Transcript Dual-Use-Education_a.. - University of Bradford

Dual-Use Education and Oversight
of Science and Technology
Tatyana Novossiolova
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre
University of Bradford, UK
European Union Joint Action in support of the
Biological Weapons Convention
Regional Workshop on National Implementation
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
22-24 June 2011
Outline:
A. Dual-Use Science and Biosecurity Discourse
B. Lack of Awareness among Practising Life Scientists
C. Bridging the Education Gap: Train-the-Trainer
Programme
D. The Way Forward: 7th BTWC Review Conference
A. DUAL-USE SCIENCE
AND BIOSECURITY
DISCOURSE
A.1 New Security Threats: Dual Use
• 9/11 terrorist attacks
• ‘Anthrax Letters’ Attacks –
October 2001
• US Department of Homeland
Security
• Securitisation of Public Health
• Bioterrorism
A.2 Paradigm Cases
 Mousepox experiment
 Recreation of 1918
Influenza Virus
 Artificial synthesis of
Polio Virus
 Raise ethical consideration
around the Responsible
Conduct of research
 Allowed under Laboratory
Biosecurity and Biosafety
Regulations
 Can possibly be misused
for malevolent purposes
A.3 Dual Use: the Discourse
• High-Level Review
•
Fink Report, Lemon-Relman Report, NASBB
• Funders of Life Sciences
•
Wellcome Trust, BBSRC
• Statement of Life Science Editors
• Inter-Academy Panel 2005
A.4 Dual-Use Research
‘Research that based on current understanding
can be reasonably anticipated to provide
knowledge, products, or technologies that
could be directly misapplied by others to pose
a threat to public health and safety,
agricultural crops and other plants, animals,
the environment, or material.’
(NSABB 2007)
A.5 Biosecurity
• A very recent concept that appeared in parallel with
discussions about the growing bioterrorist threat
• ‘Beyond the laboratory door biosecurity’
• The objective of the whole range of policies,
mechanisms, regulations, and initiatives including
export controls and national implementation of the
BTWC
A.6 Biosecurity and Life Sciences
• Biosecurity as a concept of a web of preventative
policies centred on the prohibition of the misuse of the
life sciences embodied in the General Purpose
Criterion of the BTWC
• A role for practising life scientists in being aware that
the knowledge they generate may be misused, and for
contributing their expertise to the development and
maintenance of preventative policies
B. LACK OF AWARENESS
AMONG PRACTISING
LIFE SCIENTISTS
B.7 Surveys of Biosecurity Awareness
• Analysis of interactive seminars conclude that there is
little evidence that life scientists:
a. regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as a
substantial threat;
b. considered that developments in life sciences
research contributed to bio-threats;
c. were aware of the current debates and concerns
about dual-use research; or
d. were familiar with the BTWC.
• Lack of biosecurity awareness requires explanation:
One possible explanation: it does not feature in their
university education.
B.8 University Education Surveys
• Survey the extent of biosecurity education in life
science degree courses in Europe using a sample of
142 courses from 57 universities in 29 countries
speaking 25 different languages.
• Results: only 3 out of 57 Universities identified in the
survey offered some form of biosecurity module and in
all cases this was optional.
• Similar results were found in surveys in Israel and in the
Asia-Pacific Region.
C. BRIDGING THE
EDUCATION GAP:
TRAIN-THE-TRAINER
PROGRAMME
C.9 Basic Elements of EMR
 21 lectures freely available online
 Video links
 Sample essay questions
 References
 Available in English, Japanese, Russian, French and
Romanian/Moldovan; soon to come in Spanish, Urdu, Polish,
Arabic, Georgian and Chinese.
http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/EducationalModuleResource/
C.10 Applied Dual-Use Biosecurity Education:
Online Distance Learning Train-the-Trainer
C.11 Learning Outcomes
To build capacity of participants to develop:
1. Knowledge & Understanding
– Review and appraise ethical/biosecurity themes and methods
relevant to dual-use
– Ability to contribute to the practical development of biosecurity.
