Transcript PowerPoint プレゼンテーション

Safety Study of
Hydrogen Supply Stations for the
Review of High Pressure Gas Safety
Law in Japan
International Conference on Hydrogen Safety
September 10, 2005
Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)
Hydrogen Technology Group
Shigeki Kikukawa
1
In Japan, regulations for gaseous hydrogen
supply stations were revised in April 2005.
We made drafts of the regulations.
2
Topics

Introduction


Safety Study






Background of the project
Risk Assessment
Basic Approach
Risk Matrix
Consequence Estimation and Likelihood Estimation
Review of Regulations
Safety Requirements for High Pressure Gas Safety Law

Setback Distance and others
3
Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)

JPEC
 Established
in 1986
 Affiliated with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industries of Japan (METI)
 Carries out a range of activities, which are mainly
related to petroleum industry.
 http://www.pecj.or.jp/
4
Governmental Leadership of FCV & H2
Infrastructure


Japanese government is strongly promoting the wide spread
of fuel cells.
Anticipated market size
FCV (vehicles)
Hydrogen Fueling Station (stations)



2010
2020
2030
50,000
5M
15M
500
3,500
8,500
Driving
Setting R&D Target
Force
Review of codes & Standards
Financial help for R&D and Demonstration projects
5
Concerns with Regulation

A task force formed by the government in Oct. 2002.
 Released the Road Map.
 Identified 28 concerns with regulation which should be
reviewed for market introduction of Fuel Cells.
5 items
To be clarified before
Dec. 2002
3 items
FCV
4 items
High Pressure H2
Tank of FCV
7 items
Setback distance etc.
H2 Infrastructure
5 items
Stationary FC
To be clarified before
FY2005
6
Key Issue 2: Setback Distance
High Pressure Gas Safety Law
Setback distance for general high pressured equipment
17m : Hospital, school, etc.
H2
11.3m : Dwellings
8m
11.3m
17m
8m : Fire sources
Hydrogen stations must FREE from DANGER!
H2
We have to add some safety requirements to reduce the setback distance.
7
Key Issue 2 :
Permission to set up H2 stations
with Gasoline stations
Fire Protection Law
Gas
H2
Separately
Gas
Same area
Residential
area
H2
Commercial
area
Industrial
area
H2
Residential area
Commercial area
Industrial area
H2
H2
Key Issue 3 :
Permission to build in an urban
area
Building Standard Law
H2
8
Scope of JPEC’s project

Mission: Developing drafts of revised safety C&S of H2 stations



Focused on H2 station
Pipelines, Transportation and FCV are out of scope
Relevant regulations




Schedule



High Pressure Gas Safety Law
Fire Protection Law
Building Standards Law
We should prepare drafts of review by Sep. 2004.
Government would review the regulations by the end of Mar. 2005.
Funds

New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO)
9
Project Partners
Japan Steel Works
Material Test (Stainless
steels, Chromium
Molybdenum steels )
Reliability of compressor
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Ltd. (MHI)
H2 Diffusion & Explosion
Experiments/CFD
Japan Petroleum
Energy Center (JPEC)
General administration
Risk assessment
Iwatani International Corp.
Tatsuno Corporation
Reliability of H2 gas
dispenser
Japan Industrial Gas
Association
Reliability of liquid H2 system
Reliability of piping materials,
valves, etc.
10
Safety Study

Risk Assessment
 Popular
and highly experienced measure is used
for our study.
11
Basic Approach
START
Definition of H2 station model
Experiments, Simulations,
Surveys, etc.
By Project Partners
Hazard Identification
Risk Estimation
Risk Reduction
Risk Evaluation
N
Tolerable Risk?
Y
END
Output of the study :
Safety requirements for H2 station
12
Definition of H2 Station model
The model should be concrete enough for risk assessment.
The model should keep generality to be used for the review of C&S.

On-site type H2 station





H2 Demand
H2 Generation
Compressor
H2 Cylinders
Dispenser
: 300Nm3/hr (30Nm3/vehicle * 10vehicles/hr)
: 300Nm3/hr
: 300Nm3/hr, 40MPa
: 250L * 14 = 3500L (40MPa, 1400Nm3)
: 35MPa (supply pressure)
13
Types of H2 Stations
1) On-site type
Cylinders
PSA
Material tank
Reformer
Compressor
Dispenser
Study was finished
2) Off-site type
3) Liquid hydrogen type
Liquid H2 storage
Heat Exchanger
Gas Dispenser
Study is on progress
Liquid H2 pump
Liquid Dispenser
14
Hazard Identification

Applied Methods :



HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies)
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis)
233 accident scenarios were identified for the onsite type H2 station model



