The Siphon Project An Implementation of Stealth Target Acquisition & Information Gathering Methodologies 11/7/2015 Blackhat USA 2001

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Transcript The Siphon Project An Implementation of Stealth Target Acquisition & Information Gathering Methodologies 11/7/2015 Blackhat USA 2001

The Siphon Project
An Implementation of Stealth
Target Acquisition & Information
Gathering Methodologies
11/7/2015
Blackhat USA 2001
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Contact Information
Marshall Beddoe: [email protected]
Christopher Abad: [email protected]
URL: www.gravitino.net/projects/siphon
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Overview
A definition of general network mapping
Active techniques
Passive techniques (Siphon)
Example Siphon report
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What is Network Mapping?
The process of gathering information in order to
identify and understand the internetworking of
systems
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Why is this Important?
To gather information
To identify weaknesses
To learn how the network operates
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Network Mapping Information
Port Information
Operating System Information
Information Enumeration
Topology Map Generation
Vulnerability Information
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Port Information
Vulnerable services run on TCP/UDP ports
Perception of security on the network and/or host
Ability to perform accurate OS identification
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Operating System Information
Survey of the types of OS’ on a network
Vulnerabilities specific to operating systems
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Information Enumeration
“Harmless” information that can later lead to the
compromise of a network
Examples: E-mail addresses, NetBIOS names, NFS
exports, usernames, hostnames, whois information,
etc.
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Topology Map Generation
Understanding the physical layout of the network
Possible discovery of alternate penetration routes
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Vulnerability Information
Consists of all previously explained network mapping
information
Discovering vulnerabilities on systems and in network
configuration
One vulnerability can lead to the compromise of an
entire network
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Current Mapping Techniques
Active Network Mapping
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Nmap
Queso
Nessus
Passive Network Mapping
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Siphon
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Active Network Mapping
Sending queries to receive responses in order to
gather port information, operating system
information, etc.
Requires employing applications that generate
“noise” on a network
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Active Mapping Techniques
Active
Active
Active
Active
Active
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port mapping
operating system identification
information enumeration
topology map generation
vulnerability assessment
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Active Port Mapping
TCP connect() scan (1)
TCP SYN “stealth” scan (2)
Special TCP FIN, XMAS & NULL scans
Vanilla UDP scan (4)
(3)
SYN to port 23
(1)
SYN|ACK from port 23
ACK to port 23
FIN to port 23
(3)
No RST response, port is open
SYN to port 23
(2)
SYN|ACK from port 23
UDP packet to port 67
(4)
No ICMP port unreachable, port is open
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Active OS Identification
TCP Advertised Window
TCP Options
FIN Probes
ISN Sampling
Frag Handling
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TCP Packet
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Active Information Enumeration
NetBIOS name gathering
NetBIOS drive sharing
Sendmail EXPN probes
Finger information
WHOIS information
NFS exports
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Active Topology Mapping
Traceroute
INTERNET
Host B
Host A
Host C
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Active Vulnerability Assessment
Banner checking
RPC portmapper queries
DNS version queries
TCP connect() to port 21
220 FTP Server (Version wu-2.6.0(1) ready.
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Pros & Cons of Active Mapping
Pros


Cons
Assessment can be
conducted from a
different network
Requires little time to
gather information

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Generates network noise
Alarms intrusion
detection systems
Reveals source of probe
Accuracy problems
Intrusive
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The Siphon Project
When it was created

January 2000
Why it was created

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
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Does not generate network noise
Does not trigger IDS alarms
Does not reveal source of probe
Does not send out a single packet
Stealth technique
Datalink layer level mapping
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Passive Network Mapping
Gathering information about a network without
sending out a single packet
By monitoring traffic, can determine the entire layout
of the network and the configuration of hosts
connected to the network
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Is Passive Feasible?
Does passive mapping provide complete information?


For the most part, the only difference is that passive
network mapping takes more time to gather information
Hosts that never receive network traffic on a network might
not be reported by Siphon
Who would use passive network mapping?