2. Discipline Skills
– Ideas and questions relevant to assessing ethics, Organise and
synthesise dilemmas in specific dual-use issues affecting humans,
animals and plants
– Integrate dual-use biosecurity issues and concerns into their training
3. Personal Transferable Skills
– Communicate effectively in an online environment with their
colleagues and students using a range of media
C.12 Key Themes of the Course
A. The Threat of Biological
Warfare and Biological
Terrorism
B. International Prohibition
Regime
C. The Dual-Use Dilemma
D. Responsibilities of Life
Scientists
E. National Implementation
of the BTWC
F. Building an Effective Web
of Prevention
C.13 Tools: Elluminate, NING and Blackboard
• Elluminate
– Live platform for lectures
and seminars,
– Virtual classroom enabling
the interaction amongst
participants backed up by
(PPTs, Webcam, Audio
equipment)
• NING
Induction and
social
networking
platform outside
of lectures
• Blackboard
Archives of the
course: lecture
PPTs, videos,
hand books
C.14 Course Structure and Assessment
Two types of courses
1x 20 Credit Module (UK Higher Education Master’s level
credits)
 12 Lectures in 12 weeks
 12 Real-Life Expert-Level Seminars (21 scenarios available)
1x Certificated 6 Week Short Course
Assessment: 20 Credit Module
1x Essay (Individual Action Plan) 70%
1x Group Work 30%
• 2,000 words report + online presentation
C.15 Additional Questions for Action Plans
1. How is dual-use biosecurity distinct from biosafety and laboratory biosecurity?
2. What is your organisation? What advice do you receive regarding biosecurity?
What is the wording of the advice?
3. Do you have a mechanism by which you could get help if you should encounter an
issue or an experiment of dual-use concern?
4. Does your professional association require that you have an understanding of the
international CBW prohibition regimes?
5. What is your professional association? Does your professional organisation
require that you have an understanding of dual-use issues? And what
mechanisms does your association have in place to consider such issues?
C.16 Responsible Conduct of Research
 Would you be able to spot an experiment of real dual-use concern?
 Are dual-use and biosecurity policy developments being carefully
followed and are you being kept informed so that you can contribute
your expertise to finding solutions?
 Are you well informed about the national laws and regulations that
could affect your country’s obligations under the Biological Weapons
Convention.
 Are you aware of the key provisions of the Convention and of how
efforts are being made to keep it up to date with ongoing scientific
advances?
D. THE WAY FORWARD:
7TH BTWC REVIEW
CONFERENCE
D.17 Seventh BTWC Review Conference 2011
‘State parties are encouraged to inform the
Seventh Review Conference of, inter alia, any
actions, measures or other steps they may have
taken on the basis of the discussions ... in order
to facilitate...decisions on further action...’
‘State Parties should inform on their awareness-raising
activities on dual-use education in a more explicit
manner. [By doing so] those SP which are at a more
advanced stage in the implementation of their dual-use
awareness-raising and education activities would be able
to identify, and offer appropriate cooperation to, SP at a
less advanced stage in such activities.’
(Background Paper - ‘JACKSNNZ’
Prep Com Meeting
13-15 April 2011, Geneva)
D.18 Conclusion (I)
 Momentum behind the inclusion of dual-use
biosecurity/bioethics training may translate into a legallybinding obligation at the BTWC in 2011
 Online Dual-Use Applied Biosecurity/Bioethics Train-theTrainer programmes are proof of concept that life scientists
can be trained online on dual-use and can be encouraged to
assimilate dual-use into the training of others
 Biosafety training needs to be complemented by training in
biosecurity
D.19 Conclusion (II)
 Awareness raising and sustained engagement in both
biosecurity and biosafety through the creation of
international competency standards
 Life scientists need to be involved in strengthening the
BTWC as a bottom-up approach to responding to new
threats is essential
 Online education can assist in the process of awareness
raising
Thank you!
Facebook: http://tinyurl.com/bioseced
Twitter: http://twitter.com/#!/DualUseBioSec
Skype: dual.use.biosecurity
http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/