Design, Human Factors and Safety Thomas B. Sheridan, ScD Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Design, Human Factors and Safety Thomas B. Sheridan, ScD Massachusetts Institute of Technology Definitions DESIGN - is the synthesis of a means to serve a human need - is an art that makes use of science and technology ERROR - is an unwanted, unwonted exchange of energy RISK of an event - is some function of undesired consequences that migh t occur and the probability of their occurrence. Two common definitions of risk are: o (consequences x probability) = expected value, and o (worst possible outcome) but risk could be defined in more complex ways SAFETY - is acceptable risk The Usual Steps in System Design 1. Pro blem identification, based on errors ine fficiencies complaints 2. Task analysis observation analysis of mental workload inter views and focus groups activity recording analysis of infor matio n flows and situat ion awareness simulations 3. Mathematical modeling statistical models dynamic models decision theoretical models event trees logic trees cause-consequence models 4. Detailed design/redesign, with help of all actors involved 5. Controlled experiments and simulations to refine and validate 6. Pilot testing in-situ What is Human Factors Engineering? Psychology and systems engineerin g discipl ines applied to human tasks and hu man-system interaction : to understand error causation, inefficienc y redesign physical environment, techno logy redesign task and administrat ive procedures improve training (The subset o f HFE called ergonomics, which is bio mechanics and physiology applied to spatial arrangements and physical work, is of diminish ing importance as auto mation takes over physical work and hu man tasks become more cognit ive.) SHEL MODEL OF HUMAN INTERFACES H HARDWARE human- machine S SOFTWARE language L LIVEWARE inter- personal L LIVEWARE body stressors E ENVIRONMENT The Procrustean bed: forcing the human to fit the technology DISPLAY-CONTROL COMPATIBILITY (E.G., THE STOVE BURNER CONTROL PROBLEM) DESIGN OF SCALES AND NUMBERING 6 10 3 0 0 Combining two related variables into one integrated display phas e-change line temperat ure gas s tate liquid press ure Ecological display in process control inf low rate A inf low rate B maximum lev el lev el lev el inc reas ing out f low rate des ired out f low range Temporal Analysis of Nurse Tasks (in Surgical Procedure) Concurrence of Exits, Handoffs, Counting Activities with Procedure Benchmarks Exits Handoffs Counts 12:00:00 PM Intubation 2:24:00 PM Incision 4:48:00 PM Porta Hepatis Dissection Liver Resection 7:12:00 PM Fascial Closure Table 3: Safe ty Compromisin gEve n ts an d Contribu tin gan d Compe n satory Factors A Wound dehiscence Intra-operative tissue injury requiring surgical revision #1 Intra-operative tissue injury requiring surgical revision #2 Medication administration error # 1 B C D E G H I J K L M N O P Q ND Self Wound contamination # 2 Hypothermia Other Wound contamination # 1 Inadequate preoperativ e preparation Near-injury to inexperienced assistant F Eve n t De te ction ** Medication administration error # 2 Adverse drug reaction C ompe n satory Factors* C on tribu ting Factors* Eve n t Predictor display (for train) (mov ing window) (1) speed limits (2) opt imum t raject ory radius sp ee d 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 (3) predict ion (4) serv ice braking (5) emergency braking 7 8 9 10 kilometer post s 11 12 13 track curv at ure 14 15 16 Supervisory control f eedback of sy stem state human human operat or computer f eedback of comput er's understanding of commands cont rolled process Levels of automation T able 1. A Scale of Degrees of Automation 1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must do it all. 2. The computer suggests alternative ways to do the task. 3. The computer selects one way to do the task and 4. executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 5. allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 6. executes the suggestion automatically, then necessarily informs the human, or 7. executes the suggestion automatically, then informs the human only if asked. 8. The computer selects the method, executes the task, and ignores the human. Telepresence (e.g, in materials handling) ment al model, inc luding s ens e of being present wit h env ironmental object (s ) teleoperat or or comput er (hardware or s of t ware) human operat or, dis play and c ont rol interf ac e real or v irt ual env ironment al object (s ) Reason’s model of an accident: penetration of multiple barriers Qu i c k T i m e ™ a n d a T I F F (L Z W ) d e c o m p re s s o r a re n e e d e d to s e e th i s p i c t u re . SOME CAUSES OF HUMAN ERROR Lack of feedback Capture Invalid mental models Wrong track of hypothesis verifi cation Stress and perceptual narrowin g Risk homeostasis State of the nervous system Shift work: fitness for duty CIRCADIAN EFFECTS perf ormance 09 12 Noon error 15 18 21 24 03 Midnight 06 09 ERROR THERAPIES • Design for ease of use • Education and training • Prevention or inhibition of exposure • Computer-based decision aids • Alarms • Posted warnings Metaphor of Organizational Resilience to unpredictable incidents and anomolous events Qu i c k T i m e ™ a n d a T I F F (L Z W ) d e c o m p re s s o r a re n e e d e d to s e e th i s p i c t u re .