Application Security Lessons from the Pro’s How leading US online banks secured their applications Software isn’t complete unless its secure Rob Rachwald August 2007

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Transcript Application Security Lessons from the Pro’s How leading US online banks secured their applications Software isn’t complete unless its secure Rob Rachwald August 2007

Application Security Lessons from the Pro’s
How leading US online banks secured their
applications
Software isn’t complete unless its secure
Rob Rachwald
August 2007
Wii Olympics & Free Beer
(Boxing and Tennis)
Fortify & Watchfire
Tonight: 5 PM
Maryland Room B & C
Prizes include
Wii
iPod Shuffles
Evidence
Strong Growth
Total online banking customers at the top 10 online
banks surpasses Internet growth with 44M users.
Less Hacking
Only 8% top of US banks reported external hacks
against their systems yet 2006 was the worst year for
web application hacking in history. (Gartner 2007)
New Forms of
Attacks Required
60% of banks report suffering from phishing attacks—
security burden is on authentication and fraud
detection. (Gartner 2007)
Weaker Banks
Targeted
Hackers are targeting smaller banks with few resources
with hacking and phishing schemes. (Gartner 2007)
Better
Perception
68 percent of respondents believe that their financial
institutions’ websites are more secure.
(Comscore Networks, April 2007)
(Comscore Networks, April 2007)
Banking Online is Safer than Banking Offline?
Around 75%
of Fraud is
Offline
Less than 15%
of Fraud is
Online
Can You Trust Your Mom?
Can You Trust Your Mom?
I want your
password
The Hackers
“Oceans 1100”
Followers
(thousands and growing)
Hacker Economics
“The potential gain from even one
successful computer intrusion makes
[hacking] an attractive, relatively lowrisk option… and the risk to sensitive
information on US computer systems
will increase.”
—US Defense Security Service, 2007
Defensive Economics
“If the bear continues biting you
long after you assume a defensive
posture, it likely is a predatory
attack.
Fight back vigorously.”
Online Banking Defensive Economics
Don’t Run Fast, Just Faster
Complex Code
Applications addressing
Personal banking
Retirement accounts
Stocks
Loans
Credit cards
Lots more
BIG: Online banking apps
often 10 million lines of
code
Lots of Java and .NET
Large attack surface
Hundreds of applications
Thousands of entry points
Other Top Hacks
Cross-Site
Scripting
Biggest avenue for phishing.
SQL Injection
Large attack surface and obtaining bits of
customer data are critical in executing
attacks.
Privilege
Escalation
Horizontal or vertical escalations are
especially pernicious. Authentication and
fraud detection technologies are critical.
OWASP Top 10
They never go out of style.
The Software Security Problem
"Since most security for Web
applications can be
implemented by a system
administrator, application
developers need not pay
attention to the details of
securing the application…"
– BEA WebLogic Server
Security Documentation
Stage 1: Reactionary
Code
Developed
Description
Unit Tests
Functional
Tests
Production
Mature SDLC for delivering functional requirements.
Security=cryptography, authentication systems, etc.
Obstacles
Security knew production would get hacked successfully—had a
difficult time getting executive mindshare.
Approach
Security and Incident Response teams conduct emergency meetings
with developers, sys admins, and executives to create a tactical
solution to solve the immediate threat.
Cost
Most expensive security solution
Loss of revenue from system downtime
Damage to brand
Unscheduled development time
Stage 2: Apply band aids
Code
Developed
Unit Tests
Functional
Tests
Pen Test
Production
Description
Put in mitigating solutions before the hackers succeed.
Obstacles
Pen testing did add value, but was it enough (the badness-ometer)?
Is there a clear indication of risk exposure?
Is the application fundamentally more secure?
Solving the illness or just treating the symptoms?
Where is the application broken?
How many areas are truly at risk?
Approach
Security and Incident Response teams conduct pen tests, executives
paying attention, but not fully involved.
Cost
Still reactive and very expensive
Constantly putting out fires
Pagers going off constantly at 2 AM
Low team morale
Stage 3: Beyond the badness-ometer
Code
Developed
Description
Obstacles
Approach
Cost
Unit Tests
Code
Reviews
Functional
Tests
Pen
Test
Production
Manual code reviews to look for problems.
Finds useful issues, but doesn’t scale.
Incomplete coverage
Miss complex issues
Developers finally given exact areas within the code base to fix and
provided an opportunity to remediate the root cause of the
vulnerabilities.
Implement a gate model, secure strong executive support
Expensive, still had to put out fires, but much more manageable
Reduced the amount of vulnerabilities discovered by pen testing
Stage 4: Teach a Man to Fish
Functional
Tests
Code
Developed
Static
Analysis
Description
Continued to produce vulnerabilities, only catching them earlier. Not
sustainable.
Obstacles
Education needed: fewer bugs are produced by smarter developers.
Introduced training focused on developing software securely
This differs from training on developing security software
Developers embraced the knowledge and rarely produced the same
errors.
Approach
Moved the software scanning earlier in the development cycle.
Cost
Still expensive because still producing vulnerabilities.
Unit
Tests
Code
Reviews
Pen
Test
Production
Stage 5: Homo securus
Devs
Trained
Code
Developed
Static
Analysis
Unit
Tests
Code
Reviews
Pen &
Functional
Production
Description
The target SDLC was a self-sustaining system with C-level executive
support.
Approach
Security team moves on to:
Oversee the secure SDLC process
Conduct periodic reviews
Perform in-depth, detailed analysis of projects
No longer distracted by “low-hanging fruit” issues
Cost
Zero S1 vulnerabilities in the system.
Overhead from application security significantly reduced
Challenges Remain
New Web 2.0, SOA=Same problems all over again
Hacker sophistication continues to rise, especially phishing
attacks
Keeping developer mindshare
Ensuring 3rd party code is secure (remember BEA?)
Lessons
Security requires executive initiative
Security is a programming problem
Security is a process: Define a Secure Development
Lifecycle (SDL) and implement it
Don’t forget the whitepaper
Rob Rachwald
[email protected]
(650) 213-5683
Fortify Within the Secure Software Lifecycle
Fortify Manager
Central reporting and management of software security across the enterprise
Fortify SCA
Fortify SCA Dev
Security Ops Team
Fortify Defender
Management
Developers
Proactive security with targeted,
accurate analysis tuned for low
false positives
Monitors and measures web applications
in production
FPR
Security Testers
Fortify Tracer
Makes every black box security test measurable and actionable
Fortify Tracer & Watchfire AppScan
Thorough black box application security testing
Fortify SCA
Build Server
Analyzes code comprehensively
and accurately
Security Leads / Auditors
Wii Olympics & Free Beer
(Boxing and Tennis)
Fortify & Watchfire
Tonight: 5 PM
Maryland Room B & C
Prizes include
Wii
iPod Shuffles
Thanks
Software isn’t complete unless its secure