Practical Crypto Attacks Against Web Applications Justin Clarke OWASP London Chapter Leader OWASP Global Connections Committee Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy,

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Transcript Practical Crypto Attacks Against Web Applications Justin Clarke OWASP London Chapter Leader OWASP Global Connections Committee Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy,

Practical Crypto Attacks
Against Web Applications
Justin Clarke
OWASP London Chapter Leader
OWASP Global Connections Committee
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.
The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org/
Overview
IANAC
Usage != security
Pentesting?
OWASP Foundation
The Need for Cryptography
Confidentiality – Prevent the disclosure of
information to unauthorized individuals or
systems
Integrity – Ensure that data cannot be
modified undetectably
Authenticity - Validate that a party is who they
claim they are
OWASP Foundation
Scenarios
Symmetric Crypto Attacks
ECB Mode Usage
Padding-Based Attacks
Secure Random Number Generation (if we have
time)
OWASP Foundation
Symmetric Crypto Attacks
Most block ciphers support multiple modes of
operation
The most common modes are :
ECB – Electronic Code Book
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
CFB - Cipher Feedback
OFB - Output Feedback
None provide integrity if used in isolation
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #1
ECB
CONFIDENTIALITY
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #2
UID:23909,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe2301,Role:3
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #2
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
Block 7
UID:2390
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
1,Role:3
9648dab1
d7f285ac
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
UID:23909,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe2301,Role:3
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #2
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
Block 7
UID:2390
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
1,Role:3
9648dab1
d7f285ac
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
UID:23909,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe2301,Role:3
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 7
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
9648dab1
d7f285ac
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #2
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
Block 7
UID:2390
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
1,Role:3
9648dab1
d7f285ac
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
UID:23909,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe2301,Role:3
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 7
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
9648dab1
d7f285ac
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
UID:2390
1,Role:3
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
UID:23901,Role:39,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe230
OWASP Foundation
Why is ECB mode BAD?
Reason #2
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
Block 7
UID:2390
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
1,Role:3
9648dab1
d7f285ac
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
UID:23909,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe2301,Role:3
CIPHERTEXT
Block 1
Block 7
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
Block 5
Block 6
9648dab1
d7f285ac
69e75f87
cf74ab6d
22a1eaee
db7aabbb
0f5a7a2a
1f8de75f
86adfcf6
17abcbcf
6adb7872
7ab9dd8e
96bdc238
5fa70ba2
UID:2390
1,Role:3
9,Email:
john@doe
.com,Nic
kName:Jo
hnDoe230
UID:23901,Role:39,Email:[email protected],NickName:JohnDoe230
OWASP Foundation
DEMO
ECB Mode Attack
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.
The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org/
What about CBC mode?
OWASP Foundation
What about CBC mode?
CBC
CONFIDENTIALITY
OWASP Foundation
CBC Decryption
Original Ciphertext
BLOCK 1
BLOCK 2
BLOCK 3
OWASP Foundation
CBC Decryption
Block Swapping will result in data corruption
BLOCK 1
BLOCK 3
BLOCK 2
OWASP Foundation
Attacking CBC Encrypted Data
“Padding Oracle” Attack
Leverages byte flipping of ciphertext to generate
invalid padding exceptions
Data can be decrypted (and encrypted too) without
knowledge of the secret key
OWASP Foundation
How Padding Works
OWASP Foundation
How Padding Works
Assuming this scheme, then there are only 8
possible valid padding sequences:
0x01
0x02,
0x03,
0x04,
0x05,
0x06,
0x07,
0x08,
0x02
0x03,
0x04,
0x05,
0x06,
0x07,
0x08,
0x03,
0x04,
0x05,
0x06,
0x07,
0x08,
0x04
0x05,
0x06,
0x07,
0x08,
0x05,
0x06, 0x06
0x07, 0x07, 0x07
0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08
OWASP Foundation
Flipping Bytes in CBC Mode
OWASP Foundation
The Decryption Process
Is the key the correct size?
Invalid Key Exception
Is the value (bytes) an even block multiple?
Invalid Length Exception
Is the decrypted block properly padded?
Invalid Padding Exception
CRITICAL
Return the value
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
Call this “Byte X”
Call this “Byte Y”
Basic Premise:
• A change of Byte X (ciphertext) will change Byte Y (plaintext)
• There is a one-to-one correlation between Byte X values and Byte Y values
• Exception is thrown if plain-text does not end with a valid padding sequence
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
Byte X == 0x00
Byte Y == ???
Exception? YES
• Byte Y is not valid padding
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
Byte X == 0x01
Byte Y == ???
Exception? YES
• Byte Y is not valid padding
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
Byte X == 0x02
Byte Y == ???
Exception? YES
• Byte Y IS valid padding (must be 0x01)
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
What does that tell us?
The altered byte value produced valid padding when
XOR’ed with the intermediate value
IF A ^ B = C
THEN A ^ C = B
AND C ^ B = A
OWASP Foundation
The Padding Oracle Attack
What does that tell us?
If the padding byte was 0x01:
– Our Byte (0x02) ^ Intermediate Byte (??) == 0x01
– Intermediate Byte == Our Byte (0x02) ^ 0x01
The plain-text value is the intermediate value
XOR’ed with the prior ciphertext byte
OWASP Foundation
DEMO
Padding Oracle Attack
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.
The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org/
What’s the solution?

As we’ve seen, encrypted data (while kept
private) is still susceptible to tampering
Message
Encryption
We need to ensure PRIVACY and INTEGRITY
OWASP Foundation
What’s the solution?
Encrypt + Sign the Ciphertext
Message
SIGNATURE
Encryption
HMAC: Combines a cryptographic hash function with
a secret key
 Cannot be re-computed without the key
Verifies the integrity and authenticity of a
message
OWASP Foundation
Another Lesson Learned
Why not HMAC within the ciphertext?
 Does not prevent against side channel attacks
during decryption

Padding Oracle Attack in .NET Framework
 Discovered September 2010
 Viewstate and Forms Authentication Cookies were affected even
though an HMAC was included within the ciphertext
 Tampering was only be detected after decryption
OWASP Foundation
So to Summarize…
Crypto is hard to get right
Lots of ways to make mistakes
When in doubt, ask an expert
OWASP Foundation
Justin Clarke
[email protected]
[email protected]
Twitter: @connectjunkie
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.
The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org/