Transcript Introduction - Pete Mandik

W&O: §§ 4-6
Pete Mandik
Chairman, Department of Philosophy
Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory
William Paterson University, New Jersey USA
§ 4. Ways of Learning Words
“…even the sophisticated learning of a new
word is commonly a matter of learning it in
context--hence learning, by example and
analogy, the usage of sentences in which
the word can occur. It therefore remained
appropriate, throughout § 3 and not just at
the beginning of it, to treat sentences and
not words as the wholes whose use is
learned--though never denying that the
learning of these wholes proceeds largely
by an abstracting and assembling of parts.”
p. 13
2
“The learning of words…partakes of a
contrast correlative to that between
learning sentences as wholes and
building them of parts. In the case of
words it is a contrast between
learning a word in isolation--i.e., in
effect, as a one-word sentence--and
learning it contextually, or by
abstraction, as a fragment of
sentences learned as wholes.” p.14
3
“Some, certainly, e.g. ‘sake’, will be learned
only contextually. The same would seem to
be plausible for terms like ‘molecule’,
which, unlike ‘red’, ‘square’, and ‘tile’, do
not refer to things that can be distinctively
pointed out. Such terms, can, however, be
inculcated also by yet a third method:
description of the intended objects. This
method could be grouped under the head
of the contextual, but it deserves separate
notice.” p.14
4
“What makes insensible things intelligibly
describable is analogy, notably the special
form of analogy known as extrapolation.
Thus consider molecules, which are
described as smaller than anything seen.
This term ‘smaller’ is initially meaningful to
us through some manner of association
with such observable contrasts as that of a
bee to a bird, an gnat to a bee, or a mote
of dust to a gnat.” p. 14
5
“This analogy is of course very
limited….One must see the molecular
doctrine at work in physical theory to
get a proper notion of molecules.” p.
15
6
“One tends to imagine that when someone
propounds a theory concerning some sort
of objects, our understanding of what he is
saying will have two phases: first we must
understand what the objects are, and
second we must understand what the
theory says about them. ….[Sometimes]
there is virtually no significant separation;
our coming to understand what the objects
are is for the most part just our mastery of
what the theory says about them. We do
not learn first what to talk about and then
what to say about it.” p. 16
7
“Picture two physicists discussing whether
neutrinos have mass. Are they discussing
the same objects? They agree that the
physical theory which they initially share,
the pre-neutrino theory, needs emendation
in the light of an experimental result now
confronting them….To discern two phases
here, the first an agreement as to what the
objects are (viz. Neurtrinos) and the
second a disagreement as to how they are
(massless or massive), is absurd.” p. 16
8
“’Centaur’, though true of nothing, will
commonly be learned by description of its
purported objects. Also of course it could
be learned contextually. ‘Sake’ can be
learned only contextually. ‘Tile’, which does
refer to objects, may be learned either in
isolation as a one-word sentence, or
contextually, or by description. ‘Molecule’,
which also (let us grant) refers to objects,
will be learned both contextually and by
description. Similarly for ‘photon’ and
‘neutrino’….
9
Summarizing § 4
There are three ways of learning a
new word: (1) in isolation as a
one-word sentence, (2)
contextually as a part of a
sentence, and (3) by description
of the intended objects to which
the word refers. Every word may
be learned in at least one of
these ways, but not every word
may be learned in all three ways.
10
§ 5. Evidence
“…words mean only as their use in sentences
is conditioned to sensory stimuli, verbal
and otherwise. The pattern of conditioning
is complex and inconstant from person to
person, but there are points of general
congruence: combinations of questions and
non-verbal stimulations which are pretty
sure to elicit an affirmative answer from
anyone fit to be numbered within the
relevant speech community. Any realistic
theory of evidence must be inseparable
from the psychology of stimulus and
response, applied to sentences.” p. 17
11
“Calling a stone a stone at close quarters is an
extreme case. Evidence is deliberately marshaled
only when there is more nearly an equilibrium
between the sensory conditioning of an affirmative
response and the contrary conditioning, mediated
by the interanimation of sentences. Thus the
question under deliberation may be whether
something glimpsed from a moving car was a stone.
That it was a stone, and that it was a crumpled
paper, are two ready responses; and the tendency
to the former is inhibited by the tendency to the
latter, via sentential interconnections at the level of
common-sense physical theory. Then one ‘checks,’
or seeks overwhelming evidence, by returning to
the spot to the best of his judgment and so putting
himself in the way of stimulations more firmly and
directly associated with the attribution of stonehood
or paperhood.” pp. 17-18
12
“Prediction is in effect the conjectural
anticipation of further sensory evidence for
a foregone conclusion. When a prediction
comes out wrong, what we have is a
divergent and troublesome sensory
stimulation that tends to inhibit that once
foregone conclusion, and so to extinguish
the sentence-to-sentence conditionings
that led to the prediction. Thus it is that
theories wither when their predictions fail.”
