Transcript Rapid Identification of Architectural Bottlenecks via Precise Event Counting John Demme, Simha Sethumadhavan Columbia University {jdd,simha}@cs.columbia.edu.

Rapid Identification of Architectural
Bottlenecks via Precise Event Counting
John Demme, Simha Sethumadhavan
Columbia University
{jdd,simha}@cs.columbia.edu
2002
Objective-C
Scheme
Language Popularity
Platforms
C#
Lisp
Python
Delphi
Javascript
Other
Java
PHP
Perl
C
Visual Basic
C++
Source: TIOBE Index http://www.tiobe.com/index.php/tiobe_index
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2011
Language Popularity
Platforms
Go
Other
Lua
Java
Ruby
Objective-C
C#
C
Scheme
Ada
Lisp
Python
Delphi
Moore’s Law
C++
PHP
Javascript
Perl
Visual Basic
Multicore
Source: TIOBE Index http://www.tiobe.com/index.php/tiobe_index
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HOW CAN WE POSSIBLY
KEEP UP?
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Architectural Lifecycle
Performance
Data
Collection
Architectural
Improvement
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Human
Analysis
5
Performance Data Collection
• Analytical Models
– Fast, but questionable accuracy
• Simulation
– Often the gold standard
– Very detailed information
– Very slow
• Production Hardware (performance counters)
– Very fast
– Not very detailed
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Performance Data Collection
• Analytical Models
– Fast, but questionable accuracy
• Simulation
– Often the gold standard
– Very detailed information
– Very slow
• Production Hardware (Performance Counters)
– Very fast
– Not very detailed
– Relatively detailed
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ACCURACY, PRECISION &
PERTURBATION
A comparison of performance monitoring techniques
and the uncertainty principal
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Accuracy, Precision & Perturbation
Normal Program Execution
Corresponding Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
Time
• In normal execution, program interacts with
microarchitecture as expected
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Precise Instrumentation
Monitored Program Execution
Measured Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
Start of
Start of
Start of
mutex_lock
mutex_unlock
barrier_wait
“Correct” Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
Time
• When instrumentation is inserted, the
machine state is disrupted and
measurements are inaccurate
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Performance Counter SW Landscape
Precise
Reads counters whenever
program or instrumentation
requests a read
Heavyweight
Examples
Overhead
• PAPI
• perf_event
• Proportional
to # of reads
• PAPI: 1048ns
• Perf_event:
262ns
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Sampling vs. Instrumentation
Traditional Instrumented Program Execution
Start of
mutex_lock
Start of
mutex_unlock
Start of
barrier_wait
Sampled Program Execution
n cycles
n cycles
Time
• Traditional instrumentation like polling
• Sampling uses interrupts
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Performance Counter SW Landscape
Sampling
Interrupts every n
cycles and
extrapolates
Precise
Reads counters whenever
program or instrumentation
requests a read
Heavyweight
Examples • vTune
• OProfile
Overhead • Inversely
proportional to n
• Up to 20%
• Usually much less
• PAPI
• perf_event
• Proportional
to # of reads
• PAPI: 1048ns
• Perf_event:
262ns
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The Problem with Sampling
40 if (info->s->concurrent_insert)
rw_rdlock(&info->s->
41
key_root_lock[inx]);
42 changed=_mi_test_if_changed(info);
43 if (!flag) {
switch(info->s->
44
keyinfo[inx].key_alg) {
/* 37 lines omitted */
82 }
84 if (info->s->concurrent_insert) {
if (!error) {
85
while (...) {
86
/* 10 lines omitted */
}
97
}
98
rw_unlock(&info->s->
99
key_root_lock[inx]);
100 }
Sample Interrupt
Is this a critical section?
