Biosafety Awareness Training For Laboratory Personnel University of Idaho Environmental Health and Safety & Office of Research Assurances0
Download ReportTranscript Biosafety Awareness Training For Laboratory Personnel University of Idaho Environmental Health and Safety & Office of Research Assurances0
Biosafety Awareness Training For Laboratory Personnel University of Idaho Environmental Health and Safety & Office of Research Assurances 2010 0 An agent of biological origin that has the capacity to produce deleterious effects on humans, animals, plants and/or the environment. Some biohazard examples: recombinant DNA, microorganisms, Select Agents & toxins, prions, virions, viroids, biological allergens. 1 Laboratory Associated Infections Laboratory Associated Infections (LAIs) • • • • • Survey data dating back to the late 1970’s More than 5,000 labs surveyed 4.091 cases cited 159 different agents involved 168 deaths Top ten list of laboratory associated infections: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Brucella sp. Q Fever Hepatitis B Typhoid Tularemia 6. Tuberculosis 7. Dermatomycosis 8. Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 9. Psittacosis 10. Coccidioidomycosis 2 Laboratory- Associated Infections Causes for lab-associated infections • Improper Facility Design 1% • Containment Equipment Failure 9% Improper laboratory Practices 90% >80% have been implicated to involve aerosols – Inspired investigations into the behavior of aerosols generated in the laboratory – Guidelines for protecting microbiological lab workers were developed using: • Historical data • Understanding risks associated with different routes of transmission 3 Picture of Aerosol Production When Pipetting Liquid 4 Preventing Laboratory Associated Infections: A safe work environment results from a combination of : • Appropriate engineering controls • Management/administrative controls • Work practices and procedures • Medical surveillance program (as determined by risk assessment) 5 Principles of Biosafety Biosafety Guidelines reflect combinations of: Laboratory Practices and Techniques Standard Practices Special Practices Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers) Laboratory Facilities (Secondary Barriers) 6 Principles of Biosafety Introduction Biosafety Levels 1-4 Provide: – Increasing levels of personnel and environmental protection – Guidelines for working safely in microbiological and biomedical laboratories References: Biosafety in the Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 5th Edition (BMBL). CDC/NIH: • http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, April 2002: • http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines/guidelines.html World Health Organization : Laboratory Biosafety Manual - Third Edition • http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/Biosafety7.pdf 7 Lab Practices and Techniques – Knowledgeable supervisor • Demonstrates appropriate lab techniques • Project specific training • Ensures personnel receive additional required training – Personnel • Aware of potential hazards • Proficient in practices/techniques • Obtain required training – Biosafety manual specific to lab • Specific to protocols in the lab • Routine safe practices • Emergency procedures 8 Safety Equipment – Biosafety cabinets (BSCs) • Primary containment • Three types (Class I, II, and III) – Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) • • • • Gloves Gowns Eye and face protection Respiratory protection – Mechanical pipette devices – Safety centrifuge cups and enclosed rotors • enclosed to prevent release of aerosols 9 Risk Assessment • Risk assessment is an important responsibility shared between directors, principal investigators, institutional biosafety committees, animal care and use committees, biosafety professionals, etc. • Risk assessment is used to: – Identify the hazards associated with a known infectious or potentially infectious agent or material – Activities that can result in an exposure – Likelihood that such an exposure will cause an LAI – Consequences of such an infection 10 Risk Assessment • Primary factors in the risk assessment process: – Agent hazards – Laboratory procedure hazards • Capability of lab personnel to control hazards – Training – Technical proficiency – Good habits • Operational integrity of containment and facility safeguards 11 Risk Assessment • Hazardous Characteristics of Biological