Transcript 23 April 2007 Collective Security in Space : Asian Perspectives Panel II Perspectives on Space Security Space Security of Asia from the Perspective of International Space.

23 April 2007
Collective Security in Space
: Asian Perspectives
Panel II Perspectives on Space Security
Space Security of Asia from the
Perspective of International
Space Law
Setsuko AOKI
Professor, Faculty of Policy
Management, Keio University
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[email protected]
Table of Contents
1 what is space security ?
2 current status of international space law on
space security
3 Asian perspective: What can be done for the
next 5 years
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1 What is Space Security？
For the purposes of this presentation,
“space security” refers to “the secure and
sustainable access to and use space, and
freedom from space-based threats”
(from a statement of Canadian delegation at 44th session
of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) 21 Feb. 2007) Canada maintains the
necessity of “rules-based behavior in space”.
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“Space Security” and “Space Safety”
Space Traffic Management (STM) means “the set
of technical and regulatory provisions for
promoting safe access into outer space,
operations in outer space and return from outer
space to Earth free from physical or radiofrequency interference”.
Space safety at the COPUOS ?
Space security at the Conference on Disarmament
(CD)?
Holistic approach needed ? No consensus
reached in the international fora
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2 Current Status of International
Space Law on Security
(1) UN Space Treaties on Outer Space
(2) Arms Control Agreements
(3) Legal Instruments of Laws of Armed
Conflicts ←USAF “Counterspace
Operations” (2004)
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(1) UN Treaties on Outer Space
1967
1968
1972
1975
1979
Outer Space Treaty (OST) 99
Rescue Agreement 89
Liability Convention 82
Registration Convention 46
Moon Agreement 13
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para. 1 of the Article IV of the OST
States Parties to the Treaty undertake
not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner.
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para. 2 of the Art. IV
The Moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing
of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military manoeuvres on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden.
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The Moon Agreement
Scope of the “Moon”
Art.1
(1) other celestial bodies within the solar
system (other than the Earth)
(2) orbits around or other trajectories to or
around the (astrological) Moon
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Art. 3 of the Moon Agreement
(strengthened peaceful uses)
1. The Moon shall be used by all States Parties
exclusively for peaceful purposes.
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile
act or threat of hostile act on the Moon is
prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the
Moon in order to commit any such act or to
engage in any such threat in relation to the
Earth, the Moon, spacecraft, the personnel or
spacecraft or manmade space objects.
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(continued)
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or
other trajectory of the Moon objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction or place or use such
weapons on or in the Moon.
4. The establishment of military base, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of
weapons and the conduct of military
manoeuvres on the Moon shall be forbidden.
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(2) Arms Control Agreements
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) (1963)
Art. 1 Parties to the PTBT undertake to
prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, at any place
under its jurisdiction or control;
(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits,
including outer space; or under water,
including territorial waters or high seas;
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ABM Treaty (1972-2002)
Art. V
1 Each Party undertake not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM systems or components
which are sea-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based.
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Confidence building provisions in arms
control agreements which are applicable to
space-based monitoring
1972
Art.12 of the ABM Treaty
1972 -77 Art. 5 of the SALT I
1987
Art. 12 of the INF
1990
Art.14,15 of the CFE Treaty
1991
Art. 9 of the START I
1993(- terminated while not into effect)
Art. 4 of the START II
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National Technical Means of
Verification (NTMs)
1. For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national
technical means or verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with para.1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by national technical
means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. ---
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CFE Treaty :Multilateral technical Means of
Verification
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, a State Party shall have the right to use, in
addition to the procedures referred to in Article XIV, national or
multinational technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. A State Party shall not interfere with national or multinational
technical means of verification of another State Party operating in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures that impede
verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by
national or multinational technical means of verification of another
State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices
associated with normal personnel training, maintenance or
operations involving conventional armaments and equipment limited
by the Treaty.
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(3) Legal Instruments of Laws of
Armed Conflicts
1907 Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land
1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention)
1977 Protocol Additional I to the Geneva
Convention
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD Convention)(1977)
Art. I
1 --undertake not to engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party.
2---undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce
any State, group of States or international
organizations to engage in activities contrary to
the provisions of the Art. I, para.1.
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Definition of “environmental
modification techniques”
Art. II ---any techniques for changing –
through the deliberate manipulation of
natural processes - the dynamics,
composition or structure of the Earth,
including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer
space.
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Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Convention (1977)
Art. 36 New Weapons
In the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means of or method
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an
obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of
international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.
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Hague V Convention
Art. 7 A Neutral Power is not called upon to
prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one
or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of
war, or, in general, of anything which can be of
use to an army or a fleet.