Conditional Locks
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Corrected with Precision
40 if (info->s->concurrent_insert)
rw_rdlock(&info->s->
41
key_root_lock[inx]);
42 changed=_mi_test_if_changed(info);
43 if (!flag) {
switch(info->s->
44
keyinfo[inx].key_alg) {
/* 37 lines omitted */
82 }
84 if (info->s->concurrent_insert) {
if (!error) {
85
while (...) {
86
/* 10 lines omitted */
}
97
}
98
rw_unlock(&info->s->
99
key_root_lock[inx]);
100 }
Read counter
Read counter
Conditional Locks
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But, Precision Adds Overhead
Monitored Program Execution
Measured Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
“Correct” Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
Time
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Instrumentation Adds Perturbation
Monitored Program Execution
Measured Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
“Correct” Machine State (Cache, Branch Predictor, etc)
Time
• If instrumentation sections are short,
perturbation is reduced and
measurements become more accurate
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Performance Counter SW Landscape
Sampling
Interrupts every n
cycles and
extrapolates
Precise
Reads counters whenever
program or instrumentation
requests a read
Heavyweight
Examples • vTune
• OProfile
Overhead • Inversely
proportional to n
• Up to 20%
• Usually much less
Lightweight
• PAPI
• perf_event
• Proportional
to # of reads
• PAPI: 1048ns
• Perf_event:
262ns
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Performance Counter SW Landscape
Sampling
Interrupts every n
cycles and
extrapolates
Precise
Reads counters whenever
program or instrumentation
requests a read
Heavyweight
Examples • vTune
• OProfile
Overhead • Inversely
proportional to n
• Up to 20%
• Usually much less
• PAPI
• perf_event
• Proportional
to # of reads
• PAPI: 1048ns
• Perf_event:
262ns
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Lightweight
• LiMiT
• Proportional
to # of reads
• 11ns
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Related Work
• No recent papers for better precise counting
– Original PAPI paper: Browne et al. 2000
– Some software, none offering LiMiT’s features
• Characterizing performance counters
– Weaver & Dongarra 2010
• Sampling
– Counter multiplexing techniques
• Mytkowicz et al. 2007
• Azimi et al. 2005
– Trace Alignment
• Mytkowicz et al. 2006
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REDUCING COUNTER
READ OVERHEADS
Implementing lightweight, precise monitoring
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Avoid system
calls to avoid
overhead
Why Precision
is Slow
Perfmon2 & Perf_event
Program requests
counter read
LiMiT
Program reads
counter
Why is this
so hard?
Kernel reads counter
and returns result
Program uses value
Program uses value
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A Self-Monitoring Process
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Run, process, run
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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24
39
24
Overflow
L1 Misses
7
Branches
24
Cycles
100
39
95
Psst!
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Overflow
L1 Misses
7
Branches
24
Cycles
1 00
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
0
0
100
26
Modified Read
20
+ 100
120
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
7
24
20
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
0
100
27
Overflow During Read
99
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
7
24
99
Overflow Space
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L1 Misses
Branches
0
0
Cycles
0
28
Overflow!
99
L1 Misses
7
Branches
24
Cycles
1 00
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
0
100
0
29
Atomicity Violation!
99
+ 100
199
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
7
24
0
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
100
30
OS Detection & Correction
99
L1 Misses
7
Branches
24
Cycles
1 00
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
0
100
0
31
OS Detection & Correction
0
99
Looks like
he was
reading
that…
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
7
24
00
Overflow Space
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
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0
0
100
32
Atomicity Violation Corrected
0
+ 100
100
L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
7
24
0
Overflow Space
So what does all this
effort buy us?
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L1 Misses
Branches
Cycles
0
0
100
33
Time to collect 3*107 readings
Time
User
System
Wall
PAPI
1.26s
Perf_event
0.53s
LiMiT
0.034s
Speedup
3.7x / 1.56x
30.10s
31.44s
7.30s
7.87s
0
0.34s
∞
92x / 23.1x
Average LiMiT Readout
Number of instructions
5
Number of cycles
37.14
Time
11.3 ns
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LiMiT Enables Detailed Study
• Short counter reads decrease perturbation
• Little perturbation allows detailed study of
– Short synchronization regions
– Short function calls
• Three Case Studies
– Synchronization in production web applications
• Not presented here, see paper
– Synchronization changes in MySQL over time
– User/Kernel code behavior in runtime libraries
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CASE STUDY:
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF
LOCKING BEHAVIOR IN MYSQL
Has MySQL gotten better since the advent of multi-cores?
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Evolution of Locking in MySQL
• Questions to answer
– Has MySQL gotten better at locking?
– What techniques have been used?