Agents – Capability to infect and cause disease in a susceptible host – Virulence as measured by the severity of disease – Availability of preventive measures and effective treatments for the disease Resources: BMBL 5th edition NIH Guidelines World Health Organization Biosafety Manual 12 Risk Group Classification NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules 2002 World Health Organization Laboratory Biosafety Manual 3rd ed. 2004 Risk Group 1 Agents that are not associated with disease in healthy humans (No or low individual and community risk) A microorganism that is unlikely to cause human or animal disease Risk Group 2 Agents that are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventative or therapeutic interventions are often available (Moderate individual risk; low community risk) A pathogen that can cause human or animal disease but is unlikely to be a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the community, livestock or the environment. Laboratory exposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of infection is limited Risk Group 3 Agents that are associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available (high individual risk but low community risk) (High individual risk; low community risk) A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease but does not ordinarily spread from one infected individual to another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available Risk Group 4 Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available ( high individual risk and high community risk) (High individual risk and high community risk) A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease and that can be readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available. 13 Risk Assessment The BMBL provides a 5 step approach to the risk assessment process. • First Step: • Identify the hazards associated with the agent and do an initial assessment of the risk • Capability to infect and cause disease • Severity of disease • Availability of preventive measures and effective treatment • Utilize your resources • BMBL, NIH, WHO and other references for information • Always keep the generation of aerosols in mind 14 Risk Assessment • Second Step: – Identify laboratory procedure hazards • Agent concentration • Suspension volume • Equipment and procedures that generate small particulates and aerosols (cell sorters) • Sharps • Procedures involving animals – Bites, scratches, zoonotic diseases • Complexity of a laboratory procedure – Changes in procedures – New techniques and/or equipment 15 Risk Assessment • Third Step: – Make a final determination of the appropriate biosafety level and select additional precautions indicated by the risk assessment • Based on understanding of lab practices, safety equipment, and facility safe guards • Additional safe guards may be warranted based nature of protocol • A risk assessment indicate a need to alter the recommended facility safe guards in some way. This will require careful review by both safety and facility personnel • Recognize that laboratory personnel will differ in their susceptibility to disease – Pre-existing conditions, medications, compromised immunity, pregnancy, breast-feeding, etc. – Medical Surveillance 16 Risk Assessment • Fourth Step: – Evaluate proficiencies of staff regarding safe practices and the integrity of safety equipment • Protection of laboratory workers, other staff and the public depends on the laboratory workers themselves • Laboratory director or principal investigator should ensure that personnel have acquired the technical proficiency to handle the agents and the equipment safely • Laboratory director or principal investigator should ensure that the necessary safety equipment is available and operating properly – A non-certified biosafety cabinet represent a potentially serious safety hazard 17 Risk Assessment • Fifth Step: – Review the risk assessment with a biosafety professional, subject matter expert, and the institutional biosafety committee • Review of the risk assessment and the selected safeguards by knowledgeable individuals is always beneficial and often required by regulatory or funding agencies • Review of high risk protocols by the IBC should be standard practice • Adopting this step voluntarily will promote the use of safe work practices in the laboratory 18 Risk Assessment – Relationship to Chain of Infection 