Transcript Document

Class #2
Scientific Materials and
Information: Openness,
Security, and Controls
Policy Background and Post 9/11 Issues
C. M. Vest
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Federal R&D Budget:
The Impact of 9/11
This budget totaled
$0.6 billion in FY 01.
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Control of Dangerous
Materials
• “Select Agents” Regulations
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Control of Scientific Information
• What legislation has said about
universities and areas of study
• Contrasting nuclear weapons and
biological weapons / bioterrorism
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Control by the Federal
Government
• Security and classification
– Developed through the nuclear and other
weapons programs
– Based on “need to know”
• SECRET /TOP SECRET (Q) / SPECIAL
COMPARTMENTED
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Control by the Federal
Government
• Sensitive but Unclassified
• Export Controls
– NSDD 189
– “Deemed exports”
• Clauses conflicting with campus policies
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Science and Secrecy:
The Origins of NSDD 189
The National Academies Science, Technology,
and Law Panel
March 18, 2005
John C. Crowley
Vice President for Federal Relations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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My Assignment
• Trace the origins of National Security
Decision Directive 189 (NSDD 189).
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Preface: Pre-911 Tensions
Between Science and Security
• A long history.
• Rooted deeply in the governmentuniversity research enterprise.
• In 1947, shortly after World War II, the
President’s Scientific Research Board
report on Science and Public Policy
addressed them as follows:
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“Strict military security in the narrow sense is not
entirely consistent with the broader requirements of
national security. To be secure as a Nation we must
maintain a climate conducive to the full flowering of
free inquiry. However important secrecy about
military weapons may be, the fundamental
discoveries of researchers must circulate freely to
have full beneficial effect. Security regulations,
therefore should be applied only when strictly
necessary and then limited to specific instruments,
machines or processes. They should not attempt to
cover basic principles of fundamental knowledge.”
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August 1949: E. O. 9835 &
The AAAS Special Committee
on Civil Liberties for Scientists
• Executive Order No. 9835 -- The Loyalty Order - no
person shall be employed in a federal post if he is
believed to be disloyal to the government of the United
States.
• The E.O. goal: “complete and unswerving loyalty to the
United States” of all in its service.
• AAAS Committee urged a focus on behavior not
beliefs.
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The AAAS Committee Quoted
Judge Cardozo
“Experimentation there may be in many
things of deep concern, but not in
setting boundaries to thought, for
thought freely communicated is the
indispensable condition of intelligent
experimentation, the one test of its
validity.”
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The AAAS Committee Also
Quoted President Truman
“Continuous research by our best
scientists is the key to American
leadership and true national security.
This work may be made impossible by
the creation of an atmosphere in which
no man feels safe against the public
airing of unfounded rumors, gossip and
vilification.”
August 19, 1949
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The 1950’s Brought
The Cold War, And With It…
• The House UnAmerican Activities
Committee
• The McCarthy era
• “Duck and Cover” drills in schools.
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Then, After Thirty Years Of…
• The Korean War
• The Space Race
• Viet Nam
Came….
The Fears of the 1980s
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Openness =
Vulnerability to Soviet Threat
• The U.S. - Soviet relationship deteriorated to the
levels of the Cold War of the 1950s.
• U. S. Fears:- Loss of militarily significant technology and superiority;
- Loss of technological leadership and know-how;
- Loss of industrial competitiveness.
• Universities were seen as targets of foreign
intelligence gathering, as points of “leakage” and
“hemorrhage” of technology, even as the Nation’s soft
underbelly.
• Classified intelligence findings were invoked.
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The Times Led The National
Academies To Suspend BiLateral Exchanges
In Response, Professors Weisskopf and Wilson wrote:
“The only appropriate way for the scientific community to
deal with any kind of problem, scientific or human, is
through reason and discussion…If we cannot learn how to
rationalize our differences, how to resolve them by
argument rather than by threats and by cutting off
relations, then we are really lost.” Weisskopf and Wilson, Science, 5-301980
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Election of 1980: New Policy
Leaders & DOD-University Forum
• April 3, 2001, HASC Hearing on DOD and the
universities.
• Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, newly appointed Under
Secretary, R&E, attended simply to listen.
• HASC Requested a new DSB Report: University
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements.
• Dr. DeLauer also asked AAU for a report.
• The AAU report was completed in November 1981; The
DSB report was released in January, 1982.
• Each report recommended a mechanism for dialogue
between DOD and universities be established.
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DOD-University Forum
• Co-chairs:
- Under Secretary DeLauer
- Dr. Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University
• Members:
- 7 university presidents
- 6 senior DOD officials and 3 DSB Members
- Staff: USDRE, AAU (on behalf of AAU, ACE, NASULGC)
• Dr. DeLauer established 3 working groups:
- Foreign languages and area studies
- Science and engineering education
- Technology Export Controls, David A. Wilson, U. Ca. Co-chair
• The Forum Met in May, 1982; working groups in the Fall.
• A 2-year FACA charter took effect on 12-15-83.
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“The Government, Secrecy,
and University Research”
D. Kennedy, Science, 4-23-1982
•
•
•
•
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Promising signs of change.
Apply visa controls.
Classify the technology.
Enable universities to decide in advance.
New burdensome regulations will cost
the nation more than it can be worth.
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Contemporary Incidents
• April, 1982, E.O. 12356, broadened authority to
classify information; however, it included this:
- “Basic scientific research information not clearly
related to national security may not be classified.”
- The meaning of this statement was widely debated.
