Transcript Plant & Process Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Emergency Management:
Assessing Risks and Improving Emergency
Preparedness especially in Existing Chemical Plants
Prof. Dr. Christian Jochum, Consultant
[email protected]
Chairman, German Commission on Process Safety
Director, European Process Safety Centre (EPSC)
New Delhi, February 11-13, 2009
©Prof. Jochum
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European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) www.epsc.org
Network funded by 40+ mainly European based (petro)chemical
multinationals to develop best practice in major accident/process safety
Objectives:
•
Information/know how exchange
•
Legislation (esp. Seveso II & ATEX)
•
participation & co-ordination of EU funded projects
Outputs:
•
Internal reports & books
•
User groups & public conferences
•
EU projects & working groups
Major topics 2008/09:
•
Process Safety Indicators/Learning from Accidents
•
Safety Critical Equipment
•
Fostering Senior Management Involvement in Process Safety (with EFCE)
•
LOPA Experience & Development
©Prof. Jochum
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Disaster Management
Disaster management is a multi-stage process starting with prevention
of major accidents ...
• identify hazards comprehensively
• avoid or control risks
• communicate remaining risks
• mitigate consequences
• remediate damages
• restore trust
... pursuing the goal to define and train as much as possible in
advance
©Prof. Jochum
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Safety of New and Existing Plants
New plants: safety is generally not an issue of financial resources, but
sometimes of a lack of professionalism
• “Integrated Safety” is most effective and cheap, if considered right from
beginning of design
• “End of Pipe Safety” is less effective and/or expensive, as late design
changes may be necessary
Existing Plants need another approach to come close to today´s safety
standards
• Upgrading may be technically and economically difficult
• Operating experience is major asset
Experience in Germany after 1960 demonstrates that safety of existing
plants can be dramatically improved
©Prof. Jochum
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Development of accidents at and on the way to the worplace in Germany since 1950
120
109,18
100
80
98,65
83,12
Arbeitsunfälle
60
Wegeunfälle
54,51
„Arbeitsunfälle“
= occupational
accidents
40
34,9
20
21,13
18,08
20,45
13,92
8,96
8,16
5,85
5,42
5,37
16,79
15,78
14,93
5,31
5,01
4,96
„Wegeunfälle“
= acc. on the
way to work
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
©Prof. Jochum
2003
2004
2005
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Plant & Process Safety: improvement of existing („old“) plants
Make best use of limited resources by a stepwise approach:
1. Have full knowledge about hazardous properties of all substances (e.g.
Material Safety Data Sheets, data bases, etc.)
2. Identify and rank critical points (human- and eco – toxicity, hold-up of
hazardous substances, reaction conditions) by e.g. „What-if“- or HAZOP
– studies
3. Document this in a safety study as a tool for use by the plant and by
authorities
4. Focus improvements (manpower, money, additional safeguards etc.) and
inspections on the most critical points.
5. The higher the risk, the more independent safeguards („barriers“) should
be considered.
6. Use the scenarios developed under (2) for emergency planning
©Prof. Jochum
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Plant & Process Safety: Use existing knowledge
Most accidents and eco – incidents have a previous history ...
• Preliminary events leading up to the accidents (failure of preliminary
safeguards) have not been identified
• Prior to most major accidents similar smaller incidents or near misses
have happened, but not evaluated
... which should be used for prevention
• Raise the awareness of the workers
• Use the experience of workers
– Encourage reporting of deviations, near misses and even minor
incidents as well as suggestions for improvements. Consider
contests and awards for groups working together
– Have a system for following up such reports/suggestions
©Prof. Jochum
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Plant & Process Safety: The Human Factor
Workers are risks and resources for safety
• They have to know the risks to cope with
• Detailed written procedures are a tool both for workers and for
management. They should ...
– describe the procedure as it is in the plant step by step
– use a language and expressions which are understood by the
workers (no scientific or technical paper)
– highlight hazards, safety measures and critical process parameters
(temperature, pressure, ...)
– make independent double checks mandatory for critical parameters
and procedures (e.g. charging the right products!)
– include start-up, shut-down, maintenance and process-specific
information for emergencies
• Use other procedures (e.g. GMP) for safety purposes, too.
• Include normal and abnormal situations in training
©Prof. Jochum
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Emergency Preparedness
Accidents may happen even in most modern plants. They cannot be
planned, but they should be considered.
