Transcript Logical behaviourism: objections

Logical behaviourism:
objections
Michael Lacewing
[email protected]
Logical behaviourism
• Mental states are dispositions of a
person to behave in certain ways (in
certain circumstances)
– Talk about the mind and mental states is
talk about behaviour
Mental causation
• Ryle: mental states aren’t causes – to think
that they are is a category mistake
– To cite a disposition is not to cite a cause
• Obj: there is mental causation
– Even if dispositions aren’t causes in the same
sense as events, they are part of the ‘causal
story’
• E.g. the flying stone won’t break the glass if it is
not brittle
Davidson’s argument
• ‘I went to the party because I thought it
would be fun’
– My thought is causally relevant to my action
• Suppose I also believe that you’ll be at the
party, and I want to see you. But suppose
that my reason for going is not to see you,
but because I want to have fun
– How is this possible? I have both dispositions
– My reason for going is the one that causes my
action
Is mind without body
conceivable?
• If mental states are behavioural dispositions,
only creatures that can behave have mental
states
• So mind without body is inconceivable – a
category mistake
• But mind without body is conceivable
• So behaviourism is false
• Reply: we are wrong to think that mind
without body is conceivable
Multiple realizability
• Which behaviour is a mental state a disposition
to?
• Multiple realizability: different people can
express the same mental state by different
behaviours in the same situation
– How can these different dispositions be the same
mental state?
• Reply: On the whole, people with the same
mental state have similar dispositions
– Fear: facial expression; saying ‘yes’ to ‘are you
scared?’ …
Multiple realizability
• The same behaviour can express different
mental states
– E.g. running towards a lion
– Depends on what else one believes and desires
• Reply: ‘Behaviour’ doesn’t name a single ‘piece’
of behaviour
– Can’t tell from this what disposition is being
expressed – need to consider broader spectrum of
behaviour
– This doesn’t remain the same while expressing
different mental states
Circularity
• There is no set behaviour correlated with a
mental state
– Can’t analyze what dispositions to behaviour a
mental state without referring to other mental
states
– A particular belief is compatible with any
behaviour at all, depending on what else you
believe or want
Circularity
• So different mental states may be dispositions
to the same behaviour, depending on other
mental states.
– And the same mental state may be dispositions to
different behaviour, depending on other mental
states
• So mental states can’t be analyzed as
behavioural dispositions
Reply
• Ryle: we can’t reduce mental concepts to a
set of behavioural dispositions
– They are ‘indefinite’
– Dispositional statements can’t be completely
analyzed either
• But mental concepts are still concepts of
behavioural dispositions, just at a higher
level of generality
– So the circularity objection is correct, but not an
objection
Knowledge of the mind
• Dualism thinks of mental states as
‘inner’ and defends an asymmetry of
knowledge
– Our mental states are inaccessible to
other people
– But known to us through conscious
introspection
Knowledge of the mind
• Behaviourism rejects this
– We don’t have to infer that someone has a mind
from their behaviour
– To say that someone has certain behaviour
dispositions just is to say they have a mind
– So we can know other people’s mental states
• But now, can I only know my own mental
states by observing my behaviour??
– If they are behavioural dispositions, how could
‘introspection’ reveal them?
Knowledge of the mind
• Ryle: conscious introspection is a myth
– We pay attention to ourselves just as we
pay attention to others’ behaviour
– To know what you think is just to be ready
to say what you think
– We just have more evidence – thinking is
inner speech
Mental states without
behaviour
• Many conscious mental states, e.g. pain,
have a particular feeling, ‘what it is like’ –
this cannot be understood just as a
behavioural disposition
– Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of the
mind
• Putnam’s ‘super-spartans’
– Through culture, they have no disposition to
express pain at all
– Yet they feel pain