Transcript No Slide Title

National Poverty Reduction
Strategies (PRSs) in
South Eastern Europe
SEE Team PRS Learning Event 21 March 2003
PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project
Origins of the PRSP Idea


Mixed record on poverty reduction in 1990s (Africa,
Transition economies, post-1997 Asia)
Findings on aid effectiveness – off-budget projects, ex
ante conditionality, parallel donor processes
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International Development Targets/MDGs
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Multilateral funding for debt relief (HIPC II)
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What’s new?
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‘Costed’ poverty reduction strategy linked to macro &
fiscal framework
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Outcome focused; making the links between policy &
results
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Opening-up the policy process to new forms of
participation
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New incentives for monitoring & evaluation
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New partnership possibilities & new forms of aid
delivery
Assumptions behind PRS
initiative?
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Conflict study - no explicit ‘preconditions’ for embarking
on a PRS but there are implicit expectations about:
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Credible political authority with control over
people & territory
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Commitment to peace & poverty reduction
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Functioning government (that follows certain
basic good governance and economic policies)
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Some space for public participation
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As in Africa, a PRS may be embarked on without these
being met, but constrains chances for ‘success’
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Politics study - implicit empowerment model in PRS
approach and assumption that it will support political
devt.
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Is PRS approach appropriate to
transition countries?
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Principles are appropriate & poverty levels are very
high - but specific context of transition countries
means it will play out differently than elsewhere
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No HIPC incentive – but concessional lending
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EU accession agenda
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Thus donor profile is different than elsewhere (EU-IFI
relations)
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Complex conflicts
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New states in most cases
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Extremely fragile civil society
Participation
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Context for participation
 History of conflict
 Extreme distrust between govt and NGO/CSO in
many
cases
 Fragile civil society, sometimes aid dependent, very
low capacity
 Low capacity within government for carrying out PPA
Globally, there has been some opening of policy debate
to broader participation by domestic constituencies - extent
of gains dependent on starting point
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Broadly true in transition countries…
Participation
Much information provision - drafts disseminated in
relevant languages (Macedonia) and discussed in
workshops nationally, regionally and sectorally
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Albania – promoted a national debate on poverty, talk
shows, radio programs, newspaper coverage
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Who is involved? Many groups nominally engaged, but
depth hard to judge and not necessarily respresentative
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Parliamentary involvement usually weak
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No PPAs and little community level consultation
Not clear that participation is institutionalised (e.g. in
monitoring plans or national fora for continued dialogue)
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Governmental ownership
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Context for ownership of PRS in SEE
 Recent states carrying out new functions
 Complex political institutional environment in many
cases
 Budget systems weak
 Relationships with donors – incentives for owning
PRS?
 Welfarist understanding of poverty
Globally, there are challenges with ‘mainstreaming’ the
PRS – especially building political engagement & improving
links with other planning and reform processes.
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Governmental ownership
Note ownership may look different at different stages only Albania has full PRS
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Understanding of PRS principles may be weak even in
key counterparts
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PRS sometimes in context of national development
strategy
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Links between centre/PRS unit and sectoral ministries
and regional bodies often extremely weak – PRS process
exposes this weakness…and strengthens?
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Considerable use of consultants in formulating PRSs –
sustainability questionable
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Donor behaviour also affects possibilities for ownership –
more later, but governments somewhat fatigued.
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Links with budget reform
PRS units established in MoF in some cases, and in
Social/Welfare departments in other cases – prospects for
links with resource allocation?
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Acceptance among governments that MTEFs are a
positive tool.
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But no MTEF process in most SEE countries – though
Albania MTEF formulation very closely linked with PRS
formulation (and implementation prospects hopeful).
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Globally, prioritisation and costing have proved difficult
(but worthwhile) exercises for most governments – SEE no
exception
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Results orientation
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Globally, operational M&E plans are often developed after
first PRS is complete – considerable time needed to get
buy-in from a range of stakeholders. Tendency towards
somewhat top-heavy, outcome-oriented, cumbersome
systems.
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Context for results-orientation
 Some experience of data collection and monitoring but
incentives under Soviet system led to distortions
 Very weak data and work on poverty assessments in
early stages
 Little room for CSO monitoring
 Will require a considerable shift in culture – not yet
evident given PRSs not complete
 Albania PSIA pilot
Part II – Donor behaviour
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Donor profile in SEE is exceptional
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EU accession most prominent agenda
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IFIs present but not main actors
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Bilateral community in early stages of coordination
Donors making transition out of relief/reconstruction to
development
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PRS is an opportunity to bring about greater
harmonisation and alignment amongst donors – globally, it
is providing considerable impetus to in some countries
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Not clear that this is the case in SEE?
World Bank and IMF
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Experience of DFID engagement with IFIs is variable
Sometimes good relations, open lines of
communication (esp with WB)
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In other cases, mixed messages on key issues, less
open relations with other donors generally, sudden
decisions
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Timetables for PRS preparation are often driven by IFIs
and prescriptive on content
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JSA process likely to be a key area for engagement as
PRSs are finished – experience elsewhere suggests that
this is not necessarily straightforward or open for
comments
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The EU
EU accession is driving force for reform in all SEE
countries
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There are high-level commitments from both Bank and
EU to work more closely on PRS and SAA
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On the ground, this is not generally translated into
practice
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Indications that the EU tends to see SAA as a political
process as distinct from the PRS developmental process
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WB/IMF do not always acknowledge the prominence of
the SAA agenda for these countries
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UNDP
UNDP is most closely associated with PRS agenda
globally – but also with MDG agenda
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In practice not a great deal of harmony between these
processes at present (in SEE and globally)
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In theory governments can monitor progress towards
MDGs by monitoring PRS implementation outcomes, but at
present parallel processes
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Aid instruments
There are problems with transactions costs of aid and offbudget aid (CIS countries and maybe SEE?)
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Little evidence of move towards programmatic finance –
PRS not affecting reasons for this (no PRGF, corruption)
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PRSC – not clear that Bank is doing business differently
Performance assessment requirements of different
agencies taxing – PRS, SAA, Stability Pact, MDGs,
projects
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Some countries will graduate to IBRD status – no formal
requirement for a PRS
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