Trade Policy Dialogue on the Multiple Dimensions of Market Access and Development Regional Trade Liberalization as a Complement to Multilateral Liberalization? Carlos A.

Download Report

Transcript Trade Policy Dialogue on the Multiple Dimensions of Market Access and Development Regional Trade Liberalization as a Complement to Multilateral Liberalization? Carlos A.

Trade Policy Dialogue on the Multiple
Dimensions of Market Access and Development
Regional Trade Liberalization as a Complement
to Multilateral Liberalization?
Carlos A. Primo Braga
Senior Adviser
World Bank
OECD Global Forum on Trade
Mexico City, 23-24 October 2006
Planning ahead
Trade, Regionalism and Development:
Key Messages



Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are
proliferating and now cover one third of world
trade, but their liberalizing effect has often been
modest.
RTAs can create trade and bring many other
benefits for development …but results are not
automatic and depend critically on design and
implementation.
RTAs have systemic consequences that adversely
affect excluded countries, requiring international
attention.
Regional Trade Agreements are proliferating…
Annual number
30
Total in force
300
25
250
20
200
Cumulative in force
15
150
New agreements annually
10
100
5
50
0
0
1958
1969
1976
1984
1989
1994
1999
2004
…and now potentially cover more than one-third of global
trade
South-South RTAs predominate in number, but
not in trade covered
Number of RTAs
Percent of World Trade Covered
35
250
30
200
25
SouthSouth
150
SouthSouth
20
15
100
US
US
10
50
5
European
Union
0
1990
1996
European
Union
0
2002
1990
1996
2002
Why this proliferation?
High-income countries, such as US and EU
Grant trade access to support foreign policy goals, including
development
 Slow progress on multilateral agenda: “competitive
liberalization”
 Access to services markets, protection of intellectual
property, and rules for investment
Developing countries






Secure access to markets, especially large markets
Lock in reforms to promote domestic agenda
More FDI
Among neighbors, lowering trade cost at border
Framework for regional cooperation
…but RTAs provide less new market
access than it might appear
Share of trade covered (%), 2003
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Including all trade
Excluding 0% MFN
Excluding <3% MFN
…and regional agreements are a relatively small
driver of trade reform
Decomposing tariff reductions in response to multilateral, regional and own initiatives
Av. Tariffs, 1983 and 2003
30
Decomposing 20% pt. decline
Regional
Agreements
10%
29.9
25
20
Multilateral
Agreements
25%
15
9.3
10
Autonomous
Liberalization
65%
5
0
1983
Source: Martin and Ng, 2004
2003
Assessing effects of RTAs on members: two
ways
1 Prospective – general equilibrium models
 Most agreements projected to create more
trade than they divert
 Projected gains less than multilateral
 Excluded countries almost always lose
 Market access is a key determinant on net
benefits
2 Retrospective – econometric, gravity model
 Different studies – different results
 Meta analysis suggest that half of agreements
have been net trade diverting
Effects on members: Do RTAs create – or divert -trade?
Estimated exponential impact on trade
-4
SACU
NAFTA
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Overall exports
Overall imports
EC
CACM
Intra-regional trade
ECOWAS
GCC
AFTA
ANDEAN
CEMAC
Mercosur
SADC
SAPTA
CIS
EAC
WAEMU
COMESA
Note: The bars show the magnitude of the dummy variables capturing respectively the extent to which intraregional
trade, overall imports and overall exports differ from the “normal” levels predicted by the gravity model on the
basis of economic size, proximity and relevant institutional and historical variables, such as a common language.
Agreements with high external tariffs risk
trade diversion
NAFTA
AFTA
SADC
EAC
MERCOSUR
COMESA
ECOWAS
SAFTA
0
5
10
15
20
Average weighted tariffs
Note: Tariffs are import-weighted at the country level to arrive at PTA averages
Source: UN TRAINS, accessed through WITS
25
Lower external tariffs are associated with
greater regional integration
Average external tariffs
25
SAS
20
MNA
SSA
15
LAC
10
ECA
EAP
5
0
0
5
10
15
20
Intra-regional trade/GDP
25
30
RTAs go far beyond trade
Customs
Intellectual
Dispute
Standards
Transport
cooperation
Services
Property
Investment
Settlement
Labor
Competition
US-Jordan
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
US-Chile
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
US-Singapore
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
US-Australia
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
US-CAFTA
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
US-Morocco
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
NAFTA
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
U.S.-Led
E.U.-Led
EU-South Africa
EU-Mexico
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
EU-Chile
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
MERCOSUR
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Andean Community
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
CARICOM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AFTA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Japan-Singapore
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Canada-Chile
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Chile-Mexico
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
South-South
SADC
COMESA
Other
Let’s consider: trade faciliation, services, investment, intellectual property
rights and temporary movement of labor
Delays at border drives up trading costs
Trade/GDP
RTAs can provide
framework for mutual
efforts to reduce costs
Single customs
document

250
Malaysia
200
Slovenia
Slovakia
150
Harmonize driving & 100
weight regulations

Computerize both
sides of the border

Malawi
Kyrgyzstan
Ethiopia
50
Uganda
0
0
5
10
15
20
Days through customs, imports
Potential of RTAs to reduce border costs not yet realized
25
Services liberalization deepest in N-S
agreements…


US and EU (less systematically) agreements establish
 National treatment
 MFN treatment for members
 Nonrestrictive rules of origin of investor
 Pre-establishment access subject to negative lists (US) or
positive lists (EU)
Upside potential great because risks of losses through
diversion minimal.

