Markets for Sale: Causes and Consequences of Stock Exchange Demutualization Helen Callaghan, (MPIfG) Paul Lagneau-Ymonet, (Paris-Dauphine) Angelo Riva (EBS-Paris & IDHE Paris-Ouest-LaDefense)
Download ReportTranscript Markets for Sale: Causes and Consequences of Stock Exchange Demutualization Helen Callaghan, (MPIfG) Paul Lagneau-Ymonet, (Paris-Dauphine) Angelo Riva (EBS-Paris & IDHE Paris-Ouest-LaDefense)
Markets for Sale: Causes and Consequences of Stock Exchange Demutualization Helen Callaghan, (MPIfG) Paul Lagneau-Ymonet, (Paris-Dauphine) Angelo Riva (EBS-Paris & IDHE Paris-Ouest-LaDefense) Research Agenda: What drives change in capitalist social systems? => Streeck 2009: •move beyond abstract labels to identify mechanisms of change in specific historical contexts. •Focus on competition and innovation Our case study: Stock market demutualization in France and Germany, 1980-2010 Findings: -Innovation as one resource among others -Competition as “rule of the game” -Political agency as the crucial initiator Background (2): What is demutualization, and why does it matter? Traditional governance structure New governance structure “Durkheimian”: • Ownership by users (mainly financial intermediaries) • Self-governance and selfregulation by user-owners “Williamsonian”: • Separation of ownership rights from membership rights • conversion of membership rights into common stock holdings Demutualization as a three-step process • The incorporation; • The IPO; • The sell of their shares by the former owners-users. Illustration: Demutualization in Germany Significance of strategic investors in the ownership structure of Deutsche Börse Group Significance of Anglo-American Investors in the Ownership Structure of Deutsche Börse Group Illustration: Demutualization in France Mainstream explanations and their limits Standard three-level rationale: • normative optimality of market coordination (Ansidei 2001; Ramos 2003) • IT-revolution (Schwartz et alii 2009) Predicted outcome of demutualisation Actual outcome of demutualization -lower trading fees -supremacy of the bigger intermediaries -increased liquidity -Fragmentation, opacity & privatisation of liquidity among exchanges and alternative trading venues -lower capital costs for issuers -growing conflicts between users (intermediaries and issuers) & shareholders (funds of all kind) Case study: the political economic constitution of markets for markets in France and Germany France Germany The (national) In the 1980s, the In the 1990s, the political impetus struggle against containment of inflation through the inflation caused by reform of the reunification. financial system. •The capture of intermediation profits The business drive by banks, against local intermediaries; •Stock exchanges ceased to be perceived by banks as strategic holdings. The EU political drive Since the dawn of the millennium, the contested disembedding of stock exchanges from their historical financial centres Conclusion: Lessons from the case study •At the policy-making level: A “sorcerer’s apprentice” sequence •At the industry level: The failure of “efficiency through competition” •At the organizational level: The end of exchanges? About the drivers of change in capitalist systems: Political agency shaped the competitive arena in which technological innovation was one resource among others