Transcript WEEK #3 Socratic Practice (Euthyphro, Laches, and

WEEK #3
Socratic Practice
(Euthyphro, Laches, and
Charmides)
(1-31-06)
AGENDA
• Introduction
– Last week
– Three Characteristic Features of S’s Practice
• Method/Elenchos
• Profession of Ignorance
• Preoccupation with Definition
– Paradigmatic Dialogues
• The Elenchos
– Formal Structure
– Vlastos’ Interpretation
– The Text
• Ignorance
• Definition
– Preoccupation
– Socratic Fallacy
Last Week
• S believed his guilty verdict was based on informal charges
• S did not believe that he was guilty of these informal
charges; but understood why he might be thought to be
• A subtle difference between what he is reputed to do and
what he actually does
• Note: it is not a mistaken understanding of his doctrines
that he blames, but a mistaken understanding of his
practice
• Philosophy (here) is understood less as a set of
beliefs/doctrines, than as a way of behaving, a practice
Informal Charges
Second mention
• Second mention “Socrates is a criminal and a
busybody, investigating the things beneath the
earth and in the heavens and making the weaker
argument (logos) stronger and teaching others
these same things.” [Apology 19b4-c1: Fowler
trans.]
1. Natural Philosopher
2. Making weaker argument the stronger (Sophist)
3. Teaching this to others (Sophist)
Tonight’s Thesis
Socrates’ philosophical practice is
characterized by three features
[1] A distinctive method
[2] A profession of ignorance
[3] A preoccupation with ‘definition’
Questions Tonight
1. What is S’s distinctive method and what does he
take the results of it to be (and is he justified)?
2. How are we to understand Socrates’ disavowal of
knowledge: as irony, as sincere, as a disavowal
of one type of knowledge, but not of another?
3. What motivates Socrates’ preoccupation with
definition? Is it because he is committed to the
so-called ‘Socratic Fallacy’ or for some other
reason?
Preliminaries
• Adequacy Condition
– Interpretation should be potentially confused
with but subtly different from sophistry and
natural philosophy
• The Evidence for the Interpretation
– Apology
– Aristotle & Xenophon (a bit)
– The Socratic dialogues
Questions Tonight Again
What is S’s distinctive method and what does he take the
results of it to be (and is he justified)?
1. Elenchos
2. Inconsistent beliefs
3. yes
2. How are we to understand Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge:
as irony, as sincere, as a disavowal of one type of knowledge,
but not of another?
1. Sincere
2. One type
3. What motivates Socrates’ preoccupation with definition? Is it
because he is committed to the so-called ‘Socratic Fallacy’ or
for some other reason?
1. Priority of definitional knowledge
1.
2. Fallacious?
Key Features in Apology
1. Profession of Ignorance
2. Concern for the Soul
3. Manner of Practice
–
he went to those who seemed to be wise both
[a] to themselves and [b] to many others
(21c5-7), “thinking that there, if anywhere, I
could refute the oracle and say to it ‘This man
is wiser than I, but you said that I was.’”
[21c1-3; Grube trans.]
Key Features Continued
4. Immediate Aims
– He investigates and examines those who seem wise in
order [a] to show him that he is not, if he is not (21c78 and 23b6-7), and [b] to learn from him, if he is
(22b5).
5. Consequences
– As a result [a] he quickly incurred their hatred and [b]
gained a reputation for wisdom “for each of those
present thought that I was wise with respect to those
things concerning which I had refuted the other”
(22e6-23a5)
6. Three Classes of Examinees
– Politicians (21c3-22a8)
– Poets (22a8-c8)
– Craftsmen (22c9-e5)
Dramatic Dates
• Euthyphro: 399
• Laches: 424-418
• Charmides: 432
• Delphic Oracle: either 431 or 422-413
Laches
THE CONTEXT OF THE QUESTION
Lysimachus’ Explanation for Inviting Laches and Nicias to View
the Display [Laches 178a1-180a5]
II. Introducing Socrates [Laches 180a6-d3]
III. Lysimachus Addresses Socrates [Laches 180d4-181c9]
IV. The Speeches of Nicias and Laches [Laches 181d1-184c8]
I. Nicias [Laches 181d8-182d5]
II. Laches [Laches 182d6-184c8]
V. An Argument that It is the Advice of the Expert Concerning the
Care of the Soul that Should be Followed [Laches 184c9-186b8]
VI. Socrates Denies Expertise and Nicias and Laches Agree to be
Examined [Laches 186b8-189d3]
VII.Introduction of the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question [Laches 189d4190e3]
I.
Laches Continued
LACHES’ ANSWER
1.
First Definition [Laches 190e4-192b8]: not fleeing and
facing the enemy
2.
