I Want My Voice to Be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for Unobservable Censorship Circumvention Amir Houmansadr (The University of Texas at Austin) Thomas Riedl (University.
Download ReportTranscript I Want My Voice to Be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for Unobservable Censorship Circumvention Amir Houmansadr (The University of Texas at Austin) Thomas Riedl (University.
I Want My Voice to Be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for Unobservable Censorship Circumvention Amir Houmansadr (The University of Texas at Austin) Thomas Riedl (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Nikita Borisov (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Andrew Singer (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Internet Censorship • The Internet is a big threat to repressive regimes! • IP filtering, DNS hijacking, Deep packet-inspection, etc. • Circumvention systems NDSS 2013 • Repressive regimes censor the Internet: 2 New stage in the arms race Past: detect circumvention end-points Now: detect circumvention traffic also NDSS 2013 • The threat model has changed We need traffic unobservability against passive, active, or proactive analysis 3 A recent approach • A promising approach: hide circumvention traffic within popular Internet protocols • A new trend: mimic the target protocol FLAWED NDSS 2013 • Censors are unlikely to completely block that protocol • SkypeMorph, StegoTorus, and CensorSpoofer (CCS’12) • It’s hard to imitate network protocols The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications [Oakland’13] 4 Our approach • We seek the same objective, but take a different approach: • By running the target protocol no need to worry about implementation quirks, bugs, protocol details NDSS 2013 Run the target protocol • Challenge: how to efficiently encapsulate traffic into the target protocol 5 FreeWave: IP over Voice-over-IP • Why VoIP • Widely used protocol (only 663 Million Skype users) • Collateral damage to block NDSS 2013 • Target protocol: Voice-over IP (VoIP) • Encrypted • How to hide? • The dial-up modems are back! 6 Client FreeWave Server NDSS 2013 FreeWave architecture 7 The Internet FreeWave Client Web Browser HTTP traffic Audio MoDem The Internet VoIP peers VoIP traffic VoIP client Audio VSC FreeWave Server Audio VoIP client VoIP peer The Internet HTTP traffic Audio VSC VoIP traffic NDSS 2013 System components MoDem Proxy HTTP traffic Censored Destinations 8 MoDem component • A typical acoustic modem • QAM modulation NDSS 2013 • Reliable transmission • Turbo codes • Use Preambles Raw data (IP traffic) Channel Encoder Preamble Interleaver Signal Training 1 QAM mapper Data 1 Data 1 Training 2 A data frame Data 2 Data 2 …….. …….. Data N Training N Data N 9 NDSS 2013 Evaluations 10 FreeWave’s unobservability • Traffic analysis (packet rates and sizes) Fixed rate codecs (e.g., G.7 series) • Not an issue NDSS 2013 • Comprehensive unobservability at the protocol level Variable bit-rates (e.g., Skype’s SILK) • Simple analysis • Superimpose with recoded conversation 11 Client FreeWave Server NDSS 2013 Server obfuscation 12 Future directions • Embed into Video of VoIP NDSS 2013 … IP over Voice over IP over Voice-over-IP • Find other protocol to tunnel • Look for better efficiency 13 NDSS 2013 Questions! 14