• Use the scenarios identified for prevention of major incidents for
emergency planning and training, too.
• Cover all relevant scenarios in the emergency plan.
• Assign responsibilities rather than regulating details.
• The emergency organisation is different from the normal organisation,
but is empowered to use it.
• Adjust the emergency organisation to the dimension of the incident (e.g.
„blue, yellow, red alert“)
• Clearly document all available resources (site, company, neighbouring
sites, authorities, ...) for the different scenarios. Ensure that they can be
used in emergencies (e.g. co-operative agreements).
• Before you rely on off-site resources, consider the time until availability.
• Industrial zones with many chemical companies close together need
special attention („domino-effects“)
©Prof. Jochum
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Emergency Response
The basic principle: the faster and more effective the initial response,
the smaller the consequences for men, environment and economy.
• Provide the infrastructure for fast response (fire brigade, emergency
control room, notification and availability of key personnel, etc.)
• Encourage immediate reporting of incidents (not to wait until own efforts
failed ...), do not blame for false alarms.
• Site fire brigades (or shared with adjacent sites) usually are faster and
more efficient then municipal brigades, which rather serve as a back-up.
• If the fire brigade is (partly) staffed by chemical workers be aware of the
risks of understaffed chemical production.
• Better start with a higher level of alarm (worst case assumption) and
grade it down later than vice versa.
• Notify and involve public fire brigades and authorities as soon as
possible.
• Analyse every incident and the response to improve the organisation
without blaming anyone
©Prof. Jochum
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The Role of Authorities
The cooperation between authorities and companies at an incident
depends on their cooperation before the incident.
• Open communication about risks and safety measures on a regular basis
(e.g. in a local or regional committees) builds up trust which is urgently
needed during emergency response
• Authorities need to know about the possible scenarios for major
accidents to do their own preparations
• Authorities should have clear rules about their responsibilities in
handling major incidents to avoid conflicts between the different
agencies (e.g. labour safety, environment, civil protection, police etc.)
• Mitigation of consequences should come first, prosecution of individuals
responsible for the incident later.
©Prof. Jochum
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Neighbours, Journalists and Environmentalists
The basic issue: Neighbours and the general public share the risks of
chemical sites, but not necessarily the benefits.
• Communication of relevant risks has to be done openly and in an
adequate form („not scientific“) prior to incidents (e.g. “neighbourhood
councils“, brochures, ...)
– to build up trust in the competence of the company to handle risks
– to enable the neighbours to react adequately during an incident
• The response of neighbours etc. to incidents depend on the companies
response to requests and complaints prior to the incident.
• Fast and open information after an incident is crucial.
• Fears and worries of neighbours etc. have to be taken seriously even if
they are based on emotions rather than science
• On the long term, conflicts with neighbours etc. endangers the „licence
to operate“
• Committees with all stakeholders like the German Commission on
Process Safety are an effective tool for cooperation and communication.
©Prof. Jochum
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Commission on Process Safety (Kommission fuer Anlagensicherheit [KAS])
Mandated by the Federal Immission Control Act
•
Advises government as well as plant operators and state and local authorities on
process safety
•
32 members with different professional and educational background representing
different stakeholders („Round Table“)
•
Any group needs „allies“ to win votes
•
Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible
About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e.g.
•
Land Use Planning (Safety distances)
•
Risk evaluation and perception
•
Emergency Planning
•
Industrial parks
•
Provisions against terrorist attacs on chemical plants
All publications of the Commission are available (partly in English) at
www.kas-bmu.de
©Prof. Jochum
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Conclusions
• Investing in safe and eco-efficient plants pays off at least on the long
term
• The (remaining) risks of chemical/pharmaceutical plants can be assessed
and are the basis for scenarios for emergency planning.
• The knowledge and experience of the operators should be used by all
means.
• Risks should be communicated as well as benefits with all stakeholders,
esp. the neighbours.
• The resources for emergency response (manpower, equipment,
communications, organisation etc) have to be planned in advance and
readily available in case of an incident. People usually accept the risk of a
chemical/pharmaceutical plant, but not incompetence in handling it.
• Authorities should involve themselves actively in emergency planning,
balancing this out with their law enforcement duties.
• Combined efforts will definitely lead to safer and more accepted plants,
as the figures from Germany may show.
©Prof. Jochum
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Thank you for your attention!
©Prof. Jochum
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