• August, 1982, “Raid at San Diego”: The first 2 papers
were withdrawn from 26th annual Society for PhotoOptical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) conference;
in all, more than 100 papers were withdrawn at
government request.
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Also in the Spring of 1982,
The NAS and NRC Established The
Corson Panel
• Mandate:
- Examine evidence of technology leakage and
methods of controlling it;
- Seek policy measures by which competing
national goals of defense and intellectual
freedom could be accommodated satisfactorily.
• Dr. Dale Corson chaired a distinguished group.
• The Panel reviewed classified information.
• They worked fast.
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Corson Panel Report:
“Scientific Communication and National
Security”, 9-30-1982
• Primary Conclusions:
– “Security by Secrecy” will weaken U.S. technological
capabilities.
– There is no practical way to restrict international
scientific communication without also disrupting
domestic scientific communication.
– Build “high walls around narrow areas” in pursuit of
“security by accomplishment”.
– Identify and devise controls only for “Gray Areas”
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Gray Areas: Four Criteria
The Panel recommends that no restriction of any kind limiting access or communication
should be applied to any area of university research, be it basic or applied, unless it
involves a technology meeting all the following criteria:
- The technology is developing rapidly, and the time from basic science to application is
short;
- The technology has identifiable direct military applications; or it is dual-use and
involves process or production-related techniques;
- Transfer of the technology would give the U.S.S.R. a significant near-term military
benefit; and
- The U.S. is the only source of information about the technology, or other friendly
nations that could also be the source have control systems as secure as ours.
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Meanwhile, The DODUniversity Forum Quietly
Pressed Ahead
• From 1982 to 1984 the Working Group on Technology Export
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•
•
•
•
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Controls tried to define and then implement a category “unclassified
but sensitive”; i.e.., Corson Panel gray areas.
On April 17, 1984 the effort was abandoned in favor of two
categories: “classified” or “unclassified”.
We must “run faster” than our competition and adversaries.
May 24, 1984: DOD announced a draft national policy agreed to by
DOD and OSTP.
Further dialogue produced changes agreed to on 9-14-84.
October 1, 1984: Dr. DeLauer issued a memorandum to the
Services and DARPA - it was the basis for NSDD 189.
Forum’s report sought a “new era of closer cooperation”.
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“Scientific Communications and
National Security” R. DeLauer
• Must distinguish science from technology; technology
from know-how.
• Nature yields her secrets to anyone.
• Ideas cannot be stopped at national borders.
• Benefits of open publication far outweigh the risks.
• “Ultimately the relationships among academia,
government and industry will depend on the trust and
understanding among the people who work together
and depend on one another.” Science, 10-5-84
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NSDD 189: September 21,
1985
“It is the policy of this Administration that, to
the maximum extent possible, the
products of fundamental research remain
unrestricted. …that where the national
security requires control, the mechanism
for control of information generated
during federally-funded fundamental
research in science, technology, and
engineering at colleges, universities and
laboratories is classification.
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NSDD 189, con’t
Each federal government agency is
responsible for: a) determining whether
classification is appropriate prior to the
award of a research grant, contract, or
cooperative agreement and, if so,
controlling the research results through
standard classification procedures; b)
periodically reviewing all research grants,
contracts, or cooperative agreements for
potential classification.
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NSDD 189 con’t
No restrictions may be placed upon the
conduct or reporting of federally-funded
fundamental research that has not
received national security classification,
except as provided in applicable U.S.
Statutes.”
Ronald Reagan, September 21, 1985
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Two Questions
• Why did the President sign NSDD 189?
– Dr. John McTague’s leadership was essential.
– David Packard’s timely personal recommendation in support
of OSTP in the Oval Office.
• Why was the final clause added?
– It was the compromise necessary to achieve coordination
and approval of it.
– It also, however, planted the seeds of continuing debate and
controversy, especially after 911.
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Also in 1985
• Dr. DeLauer retired.
• His personal leadership and collaborative
vision, and, quickly afterward, the DODUniversity Forum, all came to an end.
• NSDD 189, however, has remained on the
books- at least in spirit - for twenty years.
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After 911, Dr. Rice’s Letter in
Reply to Dr. Brown and CSIS
• “In the context of broad-based review of our technology
transfer controls that will begin this year, this
Administration will review and update as appropriate
the export control policies that affect basic research in
the United States. In the interim, the policy on the
transfer of scientific, technical and engineering
information set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in
effect, and we will ensure that this policy is followed.”
(November 1, 2001)
• Dr. John Marburger reaffirmed this at NAS, AAAS.
• Energy Secretary Abraham recommended NSDD-189
be re-issued. (May 12, 2003)
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Question: Now, Three years later,
How Deeply Different Is Today’s
Post-911 Environment?
• Changes seen since 1985:
– Globalization of science and knowledge
– Emergence of bio-warfare threats
– Shorten time frames between discovery and
application
– Instantaneous web-based global communications
– Objectives and motivations of adversaries
• Some knowledge will always pose dangers.
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Back to October 13, 2005
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Control by the Scientific
Community
• Precedent: Atomic scientists in the
1940s
• The Fink report
• Life Science Journal Editors
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Discussion Questions
• Does the approach of the last few
decades seem appropriate in 2005?
– Do universities have an obligation to take
new positions regarding classified research
after 9/11?
– How do you think about risk and benefit in
this context?
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Discussion Questions
• What would you do as a policy maker or
legislator?
• What do you think of “self policing” of
scientific journals?
• Should such self policing be unique to
the life sciences, or are there other
subjects to which you would extend it?
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