Transcript Document

1st International Pragmatics Conference of the Americas (AMPRA)
and the 5th International Conference on Intercultural Pragmatics,
19-21 October 2012, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Interactive Semantics and Pragmatic Compositionality
Kasia M. Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge
http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21
?
‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?
2
What is expressed in the lexicon in one language
may be expressed by grammar in another.
3
What is expressed in the lexicon in one language
may be expressed by grammar in another.
What is expressed overtly in one language may be
left to pragmatic inference or default
interpretation in another.
4
Swahili: consecutive tense marker ka
(1)
a. …wa-Ingereza wa-li-wa-chukua
3Pl-British
3Pl-Past-3Pl-take
‘…then the British took the corpses,
b. wa-ka-wa-tia
katika
3Pl-Cons-3Pl-put.on on
put them on a flat board,
wa-le
3Pl-Dem
bao
board
maiti,
corpses
moja,
one
c. wa-ka-ya-telemesha maji-ni
kwa
3Pl-Cons-3Pl-lower
water-Loc
with
and lowered them steadily into the water…’
utaratibu w-ote…
order
3Pl-all
adapted from Givón (2005: 154)
5
cf. rhetorical structure rules, Asher and Lascarides 2003
Narration:
(2)
Lidia played a sonata.
e1

The audience applauded.
e2
6
Central Pomo
Future can be realis or irrealis
7
Thai
(3)
f3on
rain
t1ok
fall
(3a) It is raining. (default meaning)
(3b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)
8
Minimalism/contextualism debate
‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like
the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an
algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have
claimed? Contextualism: Yes. Literalism: No. (…) Like Stanley and
the formal semanticists, I maintain that the semantic
interpretation is grammar-driven.’
Recanati (2012: 148)
9
 K.M. Jaszczolt, 2005, Default Semantics: Foundations of a
Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
 K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H.
Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 215-246.
 K. M. Jaszczolt, in progress, Interactive Semantics, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Assumptions
• The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning
underdetermined.
11
Assumptions
• The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning
underdetermined.
• The object of study of a theory of meaning is a pragmatically
modified representation. (Interactive Semantics is a radical
contextualist theory.)
12
Assumptions
• The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning
underdetermined.
• The object of study of a theory of meaning is a pragmatically
modified representation. (Interactive Semantics is a radical
contextualist theory.)
• There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.
13
(4)
A: Shall we meet tomorrow?
B: I’m in London.
(4a) B is in London at the time of speaking.
(4b) B will be in London the following day.
(4c) B can’t meet A the following day.
14
Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended
content through a proposition which is not syntactically
restricted.
Experimental evidence:
Pitts 2005
Schneider 2009
15
Merger Representation 
• Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.
16
Merger Representation 
• Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.
• The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge
and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.
17
Merger Representation 
• Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.
• The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge
and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The
syntactic constraint is abandoned.
• Merger representations have the status of mental
representations.
18
Merger Representation 
• Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.
• The outputs of sources of information about meaning
merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.
The syntactic constraint is abandoned.
• Merger representations have the status of mental
representations.
• They have a compositional structure.
19
Sources of information for 
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
world knowledge (WK)
word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
situation of discourse (SD)
properties of the human inferential system (IS)
stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)
20
(iv)
(5)
properties of the human inferential system IS
The author of The Catcher in the Rye still shocks the
readership.
(5a) J. D. Salinger still shocks the readership.
21
world knowledge (WK)
word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
merger representation Σ
situation of discourse (SD)
stereotypes and presumptions
about society and culture (SC)
properties of human inferential system (IS)
Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ
sources of information
types of processes
23
Mapping between sources and processes
WK
SC
WS
SD
IS





