Transcript Document

Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
(1779)
Three preliminary questions:
What is meant by "natural religion"? "Natural" as opposed to
what?
How did Hume respond to criticisms of this book?
Who speaks for Hume in the Dialogues? Why is this question
important?
The Prologue:
The main subject of discussion will be the nature
and attributes of the Deity, not Its/His existence (p.
2)
Why? Can the one really be discussed
without the other?
Philosophical Skepticism
(Dialogues Part I)
Part I: A discussion of the competency of
human reason to settle the great questions
of natural theology.
The Dialogues begin precisely where the Enquiry ends: with
a discussion of skepticism.
Why might it be important to address the issue of skepticism
right at the beginning of an inquiry into the philosophical
credentials of natural theology?
Philo's Skeptical Position: "When the
coherence of the parts of a stone, or even that
composition of parts which renders it extended
... are so inexplicable ... "with what assurance
can we decide concerning the origin of worlds
or trace their history from eternity to eternity?"
(pp. 4-5)
In other words, if we can't even understand rocks (with which we
have plenty of experience), how can we possibly understand the origin
of the world, with which we have no experience? Human reason is
too weak for such inquiries.
Cleanthes' "Arguments" Against (Total)
Skepticism (pp. 5-6):
Skeptics are insincere (they always leave by the door rather
than the window).
It is impossible to adhere to skeptical principles for more
than a few moments.
In short, skepticism is an unlivable philosophy.
Philo's Responses:
Right. Each of us lies under an "absolute necessity" of acting.
Nonetheless, skepticism still has beneficial practical effects on thought and
action.
Speculations about matters beyond our common experience are special: In
theological matters we are "like foreigners in a strange country to whom
everything must seem suspicious" (p. 7).
Cleanthes' Response:
The skeptic is inconsistent in believing claims in
natural philosophy (e.g., Newton's explanation of the
rainbow, Copernicus' theory, etc.), but in rejecting
theological claims as beyond human experience.
Scientific and religious beliefs are on a par. The sort
of reasoning that works in the former case works in
the latter as well.
Cleanthes' Argument Against Skepticism:
P1: Even the skeptic, if he is to be taken seriously, has to be consistent.
P2: The skeptic rejects the possibility of natural theological knowledge.
P3: The skeptic uncritically accepts natural philosophical knowledge.
P4: There is no significant difference between the two kinds of knowledge.
C: The skeptic is inconsistent, and should not be taken seriously.
Question: What part (premise or reasoning) of this argument could the
skeptic dispute?
The Design Argument (Dialogues Part II)
Preliminaries: Demea's mysticism and Philo's a priori
argument, with cautions.
Demea's mysticism: God surely exists, but given the
infirmities of human understanding, the nature of God is
"altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us" (p. 13).
But if so, then what is the "content" of the claim that "God
exists"?
Philo's a priori argument, with cautions:
"[T]he question can never be concerning the being but only the nature of the
Deity. The former truth ... is questionable and self-evident. Nothing exists
without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call
God, and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection" (p. 14).
BUT, "as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we
comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections
have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature" (p. 14).
P1: "Our ideas reach no farther than our experience.“
P2: We have no experience of divine attributes and operations.“
C: Ergo:
Cleanthes' Riposte:
"Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You
will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite
number of lessr machines.... Since therefore the effects resemble each
other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also
resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind
of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the
grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence
of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence" (p. 15).
Cleanthes' A Posteriori Argument:
P1: The world is one great machine, composed of lesser machines.
P2: The world and its parts resemble productions of human contrivance.
P3: The "rules of analogy" instruct us that similar effects bespeak similar
causes.
C: Therefore, the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man,
though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the
work which he has executed.
Philo's Concise Version of the A Posteriori
Argument (p. 18):
P1: "From similar effects we infer similar causes."
P2: "The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a
machine of human contrivance."
C: "The causes, therefore, must be resembling."
The Basic Structure of Cleanthes’ Argument:
Human Minds ------> Human Contrivances
|
similar to
|
Author of Nature <------------- Nature
Philo's Principle:
"[W]henever you depart, in the least, from the similarity
of cases, you diminish proportionately the evidence; and
may at least bring it to a very weak analogy, which is
confessedly liable to error and uncertainty" (p. 16).
For Example:
Semi-plausible:
Circulation of Blood in Humans --------> Structure of
Human Bodies
|
similar to
|
Circulation of Blood
Structure of Non-Human
in Non-Human Animals <------------------ Animal Bodies
Less plausible:
Circulation of Blood in Animals --------> Structure of Animal Bodies
|
similar to
|
Circulation of Sap in Trees <------------- Structure of Plants
Plausible?:
Human Architect ------> House
|
similar to(?)
|
Divine Architect <------ Universe
Philo's Counter-Argument:
P1: "Experience alone can point out ... the true cause of any phenomenon"
(p. 17).
P2: We have no experience of world making (p. 22).
C: Therefore, we cannot reason to the true cause of the world.
Cleanthes' Rebuttal (Dialogues Part III)
Cleanthes' "Vegetating Library Argument":
P1: Books bear the undeniable mark of intelligent design.
P2: Natural objects (e.g., living things) bear even stronger marks of intelligent
design than books.
P3: If it must be admitted that books are the product of design, the same must
be admitted for natural objects.
P4: It must be admitted that books are the products of design.
C: Therefore, it must be admitted that natural objects are the products of
thought and design.
How does this "rebuttal" avoid simply begging the question?
How does Demea respond to Cleanthes' arguments?