Portfolio Balance Lecture 23 assumption: exchange risk is the only important risk. Lecture 24 assumption: default risk is important.

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Transcript Portfolio Balance Lecture 23 assumption: exchange risk is the only important risk. Lecture 24 assumption: default risk is important.

Portfolio Balance
Lecture 23 assumption:
exchange risk is the only important risk.
Lecture 24 assumption:
default risk is important.
Recap of L23
• Questions
– How can we allow for effects of risk?
• Currency risk.
• Country risk.
– How can we allow for effects of debt even if it is not monetized?
• Effects of budget deficits &
•
current account deficits
• Key parameters
– Risk-aversion, ρ
– Variance of returns, V
– Covariances among returns, Cov.
Lecture 24: Country Risk
One lesson of portfolio diversification theory:
A country borrowing too much drives up the expected rate of return
it must pay. The supply of funds is not infinitely elastic.
-- especially for developing countries.
The portfolio-balance model can be very general (menu of assets).
•
In Lecture 23, we considered a special case relevant
especially to rich-country bonds: exchange risk is the only risk.
•
What modifications are appropriate for developing country debt?
The view from the South:
Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Harvard University
EM sovereign spreads
↑ Spreads shot up in 1990s crises,
• and fell to low levels in next decade.↓
Bpblogspot.com
Spreads rose again in Sept.2008 ↑ ,
• esp. on $-denominated debt
• & in E.Europe.
WesternAsset.com
World Bank
Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School, Harvard University
What determines spreads?
EMBI is correlated with risk perceptions
risk off
“risk on”
Laura Jaramillo & Catalina Michelle Tejada, IMF Working Paper, March 2011
The portfolio balance model
can be applied to country risk
Demand for assets issued by various countries f:
x i, t = Ai
+ [ρV]i -1
Et (r ft+1 – r dt+1) ;
Now the expected return Et (r ft+1) subtracts from i ft
the probability of default times loss in event of default.
Similarly, the variances & covariances
factor in risks of loss through default.
When perceptions of risk are high, sovereign spreads must be high
for investors to absorb given supplies of debt, and vice versa.
In developing countries:
•
Domestic country is usually assumed to be a debtor, not a creditor.
•
It must pay a premium as compensation for default risk.
•
Debt to foreigners was usually $-denominated
•
Then, expected return
•
Denominator for Debt :
More relevant than world wealth is
the country’s GDP or X. Why? Earnings determine ability to repay.
•
Supply-of-lending-curve slopes up: when debt is large
investors fear default & build a country risk premium into i.
=> no exchange risk .
= observed “spread”
between
interest rate on the country’s loans or bonds and risk-free $ rate,
minus expected loss through default
-- instead of rp .
API-120 - Macroeconomic Policy Analysis I , Professor Jeffrey Frankel,, Harvard University
• The spread may rise steeply when Debt/GDP is high.
Stiglitz: it may even bend backwards, due to rising risk of default.
i
Supply of
funds from
world
investors
b
Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School, Harvard University
≡ Debt/GDP
Eichengreen & Mody (2000):
Spreads charged by banks
on emerging market loans
are significantly:
• reduced if the borrower
generates more business for
the bank,
but
• increased if the country has:
-----
high total ratio of Debt/GDP,
rescheduled in previous year
high Debt Service / X, or
unstable exports; and
• reduced if it has:
-- a good credit rating,
-- high growth, or
-- high reserves/short-term debt
Why don’t debtor countries default more often,
given absence of an international enforcement mechanism?
1. Common answer: They want to preserve their
creditworthiness, to borrow again in the future.
Not a sustainable repeated-game equilibrium: Bulow-Rogoff (AER, 1989).
Defaulters seem to return to the market before long:
Eichengreen (1987), Arellano (2009).
2. Cynical answer: Finance Ministers want to remain
members in good standing of the international elite.
3. Best answer (probably): Defaulters may lose access
to international banking system, including trade credit.
Loss of credit disrupts production, even for export.
Theory: Eaton & Gersovitz (RES 1981, EER 86). Evidence: Rose (JDE, 2005).
API-120 - Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Harvard Kennedy School
Debt dynamics:
Definition of sustainability: a steady or falling debt/GDP ratio
Debt
b
where Y ≡ nominal GDP
Y
db dDebt/ dt Debt