19 Biosafety Levels • There are four biosafety levels that consist of combinations of: – Laboratory practices and techniques – Safety equipment – Laboratory facilities • Biosafety levels differ from risk groups described in the NIH Guidelines and the WHO Biosafety Manual – Risk groups are defined by the classification of a potentially infectious agent and association with, and severity of resulting disease in humans. – Biosafety levels include the risk group of the agents along with mode of transmission, procedures, experience of personnel, and other risk factors to determine the appropriate containment level for the proposed project activities, staff , equipment and location. 20 Biosafety Levels – Know the Risks • BSL 1: Material not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adults. • BSL 2: Associated with human disease. Hazard is from percutaneous injury, ingestion, or mucous membrane exposure. Some agents with environmental or agricultural impact. • BSL 3: Indigenous or exotic agents with potential for aerosol transmission; disease may have serious or lethal consequences. • BSL 4: Dangerous/exotic agents which pose a high risk of lifethreatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections or related agents with unknown risk of transmission 21 Biosafety Level 1 Applicable for work involving well-characterized agents not known to consistently cause disease in immunocompetent adult humans and present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel, animals, plants and/or the environment. • Examples – Recombinant DNA work with Risk Group 1 standard E. coli host/vector systems. – Risk Group 1 plant/animal & Human agents 22 Biosafety Level 1 • Other Examples: – Bacillus subtilis – Naegleria gruberi – Pseudomonas fluorescens – Most plant pathogens, e.g. Aschochyta spp. – Adenoviruses Types 1-4 – Most established (2°) human cell lines – Most non-zoonotic endemic animal disease agents. – Exempt organisms under NIH guidelines 23 Biosafety Level 1 Laboratory Facilities • Wastes are separated, labeled, and stored properly • Work can be done on open bench top 24 Biosafety Level 1 Laboratory Facilities – Sink for hand washing – Work surfaces easily cleaned – Bench tops (can use plastic backed absorbent pads on the surface) – Sturdy furniture – Operable windows fitted with fly screens 25 Facility Design • Doors for access control • Lab easily cleaned and decontaminated • Adequate space between benches and equipment • Bench tops impervious to water and resistant to heat, organic solvents, acids, alkalis, and chemicals used for decontamination • Lab chairs used with agents must have a nonporous cleanable 26 surface Facility Design – Laboratory location • There are no specific requirements for isolating the BSL-1 laboratory – Laboratory ventilation • Though there is no specific requirement for more than six air changes per hour, it may be necessary if there are volatile chemicals in use • May require a chemical fume hood • Laboratory should be negative with respect to the hallway (air moves from outside hallway into the lab) 27 Biosafety Level 1 Standard Microbiological Practices – Principal Investigator responsible for enforcing the University of Idaho access requirements as outlined in the approved Biosafety Manual – Wash hands • After handling viable materials • After removing gloves • Before leaving the lab – Prohibit eating, drinking, smoking , and storing food for human consumption in the lab 28 Biosafety Level 1 Standard Microbiological Practices – Use mechanical pipetting devices – Mouth pipetting is prohibited – Policy for the safe handling and disposal of sharps 29 Biosafety Level 1 Needles & Sharps Precautions DON’T • Break, bend, re-sheath or reuse syringes or needles DO • Use single-use needles and syringes whenever possible • Use sharps containers 30 Biosafety Level 1 Sharps Precautions • Discard needles, syringes, and similar devices in a leak proof and puncture resistant container • Non-disposable sharps must be placed in a hard walled container for transport to a processing area for decontamination preferably by autoclaving • Contaminated sharps must be decontaminated by appropriate means prior to disposal 31 Biosafety Level 1 Needles & Sharps Precautions DON’T • Touch broken glass with hands Do • Use a mechanical device to pick up the sharp – – – – Tongs Tweezers Forceps Dust pan and brush 32 Biosafety Level 1 Needles & Sharps