SCWD or CPI
SCWD or CPI
WS
(logical form)
CPI
CD
DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of 
with a subscript standing for the type of processing.
24
Primary meaning:
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure (WS)
merger representation Σ
social, cultural and
cognitive defaults (CD)
world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm)
conscious pragmatic inferencepm
(from situation of discourse, social and
cultural assumptions, and world
knowledge) (CPIpm)
Secondary meanings:
 Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm)
 conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)
Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised
version of Default Semantics
Compositionality of Primary Meanings
• DS, IS: compositionality of utterance meaning rather than
sentence meaning.
Fodor (2008) compositionality of Mentalese only?
26
Compositionality is a methodological principle:
‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply
adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless
that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)
27
Compositionality should be an empirical assumption about
the nature of possible human languages.
Szabó (2000)
28
Two examples of applications
Example 1
Representing Time: Pragmatic Compositionality
31
Jaszczolt, K. M. in press. ‘Temporality and epistemic
commitment: An unresolved question’, in: K. Jaszczolt & L. de
Saussure (eds). Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford:
Oxford University Press (vol. 1 of Oxford Studies of Time in
Language and Thought)
Main questions
 Is the human concept of time a universal concept?
Probably yes
 Is it primitive or composed of simpler concepts?
Supervenient on properties of modality
 How do linguistic expressions of time reflect it?
Representations in Default Semantics/Interactive
Semantics
33
Time as Modality: Supervenience
(i)
supervenience of the concept of time on the concept of
epistemic detachment (temporal properties on modal
properties in semantics)
(ii)
supervenience of the concept of time on space-time
(properties of the concept of time on properties of spacetime).
(i) + (ii): It is not just the construal of reality that requires
modality; it is reality itself.
34
Supervenience
A set of properties T supervenes on a set of properties M iff
no two things can differ with respect to T properties without
also differing with respect to M properties.
‘There cannot be a T-difference without an M-difference.’
adapted from McLaughlin & Bennett 2005
35
Merger Representations for the Past
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Lidia went to a concert yesterday.
(regular past)
This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a
concert, meets her school friend and tells her…
(past of narration)
Lidia would have gone to a concert (then).
(epistemic necessity past)
Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday).
(epistemic necessity past)
Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday).
(epistemic possibility past)
Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday).
(epistemic possibility past)
36
Fig. 3: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions
with past-time reference
rp, pn
1
enp
epp
0
Acc ├ p
‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’
Grice (2001)
38
ACCΔ ├ Σ
‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’
39
amended and extended language of DRSs (Kamp and Reyle 1993)
40
Fig. 4: Σ for ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past)
x t Σ'
Σ
[Lidia]CD (x)
yesterday (t)
[ACCrp ├ Σ']WS
Σ'
[x go to a concert]WS
Past-time reference in Thai (pragmatic)
(12)
m3ae:r3i:I
Mary
kh2ian
write
n3iy3ai:
novel
42
Fig. 5:
 for example (12) ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past)
x y '

[m3ae:r3i:I]CD (x)
[n3iy3ai:]CD (y)
'
[x kh2ian y]WS
[ACCrp ├ ']WS, CPIpm
43
Capturing cross-linguistic differences
Realis/irrealis future (Central Pomo):
ACCΔ ├ Σ
Consecutive tense (Swahili):
WS + CPIpm
44
Mapping Question
qualitative differences between P, N, F
quantitative modal differences( in ACC)
45
quantitative concept (ACC  )
qualitative concepts (P, N, F)
(i) correlation
or
(ii) P, N, F as quantitative concepts
46
Two possible solutions:
Direct-Quantitative (DQ) & Modal-Contextualist (MC)
47
Example 2
First-person reference in discourse
De se
 Grammar/pragmatics interface in conveying the intended de
se meaning
 Representing de se reports in Default/Interactive Semantics
49
The scenario:
(13) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.
(14)
I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge.
after Perry (1979: 3)
50
referential semantics conflates (13) with (14):
(13) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.
(14) I am to blame.
x [to-blame(x)] (kasia jaszczolt)
51
? Grammar
produces the self-referring function
Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is
‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (nonpronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically
present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is
systematically and unambiguously associated with the
interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and
gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of longdistance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.
52
? Grammar
produces the self-referring function
Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is
‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (nonpronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically
present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is
systematically and unambiguously associated with the
interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and
gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of longdistance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.
53
The cognitive access to the self is present in
the semantics (in some form or other).
54
An argument from non-pronominal expressions
(but not the one you expect)
x Pace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so
‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of nonpronominal expressions:
(16) Sammy wants a biscuit.
(17) Mummy will be with you in a moment.
55
Honorifics:
 Japanese and Thai: the first-person marker has the characteristics
of both a pronoun and a noun. Pronouns and nouns are not
morphologically different: like nouns, pronouns do not form a
closed class; like nouns, they form the plural by adding a plural
morpheme;
 also e.g. Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese.
Typically: ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s
servant’ are used for self-reference with self-denigration;
 Thai: 27 forms of first person (cf. ‘mouse’) (Siewierska 2004: 228);
Siewierska (2004) and Heine and Song (2011)
56
Conflation of the nominal with the pronominal:
 Acoma (New Mexico), Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns;
 Generic one and arbitrary PRO:
(18) One can hear the wolves from the veranda.
(19) It is scary PRO to hear the wolves from the veranda.
Generic one and arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO express
‘generalizing detached self-reference.’ Moltmann (2010: 440)
57
 Counterfactuals:
‘if I were you’ conveys second-person oriented advice:
(Moltmann 2010: 453)
(20)
If I were you I would wait a couple of days before
issuing a complaint.
cf.
(21)
Wait a couple of days before issuing a complaint.
58
Spatial deixis:
 Thai phŏm1 nii2 ( ‘one male this’);
 Japanese kotira, Korean yeogi, and Vietnamese hây (‘here’)
used for self-reference;
59
Degrees of cognitive access to oneself:
(22) I think I put this book back on the shelf.
(23) I think I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.
(24) I put this book back on the shelf.
(25) I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

