Real Life Information Security Bringing cost-benefit analysis into risk management OWASP Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under.
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Real Life Information Security Bringing cost-benefit analysis into risk management OWASP Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org Hewitt Associates Human Resources Outsourcing ~25’000 employees worldwide Highly sensitive clients’ data OWASP 2 HRO Market Not purely financial Mostly B2B Highly competitive Stay competitive Stay flexible OWASP 3 Shepherds or policemen? Very high pressure from business No „one size fits all” approach Lessons learnt Talk to business Have real arguments Talk business Where do all these numbers come from? OWASP 4 From the past Source: DatalossDB.org OWASP 5 From market analytics ~$100 USD per record No actual abuse required „Losing control” is the bad word How much to spend and where to stop? Source: Ponemon Institute, „2008 Annual Study: Cost of Data Breach” OWASP 6 From others’ fines Source: FSA, 22 July 2009 OWASP 7 From Risk Analysis Risk = Potential Loss * Threat Probability Potential Loss ~ Asset Cost, Brand Value... OWASP 8 When Risk Analysis makes sense? Control Cost << Asset Cost Source: Flickr (edouаrd) OWASP 9 What makes Control cost? Roll-out cost Obvious Change cost Not so obvious Management cost Not so obvious End-user usage cost Largely ignored Especially if outside Source: Flickr (dаveme) OWASP 10 Potential loss → Control → Real loss OWASP 11 Case studies OWASP 12 Qualified Certificate in ZUS* ZUS costs Roll-out = ? Administration = ? Taxpayer costs (245’000 QC’s) 100-140 million PLN – one-time ~40 million PLN – annual QC renewal Future costs Attribute certificates (ZUS & taxpayers) = ? „e-PUAP trusted profiles” (ZUS) = ? * ZUS = Polish public pensions provider Source: Money.pl, ZUS OWASP 13 Invoicing What’s the cost of invoicing? People, paper, printing, postal, processing Average €1,4 per paper invoice Ultimate solution Give up VAT When e-invoicing makes sense? » Electronic invoice TCO << Paper invoice TCO » Theory: €0,4 versus €1,4 » Key word: TCO Sources: EU MEMO/00/85 OWASP 14 E-Invoicing in Europe Denmark Poland OCES & others allowed Only QES & EDI allowed OCES: Quite simple origin & integrity authentication OCES: Proportional to einvoicing risks Around 66% of all invoices are e-invoices EDI: supermarkets only QES: Not designed for automatic signature QES: More legal that real security Around 5% of companies use einvoicing Sources: EEI 2007, ITST, OECD; GUS 2008 OWASP 15 Risk Management in e-banking Auth method Num ber SMS 15 Token 11 Individual Millions of clients ↑Usable, ↓Big cost ↓Big cost Corporate High nonrepudiation needs ↓Repudiation ↓Repudiation TAN 7 ↓Low security, ↓Repudiation ↑ Low cost Smartc ard 2 ↓Not usable, ↓Big cost ↑ Nonrepudiation Source: Bankier.pl report, October 2009 (selected data only) OWASP 16 Laffer’s curve in security Source: Wikipedia OWASP 17 Mayfield’s Paradox Source: ISACA, „Mathematical Proofs of Mayfield's Paradox”, 2001 OWASP 18 How to? OWASP 19 Pitfall of „One-size fits all” approach 80 70 60 50 A B C 40 30 20 10 0 Risk Cost OWASP 20 Source: Willem Duiff, GE (SASMA 2009) OWASP 21 Control questions Before deploying a new solution Do my controls help, instead of breaking process? How do my controls help business do its work? Before asking for new funding What we earned on last project? OWASP 22 Is security a cost? Security is an investment to prevent losses Spend $100k to prevent losing $1m = 10x benefit NOT: „Security again spent $100k” YES: „Security helped save $1M for just $100k” OWASP 23 How FDE saves money Office break-in Four laptops stolen All with full-disk encryption Cost of incident – zero Hardware – insurance Data confidentality – able to prove to client Data availability – backups & network drives Where’s ROI of FDE? No $$$ in fines No $$ in breach notification No $? in brand damage OWASP 24 Building a consistent security policy #1 Should people should take their laptops home? Isn’t that increasing risk of theft? Laptop theft Lose laptop ($) Lose data ($$$) Source: Flickr (аresnick) OWASP 25 Building a consistent security policy #2 Laptop at home Work from home Disaster recovery, business continuity Examples: UK snow (2009), London flood (2009), Hemel Hempstead explosion (2005) Need to prevent the other risks Source: Wikipedia OWASP 26 Building a consistent security policy #3 End-user message „Always take your laptop home” FDE is standard, non-optional proces OWASP 27 Things we learned when talking to bussiness Avoid „weasel talk” and buzzwords „Some attacks exist that might pose a significant risk...” Use as much facts and numbers as possible Do use industry reports Be careful with vendor reports „How spam filtering helps preventing global warming” Filter them through your company’s reality check Learn from historic incidents in your organisation Perform periodic review of your controls Make sure at the old threat is still there Make sure no new threats appeared OWASP 28 Questions? Questions, comments [email protected] http://www.linkedin.com/in/pawelkrawczyk OWASP 29