Precautions DO •Use plastic as a substitute for glass •Whenever possible adopt improved engineering and work practice controls that reduce the risk of sharps injuries 33 Biosafety Level 1 Standard Microbiological Practices – Minimize splashes and aerosols – Decontaminate work surfaces daily – Decontaminate wastes by approved methods – Maintain insect & rodent control program 34 Biosafety Level 1 Standard Microbiological Practices • Hand washing • Liquid soap preferable to bar soap • 20 seconds of vigorous lathering • Paper towel to dry, use towel to turn off faucet 35 Biosafety Level 1 Personal Protective Equipment • Biosafety cabinets are not usually required for work with agents assigned to BSL1 • Lab coats, gowns, (recommended not required) • Disposable gloves required, latex or nitrile (risk assessment) • Protective eyewear and/or a face shield (splash guard) 36 Biosafety Level 1 • Supervision – Scientist with general training in microbiology or related science – Establishes general safety procedures – Provides protocol specific training to personnel • Lab Personnel – Specific training in lab procedures – Follow prescribed protocols 37 Biosafety Level 1 Special Practices • There are no “special” practices required for activities conducted at BSL-1 38 Biosafety Level 2 Applicable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel, plants, animals and the environment. Differs from BSL-1 in that: a. Requires specific training in handling pathogenic agents & supervision by scientists competent in handling infectious agents b. Access limited when work being conducted c. Extreme caution with contaminated sharps d. BSC’s & other containment of work with aerosol or splash potential 39 Biosafety Level 2 Examples: – – – – Salmonella spp. Toxoplasma spp. Hepatitis B virus Some established human cell lines, e.g. HEK-293, HeLa – E. coli O157 • Antibiotic treatment and immunizations are available. – Example the Hepatitis B vaccine series 40 Biosafety Level 2 • BSL-1 Facilities PLUS: – Autoclave available • place waste in autoclave bag before removing from BSC • All materials to be decontaminated outside of the immediate lab must be placed in a durable, leak-roof container for transport – Eyewash station • Test weekly – Safety shower • Test monthly 41 Biosafety Level 2 Laboratory Facilities • Laboratory door is closed when work is conducted (should be self-closing with locks) • Eye wash station is readily available • Vacuum lines equipped with HEPA filters • Adequate illumination • Biosafety Cabinets (equivalent containment equipment) • Ventilation: Ideally negative pressure (inward flow of air) [risk assessment] • Consider locating new facilities away from public areas 42 Biosafety Level 2 Standard Microbiological Practices & PPE • As the biosafety level increases, all of the Standard Microbiological practices & PPE from the lower levels carry forward PLUS: • Additional PPE (as dictated by risk assessment) • Lab coat, gown, tyvek (required & must be removed before leaving the lab area) [Gloves must also be removed before leaving the lab] • Eye, face & respiratory PPE per risk assessment in animal rooms • All Lab personnel provided with immune competence information and conditions that may predispose them to infection. •All lab personnel responsible for self-identifying to healthcare provider for counseling and guidance 43 Biosafety Level 2 Safety Equipment •BSL-1 Equipment PLUS: Properly maintained & annual certified biosafety cabinets (class II) for work with infectious agents involving: – Aerosols and splashes • Grinding, blending , mixing, sonic disruption, tissue harvest, pipetting, handling liquid stock cultures, and intranasal animal inoculations – Large volumes and/or high concentrations of infectious agents • May use centrifuge with sealed rotor heads or centrifuge safety cups • Rotors or safety cups should be opened in a biological safety cabinet 44 Biosafety Level 2 Safety Equipment Room air in at A through front grille and under work surface •Air is blown via F through the rear air plenum E to the top of the cabinet Class II-A Biosafety Cabinets •Air is divided into two chambers at D • Thirty percent of the air is exhausted out C through at HEPA filter into the lab room. •Seventy percent of the air B is directed through another HEPA filter down to the work surface 45 Biosafety Level 2 Special Practices • Policies and procedures for entry “Restricted