Conscious awareness is present to different degrees rather than as a
binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.
60
An argument from conceptual shift
(26)
‘It1+t2 believe I should have prepared the drinks party. In a
way It1 also believed that It1+t2 should have done it when
It1 walked into the room. The fact is, the person
appointed by the Faculty Board should have done it and
as It1 later realised It1+t2 was this person.’
61
Wiemt1+t2,
know1SgPres
że
that
przygotować
prepareInf
te
drinki.
thisAccPl drinkPlMAcc
wtedy
then
też
also
wiedziałamt1,
know1SgFPast
ponieważ
because
miała
be-toSgFPast
przygotować
prepareInf
osoba
personSgFNom
wybranaprzez
selected by
Radę
Wydziału,
BoardSgFAcc FacultySgMGen
a
and
jat1+t2
INom
to
Dem
to
Dem
jat1+t2
INom
powinnam byłat1+t2
should1SgFPast
W pewnym
sensie,
In certainSgMInstr senseSgMInstr
byłam
tą
beSgFPast DemSgFInstr
je
theyNMAcc
osobą.
personSgFInstr
62
An argument from 1st person pronoun
Kratzer (2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a
referential and a bound-variable interpretation
(27) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.
(28) Only I admitted what I did wrong.
(29) Only you can eat what you cook.
63
Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted,
and differ from language to language.
Tylko ja
jeden
only 1Sg soleSgMNom
Tylko ja jedna
przyznałem
się do błędu.
admit1SgPastM
Refl to mistakeSgMGen
tutaj
Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here
swoimi
ReflPronPl Instr
potrafię
zajmować
się
can1SgPres
careInf
Refl
dziećmi.
childPl Instr
64
Kratzer:

bound variable pronouns are underlyingly referential pronouns
whose meaning can be accounted for through context-shifting.
or:

