mind and body are different
substances that interact but which are
essentially different.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Mind and Body:

Descartes is a Dualist: he argues that mind and body are different,
separate substances. Here is one Cartesian argument for Dualism:

1) If one substance has a property P while another substance lacks
property P, then the two substances are not identical.
2) I can doubt the existence of my mind: my mind has the property
of 'dubitability'.
3) I can't doubt the existence of my body: my body lacks the
property of dubitability.
4) Therefore my mind is a different substance from my body.
DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Reservation: is 'dubitability' a property of
things or of thinkers? Perhaps premises
two and three say more about Descartes
thought processes than about the things
Descartes is considering.
For Physicalism:
Physical Evidence of Anasthesia
 Contemporary Science of Consciousness
presumes physicalism.
 Mind-Brain Identity and “Split Brain”
cases.

DESCARTES: Meditations on
First Philosophy

Final Issues in Cartesian Epistemology:

Does Descartes have a satisfactory response to the
skeptic? Unless one is satisfied with the proof of the
existence of God, one may conclude that Descartes has
escaped the skeptical conclusion only because he
accepted a bad argument. Few believe that any of the
philosophical arguments for God's existence is
conclusive; indeed James assumes that his listeners and
readers will already have recognized that the evidence
for the existence of God is inconclusive.
Descartes: Where from here…?

Does Descartes have a satisfactory response to the skeptic? Unless
one is satisfied with the proof of the existence of God, one may
conclude that Descart has escaped the skeptical conclusion only
because he accepted a bad argument. Few believe that any of the
philosophical arguments for God's existence is conclusive; indeed
James assumes that his listeners and readers will already have
recognized that the evidence for the existence of God is
inconclusive.

If this is right, where does it leave Descartes? Are we still in the vat?
Some people conclude that Descartes simply failed to provide a
convincing response to the skeptic. The meditations get the
epistemological project off the ground, but don't really take it beyond
the vat. Where does the argument go wrong? There are several
possibilities:
Descartes: Where from here…?
Conclusions from Descartes Discussion:
1) The negative principle of justification may just be too strong a
condition to place on knowledge. Perhaps this principle should be
rejected. [Many (most!) contemporary epistemologists would reject it.]
2) Some attribute Descartes failure to the representative theory of
ideas: Bertrand Russell argued that perception gives us immediate
contact with the world, and denies Descartes claim that we are only in
immediate contact with our ideas.
3) Some argue that Descartes' failure shows that foundationalism is
unacceptable. One might opt instead for a Coherentist or Pragmatist
account of the justification of belief. [James' opts for a pragmatist
solution. Other contemporary epistemologists hold that beliefs come in
systems and deny that it is circular for all beliefs to be justified by
reference to other fallible beliefs.
Descartes: Where from here…?

Some Non-Cartesian Alternatives:

Coherentism: There are no adequate foundations for knowledge, but we
can be justified in our beliefs provided that they cohere appropriately with
other of our beliefs. [Coherentists must then give a clear account of what
'coherence' means, and must respond to the objection that fiction may be
coherent. See Keith Lehrer Theory of Knowledge for a clear, contemporary
coherentist account of justification.]

Fallibilism: To know a proposition, it not necessary to have indubitable
certainty that it is true.

Most fallibilists would reject the Negative Principle of Justification. Most
contemporary epistemologists are fallibilists. Those epistemologists who are
not fallibilists are mostly skeptics. [I haven't done a survey, these are my
impressions.]
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe



James addresses a different problem: The
problem of rational belief.
James’s question is whether it is every rationally
permissible to believe something when there is
a dearth of evidence for it.
James takes it for granted that evidence for the
existence of God is insufficient to make belief a
requirement of rationality, but argues for the
weaker claim that belief is permissible– that is,
that disbelief is not a requirement of rationality.
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Pascal's Wager: "Either God is, or He is
not. But to which view shall we be
inclined? Reason cannot decide this
question. Infinite chaos separates us. At
the far end of this infinite distance a coin is
being spun which will come down heads
or tails. How will you wager?”
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
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Some Jamesian Terms:
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hypothesis,
Live hypothesis,
Dead hypothesis,
Option,
Forced option
Avoidable option,
Momentus option
Trivial option.
Genuine Option: Living, forced, and momentus.
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe

Doxastic Voluntarism: The theory that belief
can be commanded by the will: we can aquire
a belief that P (for example, a belief that God
exists) simply by willing to believe that P.
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Question: Is James committed to doxastic
voluntarism? Is Pascal? [The answer is no but
you need to be able to explain why not!]
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
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Principles of [Dis]Belief:
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1) If there is inadequate evidence that P is true,
then it is irrational to believe P. [Clifford, Huxley]
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2) James: Under certain circumstances, we may
be justified in believing P even if there is
inadequate evidence that P is true.
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
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"Our passional nature not only lawfully may,
but must, decide an option between
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option
that cannot by its nature be decided on
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such
circumstances, "Don't decide, but leave the
question open," is itself a passional decision, - just like deciding yes or no, -- and is attended
with the same risk of losing the truth."

James
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
James View:
Sometimes we must believe even where the evidence
is inadequate. We have two epistemic goals: (i) Gain
truth, and (ii) Avoid falsehood. It is only because we
have both aims that our epistemic situation is
interesting: If we simply wanted to gain truth, we could
believe everything. If we only wanted to avoid
falsehood, we could believe nothing. But given that we
have both aims, James concludes that "a rule which
would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging
certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really
there, would be an irrational rule.
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe

The "Religious Hypothesis: Is the option to believe
in God live? Forced? Momentus?
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“We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of
whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we
get glimpses now and then of paths which may be
deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to
death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed
to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is
any right one. What must we do? ‘Be strong and of a
good courage. Act for the best, hope for the best,
and take what comes. . . . If death ends all, we
cannot meet death better.’” --James
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe
Next: William James’s
Will to Believe