Access” • Biohazard warning signs • Biosafety manual specific to lab developed & followed • Training with annual updates 46 Biosafety Level 2 Special Practices Use leak-proof transport containers Gasket seal lid Animals and Plants not used in the research are not allowed in the lab Equipment must be decontaminated before repair maintenance or removal from the lab 47 Biosafety Level 2 Special Practices • In general persons at increased risk of acquiring infection are not allowed in lab or animal rooms • Only those advised of hazards and meeting entry requirements are provided access • Medical surveillance (as determined by risk assessment) – Immunizations • Requires written employee informed consent – Baseline serum samples may be required (case by case) • Requires written employee informed consent 48 Biosafety Level 2 Special Practices • Principal Investigator responsible for ensuring appropriate and at a minimum annual Biosafety training for all lab personnel • Potentially infectious material and wastes are placed in covered containers that prevent leakage during collection, handling, processing, storage, transport or shipping. • Decontaminate work surfaces and equipment with effective disinfectant on a routine basis. • Report spills and accidents (Incident log) • No animals in laboratories (All non-research animals are kept out of the laboratory 49 Biosafety Level 2 Special Practices • Incidents that may result in exposure – Know what to do: • What constitutes a biological exposure risk? • What to do when there has been a potential exposure? • How to clean up a biological spill? • When should you seek assistance with spill clean up? 50 What Constitutes a Biological Exposure Risk • Breach in primary containment, e.g. – Needle stick – Aerosolizing activities performed on the open bench – Splash soaks through lab coat (agent can pass through intact skin) • Breach in secondary containment, e.g – Biosafety Cabinet not functioning properly – Loss of power to the building HVAC system – Door not closed while working with agent – Improper use of the Biosafety Cabinet 51 Examples of Potential Biological Releases • Open a centrifuged tube at the open bench that contains a BSL-2 organism. • Explanation: – Unequal pressure may be created when centrifuging. Opening the lid is likely to create aerosols • BSL-2 potentially aerosolizing work performed in uncertified BSC. • Explanation: – An uncertified BSC may not be operating correctly and could contaminate the air space outside the cabinet 52 Examples of Potential Biological Releases • Using a wire transfer • Transfer liquid loop and a Bunsen cultures with a transfer burner pick a pipette to produce Campylobacter colony BSL-2 organism serial and streak for isolation dilutions. Work work in the BSC performed at the open bench. • Explanation: Bunsen burners can disrupt • Explanation: Pipetting BSC airflow produces aerosols. This activity should be performed in the BSC53 Surface Spill Decontamination – – – – – – – – – – Alert co-workers Define/isolate contaminated area Put on appropriate PPE (personal protective equip.) to include gloves, lab coat and face shield (if appropriate) Remove/glass/glass shards with forceps or scoop Apply absorbent towels to spill – Do NOT apply disinfectant directly to the spill as this may aerosolize the agent Apply disinfectant to towel surface Allow adequate contact time (generally 10-60 minutes) Remove towels, mop up; clean with alcohol or soap/water or other agent as appropriate. Dispose of materials in biohazardous waste Notify Primary Investigator/Lab Director 54 Biosafety Cabinet Spill Decontamination • If the spill of an infectious agent was enough to create puddles or liquid in the drain pan then the following procedure should be followed: – a. Leave the cabinet running and close the view screen for about 5 minutes. This will allow aerosols to settle before starting cleanup. – b. The drain pan should be flooded with appropriate disinfectant. Leave the disinfectant in the pan for required contact time, longer if the spill involved a high organic load and an organic load sensitive disinfectant is used (e.g. bleach). The disinfectant then needs to be drained out and the surfaces thoroughly cleaned with water to prevent corrosion when a corrosive disinfectant is used (bleach) 55 Personal Exposure • Clean exposed surface with soap/water, (1 minute), eyewash (eyes) 15-20 min., or rinse mouth 3x’s with