Second Definition [Laches 192b9-194c1]: an endurance
of the soul
NICIAS’ ANSWER
I.
Transition to Nicias [Laches 194c]
II.
Third Definition [Laches 194c7-200c1]
I.
The Definition [Laches 194c7-195c1]: knowledge of
fearful and daring things
II.
Laches’ Testing of the Definition [Laches 195a2196c1]
III. Socrates’ First Testing of the Definition [Laches
196c1-197d8]
IV. Socrates’ Second Testing of the Definition [Laches
197e2-200c2]
CONCLUSION [Laches 200c2-201c5]
Key Features in the Laches
1. Socratic Professions of Ignorance
•
S says he does not have knowledge concerning this affair and
is not sufficient to judge which of them speaks the truth - for
he has become neither a discoverer nor a pupil of anyone
concerning these things. [186d8-e3]
•
Well it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be unwilling
to join in assisting any man to become as good as possible. If
in the conversation we have just had I had seemed to be
knowing and the other two had not, then it would be right to
issue a special invitation to me to perform this task; but as
the matter stands we are all in the same difficulty. [200e1-e5;
Sprague trans.]
2. Concern for the Soul
•
So now we say that we are examining a discipline for the
sake of the souls of the youths... So we must examine this, if
one of us is expert concerning the care of the soul and is able
to care for it well and have had good teachers. [185e1-6]
3. Claims to Wisdom
•
[a] Socrates indicates his belief that both Laches and Nicias
seem to themselves to be wise at 186c8-d3, 190c4-5, and
194c2-7.
•
[b] Their reputation among others for wisdom is suggested
both at the beginning of the dialogue when Lysimachus
seeks their advice concerning the important matter of the
education of the sons (178a5-b5) and closer to the end at
197d1-5.
4. Immediate Aims
–
Then now it is necessary first to examine this, if
someone of us is expert concerning that for which we
seek counsel or not; and if someone is, it is necessary
to be persuaded by that one though one and leave the
others alone, if not it is necessary to seek someone
else. [184e11-185a3]
–
Let us see if Nicias thinks that he is saying something
and does not speak these things for the sake of the
logos. Then let us find out from him more clearly
what he thinks; and if he seems to be saying
something we will agree, and if not we will teach.
[196c1-4]
5. Consequences
a. Socrates reputation for wisdom
•
•
Laches explains to Lysimachus that Socrates
“always spends his time in those places where
there is some fine learning or pursuit of the sort
which you seek concerning the youth” (180c2-4)
both Laches and Nicias advise Lysimachus and
Melesias to retain Socrates as a teacher. Socrates
is quick to remind the four of them that they “are
all in the same difficulty”
b. Socrates, however, does not incur hatred
6. Laches & Nicias are politicians
The Problem of the Elenchos
Two Questions:
1. What is Socrates trying to do or accomplish
by means of his elenchos?
2. Is Socrates justified in attempting to
accomplish this by means of his elenchos, and
if so, how?
•
The Problem
–
–
Appears that the answer to [1] is ‘truth’
But the form suggests that, given that answer
to [1], the answer to [2] must be ‘no’
Preliminaries
• Translation: refutation, test, cross-examination
– Used at Apology 21c1 re the Delphic Oracle
– Used at Apology 29e5 re those who profess to care
about wisdom, truth and the best possible state of their
souls
• Evidence
– Almost never talks about, rather uses it
– Apology
– Gorgias 471e2-472c4
Form of the Elenchos
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
p (apparent refutand)
q
r (premises of the elenchos)
s
(q & r & s)  not-p
So, not- (p & q & r & s) (prima facie
conclusion)
7. So, not-p (constructive conclusion)
Consequences of Form
• Not All Arguments in the Elenctic
Dialogues are Elenchoi
– Most of Apology
– The speech of the Laws in the Crito
– The first half of the Laches
• Remember Apology is explaining what is
special about Socrates
Vlastos’ Misplaced Motivation
It left me with this question: if that were all
Socrates expected to get from the elenchus –
exposure of his interlocutors’ inconsistencies –
where did he find positive support for those strong
doctrines of his on whose truth he based his life?
If the elenchus, his only line of argument, gave
those doctrines no rational grounding, what did?
Grote had not been troubled by that question
because he found it possible to believe that
Socrates’ own positive convictions and his critical
assaults on thos of others ran on separate tracks. I
could not. I could not reconcile myself to Grote’s
missionary of the examined life who was a
dogmatist himself.
The Kraut/Vlastos Debate
• Elenchos = Any Socratic Argument
– We are wrong about its form
– No special problem (Kraut)
• The fact that the premises “are logically unsecured within that
argument.” is true of every argument
• What makes the elenchos special is the status of the
premises
• Centrality of the ‘Doxastic Constraint’
– ‘Say What You Believe’
– Sincerity Constraint
• Given the DC, how do the premises get sufficient
credibilty (alethic status) to justify concluding not-p?