Art. 8 A Neutral Power is not called upon to forbid
or restrict the use on behalf of belligerents of
telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless
telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to
companies or private individuals.
Conditions: have to be impartiality applied to the
both belligerents (Art.9)
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Impartiality in Allowing Use of
Communication Facilities

The liberty of a neutral State, if it so
desires, to transmit messages by means
of its telegraph, telephone, cable, radio, or
other telecommunications facilities does
not imply the power so to use them or to
permit their use as to lend assistance to
the belligerents on one side only.
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Obligations on neutral states
1 impartiality to the belligerents
2 avoidance to let its territory use by the
belligerents for the purposes of executing
the armed conflicts
3 perseverance from the results of armed
conflicts contrabands, blockade, etc.
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3 Asian perspective:
What can be done
Starting point: no satellite immunity provisions, no robust space
cooperation mechanism (APSCO 2006～）
regional security cooperation fragile
no platforms on which space security could be enhanced
Step1 better implementation of the 4 of the UN Space Treaties on
Outer Space and related UN cooperative activities should be
promoted (up to 2010)
ex(1) space safety measures should come first. Regional cooperation
for the effective implementation of the STSC Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines
Ex2 (2) Regional Cooperation in space application based on the
“Recommendations of the UNISPACE III” COPUOS)
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Article IX of the OST can be applied for the
ASAT experiments
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests
of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue
studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of
extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for
this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State
Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation
concerning the activity or experiment.
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OST as confidence building
measures
Art. IX could be used for “space safety” in that
space debris could be regarded as “potentially
harmful interference” with foreign activities. In
connection with that, some actions including
ASAT experiments could be theoretically
stopped by the international consultation and
possibly.
Not direct or clear provisions, but such could be
developed into a new set of concrete rules.
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Notes should be taken while
engaging in the 1st step
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (“space
safety” )are not proxy to the space security
measures
1 Using the ASAT weapons is not be
categorically prohibited by the guidelines.
2 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are
“soft law” not legally-binding.
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Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the STSC of
the COPUOS
(annex IV, A/AC.105/890, 6 Mar.2007)
Guideline 1 Limit debris released during
normal operations
Guideline 2 Minimize the potential for breakups during operational phases
Guideline 3 Limit the probability of
accidental collision in orbit
Guideline 4 Avoid Intentional Destruction
and other harmful activities
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(continued)
Guideline 5 Minimize potential for post-mission
break-ups resulting from stored energy
Guideline 6 Limit the long-term presence of
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in
the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of
their mission
Guideline 7 Limit the long-term interference of
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with
the geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) region
after the end of their mission
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Guideline 4 Avoid Intentional Destruction and
other harmful activities
Recognizing that an increased risk of collision
could pose a threat to space operations, the
intentional destruction of any on-orbit spacecraft
and launch vehicle orbital stages or other
harmful activities that generate long-lived debris
should be avoided.
When intentional break-ups are necessary,
they should be conducted at sufficiently low
altitude to limit the orbital lifetime of resulting
fragments.
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2nd step Framework setting: lessons form
the Conference on Disarmament:
full of ideas, no tangible results
1 Definition failed “Space Weapons” ( space
to space, space to earth, earth to space ?
jamming?)
2 No legally-binding instruments have been
adopted on space since 1979 (or 1984)
Realistic goal until 2012 in Asia is
confidence-building measures based on
political commitment and civil space
cooperation
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What Asian region can borrow from
the CD and other fora (up to 2012)
Various proposals for confidence building (monitoring
weapons in space and on the Earth, keep-distance
between space assets, notification system)
One of the latest proposal
CD/1785 (21 June 2006) Canada
Space-based verification: PAXSAT A
(resurrected idea; originally in the 1980’s)
International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) similar
proposals have been submitted to the CD.
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Regional satellite monitoring
PAXSAT, ISMA type organization military uses of
outer space strengthened surveillance functions
In the Asian region, more realistic path is from
collective environmental monitoring + disaster
management → collective monitoring systems
for space security purposes ←to make it
possible, 1969 Parliamentary resolution
(contents: self-imposed no-military =peaceful
uses of space principle) should be appropriately
addressed by the prospective Basic Space Act
of Japan (to be shortly submitted to the
Parliament)
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Conclusion
1 Satellite monitoring environmental and
military objects would enhance regional
security based on the NTM experience
between the superpowers and later in
Europe.
2 Such monitoring involves “military” aspects.
To make military space activities viable,
regional security efforts in the various
fields are necessary.
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Possibility in Asia
Confidence building measures
“space safety”
“space security”
Soft law frameworks for the cooperative
measures to better implement the
provisions of Outer Space Treaty (1967)
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