Transcript The Obligations Build in

The Obligations Built into the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Lecture No. 12
1. Outline
•
BTWC Regime
– Slides 2-3
•
Role of the Preamble and the BTWC
– Slides 4-6
•
Ethical Responsibilities under the BTWC
– Slides 7-8
•
Practicing BTWC Norms
– Slides 9-14
•
Ethical Norms in Specific BTWC Articles
– Slides 15-18
•
Scientific Background Papers
– Slides 19-20
2. Regime
• International law is central to a regime and
this is seen as the starting point of an
international norm from which dual-use ethics
in life sciences can be considered.
• Regime refers to:
– “principles, norms, rules and decision making
procedures around which actor expectations
converge in a given issue area.” (Krasner, 1982)
3. The BTWC Regime
• “given issue area”:
– international prohibition against biological and
toxin weapons;
• “principles, norms, rules”:
– The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
• “decision making procedures”:
– Review Conferences, Intersessional Processes, and
other Meetings to sustain and develop the regime
4. Preamble: Norms of the BTWC
• Role of Preamble of a Treaty:
– Preamble of a treaty addresses grand principles and
norms of the treaty enshrined in its specific mission
• Not a substantive article but an interpretive guide
– Article 31(2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of
1969 states:
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes” and subsequent agreements of
the Parties to the treaty [Article 31(3)]
5. Original Preamble of the BTWC
• States Parties: “Determined to act with a view to
achieving effective progress towards general and
complete disarmament, … and convinced that the
prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons and their elimination, …
• …Determined for the sake of all mankind, to
exclude completely the possibility of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
being used as weapons,”
– Texts in Bold are essential elements of the
normative scope of the Convention.
6. BTWC Solemn Declaration in 2006
• States Parties solemnly declared that “terrorists
must be prevented from developing, producing,
stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining,
and using under any circumstances, biological
agents and toxins, equipment, or means of
delivery of agents or toxins, for nonpeaceful
purposes…”
• Normatively, the prohibition of biological and
toxin weapons are envisaged both over state and
non-state levels.
7. Ethical Responsibilities of Scientists
under the BTWC
• Ethical considerations of scientists can be
started by considering which aspects in
scientific and technological research and
practice can be potentially non-peaceful in
relation to:
– developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise
acquiring or retaining and using* biological agents
and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of
agents or toxins, under any circumstances.
8. Social Responsibilities of Non-Scientists
under the BTWC
• Ethical considerations of non-scientists can be
started by considering how risk-minimization
about the dual-use issues can be pursued in a
way not to harm the scientific freedom of
scientists.
• This consideration should be made in relation
to every aspects of measures to prevent and
respond to developing, producing, stockpiling,
or otherwise acquiring or retaining, and using
of knowledge and practice in life sciences.
9. Changing Norms into Practice (i)
International/Regime Level
• Substantial areas of the BTWC but difficult elements to be
strengthened
– Compliance; 1, Article I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII (See lecture 7 for the
role of each Article); 2, Confidence Building Measures; and 3,
Verification Protocol negotiation failed in 2001. （See lecture 8)
– Development; “economic and social development, particularly in
the developing countries” (BTWC Final Declaration 1980). It has
been less developed element under the BTWC.
– Research; Difficulty in development under the BTWC regime due
to: 1, difficulty to identify “real” intention of researcher; 2, Article
I does not prohibit “research”; 3, no other legal constrains to
prohibit research concerning BTW.
– Permanence; Prohibition enshrined in Article I is comprehensive
and unlimited duration of Article XIII is secured.
10. Changing Norms into Practice (ii)
State Level
• Nationalising the BTWC
– Article IV: National Implementation
• “Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with
its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to
prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the
Convention...“
– Difficulty of implementation
• Article IV itself neither instructs the specific implementation of
the Article, nor clarifies whether those measures require
legislations or not.
11. Changing Norms into Practice (iii)
State Level
• Guides/References for national legislation
– From the BTWC: Section of Article IV of the Final Declarations
at the Review Conferences are the useful references for realising
the scope of the Convention
– From States Parties: National legislations, which have been
already implemented by other States Parties, could be referred as
relevant models and States Parties agreed on the value of
international cooperation for this specific purpose at the BTWC
MSP2007
– From other sources: VERTIC: Collection of National
Implementation Legislation, BTWC Model Laws
12. Changing Norms into Practice (iv)
Individual Level
• Discussed topics during the Inter-Sessional Process (ISP)
2003-2005 and 2007-2010 included:
– Oversight of research; Codes of conduct; Awareness
raising and Education about the dual-use issues
– Active engagement of scientists to develop effective
culture in awareness raising is essential
– States Parties should facilitate scientists to have
initiatives to develop such culture, since they are the
forefront of cutting edge science
13. Changing Norms into Practice (v)
Individual Level
• Guides/references for codes of conduct
– Inter Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity
“This statement presents principles to guide individual scientists
and local scientific communities that may wish to define a code
of conduct for their own use”.
