The Use of

Leading Indicators

to measure the performance of the

Occupational Health and Safety System

by: Steve Oakley 1

bjectives

At the end of this session participants will understand: A common definition of leading indicators; How to use leading indicators to measure organizational OHS performance; How leading indicators can be used to create an OHS system or refine an existing system.

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esearch for Presentation

T. Krause – U.S. Consultant/Author J. Reason – U.K. University of Manchester – Psychology – Transportation Consultant /Author D. Petersen – U.S. Consultant/Author A. Sefton Division – U.K. HSE - Offshore Safety R. Flin – U.K. University of Aberdeen

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ndicate

To point out, make known, show, be a sign of, or suggest a call for treatment (Medical)

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ndicator

Person or thing that points out or indicates

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ead

To guide, go in front

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eading Indicator

1) A measure of conditions or activities that are believed to precede, and consequently affect, injury rates. (OHSCO) 2) A metric used for its ability to measure incremental progress, or quality, or to indicate the direction of future results (predictive). (Dupont, 2000)

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Cross Section of an Airfoil Leading Edge Trailing Edge

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afety Management Model

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esults-directed Indicators

Loss time case rate: Number of lost time cases x 200,000/number of hours worked

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esults-directed Indicators

Loss and restricted day rate: Number of days lost and restricted x 200,000 hours/number of hours worked

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ehaviour-directed Indicators

Frequency and Quality of:

Workplace safety and loss control inspections Job safety observations Employee safety training Safety program audits Employee safety meetings 13 (Prieskop & Woessner, 1997)

ehaviour-directed Indicators

Frequency and Quality of:

Safety communications to employees Safety performance appraisals Employee safety suggestions Personal protection equipment inspections and observations (Prieskop and Woessner, 1997) 14

ehaviour-directed Indicators

Frequency and Quality of:

Safety committee meetings Employee involvement in program implementation (Prieskop and Woessner, 1997) 15

ehaviour-directed Indicators

Timeliness of required responses to employee safety suggestions Timeliness and quality of accident/incident investigations (Prieskop and Woessner, 1997) 16

nputs/Outcomes Inputs

(leading indicators)

Outcomes

(trailing indicators) 17

anaging for Outstanding Safety

Line Ownership of Safety Management Vision, Commitment & Drive Involvement in Safety Activities, Training Comprehensive Safety Systems & Practices Safe Equipment & Physical Environment Begin with the end in Mind Safety Organization, Specialists Process Implementation Safety Aware, Trained & Committed Workforce Short Term Outcomes Outstanding Safety Performance Long Term Outcomes

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afety



Concerned with injury causing situations



Concerned with hazards to humans that result from sudden severe conditions

(Goetsch, 1993) 19

ealth



Concerned with disease causing situations



Deals with adverse reactions to prolonged exposure to dangerous, but less intense hazards.

(Goetsch, 1993) 20

There are probably more occupational health fatalities than safety fatalities, but the statistics will not reflect this difference because the health fatalities are delayed and are often never diagnosed.

(Asfahl, 1999) 21

The most valid method of achieving sustainable, long-term results is to steer a facility’s safety efforts by a variety of behaviour-based indicators, in judicious combination with accident frequency.

(Krause et al, 1991) 22

ive Indicators Worth Measuring

1) Frequency of observation 2) Percentage of actions rated as safe 3) Safety related maintenance information 4) Safety climate surveys 5) Accident frequency (Krause et al, 1991) 23

ix Quality & Safety

 Constancy of purpose – develop long term strategies and stick to them  Process, not program  Do it right the first time  Do not blame the employees  Specify standards in operational terms (Krause et al, 1991) 24

ix Quality & Safety

 Use measurement of upstream factors to assess performance  Improve the process, not the downstream results  Use statistical techniques to distinguish variation due to common cause from variation due to special cause (Krause et al, 1991) 25

azards, Defences & Losses

Defences DANGER Hazards Losses

(Reason ,1997) 26

ynamics of Accident Causation

Local triggers Intrinsic defects Atypical conditions Latent failures at the managerial levels Psychological precursors Unsafe acts Trajectory of accident opportunity Defence-in-depth

(Reason, 1990) 27

atent Conditions are Important

1) They undoubtedly combine with local factors

to breach defences. In many cases, they are

weakened or absent defences. 2) Resident ‘pathogens’ within the workplace and the organization can be identified and removed before the event.

3) Local triggers and unsafe acts are hard to anticipate and some proximal factors are almost impossible to defend against (for example, forgetfulness, inattention).

28 (Reason ,1997)

Thus, despite their inherent problems, identifying and eliminating latent conditions proactively still offer the best routes to improving system ‘Fitness’. But it has to be a continuous process. As one problem is being addressed, others will spring up in its place. There are no final victories in the safety war.

(Reason, 1997) 29

Only if the managers of a system had complete control over all the possible accident producing factors could…accident rates be linked directly to the quality of safety management. The large random component in accident causation means the “safe organizations” can still have bad accidents, and “unsafe” organizations can escape them for long periods.

(Reason, 1997) 30

ountervailing Currents within the Safety Space Increasing resistance Increasing vulnerability Very Safe Currents acting within the safety space Very Unsafe

(Reason, 1997) 31

afety Management

The only attainable goal for safety management is: To reach that region of the safety space associated with maximum resistance.

To stay in that region by sustaining the improvement.