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Network administrators that operate in red-tape
environments such as the US Government/Military
Skilled hackers that move slowly to avoid detection
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Siphon Mapping Techniques
Passive port mapping
Passive operating system identification
Passive information enumeration
Passive topology map generation
Passive vulnerability assessment
Report generation
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Passive TCP Port Mapping
Monitoring SYN|ACK packets
Logging the source port
SYN to port 23
SYN|ACK from port 23
ACK to port 23
Host A
Host B
Siphon
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TCP Port Mapping Challenges
Problem: Corruption of information caused by
spoofed connections
Solution: Monitor TCP state
SYN|ACK from host A src port 666
Network
Host C
Siphon
No initial SYN sent to port 666 of host A, Will not record
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Passive UDP Port Mapping
Monitoring UDP packets
Listening for ICMP port unreachable packets
UDP packet to port 53
Host A
Host B
Siphon
No ICMP port unreachable, port is open
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UDP Port Mapping Challenges
Problem: Accuracy
Solution: Decode application layer protocols that use
UDP
DNS Query to UDP port 53
DNS Query Response from UDP port 53
Host A
Host B
Siphon
Standard DNS query response from Host B, UDP port 53 is open
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Passive OS Identification
Operating system is determined by monitoring TCP
SYN|ACK packets
An OS is fingerprinted based upon the TCP advertised
window, the IP DF bit, the default TTL, the TCP
options, and the MSS TCP option set by the
connecting host. SYN to port 23
SYN|ACK from port 23
TCP advertised window = 0x4000
Host A
Host C
DF bit = ON
TTL = 64
OS Fingerprints:
Siphon
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4000:ON:64 = FreeBSD
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Passive OS Ident. Challenges
Problem: Multiple fingerprints for one OS version
Solution: Siphon passive OS identification algorithm
Problem OS Fingerprints File:
7D78:64:1:Linux 2.1.122 - 2.2.14
77C4:64:1:Linux 2.1.122 - 2.2.14
7BF0:64:1:Linux 2.1.122 - 2.2.14
7BC0:64:1:Linux 2.1.122 - 2.2.14
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Siphon OS Ident. Algorithm
W = { set of known windows }
Ws = sample window where WsW or WsW
Legal-Bits Mask
|W|
M = Wi
i=1
Static-Bits Mask
|W|
M = Wi
i=1
OS Detection Algorithm
hamd(M(M)’  Ws) / hamd (M(M)’) IFF Ws(M) = M and Ws + M = M
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Passive OS Ident Challenges
After applying the Siphon OS identification algorithm,
we now have only one entry for Linux 2.1.122 2.2.14
Fixed OS Fingerprints File:
7D78:77C4:64:1:Linux 2.1.122 - 2.2.14
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Passive Information Enumeration
Monitoring telnet traffic to gather usernames &
passwords
Monitoring incoming mail traffic to gather usernames
Monitoring incoming web traffic to gather hostnames
Monitoring DNS queries and responses to gather
hostnames
Monitoring file sharing: NFS, NetBIOS, etc.
Performing traffic analysis, peak hours, etc.
Network hardware fingerprinting
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Passive Topology Mapping
Dynamic routing protocols
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RIP topology mapping (general distance vector)
OSPF topology mapping (link state protocol)
Path vector routing topology
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TTL estimation
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Routing Information Protocol
Interior gateway protocol
Distance vector protocol
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Uses hop count as its metric
Sends routing-update messages frequently
Further Information
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Request For Comments (RFC) 1058 and 1723
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Topology Mapping with RIP
Monitor RIP packets on multiple subnets running
Siphon
Run results through our distance vector to link state
routing conversion algorithm
RIP
Siphon A
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Siphon B
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DV to LS Routing Conversion
as a Convex Optimization
Distance vector routing table for network i
Ni = [ ni1 ni2 … nim-1 nim ]T
I = { all known routing tables of networks 1, 2, …, m }
Routing matrix with respect to network i
Ri = [r ijk] where r ijk =
{

if j = k
Nik else if j = i
Nij else if k = i
{ x : x = |Nij – Nik| + (1 - )|Nij + Nik | , 0 <=  <= 1 }
Ideal routing matrix with respect to all networks in I
R’ = [r’jk] where r’jk =