water • Apply first aid and treat as an emergency • Notify EH&S – fill out report and other forms as requested • If appropriate report to medical clinic for treatment/counseling 56 Major Spills • This is a spill of a potentially biohazardous material that will take more than 30 minutes to clean up (not including the agent deactivation period of 10-60 minutes depending on the biological agent and disinfectant in use) Call EH&S for Assistance 885-6524 57 General Guidelines for Surface Decontamination AGENT DISINFECTANT INACTIVATION TIME Recombinant DNA 10% Bleach 20 minutes Bacterial Spores >6% Hydrogen Peroxide 30 minutes Vegetative Bacteria 10% Bleach 20 minutes Viruses & Viroids 10% Bleach 20 minutes Fungi 10% Bleach 20 minutes Feline Parvovirus 20% Bleach 30 minutes Free Living Cryptosporidium 70% Ethanol 10 minutes Most Parasites 10% bleach 30 minutes Prions 50% bleach 60 minutes Practical Disinfectants for use in Recombinant DNA Research NE=Not Effective, b=variable results dependent on virus Reference: NIH Guidelines for working with Recombinant DNA Lab Safety Monograph (Appendix D updated) Liquid Disinfectants Practical Requirements Use/Dilution Category Contact time minutes Lipo virus Broad Spectrum Inactivates Vegetative Bacteria Lipoviruses Nonlipid Viruses Important Characteristics Bacterial Spores Quaternary Ammonia Compounds 0.1-2.0% 10 NE + + Phenolic Compounds 1.0-5.0% 10 NE + + b Chlorine Compounds 500ppm(a) 10 30 + + + + Iodophor 251600ppm(a) 10 30 + + + + Alcohol, Ethyl 70-85% 10 NE + + Alcohol, isopropyl 70-85% 10 NE + Formaldehyde 0.2-8.0% 10 30 Glutaraldehyde 2.0% 10 30 Effective Shelf life > 1week Effective for Surface Decontam ination + + + + + + + b + + + b + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Liquids For Discard + Summary of Disinfectant Activities Disinfectant Disinfection Level Bacteria Lipophil. Viruses HydroPhilic Viruses M. tuberculosis Fungi Comments Quaternary Ammonium (0.5-1.5%) low + + - - +/ Ineffective against bacterial spores. May be ineffective against Pseudomonas and other gram negative bacteria; recommendation limited to environmental sanitation Alcohols (ethyl and isopropyl) 60-85% Intermed. + + - +/ + Ethyl or isopropyl alcohol at 70-80% concentration is a good general purpose disinfectant; not effective against bacterial spores. , high concentrations of organic matter diminish effectiveness; flammable Phenolics (0.4%-5%) Intermed. + + +/- + + Not sporicidal; phenol penetrates latex gloves; eye/skin irritant; remains active upon contact with organic soil; may leave residue Chlorine (1001,000 ppm) Intermed. + + + +/ + Not generally sporicidal; inactivated by organic matter; fresh solutions of hypochlorite (chlorox) should be prepared weekly; corrosive; irritating to eyes and skin + + + +/ +/ Recommended for general use. Wescodyne diluted 1 to 10 is a popular disinfectant for washing hands. Inactivated by organic matter + + + + + Used to sterilize surgical instruments that can not be autoclaved; strong odor; use with adequate ventilation. Not for use on environmental surfaces. Because it is a sensitizer and causes asthma it is not recommended for laboratory use. Iodophors (301,000 ppm iodine) Glutaraldehyde (2-5%) Intermed. high Biosafety Level 2 Supervision Supervisor is a competent scientist who understands the risks associated with the agents being used. Supervisor has increased responsibilities • Limits access • Must make sure personnel are training regarding the potential hazards in the lab • Develops biosafety manual specific to lab activities Lab Personnel Aware of potential hazards Demonstrate proficiency in both standard and special practices/techniques before working with RG-2 agents Responsible for self identification to health care provider 61 of conditions that may put them at increased risk Biosafety Level 3 Applicable for work with infectious agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by inhalation route exposure. 