Gorgias 471e2-472c4
[B]ecause you’re trying to refute me rhetorically (rhetorikos ...
elenchein), like those who think they’re refuting people in the jury-courts.
For there one side think they are refuting the other whenever they produce
many respectable witnesses for whatever statements they make, and the
man who says the opposite provides himself with only one or none at all.
But this kind of refutation (houtos de ho elenchos) is worth nothing
towards the truth ... [for] I, all alone, don’t agree; for you don’t compel
me, but you produce all these false witnesses against me and try to
dislodge me from my property and the truth. But if I can’t produce you,
all alone by yourself, as a witness agreeing on the things I’m talking
about, I think I have achieved nothing of any account in what our
discussion is about. And I don’t think you’ll have achieved anything
either unless I, all alone, bear witness for you, and you let all the others
go. Here is one form of refutation (houtos tis tropos elenchou), so you
and many others think. But there is another one too, so I think, for my
part. [Irwin 1979 trans.]
Vlastos’ View:
Thesis 1 and 2
1. Socrates takes his elenchos to establish the truth
or falsehood of a particular proposition
•
The crucial text is “Has it not been proved
(apodedeiktai) that what was asserted [by myself] is
true?” [Gorgias 479e8; Vlastos trans.]
2. In addition to requiring that the premises at step
2 are believed by the interlocutor they must also
be believed by Socrates
“Does Socrates, for his part, believe that [the premises
of his elenchos] are true? In standard elenctic
argument there can be no doubt of this: it follows
from Socrates’ conviction that the contradiction does
more than expose inconsistency within the
interlocutor’s beliefs - that it refutes his thesis, as we
can see, for instance, when Polus is told that the
argument which faulted him “proved true” the
Socratic thesis against his (Gorgias 479e8 [(T1)
above]). Socrates could not have said this unless he
were convinced that [the premises] which are shown
to entail [the apparent refutand] are themselves true.”
(Vlastos 1985 8; 1994 45
Vlastos’ Presuppositions
A. Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will
always have at the same time true beliefs
entailing the negation of that false belief (1983a
52 and 1994 25 with minimal revision), and
B. The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any
given time is consistent (1983a 55 and 1994 28
with minimal revision), entail
C. The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any
given time is true (1983a 55 and 1994 28 with
minimal revision)
My View
• Skeptical about [B]
– My view is quite the opposite of yours: ... But it’s true
that, obviously under the influence of my ignorance, I
chop and change, and even hold the opposite opinion
sometimes. [Hippias Minor 372d7-e1; Waterfield trans.
• Not necessary
• Deny Thesis 2 – so, if problem, then can’t be
solved
• Deny Thesis 1 – no problem
Considerations Against Thesis 1
• Laches 193e8-194a4: But are you willing that we
should be persuaded with our statement to this
extent? ... With the one that commands us to
endure. If you are willing, let us hold our ground
in the search and let us endure, so that courage
itself won’t make fun of us for not searching for it
courageously - if endurance should perhaps be
courage after all.” [Sprague trans.; my emphasis]
• Laches 199e6-10
Last Elenchos
1.
Courage is a part of virtue. [Laches 198a1-6]
2.
Fearful things are future evils and daring things are future
non-evils or goods. [Laches 198c2-4]
3. Courage is knowledge of fearful and daring things.
[Laches 198c6-8]
4.
The same knowledge knows future, present and past
things. [Laches 199a6-9]
5.
Then, courage is not only knowledge of fearful and
daring things. [from [ii], [iii], and [iv]; Laches 199b9-c2]
6.
Then, courage is knowledge of past, present and future
goods and evils. [from [ii], [iii], and [iv]; Laches 199c3d3]
7.
If someone knows all goods and evils (past, present, and
future), then that person is not lacking in any virtue.
[Laches 199d4-e2]
8.
Then, courage is not a part of virtue, but the whole of
virtue. [from [vi] and [vii]; Laches 199e3-5]
9.
[i] and [viii] are inconsistent. [Laches 199e6-10]
10. So, we have not discovered what courage is. [Laches
199e11-12]
Considerations Against Thesis 2
• Methodological Remarks
– LA: Why, what else would anyone say, Socrates?
SOC: Nothing, if that is what he thought. LA: Well,
this is what I think at any rate. [Laches 193c6-8;
Sprague trans.]
• Aim of Eliminating Conceit
– Availability Constraint
• Actual Premises
– Euthyphro 7a-8a
Euthyphro First Elenchos
1. If x is god loved, then x is pious and if x is god
hated, then x is impious. (Euthyphro 7a6-8)
2. The gods fight with, differ with, and hate each
other. (Euthyphro 7b2-4)
3. The just and the unjust, the fine and the foul, and
the good and the bad are the subjects of
difference which make individuals hate each
other.