– Code of Conduct for Biosecurity by Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences
• “The rules laid down in the Biosecurity Code of Conduct call for
implementation and compliance at different levels. … Calls for
awareness, accountability and oversight are targeted mainly at
individuals: researchers, laboratory workers, managers and
others.”
14. Changing Norms into Practice (vi)
Individual Level
• Guides/references for awareness raising and
education
– Biosecurity Education Portal by Federation of
American Scientists mainly provides a set of
online educational modules developed by
different institutions
– Dual-Use Bioethics by Bradford Disarmament
Research Centre provides ‘modifiable’ online
educational module resources
15. Article I
• Firstly; Ethical responsibilities of life scientists can be
discharged by firstly, considering how their own
scientific research can be prevented from dual-use
concern in regard to each aspect of ‘develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire biological agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery for
non-peaceful purposes’.
• Secondly; considerations should be actively practiced
by promoting culture of prevention against the
misuse of science.
16. Article III
• The ethical responsibilities are also discharged
by considering how dual-use scientific
knowledge and technology can be utilized to
strengthen the effort “not to transfer
[prohibited material for prohibited activities in
Article I] to any recipient whatsoever, directly
or indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any State, group of
States or international organizations”.
17. Article X
• Ethical responsibilities can be discharged by
considering how best dual-use science and
technology can be peacefully exchanged with
a view to promoting global health and social
developments and securing dual-use risks.
• Ethics for security and ethics for development.
– For some states or individuals ‘security’ is the first
ethical priority and ‘development’ is for others.
Although both are indispensable and
interconnected,
18. Article XII
• No single ethics regarding dual-use issue
– However, only clear point is updated knowledge about
cutting edge research in life sciences at each time is the
most fundamental point to consider how responsibilities
of scientists can be ethically and effectively discharged.
– In this context, Article XII is significant, since it opens a
channel for States Parties to update their scientific
understandings. Article XII reads that Review Conference
“…shall take into account any new scientific and
technological developments relevant to the Convention.”
19. Scientific Background papers (i)
• Secretariat of the Review Conference compile
the updated scientific input by States Parties.
• Background papers review diverse scientific
advances and assess relevance of those in
relation to the scope of the BTWC.
• At the 6th Review Conference, alongside the
background paper by secretariat, some 10
individual papers contributed by States Parties.
20. Scientific Background papers (ii)
• Reviewing process of increasingly advancing
science only at five-yearly intervals can be
slow compared to rapidly advancing life
sciences, and successive input of the updating
effort by States Parties to the BTWC regime is
preferred. For this purpose, the engagement
of individual scientists to provide their
scientific knowledge to the BTWC regime is
significant.
Sample Questions
1. Discuss to what extent ethical responsibilities on dual-use
issues is required by to practice life sciences research.
2. Explain why non-scientists have ethical responsibilities to
consider dual-use risks in scientific research.
3. Evaluate the potential roles of scientists to strengthen the
BTWC to develop national legislation and to promote
awareness raising.
4. Consider at which educational level, awareness raising of life
scientists should be started to develop their dual-use ethics.
References
(Slide 2)
Krasner, S. D. (1982) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization, 36 (2),
185-206.
Rosenau, J. N., and Czempiel, E.-O. (1992) Governance without
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Cambridge University Press.
(Slide 4)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Reproduced in United Nations
Treaty Law Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331. Available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.
pdf
(Slide 5)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/
(Slide 6)
United Nations (2006) “Final Report” BWC/CONF.VI/6, December 8, 2006,
Geneva: United Nations. Available from
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(Slide 7)
United Nations (1996) Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9 Part II, December
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Robin M. Coupland, “Modelling Armed Violence: A Tool for Humanitarian
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(Slide 8)
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(Slide 9)
Sims, Nicholas (2001) The Evolution of Biological Disarmament (SIPRI
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(Slide 10)
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(Slide 11)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from
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VERTIC, (2003) VERTIC: Collection of National Implementation Legislation
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VERTIC (2009) A Sample Act for National Implementation of the1972
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(Slide 12)
United Nations (2005) “Report of the Meeting of States Parties”,
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(Slide 13)
InterAcademy Panel (2005) “Statement on Biosecurity”, Available from
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.interacademies.net/%3Fid%3
D5405&ei=mhSQSanrE4iyjAfTpazECg&sa=X&oi=spellmeleon_result&r
esnum=1&ct=result&cd=1&usg=AFQjCNEcqxKn3jeMvFsCzTMsEXAjjWzog
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (2008) A Code of
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(Slide 14)
Federation of American Scientists (2008) Biosecurity Education Portal
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(Slide 15)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
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(Slide 16)
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Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons
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(Slide 17)
Sims, N. (2001) The Evolution of Biological Disarmament (SIPRI Chemical &
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
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(Slide 18)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
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Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/
(Slide 19)
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