62 Biosafety Level 3 – Exposure potential to pathogens spread by aerosol – Infection serious, possibly lethal – Examples: • M. tuberculosis • St. Louis encephalitis virus • Coxiella burnetii • West Nile • Hantavirus • SARS • Avian Influenza H5N1 63 Biosafety Level 3 Laboratory Facilities • BSL-1 and 2 Facilities PLUS: – Separate building or isolated zone • Ag Biotech BSL-3 is isolated from neighboring labs • Restricted Access – Double door entry • BSL-3 has Ante room entry or similar design – Directional inward airflow • BSL-3 is negative with respect to corridor – Single-pass air • Exhaust air is not re-circulated to other rooms • 10 /12 air changes/hour 64 Biosafety Level 3 Laboratory Facilities • Double door entry • Air movement is from the corridor to the BSL-3 procedure area • Room exhaust air may or may not be HEPA filtered but is not re-circulated 65 Biosafety Level 3 Laboratory Facilities • BSL-1 and 2 Facilities PLUS: – Enclosures for aerosol generating equipment (Biosafety Cabinets) – Enclosed centrifuges – Room penetrations sealed – Walls, floors and ceilings are water resistant for easy cleaning • Porous acoustical ceiling tiles are not used • Floor should be monolithic, continuous cove molding extending at least 4 inches up the wall – No upholstered furniture in the BSL-3 66 Biosafety Level 3 Laboratory Facilities • BSL-1 and 2 Facilities PLUS: – Vacuum lines must be protected with in line HEPA filters 67 Biosafety Level 3 Standard Microbiological Practices The same as those for BSL-1 and BSL-2 68 Biosafety Level 3 Safety Equipment • BSL-1 and 2 Safety Equipment PLUS: – BSC class II or III to manipulate infectious material 69 Biosafety Level 3 Safety Equipment • BSL-1 and 2 Safety Equipment PLUS: – Respiratory protection may be indicated – Medical surveillance – Training – Quantitative Fit Test 70 Biosafety Level 3 Special Practices Supervision • Supervisor is a competent scientist experienced working with agents • Establishes criteria for entry • Restricts access • Develops policies/procedures • Trains lab personnel in protocol/agent specific safety practices • Develops laboratory safety manual 71 Biosafety Level 3 Special Practices • BSL-2 Special Practices PLUS: – Work in certified BSC – Use bioaerosolcontaining equipment • Centrifuge tubes in containment cups – Decontaminate spills promptly using approved methods – No work with open vessels conducted on the bench – All procedures involving the manipulation of infectious material must be conducted in a BSC or other physical containment devices 72 Biosafety Level 3 Special Practices Lab Personnel Strictly follow guidelines Demonstrate proficiency Receive appropriate training Report incidents Participate in medical surveillance if required (Agent and Protocol dependent) 73 BSL-3 Requirements (summary) Facility design, operational parameters and procedures must be verified prior to operation and reverified & documented annually • Appropriate Containment – Risk assessments@ • Primary Containment -Practices – All Waste decontaminated • Facility must have autoclave – Decontamination of all reusable lab clothing, (coats) before laundering – Security (controlled access)* – Select Agent (if applicable)* – Base line serum (as appropriate) • Primary containment –Equip. &PPE – BSC*- Or other physical barriers For all open manipulations of agents – PPE –Respiratory protection as required – Sealed rotors/safety buckets (as needed) • Emergencies – Emergency Response Plans* must be posted in the lab • • Secondary Containment – Physical separation – Negative pressure – Exhausted air not re-circulated, 10-12 air changes per hour – Double access doors – Enclosures for aerosol generating equipment – Room penetrations sealed – Walls floor and ceiling are water resistant for easy cleaning – Vacuum lines protected with HEPA filters and may require additional disinfectant traps as per risk assessment. – Hands free sinks – Verify directional (-) air flow – Under failure conditions no (+)air flow Biosafety Manual must be developed that is specific to the risks of the agent and the work activities@* Biosafety Level 3 Lab Ag Biotech • Experiments involving the use of organisms requiring BSL-3 containment must first be approved by: – The Biosafety Committee (MUA) – The BSL-3 Use Committee 75 Biosafety Level 3 Lab Ag Biotech • Laboratory personnel must complete the following : • Biosafety Awareness for Laboratory Personnel (EHS) • Protocol specific training (PI) • Review of the Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory Procedures Manual • Additional training as required by approved protocol • If the protocol requires respiratory protection and/or the administration of a vaccine. Then personnel must participate in medical surveillance • The Principal Investigator must verify in writing that his/her lab personnel have completed these requirements. 