(Reason, 1997) 32

avigating the Safety Space

Increasing resistance Increasing vulnerability Very Safe Target Zone Navigational Aids Reactive outcome measures Proactive process measures Driving Forces Commitment Competence Cognisance Very Unsafe

(Reason, 1997) 33

eactive & Proactive Measures

Reactive Measures Proactive Measures

Local & Organizational Conditions Analysis of many incidents can reveal recurrent patterns of cause and effect.

Identify those conditions most needing correction, leading to steady gains in resistance of fitness.

(Reason, 1997) 34

eactive & Proactive Measures

Reactive Measures Defences, Barriers & Safeguards

Each event shows a partial or complete trajectory through the defences.

Proactive Measures

Regular checks reveal where holes exist now and where they are most likely to appear next.

(Reason, 1997) 35

roactive Process Measurement

Unsafe Acts Local Workplace Factors Proactive Channels 1 2 Safety Information System Organizational Factors 3

(Reason, 1997) 36

nvestigation of Organizational Accidents Defences DANGER Losses Hazards Latent Condition Pathways Unsafe Acts Local Workplace Factors Organizational Factors

Causes Investigation (Reason, 1997) 37

Cross Section of an Airfoil Latent Conditions Organizational Factors Local Workplace Factors Unsafe Acts Defences Leading Edge Trailing Edge

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rimary Process Subsystems

Safety-specific factors Management factors Training Training Training

CULTURAL FACTORS

Commitment Competence Cognisance Training Procedural factors Technical factors

(Reason, 1997) 39

afety Management Systems (SMS)

  Measuring indicators selected from the inputs to the safety management system requires a change in the way of thinking.

Companies who put greater effort into developing their SMS have better performance and this effort rubs off profitably onto other business systems.

40 (Sefton, 2000)

evels for Benchmarking

Leading indicators show company managers that an effective system exists to put the lessons learned from accidents, incidents and near misses into practice.

(Sefton, 2000) 41

evels for Benchmarking

Leading indicators populate the management system as a whole to demonstrate a positive safety culture exists within the organization.

(Sefton, 2000) 42

evels for Benchmarking

A virtuous cycle exists in which teams develop their own indicators to grow and learn. Accident and incident statistics are trending to zero.

(Sefton, 2000) 43

easurement of Safety Performance Leaders in safety performance use metrics that effectively drive their continuous improvement efforts. Leading indicators (e.g., observations) are used to predict changes in safety performance.

Monitor safety performance versus program implementation at all sites.

(Petersen, 1996) 44

easurement of Safety Performance Performance targets are defined and communicated.

Review targets based on feedback from staff, metrics and benchmarking.

Safety performance targets should align with business targets.

45 Petersen, 1996

easurement of Safety Performance Safety performance (operational) should be tied to bonuses and merit pay; this is consistent among leaders in business.

(Petersen, 1996) 46

easurement of Safety Performance Discipline is consistent with well developed guidelines.

Leading companies ensure in depth root cause analysis of accidents in formulating disciplinary actions.

(Petersen, 1996) 47

Trailing indicator data generally provide limited answers about relationships between causes and effects, so only broad accident preventive measures can be taken. Checklists and analyses are more suitable, detailed, and effective for safety accomplishments.

(Hammer & Price, 2001) 48

afety Management Systems

In the book “Safety Management Systems” the author advocates doing what many organizations fail to do: 1) Establish and apply a coherent set of measures of safety performance; 2) Link the set of safety performance measures coherently to the set of business performance measures.

(Waring, 1996) 49

agging/Leading Indicators

In recent years there has been a movement away from safety measures purely based on retrospective data, or

‘lagging indicators’ such as fatalities,

lost time accident rates and incidents,

towards so called ‘leading indicators’

such as safety audits or measurements of safety climate.

(Flin et al, 2000) 50

eading Indicators

The most common themes assessed in safety climate questionnaires are: Management/supervision Safety system Risk Work pressure Competence

(Flin et al, 2000) 51

tress

While organizations have traditionally emphasized stress

management, the emerging

focus includes stress

abatement, cutting off negative

stress at the source.

(Pratt, 2001) 52

trategies for Preventing Workplace Stress Align workloads with worker’s capabilities and resources Design stimulating, meaningful jobs Define workers’ roles and responsibilities clearly Give workers’ the opportunity to participate in decisions about their jobs

(Pratt, 2001) 53

trategies for Preventing Workplace Stress Improve communications Provide opportunities for social interaction among workers Establish work schedules that are compatible with demands and responsibilities outside the job

(Pratt, 2001) 54

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries Certain stressors in the workplace can contribute to accidents and injuries by making people, to one degree or another: Sleep badly Over-medicate themselves Drink excessively

(Health Canada, 2001) 55

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries Feel depressed Feel anxious, jittery and nervous Feel angry and reckless (often due to a sense of unfairness or injustice)

(Health Canada, 2001) 56

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries When people engage in these behaviours or fall prey to these emotional states, they are more likely to: Become momentarily (but dangerously) distracted Make dangerous errors in judgement

(Health Canada, 2001) 57

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries Fail in normal activities that require hand-to-eye coordination Put their bodies under stress, increasing the potential for strains and sprains

(Health Canada,2001) 58

onclusion

OHS risk factors are often complex Numerous causal layers provide various opportunities for anticipation, detection, monitoring and control of the risk factors Appropriate identification and action based on the use of leading indicators, will address the risk factors, improving the performance of the OHS system

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