they are unspecified and obtain the meaning through feature
transmission from their binders in functional heads.
65
 Grammatical foundation of self-reference cannot be excluded.
66
An argument from PRO (but not the one you expect)
(31) Lidia wants to be a scientist.
no underlying ‘I’-reference ‘I want to be a scientist.’
67
(32) Alice wants what Lidia wants.
underlying ‘I’-reference (self-attribution of property)
But:
(33) Lidia’s mother wants what Lidia wants and that’s why she is buying
her lots of scientific books.
no underlying ‘I’-reference ( propositionalism)
68
Summary so far
 Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself defies any attempt
to fit it squarely into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic
device.
69
Summary so far
 Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself defies any attempt
to fit it squarely into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic
device.
 Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the firstperson singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that
specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can
adopt the function of reference de se.
70
Summary so far
 Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself defies any attempt
to fit it squarely into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic
device.
 Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the firstperson singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that
specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can
adopt the function of reference de se.
 This suggests that formal semantics that relies on the rigid distinction
between an indexical and non-indexical expression (Kaplan 1989) needs
‘pragmaticising’ .
(Jaszczolt 2012a, b; in press a, b)
71
Interim conclusion:
The cognitive access to oneself is
?‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-
pronominal) referential expressions’;
?‘systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns’;
x ‘systematically and unambiguously associated with the
interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and
gerunds’;
 ‘associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives
(at least in some languages)’.
72
 lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs
73
Reports de se/de re about oneself
(34)
Kasia believes that she is to blame.
quasi-indexical
74
Default De Se
Maier’s (2009) default de se:
(i) syntactic processing results in a de dicto reading;
(ii) presuppositions added (‘equality first’), coreference is
established as a default link;
(iii) if  recognize (x,x), then no coreference and search
continues.
 Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, forthcoming a, b)
75
A disclaimer: non-coreferential readings
Kasiax believes that shex is to blame.
a strong tendency for coreference, van der Sandt’s (1992)
(presupposition as anaphora)
grammar delivers contextualist default contents
76
Towards a (pragmatic) solution
•
•
•
•
self-ascription (linguistic semantic)
self-reference (linguistic pragmatic)
self-attribution (epistemic)
self-awareness (cognitive)
77
?Grammar conveys self-awareness
Allocation of self-awareness to grammar is a matter of an
agreement as to what we want the grammar to do: capture
strong tendencies or capture patterns that underdetermine
meaning.
 minimalist or contextualist account
78
 Proposal: We should not ‘split’ the power of grammar into
that pertaining to the system and that pertaining to how
grammar functions in utterance processing.
 De se belief ascription provides strong support for a
contextualist, but grammar-triggered construal
79
De Se in Default Semantics
Jaszczolt, forthcoming a, b
Bel (x,’)
the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an
embedded representation ’
80
(i) CD  default status of de re
(ii) coreference x=y
(iii)
 de se (= from CD, WS)
81
?/In a sense, I believed I
t1
t1+t2 was to blame. It1 just didn’t
know that the person It1 referred to was It1+t2.
82
Merger representation:
• coreference: condition [y=x]WS
• the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and
y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator
(CPI)
83
‘I believed, in a sense, I was to blame.’ (marked reading)
x y ’
[Kasia]CD (x)
[Kasia]CPI (y)

[y=x]WS
[[x]CD [believe]CPI’]WS
’:
[[y]CPI isto blame]WS
84
‘Kasia believes she is to blame.’ (default reading)
x y ’
[Kasia]CD (x)
[Kasia]CD (y)

[y=x]WS,CD
[[x]CD [believes]CD’]WS
’:
[[y]CD is to blame]WS
85
Conclusions
 Merger representations of Interactive Semantics can
represent lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs in
expressing different concepts (e.g. temporal reference,
reference to objects) in discourse.
 Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic
compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS.
 Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time can be
explained by a universal semantics of temporality in terms of
the underlying concept of epistemic modality ACCΔ ├ Σ .
86
Conclusions
 There is substantial cross-linguistic evidence that there is no
reliable representation of self-awareness in the grammar or
the lexicon. Instead, there is a lexicon/grammar/pragmatics
trade-off, allowing for various degrees of salience of
communicating cognitive access to oneself.
 Self-awareness can be construed as conveyed by the grammar
only when grammar is allowed to produce cancellable
interpretations. This is best achieved on a contextualist
account such as Default/Interactive Semantics.
 When compositionality is shifted to the level of the merger of
information (), as in DS/IS, the differences between syntactic
and pragmatic solutions to de se are rendered unimportant. 87
‘Holistic guesswork’?
‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like
the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an
algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have
claimed?’
Recanati (2012: 148)
88
radical contextualism
 holistic (interactive semantics)
 compositional (pragmatic compositionality)
 ?algorithmic (merger representation)
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