• Methodology
– Intercept pthread locking calls
– Count overheads and critical sections
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MySQL Synchronization Times
100%
Percentage of Execution
90%
80%
70%
60%
Free
50%
Locking
40%
Lock Held
30%
Unlocking
20%
10%
0%
MySQL 4.1
(2004)
MySQL 5.0
(2005)
MySQL 5.1
(2008)
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MySQL 5.5
(Beta, 2009)
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MySQL Critical Sections
Overall Time With Lock Held
Avg. Lock Hold Time
1400
Percentage of Execution
with Lock Held
40%
1200
35%
1000
30%
25%
800
20%
600
15%
400
10%
200
5%
0%
Average Number of Cycles
Lock is Held
45%
0
MySQL 4.1
(2004)
MySQL 5.0
(2005)
MySQL 5.1
(2008)
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MySQL 5.5
(Beta, 2009)
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Number of Locks in MySQL
Static Locks
6.E+08
4.E+05
5.E+08
3.E+05
3.E+05
4.E+08
2.E+05
3.E+08
2.E+05
2.E+08
Static Locks
Dynamic Locks
Dynamic Locks
1.E+05
1.E+08
5.E+04
0.E+00
0.E+00
MySQL 4.1
(2004)
MySQL 5.0
(2005)
MySQL 5.1
(2008)
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MySQL 5.5
(Beta, 2009)
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Observations & Implications
• Coarser granularity, better performance
– Total critical section time has decreased
– Average CS times have increased
– Number of locks has decreased
• Performance counters useful for software
engineering studies
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CASE STUDY:
KERNEL/USERSPACE OVERHEADS IN
RUNTIME LIBRARY
Does code in the kernel and runtime library behave?
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Full System Analysis w/o Simulation
• Questions to answer
– How much time do system applications spend in
in runtime libraries?
– How well do they perform in them? Why?
• Methodology
– Intercept common libc, libm and libpthread calls
– Count user-/kernel- space events during the calls
– Break down by purpose (I/O, Memory, Pthread)
• Applications
– MySQL, Apache
• Intel Nehalem Microarchitecture
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Execution Cycles in Library Calls
50%
Percentage of Total Cycles
45%
40%
35%
Pthreads
Memory
I/O
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
MySQL (User)
MySQL (Kernel)
Apache (User)
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Apache (Kernel)
44
MySQL Clocks per Instruction
2
1.8
Clocks per Instruction
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
User
Kernel
Libc
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Program
45
L3 Cache MPKI
L3 MPKI
I/O
Memory
Pthreads
35
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
MySQL (User)
MySQL (Kernel)
Apache (User)
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Apache
(Kernel)
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I-Cache Stall Cycles
I/O
Memory
22.4%
3.0%
Pthreads
12.0%
Percentage of Total Cycles
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
MySQL (User)
MySQL (Kernel)
Apache (User)
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Apache (Kernel)
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Observations & Implications
• Apache is fundamentally I/O bound
– Optimization of the I/O subsystem necessary
• Kernel code suffers from I-Cache stalls
– Speculation: bad interrupt instruction prefetching
• LiMiT yields detailed performance data
– Not as accurate or detailed as simulation
– But gathered in hours rather than weeks
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CONCLUSIONS
Research Methodology Implications,
Closing thoughts
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Conclusions
• Implications from case studies
–
–
–
–
MySQL’s multicore experience helped scalability
Performance counting for non-architecture
Libraries and kernels perform very differently
I/O subsystems can be slow
• Research Methodology
– LiMiT can provide detailed results quickly
– Simulators are more detailed but slow
– Opportunity to build microbenchmarks
• Identify bottlenecks with counters
• Verify representativeness with counters
• Then simulate
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QUESTIONS?
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BACKUP SLIDES
Man down! Need backup!
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Performance Evaluation Methods
Accuracy
Precision
Speed
Cost
Simulators
↑
↑
↓
↑/↓
Analytical
Models
Prototype
Hardware
?
?
