Fabio Paglieri / ISTC-CNR, Roma Beyond temptations and distractions: Metacognitive skills for inter-temporal coordination CNCC conference “Fallibilities, illusion and metacognition” Paris, 12-13 July 2007
Download ReportTranscript Fabio Paglieri / ISTC-CNR, Roma Beyond temptations and distractions: Metacognitive skills for inter-temporal coordination CNCC conference “Fallibilities, illusion and metacognition” Paris, 12-13 July 2007
Fabio Paglieri / ISTC-CNR, Roma Beyond temptations and distractions: Metacognitive skills for inter-temporal coordination CNCC conference “Fallibilities, illusion and metacognition” Paris, 12-13 July 2007 Take-home messages • Puzzle: How do we manage mastery of long-term planning, in spite of our greedy and short-sighted nature? • How do we resist temptations and distractions, in favor of long-term goals? • Answer: A variety of skills enable inter-temporal coordination in humans, and metacognitive capacities play a key role in this process. F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Outline • Defining inter-temporal coordination • Why is ITC a problem? • Why is ITC valuable? • How do we achieve it? – Cognitive skills – Metacognitive skills •Metarepresentational (?) •Non-metarepresentational (?) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Defining ITC • Inter-temporal coordination (ITC) is the capacity to act in the present in view of some goal which is remote in time • Success: Buying an airplane ticket to Paris some months ago in order to be here today • Failure: Giving up my diet while in Paris because I am overcome by my obsession for croissants (temptation) • Failure: Delaying my PhD dissertation because I used up my time submitting papers to conferences (distraction) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Is ITC a problem ? • For many scholars ITC is remarkable but not problematic, because its solution is obvious and ingrained in human nature: planning and future-directed intentions • Many theories of intentionality basically tries to show how long-term plans are turned into immediate actions (e.g., Bratman planning theory of intentions) • I suggest this methodological stance should be reversed: What really needs explaining is how do we manage to be so good at planning, in the face of our obvious inclination to act in view of immediate environmental demands and present motivational drives? F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) The gospel for planning In the beginning was the Plan, and the Plan was with Man, and the Plan was Man. «Begin with plans and planning. The central fact is that we are planning agents. We frequently settle in advance on more or less complex plans concerning the future, and then these plans guide our later conduct. […] Our need for plans concerning the future is rooted in two very general needs. [First,] we need ways to allow deliberation and rational is the solution, reflection toPlanning influence action beyond the present. Second, we have pressing needs coordination. notforthe problemTo achieve complex goals I must coordinate my present and future activities. And I need also to coordinate my activities with yours. […] Our capacities as planners help us meet these needs. We facilitate coordination in part by constructing larger plans for the future, plans that help coordinate both our own activities over time and our activities with the activities of others. And by settling now on a plan for later I enable my present deliberation to influence my later conduct; I thereby extend the influence of my deliberation beyond the present moment» (Bratman, 1987: 2-3). F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) From plans to action Planning Intentional action Future-directed Present-directed (Bratman, 1987) Intentions Executive representations (Bach, 1978) Prior intentions Intentions-in-action (Searle, 1983) Prospective Immediate intentions (Brand, 1984) Distal Proximal intentions (Mele, 1992) FDI PDI Motor intentions (Pacherie, 2006) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) No “natural born planners” ! • Biologically speaking, we are attuned to the demands of the present environment, often via the mediation of internal drives that map such demands into our own body (hunger, thirst, lust, fear, pleasure) • Some very important anticipatory mechanisms are likely to be innate: e.g., anticipation for active vision (cf. Muckly) • However, this is short-term anticipation of highly specific features, and cannot account for our capacities at ITC F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) No “natural born planners” ! • In short, we are very sophisticated, internally modulated reactive systems with some in-grained short-term anticipatory skills • Given this biological legacy, how come we are so good at long-term planning? • How do we manage to keep steady? • The “hard problem” of intentionality? • ITC as farsighted virtual machine running on a short-sighted biological one F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Motivational value • Three features of goals: – Motivational value – Pragmatic importance – Temporal urgency • A goal is motivationally valuable when its achievement is rewarding in itself, regardless any further ends of the agent • Satisfaction / disappointment: compare slurping an ice-cream with taking the bus for getting to the ice-cream seller • Both long-term aims (happiness) and shortterm drives (pleasure) can be valuable F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) MV is not inherited • Principle of non-inheritance: The means do not inherit the motivational value of the ends • To have my ice-cream, I can choose among different means (bus, car, metro, taxi), none of which makes a difference in itself • Excellent for ensuring flexibility Planning is the problem, • Corollary 1: There are many (pursued) goals not the solution that are not motivationally valuable • Corollary 2: To persevere in his plans, the agent must be able to follow a course of action which is not always consistent with the strongest current motivational drive • Temptations are highly valuable goals that, if pursued, would jeopardize some long-term aim F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Is ITC a good thing ? • Deliberation is costly in terms of resources, so it is rational to settle deliberation at some point and not re-open it (Bratman, 1987) • ITC serves to accumulate efforts