4. So, there are somethings that some gods consider
just, fine, or good and other gods consider unjust,
foul, or bad. [from [iii] & [iv]] (Euthyphro 7e13)
5. The things one considers fine, good, or
just, one loves and the opposite of these
one hates. (Euthyphro 7e6-7)
6. So, the same things are hated and loved by
the gods. [from [v] & [vi] (Euthyphro
8a4-5)
7. So, the same things are god-hated and
god-loved. [from [vii]] (Euthyphro 8a5)
8. So, the same things will be pious and
impious. [from [i] & [viii] (Euthyphro
8a7-8)
Definition
• Frequency of ‘What is F-ness?’ Question
– Not in Apology
– Aristotle & Xenophon
Metaphysics 1078b17-29
“Socrates busied himself concerning the ethical
virtues (ethikas aretas) and was the first to seek to
define them universally (peri touton horizesthai
katholou zetiuntos protou) ... He was reasonable in
seeking the what it is (to ti estin); for he sought to
syllogize, and the what it is (to ti estin) is the
starting point of syllogisms... For Socrates may be
fairly attributed two things, epagogic arguments
(tous t' epaktikous logous) and defining the universal
(to horizesthai katholou)...”
Metaphysics 987b1-4
Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical
matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but
seeking the universal (to katholou zetountos) in these
ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on
definitions (peri horismon epistesantos protou ten
dianoian). [Ross trans.]
Memorabilia I i 16
“His own conversation was ever of human things. The
problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is
ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what
is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is
courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a
statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;-these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a
gentleman, in his estimation, while ignorance should
involve the reproach of slavishness”
Memorabilia IV vi 1
“For Socrates held that those who knew what each of the
things that are are would be able in addition to teach (or
show) it to others; on the other hand he said it was no
wonder that those who did not know were baffled
themselves and baffled others; because of these things he
never ceased seeking with his companions what each of the
things that are are.”
Socratic Dialogues
•
•
•
•
•
•
Charmides
Laches
Euthyphro
Hippias Major
Lysis
Protagoras (part)
•
•
•
•
•
Gorgias (part)
Republic I
Meno (part)
Theaetetus
Sophist
Motivation
(PD) If A fails to know what F-ness is, then A
fails to know anything about F-ness.
(SF) If A knows what F-ness is, then A knows
everything about F-ness.
Euthyphro 4d9-5d1
EUTH: (a) [My relatives say] that it is impious for a son to
prosecute his father for murder - knowing poorly, Socrates,
how the gods view the pious and the impious.
SOC: (b) Euthyphro, do you think that you have such
accurate knowledge concerning divine affairs, and concerning
pious things and impious things that, the situation being as
you say, you do not fear that by prosecuting your father you
may be doing something impious?
EUTH: (c) Socrates, I would be useless and no different than
the average man, if I did not know accurately all such things.
...
SOC: (d) Tell me, then, what you just now asserted you knew
clearly, what sorts of things you say the pious and the impious
are in the case of murder and all other actions.
Laches 190b7-c2
Then isn’t this necessary for us to begin, to
know what virtue is? For if we do not know
at all (to parapan) what virtue happens to be,
how would we become advisors to anyone
regarding how it might best be attained.
Laches 189e3-190b1
For if we happen to know concerning anything
whatever that its being added to something makes
that thing to which it is added better and further we
are able to cause that thing to be added to it, then it is
clear that we know that thing itself concerning which
we advise how someone might best and most easily
attain it ... If we happen to know that sight added to
the eyes makes them better and further we are able to
cause it to be added to the eyes, then it is clear that
we know what sight is concerning which we advise
how someone might best attain it. For if we did not
know what sight is or what hearing is, we would
hardly be advisors or doctors worthy of attention
concerning eyes and ears, how someone might best
attain hearing and sight.
Charmides 176a6-b1:
I don’t know if I have temperance or if I
don’t; for how would I know that concerning
which neither of you is able to discover what
it is, or so you say?
Sufficiency
Then teach me what this form itself is, so
that looking to it and using it as a paradigm,
I can say that that which is such as it,
whether done by you or anyone else, is
pious and that which is not such as it, is
impious. [Euthyphro 6e3-6]
Is it a Fallacy?
• Geach: “We know heaps of things without being
able to define the terms in which we express our
knowledge.”
• Charity has led many to deny Socrates’
commitment to the priority
• Charity ought to lead us to revisit the kind of
knowledge involved in the priority principle
– Professions of ignorance
– Delphic oracle
– Doxastic coherence requirement