76 Biosafety Level 4 Suitable for work involving dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. PLEASE NOTE: Organisms requiring BSL-4 containment are NOT allowed to be possessed at the University of Idaho! 77 Biological Safety Cabinets 78 Biological Safety Cabinets • Product protection • Personal protection • Environmental protection 79 Biological Safety Cabinets Types A. Class I • • • • • Inward airflow protects researcher Typically hard ducted to exiting exhaust system Air is drawn through HEPA filter as it enters the exhaust plenum Exhausts to the outside protects environment No protection for product 80 Biological Safety Cabinets Class II • Provides worker, product and environmental protection • “Sterile” work area • Use for work with aerosol-transmissible microorganisms • Use for tissue culture/virology 81 Biological Safety Cabinets Class III • Totally enclosed, ventilated to the outside via hard ducting • Suitable for working with BSL-3 or BSL-4 agents. 82 Biological Safety Cabinets HEPA Filter • High Efficiency Particulate Air filter • Traps particulates only • Chemical vapors, fumes and vapors pass through • Traps particles down to 0.3um 83 Biological Safety Cabinets HEPA Filters • Metal or wood framed • Continuous sheet of flat filter medium with aluminum separators • Gasket sealed • Adhesive bond between filter pack and frame 84 Biological Safety Cabinets Operation Location • • • • Isolated from other work areas Removed from high traffic areas Away from air ducts Away from laboratory entry doors 85 Biological Safety Cabinets Operating Procedures • Read manufacturer’s recommendations for operation of cabinet • Load BSC with all needed supplies • Turn BSC on and allow to run for 10-15 minutes • Confirm inward flow • Enter straight into cabinet, perform work in controlled methodical manner • At end of work decontaminate all items to be removed from cabinet • Decontaminate interior of cabinet • Allow cabinet to run for 10-15 minutes • Shut off 86 Biological Safety Cabinets Safe Operation Class II Biosafety Cabinets Layout of equipment •Clean materials separated from dirty items •Avoid rapid air movement at the face of cabinet •Do NOT allow the front or rear grills to be obstructed •Aerosol generating activities should be done towards the rear of 87 cabinet Biological Safety Cabinets Safe Operation • Always enter straight into the cabinet – no sweeping motions • Place materials well within the cabinet- not on the front grill • Place discard pan within cabinet • Watch for disruptions of laminar flow • Decontaminate materials before they are removed from the cabinet 88 Biological Safety Cabinets Safe Operation • Not designed for chemical use • May use for non-volatile toxic chemicals or low level radioactive materials • May use for “minute” amounts of volatile chemicals • Cabinets must be certified Annually • Place all materials into the cabinet before starting work 89 Biological Safety Cabinets Safe Operation • CAUTION!! • Chemicals may damage the HEPA filter – Exposure risk: chemical/infectious agents • Volatile chemicals NOT retained by HEPA filter – Exposes personnel if not exhausted • BSC fans are not spark proof – Chemicals may result in fire /explosion – Never use NFPA 4 flammables 90 A Word About Biosafety Cabinets, Open Flames, Bunsen Burners, etc,……….. • Disrupts air flow • Causes excessive heat build-up • May damage HEPA Filter • Presents potential fire or explosion hazard • May inactivate manufacturer’s warranties 91 Centrifuges 92 Centrifuges Operating Procedures • • • • Follow Manufacturer’s operating instructions Check tubes for cracks/chips Tightly seal all tubes and cups Ensure that the rotor is locked to spindle and the bucket seated • Close lid during operation • Allow to come to complete stop before opening 93 Centrifuge Hazards • Operator error • Mechanical failure • Lab equipment failure (tubes etc.) • Aerosol generation • Personal injury • Physical damage 94 Centrifuges Safe Operation • • • • • • • • • • Use safety cups Disinfect regularly and after all spills or breakages Lubricate O-rings and rotor threads Do not use rotors that have been dropped Contact the centrifuge representative for specific information and follow the manufacturer’s operating instructions Check tubes for cracks/chips Tightly seal all tubes and cups Ensure that the rotor is locked to spindle and the bucket seated Close lid during operation Allow to come to complete stop before opening 95