Funding Public Pensions Tax Economist Forum, January 13, 2010 by Jon Forman Professor in Residence IRS Office of Chief Counsel & Alfred P.
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Funding Public Pensions Tax Economist Forum, January 13, 2010 by Jon Forman Professor in Residence IRS Office of Chief Counsel & Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma Overview Operation and funding of public plans Financial, accounting, and legal issues How to ensure adequate funding now and in the future 2 Overview of Public Plans State and local governments typically provide their employees with a traditional defined benefit pension plan A supplemental defined contribution plan Employer and employee contributions 3 Funding Public Plans Plan actuary Makes assumptions Estimates the plan’s future liabilities to its retirees Discounts those liabilities to present value And compares that liability value to the actuarial value of the plan’s assets 4 Table 1. Actuarial Valuation for OPERS, June 30, 2008 1. Participant Data Number of Active Members Retired and Disabled Members & Beneficiaries 45,120 26,033 Inactive Members 5,580 Total Members 76,733 Projected Annual Salaries of Members $1,682,663,413 Annual Retirement Payments for Retired $376,147,494 Members and Beneficiaries 5 Table 1. Actuarial Valuation for OPERS, 2008, cont. 2. Assets and Liabilities Total Actuarial Accrued Liability $8,894,287,254 Market Value of Assets $6,255,207,565 Actuarial Value of Assets $6,491,928,362 Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability $2,402,358,892 Funded Ratio 73.0% 6 Funded Ratio & Assumptions Funded Ratio – 73% Key Assumptions Investment return rate – 7.5%/year Inflation rate – 3.0%/year Wage growth – 4.25%/year Cost-of living increase – 2%/year 7 Table 1. Actuarial Valuation for OPERS, 2008, cont. 3. Employer Contribution Rates as a Percent of Payroll Normal Cost Rate Amortization of Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability Budgeted Expenses Actuarial Required Contribution Rate Less Estimated Member Contribution Rate Employer Actuarial Required Contribution Rate Less Statutory State Employer Contribution Rate Contribution Shortfall 12.46% 10.13% 0.39% 22.98% 4.04% 18.94% 14.50% 4.44% 8 Method & Contribution Rate Entry-age normal actuarial cost method Contribution Rates as a % of Payroll Normal cost – 12.46% Amortization of UAAL –10.13% Actuarial Required Contribution (ARC) – 22.98% Contribution shortfall – 4.44% 9 Table 2. Asset Class Assumptions U.S. Equity Non-U.S. Equity Private Equity Real Estate U.S. Bonds Non-U.S. Bonds Expected Return 8.50% 8.50% 11.55% 7.00% 4.00% 3.75% Risk 16.0% 17.0% 26.0% 15.0% 5.0% 10.0% 10 Table 3. Asset Allocation of the OPERS, June 30, 2008 Actual Low Allocation U.S. Equity 38.6% 37.3% Non-U.S. Equity 37.8% 31.9% U.S. Bonds 23.2% 21.0% Non-U.S. Bonds 0.4% 0.0% Target High 40.0% 36.0% 24.0% 0.0% 42.7% 40.1% 27.0% 0.0% 11 Figure 1. Average Asset Allocation for State Pensions 12 Table 4. Asset Allocation for 125 State Pension Plans (%) Equity US Equity Non-US Equity Real Estate Private Equity Equity Subtotal Debt US Bonds Non-US Bonds Other Debt Subtotal Return Risk 2003 2008 Change 42.3 12.9 4.0 4.2 63.4 38.1 18.8 5.9 5.6 68.4 -4.2 5.9 1.9 1.4 5.0 35.2 1.4 0.0 36.6 7.3 10.3 26.7 0.9 4.0 31.6 7.5 10.9 -8.5 -0.5 4.0 -5.0 0.2 0.6 13 Table 5. Contributions Needed to Fully Fund Pensions, 2006 Simulation assumption for the rate of return on investment Projected government contribution level needed to fully fund the liability Difference between projected contribution level and the actual 9.0% of salaries Higher return scenario: 6% real Base case: 5% real Lower-return scenario: 4% real Risk-free scenario: 3% real 5.0% of salaries per year 9.3% of salaries 13.9% of salaries - 4.0% of salaries per year + 0.3% of salaries + 4.9% of salaries 18.6% of salaries per year + 9.6% of salaries 14 Financial Pressures on Public Plans Fiscal pressures on state and local governments Demographic pressures Pension envy 15 Standard & Poor’s, Ratings Direct: Market Declines Will Shake Up U.S. State Pension Fund Stability (February 26, 2009), at 3. 16 National Association of State Retirement Administrators & National Council on Teacher Retirement, Market Declines and Public Pensions (NASRA/NCTR Issue Brief, December 2008), at 3. 17 Table 6. Life Expectancy for Men and Women, 1940–2060 Life expectancy at birth Year Actual 1940 1960 1980 2000 2007 Projected 2020 2040 2060 2080 Male Female Life expectancy at age 65 Male Female 61.4 66.7 69.9 74.0 75.2 65.7 73.2 77.5 79.4 79.9 11.9 12.9 14.0 15.9 16.7 13.4 15.9 18.4 19.0 19.2 76.9 79.0 80.8 82.4 80.9 82.6 84.2 85.6 17.6 18.8 19.8 20.8 19.8 20.9 21.9 22.8 18 Figure 2. Remaining Life Expectancies for Males at Various Ages, by Cohorts from 1900 to 2100 100 At Birth Remaining Life Expectancy 80 60 At Age 30 40 At Age 65 20 At Age 100 0 1900 1940 1980 2020 2060 2100 Year of Cohort Source: Felicitie C. Bell and Michael L. Miller, Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100 (Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary, Actuarial Study No. 120, 2005), table 10. 19 Table 7. Percentage of Workers Electing SS Retirement Benefits Year 1965 1975 1985 1995 2004 Ages Age 62 63–64 23.0 17.7 35.7 24.5 57.2 21.1 58.3 19.5 57.5 19.0 Ages Age 65 66+ 23.4 35.9 31.1 8.7 17.7 4.0 16.3 6.0 18.6 4.8 Average age 65.9 63.9 63.6 63.6 63.7 20 21 Table 8. Public and Private Sector Compensation, 2008 Retirement Cost per hour Benefits and Savings State and local $39.18 $13.41 (34.2%) $3.09 (7.9%) government Private sector $27.07 $7.93 (29.3%) $0.79 (3.0%) 22 Table 9. Public and Private Sector Retirement Benefits Public Sector Employees Defined benefit plan Private Sector Employees 90% 20% Median pension in 2005 $17,640 $7,692 Retiree health benefit of any kind 82% 33% 23 Accounting for Public Pensions Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 80 percent funding target Actuarial versus market valuation of assets and liabilities 24 Public Plans Are in a Hole Stop digging Stop promising benefits w/o funding Climb out Make Actuarial Required Contributions Improve governance Avoid future holes Restructure Public Pensions At least for new workers 25 About the Author Jonathan Barry Forman (“Jon”) is the Professor in Residence at the Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for the 2009-2010 academic year; the Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, teaching tax and pension law; and the author of Making America Work (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2006). Prior to entering academia, Professor Forman served in all three branches of the federal government. He has a law degree from the University of Michigan and master’s degrees in both economics and psychology. Jon can be reached at [email protected], 405-325-4779, www.law.ou.edu/faculty/forman.shtml 26