…but achievements in additional liberalization subject to
question

South-south gone much less far
Investment accords provide for new access
and new investor protections…




Potential benefits include greater FDI flows because…
 Liberalized market access
 increased payoff to trade integration,
 reduced risk premium
 enhanced credibility of investment climate
Reduced international policy spillovers
 Rent shifting via TRIMs, etc.
However, market access more important than investor
protections as no evidence that protections significantly
increase FDI flows to developing countries…
RTAs that create large ex-post market results and, provided
good investment climate, do attract more FDI. A 10% increase
in post-FTA market size is associated with a 0.5 percent
increase in FDI in the host country.
Intellectual property rights figure prominently
in N-S RTAs, particularly US FTAs



US FTAs contain TRIPS
Plus provisions that
provide greater IPR
protection.
Brings generics under
market and data
exclusivity arrangements
No analysis of economic
consequences prior to
signing

Open questions:



Will FTAs foreclose use
of Doha flexibilities on
TRIPS for generics?
Will stronger IPRs
contribute to more FDI
and high tech trade?
Are TRIPS Plus
measures appropriate to
all countries?
Conclusion: Development consequences of
investment and IPR rules depend heavily on market
access these rules leverage
Labor services are area of potential

Types of labor services treatment





Full labor mobility (EFTA, ANZCERTA)
Access for certain groups (NAFTA, Japan-Singapore
FTA)
Mode-4 type access (ASEAN, EU-Mexico)
No provisions (APEC, COMESA)
Patterns include:



Limited mobility
Skilled labor only: mainly intra-corporate
In conclusion…not much movement
Ironically, areas with least progress – services and labor
– have greatest development potential… while areas
with most progress – e.g., IPR – are those with more
uncertain development consequences
Perceptions of risk and
opportunities vary…
Both North-South and South-South accords can
be improved…
Some sweeping generalization…
North-South


Strengths
 Compatibility among
economies
 Services liberalization
 Move to international
standards
Weaknesses
 Restrictive rules of
origin
 Exemptions, esp.
agriculture
 Inappropriate rules
 No or limited movement
of workers
Index of ROO Restrictiveness
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
NAFTA EU-Mexico EU-Chile
Estevadeordal, 2004
SADC
ChileCACM
AFTA
COMESA ECOWAS
Both North-South and South-South accords can
be improved…
Some sweeping generalization…
North-South


Strengths
 Compatibility among
economies/large
markets
 Services liberalization
 Move to international
standards
Weaknesses
 Restrictive rules of
origin
 Exemptions, esp.
agriculture
 Inappropriate rules
 No movement of
workers
South- South
Strengths
 Focus on trade
 Nonrestrictive rules
of origin
 Adjacency permit
trade facilitation
 Weaknesses

Small
markets/Higher
external barriers
Exemptions
Minimal services
No movement of workers
Design are crucial to achieving objectives
•Design
Large
Low
ex-post market
external tariff barriers
Nonrestrictive
rules of origin
Wide
product coverage with minimal
exemptions
Liberalization
Facilitating
trade at borders
Appropriate
rules
•Implementation:
agreements
of services
Avoiding paper
….Open regionalism
Overlapping African agreements…
AMU
Nile River Basin
COMESA
ECCAS
IGAD
CEMAC
Somalia
Sao Tomé & Principe
Algeria
Libya
Morocco Mauritania
Tunisia
ECOWAS
Conseil de
L’Entente
Ghana
Nigeria
Egypt
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Gabon
Equat. Guinea
Rep.Congo
Chad
Cape Verde
Gambia
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Sudan
Burundi*
Rwanda*
DR Congo
Benin
Togo
Cote d’Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Sierra Leaone
Niger
Burkina Faso
Mali
Senegal
EAC
Guinea
Tanzania*
Malawi*
Zambia*
Zimbabwe*
SACU
WAEMU
Mano River
Union
Kenya*
Uganda*
Angola
CLISS
AMU:
Arab Maghreb Union
CBI:
Cross Border Initiative
CEMAC: Economic & Monetary Community of Central Africa
CILSS:
Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC:
East African Cooperation
ECOWAS: Economic Community of Western African Studies
IGAD:
Inter-Governmental Authority for Government
IOC:
Indian Ocean Commission
SACU:
Southern African Customs Union
SADC:
Southern African Development Community
WAEMU: West African Economic & Monetary Union
South Africa
Botswana
Lesotho
Mozambique
SADC
Mauritius*
Syechelles*
Comoros*
Madagascar*
Namibia*
Swaziland*
Reunion
*CBI
IOC
Systemic issues…uneven and discriminatory
access




Preferences hurt excluded countries
Hub and spokes put weaker countries at disadvantage
Multiple arrangements burden customs
Disincentives to engage in multilateral liberalization
Av. Number of PTAs per country, 2002/3
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
E. Asia & Europe &
Latin
Middle
Pacific
C. Asia America & East & N.
Caribbean Africa
S. Asia
SubSaharan
Africa
Policy implications…

International community through the WTO
 Get Doha done
 Concentrate on transparency/Article XXIV

High income countries have systemic responsibility




Widen coverage in FTAs (i.e. agriculture)
Move toward conformity in rules of origin, and make less
restrictive
Promote rules tailored to local capacities
Developing countries should adopt a 3 part strategy,
using each instrument to its most appropriate objective
 Unilateral: driving competitiveness
 Multilateral: seeking broad market access
 Regional: deep market access and institutional
reforms (customs, ports, trade-related standards)
The importance of being
prepared…
[email protected]

Source:
World Bank (2005) Global Economic
Prospects
Thank you !