Cooperation and conflict within couples: The gendered distribution of entitlement to household income GeNet Conference, Cambridge 26-27 March 2009 Jérôme De Henau and Susan Himmelweit.
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Transcript Cooperation and conflict within couples: The gendered distribution of entitlement to household income GeNet Conference, Cambridge 26-27 March 2009 Jérôme De Henau and Susan Himmelweit.
Cooperation and conflict within
couples:
The gendered distribution of
entitlement to household income
GeNet Conference, Cambridge
26-27 March 2009
Jérôme De Henau and Susan Himmelweit
1
Motivation
• Entitlements: legitimate command over resources that
give rise to opportunities (Sen)
• Indicator of autonomy (current or future)
• Cooperative-conflict model:
– mutual interest in cooperation to increase household resources
– but still can be conflict of interest about division of resources
• Our aim;
Capture gendered effects
Identify determinants of entitlements
2
Change in male and female answers to
satisfaction with household income
Change in
male satis.
Change in
female satis.
Male
remains in non full-time/non work
non full-time to full-time job
remains in full-time job
full-time job to non full-time
-0.07
0.62
0.00
-0.60
0.00
0.47
0.00
-0.52
Female
remains in non full-time/non work
non full-time to full-time job
remains in full-time job
full-time job to non full-time
0.00
0.27
-0.02
-0.10
0.04
0.34
-0.04
-0.25
no child <0-4y
from no child to child <0-4
keep child <0-4
from child <0-4 to older child
0.01
-0.18
0.01
-0.07
0.01
-0.32
0.03
0.06
Man loses his job
both dissatisfied (woman
less so than man)
Woman loses her job
both dissatisfied too, but
less so (man much less
so than woman)
Young child woman
more dissatisfied than
man
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Why such gender differences?
• Different personality traits and attitudes to change
• Different valuation of money (trade-off with other
domains such as leisure, social life)
• Different entitlements, access to underlying resources
and burden of costs because of different
– Perceived contributions (what each member brings into the
household and how it is valued)
– Perceived fall-back positions in case cooperation breaks down
– Perceptions of interest (e.g. individualistic versus family-based)
• All these aspects can be gendered (influence of gender
norms)
4
Our model
• Among other factors, satisfaction is influenced by
entitlements
– Household entitlements (interest in cooperation)
– Relative entitlements (where interests conflict)
• Entitlements (both elements) are influenced by
– Variables that affect current and future resources
– Individual variables can have different impact according to
gender
• Our aim: disentangling gendered and non-gendered
determinants of household and relative entitlements
5
Method
• Use BHPS data
– Panel data enables us to strip out effects of unobserved timeinvariant factors (such as personality traits)
– Linear fixed effects
– Pooled ordered benchmark for comparison
• Two dependent variables
– average of scores of satisfaction:
• impact in same direction interpreted as impact on household
entitlements
– difference in scores of satisfaction:
• impact in different direction interpreted as impact on relative
entitlements
6
Method
• Control for overall satisfaction with life (to focus on
financial aspects of entitlements and avoid trade-offs
between different domains)
• Examples of explanatory variables are income level,
income source, employment status, earning share,
potential wage, housework time and presence of young
children
• Some of these variables are household level, some
individual
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Gendered pattern
• Individual factors that affect entitlements may do so in
symmetric and gendered ways for both cooperation and
conflict
• Cooperation can be achieved by partners adopting roles
that are partially symmetric and partially gendered:
– e.g. valuing both partners’ employment but putting more weight
on the man's than the woman’s
• Similarly for the conflictual element
– e.g. if being the higher earner gives either greater entitlement
but has more effect for one sex than the other
8
Cooperative aspects of
entitlements
Variables that affect this:
• Household level:
– Household income (+), investment income (+), House ownership
(+), Children aged 0-4 (-)
• Individual level (symmetric):
– human capital (+), full-time employment (+), poor health (-),
housework hours (-)
• Individual level (gendered):
– woman higher earner (+), man unemployed (-), man long-term
disabled ()
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Conflictual aspects of
entitlements
• Household level:
– Household receives transfer income (woman +/man -)
– Children aged 0-4 (woman -/man +)
• Individual level (symmetric):
– Full-time employment (+); Unemployment and disability (-) poor
health (-); Hours of housework (-)
• Individual level (gendered):
– Higher earner (+ for woman)
10
Reflections
• Not only division of current resources matters
– future autonomy/security is also reflected in partners’
assessment of their current situation
• Conflictual aspects a challenge to income pooling and
unitary models
• Perceptions matter need to explore gender norms
• Both direct and indirect gender effects need exploration:
– direct: some variables have directly gendered effects
– Indirect: distribution of variables that matter (employment,
earnings, caring responsibilities, etc.) is gendered
11
Conclusion
• Households both create and reinforce gender inequalities
• This is true of cooperative as well as conflictual aspects:
– doing what is best for joint interests may influence relative entitlements
eg more weight on male employment
– “togetherness” may undermine “autonomy”
• Model that can be applied to:
– other countries and with additional explanatory factors (e.g. external
factors and gender norms)
– extended to other domains of entitlement (such as time and social life)
• Refine model by accounting for interdependence and relational
aspects of care in Sen’s model
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