P. 18
13
“The sifting of evidence would seem from
recent remarks to be a strangely passive
affair, apart from the effort to intercept
helpful stimuli: we just try to be as
sensitively responsive as possible to the
ensuing interplay of chain stimulations.
What conscious policy does one follow,
then, when not simply passive toward this
interanimation of sentences? Consciously
the quest seems to be for the simplest
story.” p. 19
14
“Simplicity is not a desideratum on a
par with conformity to observation.
Observation serves to test
hypotheses after adoption; simplicity
prompts their adoption for testing.
Still, decisive observation is
commonly long delayed or
impossible; and, insofar at least,
simplicity is final arbiter.” p. 20
15
Summarizing § 5
Evidence is best understood as relating
sentences (interanimated by other
sentences) to sensory stimuli.
Likewise for notions related to
evidence such as those of predictions,
the testing of hypotheses, and
theories. In deciding how best to
organize our interanimated sentences
with respect to sensory stimuli, our
main guiding consideration is one of
simplicity.
16
§ 6. Posits and truth
A physicist is not interested solely in
systemizing general truths said in
common-sense terms about ordinary
physical objects. He supplements his
theory with reference to
extraordinary physical things such as
molecules and the resultant theory
including the extraordinary objects is
simpler than the theory that would
exclude them. (p. 21)
17
Quine’s Underdetermination
Thesis
Theory is undertermined by data.
An imagined completed theory of ordinary
physical objects would not entail a unique
theory of extraordinary physical objects:
the extraordinary is underdetermined by
the ordinary. And both kinds of physical
objects are underdetermined by the
totality of nerve hits undergone by human
observers. We may have all available
evidence and still no unique theory of
physical objects would be entailed. Pp. 2122
18
Posits
“Considered relative to our surface irritations,
which exhaust our clues to an external
world, the molecules and their
extraordinary ilk are thus much on par with
the most ordinary physical objects. The
positing of those extraordinary things is
just a vivid analogue of the positing or
acknowledging of ordinary things: vivid in
that the physicist audibly posits them for
recognized reasons, whereas the
hypothesis of ordinary things is shrouded
in prehistory.” p. 22
19
Posits continued
“To call a posit a posit is not to
patronize it….Nor let us look down on
the standpoint of the theory as
make-believe; for we can never do
better than occupy the standpoint of
some theory or other, the best we
can muster at the time.” p. 22
20
Truth
“What reality is like is the business of
scientists, in the broadest sense,
painstakingly to surmise; and what
there is, what is real, is part of that
question.” p.22
21
Against the pragmatic
theory of truth
“Peirce was tempted to define truth outright
in terms of scientific method, as the ideal
theory which is approached as a limit when
the (supposed) cannons of scientific
method are used unceasingly on continuing
experience. But there is a lot wrong with
Peirce’s notion, besides its assumption of a
final organon of scientific method and its
appeal to an infinite process….[A]s urged
two pages back, we have no reason to
suppose that man’s surface irritations even
unto eternity admit of any one
sytsematization that is scientifically better
or simpler than all possible others.” p. 23
22
Against the pragmatic
theory of truth continued
Even if there were such a unique
theory “we should not thereby have
defined truth for actual single
sentences….Unless pretty firmly and
directly conditioned to sensory
stimulation, a sentence…is
meaningless except relative to its
own theory….” pp. 23-24
23
Quine’s disquotational
theory of truth
“It is …[only?] when we turn back into
the midst of an actually present
theory…that we can and do speak
sensibly of this and that sentence as
true….To say that the statement
‘Brutus killed Caesar’ is true, or that
“The atomic weight of sodium is 23’
is true, is in effect simply to say that
Brutus killed Caesar, or that the
atomic weight of sodium is 23.” p. 24
24
Against relativism
“Have we now so far lowered our sights as to
settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth-rating the statements of each theory as
true for that theory, and brooking no
higher criticism? Not so….Within our own
total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth
as earnestly and absolutely as can be;
subject to correction, but that goes without
saying.” pp. 24-25
Against relativism then, we do not have
to honor any theory other than our
own as containing true sentences.
25
Summarizing § 6.
Theory is underdetermined by data. We
have no access to what exists or what
is true independent of theory, so what
there is and what is true are likewise
undetermined. Everything is a posit of
theory, but this is not to slight things
as make-believe. There is nothing
more to saying that “p is true” than to
say that p, which in turn is assessed
only from the vantage of our own
theory, but this is not to slight truth as
merely relative to one of multiple and
unassailable theories.
26
THE END
27