↑
↓
↑
↑
↑
↑
Production
Hardware
↑/↓
↑/↓
↑
↓
Accuracy and Precision
are traded off
• Production hardware provides performance counters
• However, existing interfaces make accuracy/precision tradeoff difficult
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Sampling vs. LiMiT
LiMiT Instrumented Program Execution
Start of
mutex_lock
Start of
mutex_unlock
Start of
barrier_wait
Sampled Program Execution
n cycles
n cycles
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Another process runs
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Miles
75
9
Pushups
Situps
24
39
55
Fix: Virtualization
30 Miles!
I did pretty
well today.
Miles
30
7
Pushups
Situps
24
39
No you
didn’t.
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Avoiding Communication
Miles
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Pushups
Situps
0
0
Miles
Pushups
Situps
7
24
39
57
LiMiT Operation
Program Execu on
Kernel Scheduling (Timer Interrupt Handler)
Counter Reading Code
Timer Interrupts
mov
$0, %edx
r dpmc
shl
or q
$32, %r dx
%r ax, %r dx
addq ovf l , %r dx
Process Swap
Kernel saves PMC
Different Program
Executes
Return to
Program
Process Swap
Kernel attempts to restore PMC
PMC0 < 2³¹
PMC0 >= 2³¹
No
Regular mer interrupt processing
Transi on to kernel
Special kernel handling required
to avoid double coun ng.
Atomicity Violation!
Error handler:
reset %rdx, %rax before
returning to program
Yes
Detect Counter Read
Counter Overflow!
Is the program currently
executing a PMC read?
Examine interrupted instructions
and look for read pattern
Kernel increments overflow
variable and resets counter:
ovfl += PMC0
PMC0 = 0
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RDTSC
?@#*='45'A$4*#, , 'B, 4+%C4: '4: 'A#$54$2 %: *#'D 4: E=4$E: &'
! "#$%&#'( ) *+#, '- '. / '
- . /01%
+"#$! ) %
*"#$! ' %
) "#$! ' %
( "#$! ' %
&"#$! ' %
! "#$! ! %
234 3/%
No Resource Core Sharing Process
Sharing
(SMT)
Swapping
!%
*%
+) %
&( %
, &%
(!%
( *%
' )%
)(%
0 12 3#$'45'67$#%8, '9. : '; '( 4$#'<) , =#2 >'
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MySQL Instrumentation Overhead
MySQL Execution Cycles (User Time)
2.50E+12
2.00E+12
1.50E+12
1.00E+12
5.00E+11
0.00E+00
None
LiMiT
perf_event
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PAPI
60
CASE STUDY A:
LOCKING IN WEB WORKLOADS
How does web-related software use locks?
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Locking on the Web
• Questions to answer
– Is locking a significant concern?
– How can architects help?
– Are traditional benchmarks similar?
• Methodology
– Intercept pthread mutex calls, time w/ LiMiT
• Applications
–
–
–
–
Firefox
Apache
MySQL
PARSEC
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Execution Time by Region
100%
Percentage of Total User Cycles
90%
80%
70%
60%
Free
50%
Lock
40%
Lock Held
30%
Unlock
20%
10%
0%
Firefox Apache Parsec MySQL Apache Parsec MySQL
LiMiT LiMiT LiMiT LiMiT PAPI
PAPI
PAPI
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Locking Statistics
Avg. Lock Held
Time (cycles)
Dynamic Locks
per 10k Cycles
Static Locks
Firefox
Apache
PARSEC
MySQL
789
149
118
1076
3.24
1.12
0.545
3.18
57
1
17
13853
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Observations & Implications
• Applications like Firefox and MySQL use
locks differently from Apache and PARSEC
– Many notions of synchronization based on
scientific computing probably don’t apply
• Locking overheads up to 8 - 13%
– More efficient mechanisms may be helpful
– But, 13% is upper bound on speedup
• MySQL has some very long critical sections
– Prime targets for micro-arch optimization
– If they run faster, MySQL scales better
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Hardware Enhancements
• 64-bit Reads and Writes
– Overflows are primary source of complexity
– 64-bit counters w/ full read/write eliminates it
• Destructive Reads
– Difference = 2 reads, store, load & subtract
– Destructive read difference = 2 reads
• Combined Reads
– X86 counter read requires 2 instructions
– Combining should reduce overhead
• AMD’s Lightweight Profiling Proposal
– Really good, depending on microarchitecture
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