 2 dY / dt
dt
Y
Y
TotalFisca lDeficit Debt dY / dt


Y
Y
Y
Pr imaryDefic it  iDebt
 bn
Y
where n  nominal economic growth rate and d  primary deficit / Y .

db
=
d + i b - bn
=
d + (i - n) b.
dt
=> Debt ratio explodes if d > 0 and i > n (or r > real growth rate).

db
= d + (i - n) b.
dt
where
Debt
,
b
Y
n  nominal growth rate, and d  primary deficit / Y .
Debt dynamics line
shows the relationship between b and (i-n), for db/dt = 0.
Even with a primary surplus (d<0),
if i is high (relative to n), then b is on explosive path.
i
Db/dt=0
range of explosive debt
range of
declining Debt/GDP ratio
n1
0
Copyright Jeffrey Frankel
ius
b
Debt dynamics, continued
• It is best to keep b low to begin with,
especially for “debt-intolerant countries.”
• Otherwise, it may be hard to stay on the stable path
• if
– i rises suddenly,
• due to either a rise in world i* (e.g., 1982, 2014?), or
• an increase in risk concerns (e.g., 2008);
– or n exogenously slows down.
• Now add the upward-sloping supply of funds curve.
• i includes a default premium,
which probably depends in turn on db/dt.
• => It may be difficult or impossible to escape the unstable path
– without default, write-down, or restructuring of the debt,
– or else inflating it away,
• if you are lucky enough to have borrowed in your own currency.
Debt dynamics, with inelastic supply of funds
i
Greece
2012
range of explosive debt
range of
declining Debt/GDP
Ireland
2012
n1
ius
0
b
explosive debt path
Professor Jeffrey Frankel, Kennedy School, Harvard University
Appendix 1: Debt dynamics graph,
with possible unstable equilibrium
Supply of
funds line
i
Initial debt
dynamics line
{
sovereign
spread
iUS
Debt
b
Y
(1) Good times.
Growth is strong.
db/dt = 0, or if > 0 nobody minds. Default premium is small.
(2) Adverse shift. Say growth n slows down. Debt dynamics
line shifts down, so the country suddenly falls in the range db/dt>0.
=> gradually moving rightward along the supply-of-lending curve.
(3) Adjustment. The government responds by a fiscal
contraction, turning budget into a surplus (d<0). This shifts the
debt dynamics line back up. If the shift is big enough, then once
again db/dt=0.
(4) Repeat. What if there is a further adverse shift?
E.g., a further growth slowdown (n↓) in response to the higher i & budget surplus.
=> b starts to climb again.
But by now we are into steep part of the supply-of-lending curve.
There is now substantial fear of default => i rises sharply.
The system could be unstable….
Appendix 2: The blurring of lines between debt
of advanced countries and developing countries
• 1) Since the crisis of the euro periphery began in Greece
in 2010, we have become aware that “advanced”
countries also have sovereign default risk.
• 2) Since 2000, Emerging Market Countries have
increasingly been able to borrow in their own currencies,
so their debt carries currency risk (not just default risk).
1) Country creditworthiness is now inter-shuffled
“Advanced” countries
AAA Germany, UK
AA+ US, France
AA
Belgium
AAJapan
A+
A
ABBB+ Ireland, Italy, Spain
BBB- Iceland
BB+
BB
Portugal
B
SD
Greece
(Formerly) “Developing” countries
Singapore, Hong Kong
Chile
China
Korea
Malaysia, South Africa
Brazil, Thailand, Botswana
Colombia, India
Indonesia, Philippines
Costa Rica, Jordan
Burkina Faso
S&P ratings, Feb.2012 updated 8/2012
Spreads for Italy, Greece, & other Mediterranean members
of € were near zero, from 2001 until 2008
and then shot up in 2010
Market Nighshift Nov. 16, 2011
21
2) The end of Original Sin:
After 2000, Emerging Markets successfully issued more debt
in their own local currencies (LC), instead of $-denominated (FC).
Fig. 2 from Jesse Schreger & Wenxin Du
“Local Currency Sovereign Risk,” HU, March 2013
Turkey is able to borrow in local currency (lira),
but has to pay a high currency premium to do so.
{
Total premium on
Turkey’s lira debt
over US treasuries
Pure default risk premium on lira debt
Fig. 5 from Schreger & Du, “Local Currency Sovereign Risk,” HU, March 2013
{