and labours to achieve complex objectives • ITC makes the subject more predictable, and this increases cooperation in social species (e.g. humans) • ITC grants partial emancipation from the environment, so that the subject can start adapting the environment to his needs, rather than just vice versa F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Cognitive mechanisms for ITC • Some processes that favour ITC are merely cognitive (i.e. non-metacognitive) • Sunk costs effects (Arkes, Blumer, 1985): persevering in a previous plan even when better options are available, in order to avoid “losing” resources already spent (fallacy?) • Reduction of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957): avoidance of choices that would conflict with previous decisions, in order to minimize the expected cognitive dissonance • Increase in the value of chosen goals (testable in AI): the motivational value of a goal is increased just in virtue of having been chosen F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Metarepresentational skills for ITC • Regardless any non-metacognitive mechanisms for ITC, it is only with metacognition that agents make a step change in this respect • As social metacognition enables the subject with powerful tools for social influence (Krebs, Dawkins, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1999; Sperber, 2001; Paglieri, Castelfranchi, in preparation), so self-directed metacognition allows the subject to self-influence his own intentional conduct • This seems to require a representation of the agent’s internal states as such, i.e. a form of proper metarepresentation (cf. J. Proust) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Self-influence for ITC • Environmental SI: modification of the ecological context of action in such a way as to favour ITC (e.g. avoiding commercial streets to prevent compulsive shopping) • Persuasive SI: ‘arguing with oneself’ to support long-term aims and discourage fleeting fancies (e.g. focusing on expected rewards, downplaying current alternatives) • Direct / deontic SI: self-prescribed code on when to persevere and when to relinquish (e.g. the athlete spurring herself at the top of effort) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Importance, urgency, and ITC • Goals are characterized not only by their motivational value, i.e. how much desirable they are in and by themselves • Pragmatic importance: how many and how much valuable are the further ends to which a goal is instrumental • Temporal urgency: how close in time is the moment when a given goal will no longer be achievable by the subject • Both importance and urgency influence deliberation and action through forms of metacognitive tracking, i.e. the capacity of the agent to keep track of long-term ends and impending deadlines of his own goals F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Metacognitive skills for ITC • Assessing importance and urgency involves: – Some awareness of the fact that a given internal state is a goal – Some awareness that there are further ends to which that particular goal happens to be instrumental (for importance) – Some awareness that there is some deadline attached to that particular goal (for urgency) • None of these requires either explicit metarepresentation, or comprehensive mastery of the agent’s own intentional structure (e.g. wandering in the kitchen with a sense of purpose but no exact recollection of the goal) • ‘Motivational feelings’ ? F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Metacognitive skills for ITC • The dynamics of importance favor ITC, by making the agent sensitive to further ends that would be fostered or jeopardized by present decisions • The dynamics of urgency resist ITC, by making the agent alert to any fleeting opportunity so as to catch it in time • Summary on goal dynamics and ITC: – MV contrasts ITC – TU contrasts ITC – PI supports ITC F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) ITC: A tale of two minds ? • The problem of ITC indicate two conflicting tendencies in the control of behavior: shortterm responsiveness to the environment, and long-term coordination of intentional action • Bleak prospects on human rationality: Is cognition the slave of too many masters? • A more optimistic outlook: This is the metacognitive mirror of a balance that any living organism needs achieving – the balance between fast compliance with the constraints of an ever changing environment, and slow modification of that same environment for the agent’s own needs F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Open issues • Consequences of this analysis of ITC for the notion of “willpower” and “strength of will” (Frankfurt, 1988; Holton, 1999; 2003) • Connections with the analysis of intertemporal consistency of the agent’s choices in economics (Ainsle, 2001; 2006) • What is the developmental and evolutionary story behind this functional picture? How can it be empirically studied? (e.g. long-term anticipation vs. intentional perseverance) • Further thoughts on the distinction between metacognition and metarepresentation (Proust, 2003; in press) • Connections with empirical studies on the experience of conscious will in the online control of behavior (continued) F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Conscious will revisited ? • Recent surge of interest in psychology and neurosciences for studies on conscious control of ongoing actions (Libet, Wegner, Haggard, Frith, Lau) • Bottom-line: The role of consciousness has been overrated, re: action control • Is this really the case? If so, what is the function of consciousness (if any) for the sake of our intentional conduct? F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Conscious will revisited ? • HP: Some form of consciousness, e.g. metacognitive awareness of one’s own volitions, is instrumental to achieve ITC over long-term behavior, and not for online guidance of immediate action • Corollary: Current emphasis on the latter may result in a methodological bias – if so, different experimental paradigms should be devised for empirical study of conscious will • Just speculation, but maybe warranting further investigation … F. Paglieri – Beyond temptations and distractions (Paris, 13 July 2007) Fabio Paglieri – [email protected] Thanks for your kind attention. CNCC conference “Fallibilities, illusion and metacognition” Paris, 12-13 July 2007