Why Smallpox Bioterrorism? Stable aerosol Virus Easy to Produce Infectious at low doses Human to human transmission 10 to 12 day incubation period High mortality rate (30%) CDC Materials.
Download ReportTranscript Why Smallpox Bioterrorism? Stable aerosol Virus Easy to Produce Infectious at low doses Human to human transmission 10 to 12 day incubation period High mortality rate (30%) CDC Materials.
Why Smallpox Bioterrorism?
Stable aerosol Virus Easy to Produce Infectious at low doses Human to human transmission 10 to 12 day incubation period High mortality rate (30%) CDC Materials
•Small Pox Vaccine History
1000 AD - China, deliberate inoculation of smallpox into skin or nares resulting in less severe smallpox infection. Vaccinees could still transmit smallpox 1796 - Edward Jenner demonstrated that skin inoculation of cowpox virus provided protection against smallpox infection 1805 - Italy, first use of smallpox vaccine manufactured on calf flank 1864 - Widespread recognition of utility of calf flank smallpox vaccine 1940’s - Development of commercial process for freeze-dried vaccine production (Collier)
Herd Immunity
Smallpox Spreads to the Non-immune Immunization Slows the Spread Dramatically Epidemics Die Out Naturally Herd Immunity Protects the Unimmunized
Smallpox Vaccine
Live Virus Vaccine (Vaccinia Virus) Not Cowpox, Might be Extinct Horsepox Must be Infected to be Immune Crude Preparation We Have Now Prepared from the skin of infected calves Filtered, Cleaned (some), and Freeze-dried New Vaccine is Clean, but still Live
Complications of Vaccination
Local Lesion Can be Spread on the Body and to Others Progressive (Disseminated) Vaccina Deadly Like Smallpox, but Less Contagious Encephalitis Heart Disease?
Historic Probability of Injury
Small Risk from Bacterial and Viral Contaminants Small Risk of Allergic Reaction 35 Years Ago 5.6M New and 8.6M Revaccinations a Year 9 deaths, 12 encephalitis/30-40% permanent Death or Severe Permanent Injury 1/1,000,000 Mostly among immunsupressed persons
Global Eradication Program
1950 - Pan American Sanitary Organization initiated hemisphere-wide eradication program 1967 - Following USSR proposal (1958) WHO initiated Global Eradication Program Based on Ring Immunization Vaccinate All Contacts and their Contacts Isolate Contacts for Incubation Period Involuntary - Ignore Revisionist History 1977 - Oct. 26, 1977 last known naturally occurring smallpox case recorded in Somalia 1980 - WHO announced world-wide eradication
Eradication Ended Vaccinations
Cost Benefit Analysis Vaccine was Very Cheap Program Administration was Expensive Risks of Vaccine Were Seen as Outweighing Benefits Stopped in the 1970s Immunity Declines with Time
Universal Vulnerability
Agriculture and Smallpox Stays Endemic or Dies Out Forever Most Communities had Significant Immunity Isolated Communities Synchronous Infection Break Down of Social Order Now the Whole World is Susceptible
How Have Risks Changed?
Immunosuppressed Persons Cannot Fight the Virus and Develop Progressive Vaccinia Immunosuppression Was Rare in 1970 Immunosuppression is More Common HIV, Cancer Chemotherapy, Arthritis Drugs, Organ Transplants
Role of Medical Care
Smallpox Can Reduce Mortality with Medical Care Huge Risk of Spreading Infection to Others Very Sick Patients - Lots of Resources Cannot Treat Mass Casualties Vaccinia VIG - more will have to be made Less sick patients - longer time
Complications Last time - 1947 New York Outbreak
Case from Mexico 6,300,000 Vaccinated in a Month 3 Deaths from the Smallpox 6 Deaths from the Vaccine Would Have Been Much Higher Without Vaccination?
What would happen now?
Assume 1,000,000 Vaccinated in Mass Campaign with No Screening Assume 1.0% Immunosuppressed 10,000 Immunosuppressed Persons Probably Low, Could be 2%+ Potentially 1-2,000+ Deaths and More With Severe Illness