Failure and deterioration
Human Error
Natural Disasters
15
Risk Matrix (Risk Acceptance Criteria)
Likelihood
Consequence
severity
1 Extremely Severe
Damage
2 Severe Damage
3 Damage
4 Small Damage
5 Minor Damage
A
B
C
D
Improbable
Remote
Occasional
Probable
H
H
H
H
M
M
L
L
H
M
L
L
H
H
M
L
H
H
H
M
H (High):Risk cannot be acceptable. Remedial actions should be considered to reduce the risk to
acceptable level.
M (Medium):In principle, risk cannot be acceptable. It can be accepted only when risk reduction
cannot be achieved by reasonably practical action
L (Low):Acceptable. Further risk reduction is not necessarily required.
16
Examples of Risk Evaluation
Scenario : Rupture of pipe
Earthquake – Fall of Cylinder Unit – Rupture of pipe – H2
leakage – Explosion or Jet Fire
(1) Risk rank of no safety
requirements
800Nm3 of hydrogen leakage
from D=10mm, 40MPa
Consequence Level
1: Extremely Severe Damage
Likelihood Level
C: Occasional
A
Consequence
1 Extremely Severe
Likelihood
B
C
D
H
H
H
H
2
Severe Damage
M
H
H
H
3
Damage
M
M
H
H
4
Small Damage
L
L
M
H
5
Miner Damage
L
L
L
M
Can not be acceptable
17
Examples of Risk Evaluation Cont.
(2) Applied Safety Requirements
+ To Lower the Consequence
- Install Earthquake detector and Emergency Isolation Valve with fail close type
+ To Lower the Likelihood
- Fix the cylinder unit on hard concrete base
- Establish the Emergency Isolation Valve within the cylinder unit
A
H2
Consequence
1 Extremely Severe
Likelihood
B
C
D
H
H
H
H
2
Severe Damage
M
H
H
H
3
Damage
M
M
H
H
4
Small Damage
L
L
M
H
5
Miner Damage
L
L
L
M
STOP
Cylinder Unit
Acceptable!
18
Consequence Estimation

Basic data for consequence estimation was provided
by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

MHI carried out Experiments and Computational
Simulations of H2 Diffusion, Explosion, and Jet Fire.
19
Experiments of Jet Fire (video)
10mmΦ 40→1MPa
Same as left, with wall (h=3m, w=6m)
20
Likelihood Estimation

Experiments & Surveys by our Project Partners




Material
: The Japan Steel Works
Compressor : The Japan Steel Works
Dispenser
: Tatsuno Corporation
General piping materials & instrument:
Japan Industrial Gas Association
21
Dispenser

Durability Tests for




Filling hose & Joint
Hand valve
Breakaway device
Etc.
22
Compressor





Durability Tests
Hydrogen leakage
Noise Control
Vibration
Etc.
23
Material
(Stainless Steels and Chromium Molybdenum Steels)
Tests for Hydrogen Embrittlement
in pressurized hydrogen environment are necessary.
 Tensile test
 Deep notch test
 Fracture toughness test
 Fatigue test
 Etc.
24
Review of Regulations

The result of the study was reported to the competent
authorities, then examined, and basically accepted by them.

The competent authorities revised relevant regulations.

The new regulations have been effective since April 2005.



High Pressure Gas Safety Law
Fire Protection Law
Building Standard Law
25
Safety Requirements
for High Pressure Gas Safety Law
Ｒ
Ａ
Ａ
Ａ
T
C
Ａ
Ｐ
Tank
Compressor
Reformer
Storage
Setback Distance can
be shortened with
appropriate
fire protection wall
PSA
Office
Gasoline Dispenser
Wall h=2m
H2 Dispenser
Road
Setback Distance 6 m
26
H2 leak detector
Earthquake detector
Flame detector
Ｒ
Ａ
Ａ
Ａ
T
C
Ａ
Ｐ
Tank
Compressor
Reformer
Storage
PSA
Office
Gasoline Dispenser
H2 Dispenser
Road
27
Emergency isolation valve
Excess flow valve
Ｒ
Ａ
Ａ
Ａ
T
C
Ａ
Ｐ
Tank
Compressor
Reformer
Storage
PSA
Office
Gasoline Dispenser
H2 Dispenser
Road
28
Breakaway Device
Flame Detector
Emergency Stop Button
Pressure release
after refueling
Guardrail
Piping in Trench
29
H2 Leak Detector
Water Sprinkler
Flame Detector
Fire Protection Wall
Emergency Isolation Valve,
Check Valve
Frame Structure
Pressure Indicator, Safety Valve
30
•Compressor should be placed in an
enclosure.
•Ventilation with Interlock System
H2 Leak Detector
31
Conclusions


We made drafts of revised safety codes and standards
of Hydrogen supply stations.
Government reviewed the regulations based on our
drafts and new regulations have been in force now.
 High
pressure gas safety law
 Fire Protection Law
 Building Standard Law

It was permitted to build H2 supply station in an urban
area and to install them in the premise of a gasoline
station.
32
END
33
Likelihood Levels
Level
Description
A
Improbable
B
Remote
C
Occasional
D
Probable
Definition
Possible, but the probability is extremely low.
About once in several thousands years or less.
Unlikely to occur in lifetime of one H2 station.
About once in several hundreds years.
Likely to occur once in lifetime of one H2 station.
About once in several decades.
Likely to occur several times in lifetime of one H2 station.
About once in several years or more.
Likelihood Estimation

Qualitative Evaluation
 Based on engineering judgment
 Not enough data available for quantitative evaluation
34
Consequence Levels
Level
Description
Material Damage
Human Damage
1
Extremely
Collapse of nearby
Severe Damage dwelling houses
One or more fatalities of
pedestrians or dwellers
2
Severe Damage Major damage of
nearby dwelling
houses
One or more fatalities of
customers or station
workers
3
Damage
Minor damage of
nearby dwelling
houses
Injury of hospitalization
4
Small Damage
Windows broken
Injury of medical treatment
5
Minor Damage
No damage to nearby
dwelling houses
Minor injury
35