Transcript Government alternation and legislative agenda setting

Government alternation and
legislative agenda setting
A presentation by: Alica Jung, Marco Carotta, Juliette
Dubois, Katharina Dahms
Main questions

What are the reasons for the evolution of the Executive‘s
agenda setting power?
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Which methods can be used in order to control legislative
agendas?
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What are the distinctive characteristics of the development?
Explanation for the increase of the
Executive‘s power in lawmaking
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What have been drivers for this evolution?
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What are the characteristics of the increase of power?
Historical approach
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Under which circumstances was the constitution
composed?
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End of World War II: Italy was deeply divided and ideologically
polarized
proportional representation
congruent and symmetric bicameralism
 Relatively
weak Executive
Executive‘s role in lawmaking according to
the Italian constitution
Ordinary procedure (art.72)
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no special role/ same position as any MP according to bill proposal
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disadvantage:
Every bill needs to be approved by commitee, floor and other chamber
= long procedure
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1.
2.
3.
Other procedures
decentralized
decree law
delegating law
Decentralized procedure (sede legislativa)
decentralized procedure (sede legislativa)
 whole legislative procedure takes part in the commitee
 crucial players: members of commitee (1/5+1) , floor (1/10+1),
responsibile ministers
 veto power
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only under the condition of quasi unanimity of commitee and
floor
possibility to skip the floor
Decrease of decentralized procedure
Decree law procedure
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under the condition of necessity and urgency (!)
Executive passes a bill without approvement of parliament
60 days for converting the decree law into a regular law
otherwise the former law is valid again
disadvantage: any MP in the committee and floor can propose
changes outcome not what government intended
extensive use of reissuing non converted decrees
 Constitutional Court‘s sentence in 1996: reiussing not
possibile anymore
 Strenghtening the Executive‘s power
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Development of Decree laws
[converted/not converted (reiussed)]
Delegating law procedure
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a law with a section (delega) that delegates the
responsibilty to proclaim a new law (legislative decree)
a general framework and a deadline is given by the
parliament
advantage:
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last word by Executive
in case the framework of the law is too far from the
Executive‘s desires: refusal possible
therefore Executive‘s desires considered in advance
most powerful evidence for the Executive‘s increase of
power
Delegating laws and deleghe (1963-2007)
Modification of executive role:
italian executive was one of the weakest in the
world
 attempts of the legislative to fight filibustering,
obstructionism and centralize the agenda
formation
 it failed, just strengthened internal bodies
 Chamber of deputies did not give the
executive a special role
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1971:new standing orders: no improvement
end of the 1971: party fragmentation started increasing
1980’s: government still had not any decisive role in
planning the business
1988 in Senate, 1990 in chamber of deputies: for the first
time executive’s indications were one of the source for
planning parliament activity
end of the 1990’s: government won the right to present
the conference of group chairpersons
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but no special proposal or voting rights about planning
parliamentary activity
problems:
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the amendment is not necessarily the last one
and come only from executive
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in the senate: executive has as many privileges
as the committee
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in the chamber of deputies: (beginning 1980’s)
abnormal submission of amendments
most important change about voting and
amendments (1988):
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the chamber of deputies standing orders
require two distinct voting, the first one on the
article and the final on the bill
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the so-called maxi amendments
Maxi amendments
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When was the issue raised ?
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In 2004 the President of the Republic reminded us about
a principle in the Italian procedure for the vote of law :
the bills must be approved section by section.
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In this particulare case he reproaches that the articles are
two long.
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This anomaly is an italian practice called « maxi
amendments »
What are maxi amendments :
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It's a way for the Government to pass laws easier :
at last minute, a single amendment replaces all of the
sections of a bill.
To the amendment, a question of confidence is attached
so that :
1) the bill has the priority
II) It’s difficult for MPs to vote against
Consequences :
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Then the processus goes really faster
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The final content really looks like what the government
wants,
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The bargaining equilibrium shifts to the executive area :
the executive leads the legislative process
Harmful consequences :
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Less understandable,
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More difficult to amend,
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Lack of constitutionality ? (as the pdt said, sections must
be. Show a lack of cohesion from the government, which
needs a « trick » to pass his laws
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Lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a
« trick » to pass his laws in the Parliament
When did it appear ?
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Already existed during the First Republic but is widely
utilized during the 2nd Republic.
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At first it concerned only decree laws, but then was
extended to any bill.
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Started to be used a lot under the 13th and 14th
legislatures (2 maxi amendments during the 10th, and 24
during the 14th).
Budgetary process
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A legislative sequence for the vote of budget was
defined for the first time in 1978.
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Why ? Because of the bad financial results, and the
bad management of its provision
How does it work ?
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They introduced a government financial bill and a financial
parliamentary session
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The Executive instruments that we've studied before are
used aswell for the budget
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The procedure was changed 3 times since 1978
The rationalization of the budgetary process
increased the agenda-setting power of the Presidents
of the Chambers and of the Budget Committees.
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He can :
“declare inadmissible any amendments and additional
sections dealing with subjects that are unrelated to
the Finance and Budget bills”.
decide to set aside the measures unrelated to the
subject according to the law.
ask to re-table amendments during the Floor aswell.
Impact of the introduction of a
budgetary process
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The importance of the Europeanization makes
difficult to estimate the impact
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But according to the text, the financial goals
established by the money government bills seem to
have been substantially respected up to 2001
A tentative explanation
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Demand of strong executive’s role has met an increase of
exceptional instruments
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Delegating laws
Deleghe
Degree laws
Big changes in italian political system
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End of old parties
New electoral rules (bipolarism)
differences between I and II republic
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Italian first republic
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Only one party can rule : Dc (with ally)
No government will be possible just with Msi and Pci
Only changement during a long period is party fragmentation
Italian second republic
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Two broad coalitions
Both coalition can rule
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Growing of delegating laws and deleghe in the ‘90
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Financial crisis  No integration in european union
No decreasing of deleghe and delegating laws, the
alternation had become a real possibility
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In ’96 the leftiest coalition in italian history at the government
2001 a center-right coalition righter than Dc
Italian policy space: I and II republic
What means alternation?
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In new government coalition status quo is far enough to
overcome the existing transaction costs that plague a still
fragmented coalition government, and allow the policy
change by a change in the allocation of the agenda setting
power.
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For some of the government parties could be more
convenient a no policy change. A relatively bad decision
can be convenient for a party member of the government
if it can prevent the alternation.
Why until now we have not changed the
formal rules?
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Formal changes reinforced the Executive:
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Some of the new formal rules need to be passed by
costitutional laws
The two coalition find a reform useful when they are member
of the government and dangerous when they are at opposition.
Pro-executive changes in the parliamentary standing
order are easier to be done:
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They need only the absolute majority of MP’s(No popular
referendum required)
Crucial role of the presidents of the chambers
conclusion
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Hypothesis is that the istitutional or procedural change
follows the same logic of the policy change.
The alternation helps the delegation of the agenda setting
power
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It changes the set of veto players increasing instability
It introduces a prospective change of veto players in the
strategic calculations moving the reverse point farther than the
present SQ
We should expect to find a strengthening of the
government agenda setting where
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The alternation is more frequent
Distance between alternative government is larger
Veto players pareto set is small