Njk
{
if j = k
if j  I
rijk otherwise
iI
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DV to LS Conversion Cont.
Problem of network routing disjunction therefore we need to redefine the ideal routing
Matrix as a matrix of functions r’jk : R1 -> R1
{ 1 if x = 0 else 0 }
{ 1 if x = Njk else 0 }
R’ = [r’ jk] where r’ jk(x) =
{
1
if x r ijk
0
otherwise
if j = k
if j  I
otherwise
iI
Global maxima of r’ jk(x) as a most probable metric of routing between Nj and Nk
Path proof for rijk
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DV to LS Conversion Example
Network 1 (N1) Routing Table
N11
0
Network 2 (N2) Routing Table
N21
2
N12
2
N22
0
N13
5
N23
7
N13
8
N24
7
N14
3
N25
5
Network 1 (R1) Routing Matrix
R1i1
R1i2
R1i3
R1i4
Network 2 (R2) Routing Matrix
R2i1
R2i2
R2i3
R2i4
R1i5
R2i5
R11j
{}
…
…
…
…
R21j
{}
…
…
…
…
R12j
2
{}
…
…
…
R22j
2
{}
…
…
…
R13j
5
[3,7]
{}
…
…
R23j
[5,9]
7
{}
…
…
R14j
8
[6,10]
[3,13]
{}
…
R24j
[5,9]
7
[0,14]
{}
…
R15j
3
[1,5]
[2,8]
[5,11]
{}
R25j
[3,7]
5
[2,12]
[2,12]
{}
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Continued…
R2i1
R' Routing Matrix
R2i2
R2i3
R2i4
R2i5
R21j
{}
…
…
…
…
R22j
2
{}
…
…
…
R23j
5
7
{}
…
…
R24j
8
7
[3,13]
{}
…
R25j
3
5
[2,8]
[5,11]
{}
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Open Shortest Path First
Designed to correct problems associated with RIP
Link state protocol

Learns of routing information through link-state
advertisements
 This information includes interface status and metrics used

A topological database is maintained by the collection of
LSA’s received
 All routers in the same area have the same topological
database
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Topology Mapping with OSPF
Periodic full LSA updates
Generate topology map based off LSA updates
OSPF
LSA
Update
Topology Map
[…]
Siphon
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Passive Vuln. Assessment
Analysis of packet payload
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Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring
application banners
DNS version queries
RPC queries
HTTP GET requests
TCP connect() to port 21
220 FTP Server (Version wu-2.6.0(1) ready.
Host B
Host A
Siphon Log:
Host B is VULNERABLE
Siphon
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Traffic Analysis
Port statistics are used to determine server roles
Auditing logins, email and web access can determine
user behavioral patterns and machine roles.
Analysis on initial sequence numbers and other
similar challenge protocol fields can reveal the nature
of the hosts’ PRNG.
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Assistance in Operating System Identification
TCP Sequence Guessing
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Example Siphon Report
Report: Our Siphon software was run for 1 day on
our test network
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Future Features of Siphon
Non-TCP operating system fingerprinting
Default installation fingerprinting
Passive Wireless LAN (802.11b) network mapping

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Rogue access point detection
SSID gathering
Network statistics (Signal strength, etc.)
OSPF integration
Windows 2000 Version
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Summary
Active and passive mapping are different in nature
depending on the purpose and motivation of the user
Passive network mapping is performed by monitoring
network traffic without sending out a single packet
Active network mapping is performed by sending out
queries and gathering responses generating massive
amounts of network noise, crashing machines and
setting off IDS alarms
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Contact Information
Marshall Beddoe: [email protected]
Christopher Abad: [email protected]
URL: www.gravitino.net/projects/siphon
Questions? We have answers!
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